The Chinese Communist Party is about to forcibly confiscate citizens' housing
The video begins by using Guo Youcai returning to Heze to make barbecue after becoming famous and falling into debt as an example to discuss the relationship between personal ability and opportunity, and subsequently comments on whether overseas media figures such as Liang Hongda and Yuan Tengfei belong to the anti-communist camp. The main content focuses on analyzing 2026 economic data, tax policies, and commercial land renewal regulations, stating that relevant policies in places like Shanghai and Guangzhou may require commercial real estate upon expiration to pay renewal fees of no less than 70% of the benchmark floor area land price, or be reclaimed for the public interest, and further discusses future potential renewal issues for ordinary residential housing, local financial pressures, and social reactions.
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Hello friends, today is Friday, September 18, 2026. Welcome to Zhai Shanying's YouTube channel. The title is not alarmist; after listening to recent policies, you will understand what destruction looks like when a country reaches its final stage. Plunging financial data are not major topics; in a moment you will know what a major topic is.
To start off, let's relax a bit and talk about how every bit of effort brings a corresponding reward. I've talked about the 10,000-hour rule before, and it follows this same principle. Getting a reward for every bit of effort is a very important rule of the world established by the Creator. The entire human world operates according to the program set by the Creator. Only when you conform to the Creator's program—also known as conforming to logic—can you live a happy life. If you don't conform, there will be much sorrow, and at the end of life, you must make sure your efforts are not all in vain.
Everyone understands that there is a huge difference between debtors and debtors. I suppose many friends still remember that a little over a year ago, there was a kid in Heze, Shandong named Guo Youcai. He used to make barbecue and later live-streamed singing. Capital seized upon his selling points and made him immensely popular, wildly popular. At that time, online rumors said he could earn millions a month, but I thought right then that this kid was bound to finish. He rose purely on destiny and was propped up by capital; lacking the ability to steer his own destiny, he would soon collapse.
After Guo Youcai became rich through singing, he went south to open his own company, invited Zhao Yazhi to make an appearance, and was hugely popular for a time. By September 11, 2025, in less than two years, he had lost all his savings, was saddled with debts, and returned to the south square of the Heze railway station in Shandong province to continue making barbecue at the old station platform. This barbecue was vastly different from before: previously, he made barbecue to earn a bit more money and enrich himself, but now he made barbecue to pay off his debts as soon as possible. Everyone must remember this matter regarding Guo Youcai.
Sometimes I cannot go online, and I apologize, but sometimes it is truly impossible, and one must evade things for a time. You need to understand what low-profile attacks are. In recent years, everyone has heard me talk about how I am frequently attacked, and the Chinese Communist Party meticulously targets my videos and investigates my affairs. Because I use a fixed network IP here, even though I am in the UK, I frequently encounter this situation.
I have said that there are five elements to success in life: knowledge, skills, experience, character, and finally, opportunity. Knowledge, skills, experience, and character are all gained through putting in effort for rewards. Lacking these supports, even if an opportunity presents itself, you cannot seize it, and if you happen to catch it by chance, you cannot hold onto it.
Entering today's formal topic, let's first discuss the recent widespread online rumors regarding the "defection" of Liang Hongda and Yuan Tengfei. Many overseas self-media outlets claim that anti-communist big shot Liang Hongda fled to Canada and Yuan Tengfei fled to the United States, even labeling them as anti-communist figures. Both Liang Hongda and Yuan Tengfei are very talented, wealthier and more capable than I am, but I believe this claim makes a fundamental mistake.
Liang Hongda, as well as Yuan Tengfei, these two individuals have nothing whatsoever to do with being anti-communist, nor do they have anything to do with overthrowing Xi Jinping. From birth until now, in all their publicly visible remarks and statements, they have never opposed the Chinese Communist Party, let alone spoken of overthrowing Xi Jinping. The most they have ever done is critique current social ills. When Liang Hongda evaluated Lei Feng and Jiao Yulu, and when Yuan Tengfei evaluated Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, they were both discussing history from their own perspectives, which at most can be called using the past to mock the present or using historical analogies to comment on current affairs.
