Xi Jinping Wants to Enter 301 Hospital to Avoid Reckoning, But Hu Jintao Won't Let Him! The Third Anniversary of Li Keqiang's Death Coincides with the Plenary Session, and Zeng Qinghong Has Run Out of Options 【Jiang Feng Vision 20260925 Episode 497】

This episode provides a detailed analysis of Xi Jinping's visit to the United States and the severe political situation he faces ahead of the Fifth Plenary Session upon returning to Beijing. The discussion explores the covert struggles among various factions—including Zeng Qinghong, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao—over the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as well as the accountability for Li Keqiang, while reviewing the remaining four cards in Xi Jinping's hand and his ultimate political fate.

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On the evening of September 23 at Joint Base Andrews, Old Xi's special plane touched down. As the door opened, he walked down alongside his wife, his right hand tightly gripping the handrail of the boarding stairs, while his left hand pressed heavily onto his wife for support as he pushed downward with all his might. Both of them kept their heads down with both hands fully occupied, unable to spare even a single hand to wave to the crowd below. Against this very physical state, the two factions in Beijing were plotting completely opposite calculations against him. Zeng Qinghong's camp wanted him to check into the 301 Hospital, laying out a interlocking stratagem for Old Xi. The first link involved altering the charges against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli to forming cliques and taking bribes; whether these charges were rubber-stamped or overturned at the plenary session, they would not implicate Old Xi himself. If the first link failed, there was a second link: having him check into the 301 Hospital due to illness. Once a person lay down inside, a single mention of health reasons at the plenary session would bring the case to a close with no one else having to shoulder the responsibility. Hu Chunhao, on the other hand, sought to investigate the case of Li Keqiang, holding whoever was implicated accountable until someone was left standing to give an accounting. If Xi lay down inside the 301 Hospital and couldn't come back out, the investigation would stall at the level of Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, never reaching him again. The ultimate decision on whether to send him into the 301 Hospital rested with Hu Jintao, since the military answered to him. Four years ago, Hu had been escorted out of the venue in full view of the public; this time, he was precisely the one refusing to let Old Xi hide inside the 301 Hospital. As for Old Xi himself, he had long ceased to fear stepping down—what he wanted precisely was the 301 Hospital. Descending the stairs at Andrews in that manner was his way of handing over the pretext of retiring due to health reasons of his own accord. Old Xi's face was round and swollen, with his eye bags bulging into two distinct puffs, all of which Trump saw clearly. Trump would have preferred Old Xi to remain in power indefinitely, but he also kept a fallback option. Notice this trade truce: last year's Busan round granted a full year, but this time only two months were given, extending to January 10 next year—just enough time to see through the Fifth Plenary Session. Two days before boarding the plane, he played the biggest card in his hand, using whether or not to visit the United States as a bargaining chip in exchange for expelling Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the Party. This was a zero-sum exchange, and the opposing side took away far more than he received. On September 26, Old Xi returned to Beijing with four cards remaining in his hand, none of which could survive the plenary session. Today's episode first covers that trade on September 21—what he gained and what he lost—then counts the four cards remaining in his hand upon returning to Beijing, and finally looks at what calculations the three sides are making at the Fifth Plenary Session. To put it bluntly, we are looking at just one thing: whether Old Xi can take a seat on the presidium stage of the plenary session and whether he can stay until the end.