This is also why Yuan Tengfei has repeatedly stated publicly that he is not anti-CCP, and even got angry because people like Wenhua and Falun Gong claimed he was anti-CCP, publicly stating that he is not anti-CCP. Therefore, when many overseas media outlets discuss Yuan Tengfei and Lao Liang, one point should be noted: these two have never been anti-CCP, and they have nothing to do with being anti-CCP at all.
Why are these two so popular both inside and outside mainland China? From my perspective, it is because their rhetoric and style happen to reflect the psychological baseline of the overwhelming majority of mainland Chinese, or rather, the Little Pinks. When they criticize the Communist Party and discuss society, their starting point is just right—they never touch upon the essence of the Chinese Communist Party enslaving the people, nor do they touch upon the despicableness of Xi Jinping. They stop right at the baseline of the Little Pinks, just enough to let people vent their frustrations.
Back then, when I attended government conferences inside mainland China, back when P2P was very popular, I said that P2P are all scammers, Xiong'an is a fucking stupid project, everyone in domestic finance is a liar, and listed companies' financial reports are one hundred percent falsified. Liang Hongda and Yuan Tengfei have never said things like that to this day. I speak very bluntly and am not pleasing to people; it is normal that many people do not like me, but that is simply how I see things.
Liang Hongda has arrived in Canada, and Yuan Tengfei has arrived in the United States. They have been abroad for some time now, and they have never said a single phrase like "Down with Xi Jinping" or "Overthrow the Chinese Communist Party" in any public setting. Under these circumstances, they will continue to be liked and sympathized with by the majority of mainland Chinese, which means the Little Pinks, because many people feel they had no choice and only left to avoid the situation. Deep down, what they are doing is hoping to offer suggestions to the CCP and let the CCP carry out limited reforms on its own.
At their core, these people actually look forward to the CCP continuing to enslave them, subconsciously feeling that a life enslaved by the CCP is the best life. Therefore, they leave room for maneuver with the CCP, and even hope that one day the CCP will restart reform and opening-up on its own and return to the Jiang-Hu era. Because they have not broken up with the CCP, there is still room for them to remain popular. In the overseas Chinese self-media circle, especially the so-called anti-CCP circle, many people do this, and a large number of bloggers have been bought off by the CCP, as is the case with Wang Zhian and others.
I do not like this kind of person because they still retain deep emotional ties with the CCP, behaviorally retaining the possibility of returning to life under CCP rule. They have not used their fame and reputation to awaken more Chinese people, nor have they shouldered the obligations that a true member of the Chinese and Huaxia nations should undertake to make everyone understand the truth about the CCP.
Truly influential people must at the very least state clearly that the Chinese Communist Party is a rogue dictatorial party that has deprived the entire country and its people of all wealth, that it is essentially a slave master enslaving the people of mainland China, that its crimes committed against the people of mainland China are too numerous to record, and that it has persecuted tens of millions of Chinese people to death. What perspective you stand on determines everything—where you sit determines your head, and your position and attitude decide everything.
The most terrifying thing about Chinese people is not that their bodies are enslaved, but that they have already regarded themselves as slaves in their hearts and have no idea what a normal human being is. The logic and content spoken of by many media outlets are all meant to cater to the massive number of Chinese people who hope that slave masters can optimize things and continue living under slave-master rule. They have never thought of switching to a social system built on freedom and democracy like Japan or Taiwan, and they do not want to let themselves live like human beings—they are all willing to be slaves.
Therefore, no matter how famous these people are or how high their level is, I will look down on them for the rest of my life. I like a tough person. I feel that these people do not have a shred of the moral backbone that intellectuals and cultured people of the Huaxia nation should have. True is true, and false is false; why blur the lines? I practice natural Chan Buddhism, and I cannot tolerate any sand in my eyes.
Lao Liang and Yuan Tengfei are very talented, but I really dislike them. They have nothing to do with opposing the CCP or overthrowing Xi Jinping; the labels on them were all slapped on by those overseas influencers who try to boost their heat and chase traffic. I feel that including some people, although what they talk about might not necessarily be the same, some people have great character and are worthy of respect. My channel has always had a small number of people precisely because I speak bluntly, but my values and worldview are very important.
Growing up, I was also brainwashed by the CCP, once firmly believed in the CCP, and even scolded the CCP inside mainland China. But the scolding back then was different from now; at that time, I hadn't seen through its essence. It was only after going overseas that I completely saw through the essence of the CCP, knowing that the CCP is despicable, shameless, and devoid of bottom lines. Later, after spending more than five years overseas and experiencing countless events, I eventually almost severed ties with all overseas democratic movement organizations because I do not like opportunism, money-making, and utilitarianism.
I feel that the only biggest driving factor for the collapse of mainland China right now is the interior of the Chinese Communist Party. Problems will inevitably arise within this interior. Only after the Chinese Communist Party splits into pieces, and the various fragmented systems find that they must rely on the strength of Western civilized nations to regroup, will I have the opportunity to enter a new country and exert my own strength. Whoever has correct values and worldview, I like; if their values are incorrect, I absolutely do not like them.
Many overseas self-media outlets use being anti-CCP as a label to make money from Chinese people, and everything they talk about is full of套路 and subscriber-attracting tricks, making it impossible for me to think highly of them. The above is just my frank speech and does not affect everyone's independent judgment. High-brow music finds few followers, and that is normal.
Next, I will talk about CCP policies. In September, official economic data for August was released successively, showing another downward trend all the way, with many indicators breaking historical worst records. Finance is extremely terrible, credit contraction has reached a historically high level, the urban unemployment rate has risen, and the youth unemployment rate increased by 1% month-on-month in a single month. The urban unemployment rate does not even include the vast rural areas, and cities already look very grim.
Fixed asset investment continues to decline rapidly, social financing data shows almost no growth, bank bad debts have hit record highs and are soaring, and non-performing loan write-off records have also broken historical highs. The CCP has no other options; major state-owned banks lack capital, so the Ministry of Finance has to continue issuing 300 billion yuan in special treasury bonds to replenish their capital. Last year, the Ministry of Finance just issued 520 billion yuan in special treasury bonds to replenish capital for major banks, and now it is rushing to issue another 300 billion yuan. China's major banks are in such a miserable state, and bad debts have reached such a level, that the economy is naturally impossible to look at.
I used to talk about accidents often, because there were too many of them—fires, incidents, and deaths every day. Now I don't want to talk about them anymore, because everything is an accident. I also don't want to talk about the economy anymore, because every record is the worst in history; there is no 'worst,' only 'worse.' One of the most popular topics on Bilibili this month is 'Stop worrying about sabotage by foreign forces; first see if you can survive yourself.' Behind this topic is the reality that more and more Chinese people are immediately facing a situation where they cannot survive.
In a situation where the people are struggling to make a living, the CCP has adopted many strict policies. For example, it requires audits and strict inspections of various corporate taxes and back taxes, extending the retroactive period for tax collection and fines from five years to twenty years; all revoked or cancelled enterprises are subject to re-audit; and historical overseas investment records of enterprises and residents are also being audited more strictly, with the audit period extended from five years to twenty years.
The Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration jointly issued Document No. 28 of 2026, stipulating that starting November 1, the 'Administrative Measures for the Withholding and Remittance of Value-Added Tax (VAT) by Domestic Entities for Natural Persons' will be enforced nationwide. Regardless of the entity, including individual businesses, as long as they settle expenses with non-contracted employees and generate VAT, the paying entity is the statutory VAT withholding agent. The paying entity must directly withhold and pay the VAT, not just income tax.