First, let's talk about his face. Doctors call this a moon face, which only happens to people who take steroids long-term; it's not something you get from a thirteen-hour flight. When he came to Washington for a state visit in 2015, the area under his eyes was flat. When he met Trump this May, his eye bags were bulging, and this time, his face was so swollen that his chin and neck were blended together. Then there are his hands. On August 30th in Kyrgyzstan and September 2nd in Egypt, plus this time, every time he descended the stairs, he grabbed the railing with one hand and clutched his wife's hand with the other; this is because one side of his body is weak. The stroke that was rumored outside the Great Firewall in July 2024 left him with this condition; he has to use both hands just to go down a step. Why did he have to come? Because two days before boarding the plane, he made a deal with Beijing. Zeng Qinghong's faction was even more anxious than he was, and the most anxious of all was Wang Yi, who is in charge of diplomacy; they would carry Xi Jinping onto the plane if they had to. This trip is a return visit following Trump's trip to Beijing in May. The top leader of China hasn't been to the U.S. for a state visit in eleven years. If he suddenly said he wasn't going, the whole world would ask what happened in Beijing. More importantly, the China-U.S. relationship was ruined by Xi himself. If Xi doesn't go and Hu Chunhua comes to power and investigates how the China-U.S. relationship went bad, Wang Yi and the entire diplomatic system will have to take the blame. If the conservative faction still wants to keep control of diplomacy, they have to let Xi go to Washington himself to repair the relationship. The more desperate the other side is, the more valuable his presence becomes; this card must be played. On September 21st, he moved the Politburo meeting up. At the meeting, he only wanted one thing: to expel Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the Party, because the military hates Xi to the core over the Zhang and Liu affair. Xi is afraid that if Hu Chunhua comes to power at the Fifth Plenary Session, the military will come back to settle scores with him. He wants to use the fact that they are still begging him to get on the plane to make the expulsion of Zhang and Liu a settled case that no one can overturn. The conservative faction agreed. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were originally their people; they traded their own people in exchange for Xi stepping down obediently at the Fifth Plenary Session. Although the reformist faction and the military do not recognize this handling, the Politburo is mostly composed of Xi's and the conservative faction's people. Wen Jiabao's side, of course, also made a demand. At the same meeting, they passed the changes for the Party secretaries of six provinces in one go. The announcements were released over two days; on the 22nd, they released the three remote western provinces first, and on the morning of the 23rd, they suddenly and unexpectedly threw out Anhui, Henan, and Fujian. A few hours after the release, the top leader's special plane took off from Beijing that afternoon. They didn't release it early or late, but specifically a few hours before he boarded the plane; this is a transaction of payment upon delivery. The secretaries of the six provinces had to be signed off by Xi as the Party leader. The Zhang and Liu case was the goods he wanted, and these six provincial secretaries were the payment he made.

Old Xi has lost everything in this round, dropping the provincial party secretaries of Tibet, Anhui, and Fujian in one fell swoop, and even failing to secure the position of governor of Henan. Qinghai went to Wen Jiabao's people, and Gansu went to the conservatives. Several factions sat around the table dividing the meat, and only Old Xi's family was cutting its own flesh. The most brilliant move was regarding Fujian Secretary Zhou Zuyi. Zhou Zuyi is a favorite of the Fujian faction with Zhao Leji backing him from behind. Since the elders' faction could not take him down on the spot, they simply moved him to another place, transferring him from Fujian to Henan, a province with a population of 100 million, giving him plenty of face. However, Henan is the old base where Li Keqiang started and deeply cultivated back in the day. Once Zhou Zuyi arrived there, he was completely in the dark, and on the very same day, Wang Lujin was assigned as the governor of Henan to match him. Wang is a man of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, specially assigned to keep an eye on him from the side. As soon as Zhou Zuyi left, Fujian, Old Xi's base camp, had the power of life and death over the selection of delegates to the upcoming 21st Party Congress completely change hands. Zhao Long, who succeeded him as Fujian secretary, is a connection of the elder Yu Zhengsheng. Look at the three who were replaced: Wang Junzheng of Tibet, Liang Yanshun of Anhui, and Liu Ning of Henan. When the official press release came out, they didn't even leave the fig leaf of "awaiting another assignment," and didn't write down their destinations. Look at past precedents and you will understand everything. After Zhejiang's Yi Lianhong was relieved of his duties, he was first stuffed into the National People's Congress to hang around in an idle post, and a few months later the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) directly announced his investigation and prosecution. Also, Ma Xingrui stepped down as Xinjiang secretary last July, and the press release still said he was awaiting another assignment, but he was only given the post of deputy leader of the Central Rural Work Leading Group. This position was never even made public, and it is rumored that he was taken away by Li Xi's people last November. On April 3 this year, the CCDI officially announced his investigation. Writing that they are awaiting another assignment still leads to this end: first strip them of local real power, put them on the cold bench of the National People's Congress to air out, and wait for the investigation team to cut away the periphery before slapping on the handcuffs at any time. The ones replaced this time didn't even have those four words. Even if they receive an honorary post in the National People's Congress in a few days, that is still entering the waiting room for trial. All of this was finished before he boarded the plane, but there is still one person in this transaction whom you might not have thought of, and that person is Old Xi's wife. Recently, rumors were flying outside that Madam Peng, because of her involvement in the suspicious case of former Premier Li Keqiang, was held down in Beijing by the elders' faction for a full two years without being allowed to step a foot out of the country. Well, how come once the months of August and September stepped in, visits to Central Asia, Egypt, and the United States were all cleared one after another? Just count how many people are left behind Madam Peng: Ma Xingrui, the vanguard of the Shandong faction, is already in. On August 20, Yang Xinsheng, the county party secretary of Yuncheng, Madam Peng's hometown, was taken away while in office. This time, the official press release didn't even write down the destinations for Tibet's Wang Junzheng and Anhui's Liang Yanshun. These are all prominent generals of the Shandong faction who have been registered outside in recent years. Former Hubei Secretary Wang Zhonglin had rumors outside for a long time that his family's crony relations extended to the core circle of Peng's office, and this person is now also idling in the National People's Congress. In the past, holding her back and not letting her move, using Li Keqiang's case as an excuse, actually stemmed from the fear that she would offer bad advice from the pillow. At that time, the Shandong faction was spread across major provinces, and if Madam took a couple of pillow talks, people below really dared to risk their official posts to sell their lives. But what about now? Looking around, the confidants promoted by Madam are being removed or arrested as they should be. Who is left for her to operate through even if she gives advice? At this time, letting her follow the special plane to foreign countries to walk the red carpet does not hinder the elders' faction at all. Take a closer look at what Madam is wearing this time. Over the past decade, whenever she went abroad, which time was not a meticulously matched Chinese-style magnificent dress? With cameras chasing her, her spotlight was no less than Old Xi's. What about this time? Getting off the plane she was in a drab grey robe, and on the balcony of the White House she changed into a dark blue mandarin-collar top, wearing only a single brooch and a pair of pearl earrings. This plain outfit was worn for the elders to see. As we said earlier, the conservatives are taking Zhang and Liu to force Old Xi to step down honestly, and Madam's outfit is saying this sentence on behalf of Old Xi: we have taken back the pomp, and after this trip we admit defeat.