For example, if a restaurant owner, Zhang San, asks his nephew, Li Si, to design the restaurant's VI, brand logo, visual effects, and menu plan, and agrees to pay Li Si 50,000 yuan in labor fees. In the past, when Li Si received the 50,000 yuan, the tax payment had nothing to do with the restaurant; Li Si would pay the tax himself under the name of labor income. After the policy is implemented, before the restaurant pays the labor fee to Li Si, it must forcibly deduct VAT, urban construction tax, education surtax, local education surtax, and personal income tax. If a contract is signed, stamp duty must also be paid. If the restaurant does not deduct these taxes, it will bear joint liability for tax evasion and be subject to penalties. After the 50,000 yuan is deducted, Li Si will receive at most a little over 30,000 yuan.
Over the years, everyone has become accustomed to the constant 'harvesting of leeks' through taxes and social security. But the focus today is not on harvesting leeks, but on the whole population having their leek roots dug out. Today's theme is: if you own a house in the People's Republic of China, whether you live in it or not, as long as the house is in your name, your life may have already undergone a major change.
Currently, the People's Republic of China has clearly announced implementation in three places: Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Jiangxi. More than ten provinces have already formulated and are preparing to announce local regulations named 'Administrative Measures for the Renewal of Commercial Land Use Rights' or 'Work Guidance Opinions.' These are local regulations; they are not optional to execute, but are laws and regulations, and refusal to execute them is an illegal act.
Places that have already issued relevant regulations are all areas with better economies, and they have one thing in common: they target the renewal of commercial land use rights. Most commercial real estate in China has a 40-year property right, and a small portion has 50 years. According to the Civil Code, residential real estate is automatically renewed upon expiration, while commercial real estate is not. Therefore, local governments have issued relevant regulations. The relevant income belongs to the local government, so each region sets its own rules.
According to these regulations, there are two situations for commercial real estate: one is that renewal is allowed, and the other is that it cannot be renewed. Commercial real estate that is allowed to be renewed is not free; hotels, restaurants, office buildings, and commercial-residential properties must all pay renewal fees according to standards. The renewal fee is no less than 70% of the floor base land price at the time of expiration, and there is no clear upper limit, which could reach 200%.
The reason for not being able to renew is that the local government determines that it is not suitable for renewal based on social public interest, and directly reclaims the land. What constitutes social public interest and what constitutes a violation of social public interest is not defined by judicial interpretation or detailed description in local regulations. For example, the announcement document in Shanghai states that social public interest is determined by the management committee of each district based on the actual situation of the project, which means it is determined artificially by the management committee.
Therefore, if you bought a commercial property, regardless of its use, including commercial-residential properties, as long as the property deed has a 40-year or 50-year term, you may face this situation: after the house expires, it will not be renewed due to social public interest needs. The house will be gone, the government will reclaim it without compensation, and you will not be given a single cent.
The premise for being allowed to renew and not being forcibly reclaimed is to pay the corresponding renewal fee in full within the prescribed time limit, with the amount being no less than 70% of the floor base land price set by the government that year. In 2026, the floor base land price for commercial land in different areas of Shanghai is 36,670 yuan per square meter for the first tier, 29,790 yuan for the second tier, 21,030 yuan for the third tier, and 16,780 yuan for the fourth tier.
If you have a 100-square-meter house in Shanghai, whether it is a hotel, residence, restaurant, or other use, after the 40-year term expires, calculated at the lowest fourth tier, 16,780 yuan multiplied by 100 square meters, and then multiplied by 70%, is about 1.1746 million yuan. If paid at 100% of the first tier, it is 3.667 million yuan. If you cannot pay on time, it will be reclaimed, you will be forcibly evicted, and the government may even auction off the house.
What is more important is that after paying the fees, the renewal period is determined by each district government itself, required to be greater than or equal to 5 years, and possibly 10 years, but less than 40 years. In other words, paying 1.17 million RMB or 3.667 million RMB might only get you a renewal of 5 or 10 years, after which you will have to pay again according to the floor price at that time after it has increased. If you do not pay, it will still be forcibly reclaimed.
According to the "Measures for the Administration of Revenues and Expenditures from the Assignment of State-owned Land Use Rights," these renewal fees belong to the local government's financial revenue and do not need to be turned over to the central government's finance. Local governments are generally short of money, so they will find ways to obtain revenue from land finance. Places with relatively sufficient financial revenue, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, have already stipulated that it shall not be less than 70%, and places with larger financial gaps may have even higher standards.
Some people say that this is just commercial real estate and has nothing to do with ordinary people. But in the early days of reform and opening up, the commercial real estate system came first, and ordinary residential housing only came after 1980. Legal housing in China mainly consists of ordinary residential housing and commercial-residential mixed-use housing. Ordinary residential housing has a 70-year property right with automatic renewal, while commercial residential housing has a 40-year property right, which requires approval for renewal. Once the renewal rules for commercial residential housing are established, they may become a reference for formulating renewal rules for ordinary residential housing in the future.
Currently, no local government has issued relevant regulations for ordinary residential housing because the residential land starting from 1980 will only begin to have renewal issues after 2050. According to China's land use right assignment revenue and expenditure rules, both commercial real estate and residential renewal conveyance fees belong to the local government, and the law does not allow a major difference in renewal fees between the two. Therefore, the future renewal fee for ordinary residential housing being no less than 70% of the floor benchmark price is basically a likely standard, and places with poorer economies might even reach 80% or 90%。
Shanghai's residential floor benchmark land price for 2026 sets the first tier at 52,600 RMB per square meter, the second tier at 44,800 RMB, the third tier at 37,200 RMB, and the fourth tier at 29,140 RMB. Even the fourth tier is close to 30,000 RMB. If an apartment worth 1 million RMB is renewed according to the standard when it expires, it may cost millions of RMB. Many people are still carrying decades of mortgages, and after painstakingly paying off the loans, the property might be close to its renewal date, yet they lack the ability to pay the renewal fees again.
The service life of a house follows the service life of the land, and is not recalculated from the time the homebuyer obtains the property ownership certificate. The service life of the land starts when the developer and the local government sign the land assignment contract and acquire the land. Land ownership belongs to the state, and the developer only rents the land. After renting it, they build houses and sell them to residents. Residents are actually also renting the land, which is why the issue of expiration and renewal arises.
If a developer acquired the commercial land assignment rights in 1990, the commercial real estate might expire by 2030. The Jinmao Mansion in the East Fourth Ring of Beijing has both residential and commercial-residential properties, where the commercial-residential part belongs to commercial real estate. Homebuyers can check with the relevant land or real estate transaction institutions in Chaoyang District to see how many years are left before the property expires. For commercial-residential housing in Beijing's first-tier cities, if there are no millions of RMB for renewal, the property may no longer belong to the individual.
Residential housing is relatively better. Land acquired in 1990 may not expire until 2050 or 2060, but commercial-residential mixed-use properties exist in large numbers. Among the houses built in Hangzhou, about 25% are commercial-residential in nature. When buying second-hand houses, especially old commercial-residential ones, one must check the land use period. If the house has already been used for 35 years, it will need to be renewed in five years, and the homebuyer may not necessarily have the ability to pay the fees. The better the location of the house, the higher the floor land price, and the higher the renewal fee may be.
The logic of land, houses, and local finance is that the land belongs to the state, and the local government leases the land to developers and residents for different periods. Whether continued leasing is allowed after expiration, how many years it is leased for, and how much fee is collected are determined by relevant regulations. If the local government's financial revenue is insufficient, it will rely on land finance again. In 2026, financial expenditures in all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions across the country may be higher than financial revenue, and local governments need to find sources of revenue by themselves.