Looking back at the Zhang-Liu case that Xi Jinping was desperate to push through, was it really a solid case? Just look at the charges in the September 21st announcement: being disloyal to the Party, forming cliques, and accepting huge sums of money. You have to remember, when Zhang and Liu were first arrested, the loudest cry from the military newspaper was that they had severely trampled upon and undermined the system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission assuming full responsibility. Yet, by the September 21st announcement, not even a punctuation mark of that charge remained. To expel a Politburo member, such as Zhang Youxia, the Politburo must first make a decision and then take it to a Central Committee plenary session, where it must be ratified by a two-thirds majority to complete the procedure. If the charges were written in black and white as trampling on the Chairman of the Central Military Commission's responsibility system, the case would be completely tied to the face of the top leader. If the plenary session ratified it, fine; but if the political winds shifted and the votes were insufficient, effectively overturning the case against Zhang and Liu, it would mean that over two hundred Central Committee members had declared that the top leader had framed a high-ranking general for a major crime, and he would be shattered on the spot. Now, Zeng Qinghong has dismantled this fuse for him by changing the charges to the common ones of forming cliques and taking bribes. If the plenary session ratifies it, it shows that Zhang and Liu were corrupt; if it doesn't, it's just a mistake in the accounting investigation below. Either way, the fire cannot be directed at the top leader. This is the chain of schemes Zeng Qinghong has laid out for him: the first link is to downgrade the charges to ordinary corruption and push them through the plenary session. If it succeeds, great; if it fails, there is still a firewall between the fire and the Dragon Throne. If the first link explodes at the plenary session, and Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and the veteran military generals press step by step, then they will say he has fallen ill, carry him into 301 Hospital, and announce his medical retirement. He would keep his nominal status and benefits, but hand over all real power, and the case would be closed. These two links together boil down to four words: surrender power to save your life. How could the top leader not understand this trick? He knows it better than anyone. Using the second link to surrender power in exchange for his life is the only path he can take. When this top leader drags his exhausted body back to Beijing, what exactly is left beneath his Dragon Throne?