Not many people are currently affected by this policy because there were fewer commercial real estate projects before 1990, and the number of commercial projects needing renewal starting in 2030 is not yet large, so it will not immediately form a noticeable social impact. There was no ordinary residential housing before 1980, and there will be no large-scale residential renewals in 2030 either, but twenty years later, the physical sensation will be very obvious.
Some people ask whether such a massive policy will trigger a popular uprising. I do not think so. The CCP has repeatedly tested the Chinese people through policies in the past such as the Cultural Revolution, family planning, zero-COVID policy, increasing social security contribution years and funding, and not a single event has formed a wave of opposition. In Wu Ying's illegal fundraising case, the victims' claims have still not received corresponding compensation; the China Eastern Airlines crash caused hundreds of deaths, and to this day there is still no complete explanation; the rural bank incidents in Henan and Fujian caused hundreds of thousands of people to suffer, yet no large-scale protests were formed.
The changes in social security and tax policies for more than 200 million flexible workers in 2026, pension policies, the prohibition of credit refinancing and loan renewal policies, strict control over exit policies, and the exit restrictions implemented on September 15 all failed to form large-scale protests. The compulsory enforcement of the new national standard for e-bikes forced many people to replace their vehicles, yet no large-scale protests appeared. In the eyes of the CCP, ordinary people are slaves to be tossed around however they like.
Right now, many people carry heavy debts, and any income exceeding basic survival needs is quickly transferred away, and some even reach the point of jumping into rivers, leaping from buildings, or committing suicide, without forming collective action. Therefore, the method I give you is that those who have the conditions must escape. Domestically, you are only an individual and cannot form true people's power.
The various laws and regulations introduced in 2026 show what can be called miscellaneous taxes and levies: every penny that can be scraped from every locality is being scraped, and every fee that can be collected is being collected. In the real estate sector, there are policies such as the original-site demolition and reconstruction of dilapidated housing, the installation of elevators in buildings with four or more floors, the housing voucher system, and the taxation of second-hand housing based on local property assessment values. Although the names differ, the underlying goal is to get money.
In the past, it was called demolition and relocation, and the government had to provide compensation when tearing down houses. Now, it has been changed to original-site demolition and reconstruction, which allows residents to bear the costs themselves without having to expand housing areas according to the old relocation methods. Dilapidated housing renovation, elevator installation, and the housing voucher system may all lead to residents bearing more costs. It does not matter what the policy is called; what matters is the logic behind it.
Some people in the comments section say that the Civil Code stipulates that residential land use rights are automatically renewed upon expiration and that the renewal fee is very low. I think this is misleading. The Civil Code only stipulates that residential land use rights are automatically renewed upon expiration; it does not stipulate that the renewal fee for all residences is very low. The existence of exemptions in the law does not mean that renewal fees are generally low. What Shanghai released is the work guidance on the renewal of land use rights for industrial and commercial projects; the 40-year and 50-year property rights for commercial-residential housing and commercial-residential apartments all fall within the scope of commercial land or industrial and commercial projects.
It is not that commercial real estate cannot be renewed, but that it is divided into two types: those that cannot be renewed and those that are allowed to be renewed. Being allowed to be renewed is not the same as the automatic renewal of residential land use rights, and the renewal fees and terms are still determined by local rules. The term "old, broken, and small" is just a colloquialism; there is no clear legal definition for it, and one cannot use this vague concept to muddy the waters.
People born in the CCP-ruled country receive very few subsidies compared to neighboring countries, and many places even delay their distribution; income and treatment are not proportional to labor input; the relative level of wages and prices is very low, pollution is severe, and there are many problems such as antibiotics, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, waste incineration, and the disposal of waste lithium batteries, and the gap between income and taxes is also very large. Education does not teach logic, only dialectical materialism, which is why many people cannot see the logic behind the policies.