On September 26th, the special plane landed back in Beijing. Let us count how many cards he has left in his hand and how long each one can last. The first card is whether he is willing to resign on his own. What can he get in exchange for playing this card? The plenary session would only write a single sentence agreeing to his resignation for health reasons, with no charges mentioned. But if he waits for others to force him out, they will have to write down what mistakes he committed. Then, there is the matter of his family's arrangements—benefits, security, and housing—and finally, the fact that his ideology is still enshrined in the Party Constitution. These are the three things, but there is no guarantee that the investigation into Li Keqiang's case won't reach him. Look at Zhou Yongkang; he retired and lived peacefully for over a year, only to be thrown into Qincheng Prison and sentenced to life imprisonment. Moreover, even these three things depend on Wen Jiabao's approval, because the agenda for how the plenary session's decision is written is arranged by Wen Jiabao. Therefore, before the plenary session opens, he can still bargain over whether to resign and how; once the session opens, it is no longer up to him to decide how things proceed. Why didn't he resign earlier? Because once he plays that card, he loses the title of Party leader, and that title is currently his main shield. Therefore, he can only hold onto this card and try to negotiate the best price possible. The second card is that he is still nominally the Party leader and can still convene Politburo meetings. The meeting on September 21st was nominally convened by him. With his own people in the Politburo plus the conservative faction, they were already the majority. Can he return from the United States and convene another Politburo meeting to take further action? But for the Politburo to meet, the elders must give their nod. The meeting on September 21st was successful because the elders needed something from him: the conservatives wanted him to board the plane, and Wen Jiabao wanted him to sign off on replacing the Party secretaries of six provinces. If he wants to convene a Politburo meeting this time, there is only one thing left that the conservatives want to get from Xi: his own resignation. If Xi were to convene another Politburo meeting, it would likely be to discuss how he himself should step down.

The third card is the propaganda loudspeaker hanging on the wall. Theoretically, before the plenary session, this loudspeaker was the best tool to build momentum for him. But the problem is that this loudspeaker fails to make a sound when it is supposed to. Look at this trip to Washington: before his departure, not a single major US newspaper published an exclusive interview with him. Back in 2015, on the very day he set off, the Wall Street Journal published his written interview. This time around, however, he couldn't even knock on the doors of major US newspapers, so People’s Daily had to send its own reporters to a small town called Muscatine in Iowa. In 1985, when he was still the county party secretary of Zhengding in Hebei, leading a delegation there to study grain cultivation and pig raising, he stayed in a local family's home for a few days. This time, People’s Daily sought out those old friends from back then. The loudspeaker outside the wall that was supposed to blow the wind for him had an even more miserable fate, getting slapped in the face three times in a row. First, it leaked that if the US did not withdraw its arms sales to Taiwan, he would not go. As a result, on the day he boarded the plane, not a single arms sale was withdrawn, and Old Xi boarded the plane anyway. Second, it leaked that he was going to take a large group of entrepreneurs to spread money around, but in the end, he didn't bring a single one. Third, early in the morning on September 22, it leaked that Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Shengmin had been taken away from his home. That same morning, when Xinhua News Agency released its list, Zhang Shengmin appeared at the opening ceremony of the 90th anniversary exhibition of the Long March. Once the plenary session is over, whatever the communique says, Xinhua News Agency has to read it. By that day, what these loudspeakers will be reading is a script written by someone else. The fourth card is the mere handful of head-count votes left belonging to the Fujian clique. Overseas independent media calculated the accounts for the Central Committee members at the end of July: reformers account for about 40 percent, conservatives about 40 percent, and Old Xi at most 20 percent of the votes. But out of this 20 percent, those truly willing to fight a desperate battle to the death for him, counting every single one, are just Cai Qi, He Lifeng, Wang Xiaohong, plus a few others; the rest are all fence-sitters who sway with the wind. When the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued an order in August, every single Central Committee member and alternate member had to pass a review, and this meager 20 percent is being shaved off piece by piece. The most crucial voting threshold at the plenary session is two-thirds; to block a matter, one must hold 34 percent of the votes. Old Xi has at most 20 percent of the votes, so he cannot block motions put forward by the reformers. To get things done at the plenary session, his votes are even less sufficient. His 20 percent plus the conservatives' 40 percent only equals 60 percent. Having just watched the leadership of six provinces get reshuffled, with Central Committee members whose three party secretaries didn't even have their future destinations written down, who would dare to step forward and block bullets for him at the plenary session? By October 26, it is unknown whether this 20 percent plus the conservatives' 40 percent will even add up to a total of 60 percent. If it's even less than 60 percent, don't even think about passing the cases of Zhang and Liu, and blocking Li Keqiang's case will be nearly impossible. Calculate it however you like, not a single one of these four cards is useful at the plenary session.