Recently, some people said that a person named London KJ was beaten around midnight at Piccadilly Circus in London, and also claimed that someone tried to rob his watch but failed, and the relevant content made international news. This account was previously beaten during live broadcasts in Italy and Paris in 2024 and 2025, respectively, and both times claimed that someone provoked him and tried to rob his watch but failed, and that after being injured, he called the police but they did not care, and finally claimed that only the Chinese police are the most reliable. I think these claims are not credible. Piccadilly Circus is a bustling area in London and also a key patrol area for the police; it is impossible for similar situations to occur every time and get the same result.
Regarding the Nanjing Massacre, I think historical materials should be consulted. On November 30, 1937, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone estimated that the population remaining in the urban area of Nanjing was less than 200,000. Originally, Nanjing had about 1 million people, but most of the population had left due to war and fleeing. The US, German, and British embassies and consulates all had personnel evacuation records, which can correspond to the data of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone.
In December 1937, the Japanese army entered Nanjing. During the Battle of Nanking, public data on the number of Kuomintang troops participating in the war was about 70,000 to 100,000. From December 16 to 31, 1937, and early January 1938, international embassies, consulates, and international relief agencies had relevant statistics. The International Relief Committee estimated in January 1938 that the Safety Zone accommodated about 250,000 refugees. With less than 200,000 people left before the war and 250,000 people accommodated in the Safety Zone after the war, the claim of 300,000 deaths needs to be cross-checked with population, number of combatants, records of international organizations, and evidence of corpses.
I think some narratives only cite individual testimonies and one-sided figures while excluding materials from international organizations. Historical data should correspond to pre-war population, wartime population, post-war accommodation numbers, participating troops, and death tolls one by one; one cannot determine the figures based on a single sentence. Regarding the specific figures of the Nanjing Massacre, one should consult the materials of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, the International Relief Committee, the US and British embassies and consulates, and the Kuomintang.
As for the Siege of Changchun, which caused a large number of deaths due to starvation, there are population and historical data from before and after the siege. The CCP side also admits that people starved to death in Changchun, but there is a dispute over whether the number was 260,000 or over 300,000. For all historical issues, one should check the materials, speak the facts, and reason.
Today, let's talk about Xi Jinping's physical condition again. According to the information I have, Xi Jinping did go to the 305 Hospital for a check-up, but he did not have a stroke, nor did he have any major physical problems that have been confirmed. However, objectively, there are factors in his body that could lead to major problems; minor problems can be handled by medicine now, but if a stroke or similar situation occurs, it would be a major problem.
Xi Jinping's current state is one of trepidation and sleeplessness, always worrying that someone wants to harm him and that someone will rush into his sleeping quarters to kill him. He has been arresting people for a long time and has also been living in fear for a long time. The CCP will inevitably split, and if something happens to Xi Jinping, the factional infighting within the CCP will become more intense.
Internal struggles within the CCP are extremely complex; there are parties within the party, factions outside the party, and no party or faction, all sorts of strange things, and the struggles between factions are fierce. If Xi Jinping dies, it is not certain that anyone will be able to succeed him smoothly. After Yuan Shikai died, warlords carved up the country, and various presidents changed like a revolving door; the problem was that no one could hold power stably for a long time. After Xi Jinping dies, anyone could come to power, but anyone could also step down due to internal fighting.
Beijing 305 Hospital was once the place where Zhou Enlai was hospitalized. It is relatively close to Zhongnanhai. Beijing 301 Hospital mainly serves leaders at or above the ministerial level, and the core medical level of 305 Hospital is also very high. Commercial-residential properties usually have a term of 40 years, while residential properties have 70 years. Renewal fees and land use rights issues will continue to affect many people in the future.
Everyone can look up the guiding opinions on the renewal of commercial land use rights by themselves. The highest-quality Class A projects that are allowed to be renewed must also pay a fee no less than 70% of the floor area land price. The current situation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is very bad, and this year is particularly bad. In the next episode, I will discuss what kind of situation would emerge if Xi Jinping experiences a major upheaval. That is all for today.