The Fifth Plenary Session is scheduled to open on October 26th. October 27th falls right within the session, marking the third anniversary of Li Keqiang's death. This can only mean one thing: someone intends to put the death of Li Keqiang back on the table in front of all the Central Committee members. According to overseas independent media, Hu Chunhua might propose a motion at the plenary session, requesting the session to authorize the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the case of Comrade Li Keqiang. Whoever opposes this would be seen as blocking the investigation into a former Premier, a label no one can afford to bear. Therefore, if more than half of the conservative faction's voting base defects, the case of Li Keqiang will be established, and the firewall that Zeng Qinghong built for him during the Zhang-Liu case will be rendered useless. The ones most uneasy now are Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi—these four conservative members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although they raised their hands to handle the Zhang-Liu case on September 21st, they were protecting the system from collapsing and ensuring they wouldn't be implicated; they were never trying to protect Xi Jinping. What they fear most is that once the Li Keqiang case is opened, the list for liquidation will move upward, and after the Fujian Gang, it will be their turn. Under these circumstances, the conservative faction can only choose to have Xi Jinping enter the 301 Hospital for medical retirement, and they must try to do it before the plenary session. Otherwise, if Xi Jinping sits in the plenary session and is pushed to the brink, he might blurt out that when the Zhang-Liu case was investigated at the beginning of the year, all of you on the Standing Committee nodded in agreement. This is the one thing that makes the conservative Standing Committee members most insecure. However, there is one person at the plenary session who hopes more than anyone else that Xi Jinping remains in power, and that is Cai Qi. According to overseas independent media, the cause of Li Keqiang's death is related to both Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong. If Xi Jinping enters the hospital before the plenary session, he might never come out, and the only defendants left would be Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong. Even if Cai Qi knows the orders came from Xi Jinping, it would ultimately bring him no benefit. So, you see, in this plenary session, Wen Jiabao wants to write the resignation of the top leadership into the session's resolution, Hu Chunhua wants to establish the Li Keqiang case, the conservative faction wants to close the books before the session, and even Cai Qi in his own inner circle is calculating for himself. No one is planning for Xi Jinping. But the 301 Hospital is a military hospital, and the Guard Bureau and the Garrison Command all listen to the Central Military Commission. Whether he is sent in or not is not up to the conservative faction. The Central Military Commission is currently managed by Zhang Shengmin, and Zhang Shengmin listens to Hu Jintao. So, what does Hu Jintao want? He wants three things. First, the stepping down of the Party leader must be written into the plenary session's resolution, and the two hundred or so Central Committee members must raise their hands on the spot. This way, the resignation becomes a Party decision that no one can overturn. If they go through the 301 Hospital for medical retirement, it becomes a palace drama behind closed doors. Four years ago, Hu Jintao himself was escorted out of the venue; this time, he wants everything laid out in the open and done according to procedure. Second, the Li Keqiang case must be established. Third, Hu Chunhua must take over, and it must come from the plenary session's resolution, not a position picked up at the door of a 301 hospital room. Overseas independent media say that Hu Jintao has already made his stance clear: if Wen Jiabao's civil struggle can win, then use civil struggle; if it cannot, then use armed struggle. The audacity to replace six provincial party secretaries a month before the meeting and the audacity to put the liquidation on the plenary session's agenda come from this confidence. However, they will not play the armed struggle card unless absolutely necessary, because once the military is involved, Hu Chunhua, who takes power, will owe the military a favor, and the position will no longer be clean. Hua Guofeng is an example; he was originally the successor designated by Mao Zedong, but the 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four relied on Ye Jianying's military and Wang Dongxing's guards. The task was accomplished, but the favor was owed, and within a few years, he was sidelined. Therefore, as long as civil struggle can win, Hu Jintao will not go as far as armed struggle.

Xi Jinping had a pleasant time at the White House this trip. Trump led him to see the newly built helicopter pad and took him aboard Marine One. On Peng Liyuan's side, Melania accompanied her, and a group of American children sang "Jasmine Flower." She hummed along softly, and finally, a smile appeared on her face. Xi Jinping has been fighting for over a decade in power, sending his childhood friends and old comrades down one by one. Returning to Beijing, no one will make him happy. The person in this world who is most polite to him is the American President he has been cursing for over a decade. The only one who truly hopes he sits in power for a few more years is Trump. But even Trump only dared to give him a two-month trade truce, just enough to finish the Fifth Plenary Session. Before the plenary session, he still has one last chance to speak, which is the 90th anniversary of the Long March. The 80th-anniversary meeting ten years ago was held on October 21st, and Xi Jinping gave the speech himself. This year's meeting will likely also fall in late October, just a few days before the opening of the plenary session. That is his last major stage before the plenary session. If the meeting is held as usual and he takes the stage to speak, it means he is still holding on and resisting to the end. If someone else speaks or it is downgraded to a symposium, it means he is about to step down. Alright, that's all for today's chat with friends.

We will continue to chat in the next episode.