Does Xi Jinping still not want to step down as Chairman of the Central Military Commission? The 'Beijing Nine Articles' quasi-martial law is coming! The military warns of accidental conflict; both succession lists have backup plans for him, and with the mystery of the epidemic in Russia, can he still lock down the city? [Jiang Feng Vision 20261010 Episode 510]

This episode mainly analyzes the tense situation in Beijing on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP. It is reported that Beijing is implementing the "Nine Rules for Beijing" quasi-martial law to prevent various unexpected emergencies. The military has taken a tough stance on the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, warning that if he uses the epidemic as an excuse to lock down cities again, decisive action will be taken. Meanwhile, it explores the background of two succession lists, the epidemic mystery near Lake Baikal in Russia, as well as Zhang Youxia's plot a year ago and the subsequent evolution of the situation.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng Vision. In recent days, a statement has been circulating in Beijing, spoken very bluntly: if Old Xi really dares to use the epidemic as an excuse to impose another city lockdown, the military might open fire and stop negotiating with him, directly arresting the couple and sending them on their way. On Monday we said that the military's bottom line remains that if he does not hand over the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he will be escorted out of the venue. Just a week later, "escorted out of the venue" has become "sent on their way." But this statement didn't just emerge this week. Exactly a year ago, also ten-odd days before the plenum, Zhang Youxia wanted to do just that—capture the ringleader first, handling the couple like the execution of Romania's Ceaușescu couple. What stopped him was Hu Jintao's phrase "be patient and calm down"; three months later, it was Zhang Youxia who died. Why did things escalate in just one week? Let's first look at two old scores. Before the 20th National Congress, party elders talked with Old Xi, asking him to hand over the General Secretary position. Jiang Zemin even agreed that he could stay as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for two more years. But at the 20th Congress, he completely overturned the negotiated personnel arrangements, giving up not a single one of his three titles. At last year's Fourth Plenary Session, he again agreed to step down following Hua Guofeng's path, but three months later, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were removed. Overseas leaks have talked about these two old accounts for a long time. Now, with a bit over two weeks left before the plenum convenes, the same signs are surfacing again. This time, what the elders discussed privately with Old Xi was for him to hand over the General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission positions, while keeping the title of President for now. But in recent days, two succession lists emerged overseas one after another. One says Li Qiang takes over as General Secretary and President, with Ding Xuexiang as Premier. The other says Li Qiang takes over as General Secretary, Ding Xuexiang as Premier, while Xi keeps President for himself, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission is also reserved for him. Exactly during these few days, an epidemic broke out near Lake Baikal in Russia. The Russian side reported it as pneumonia of unknown origin, with nearly 200 people under quarantine observation. As soon as the news spread, the price of doxycycline in Northeast China skyrocketed in three days, and rumors circulated that lockdowns might be returning. Remember, during the last lockdown, it was hard for party elders and senior military figures even to meet, and that was how Old Xi muddled his way through at the 20th Congress. The activity in Beijing is even bigger. In recent days, a "Nine Rules for Beijing" document leaked on X: a city-wide ban on flying drones, hot air balloons, and Sky Lanterns; unapproved radio frequency bands are strictly forbidden; 30 streets in the core area require street-facing high-rise windows to be sealed and curtains drawn; overpasses and rooftops are guarded by personnel; and even internet speeds are throttled. The lists were leaked by Old Xi's side, while the "Nine Rules for Beijing" were issued by the elders and the military. Old Xi wants to stall, waiting for an epidemic to lock the elders back inside their compounds again. The elders and the military are not waiting anymore; they have first taken control of Beijing's airspace, rooftops, and walkie-talkies. Last time, he struck first and turned the tables behind closed doors at the 20th Congress. This time, the elders and the military want to strike first. A year ago, Hu Jintao stopped Zhang Youxia with one sentence. This time, the military's hands are already on their guns—can he still stop them?

Let’s start with the "Nine Beijing Rules." This thing was leaked outside the Great Firewall over the past two days, outlining Beijing's current controls—nine articles in total. Look first at when it popped up: more than two weeks before the Fifth Plenum, an outbreak just emerged around Lake Baikal, and doxycycline has been wiped clean out of pharmacies across the Northeast. Common sense says if Beijing were to step up controls right now, what should it be controlling? Face masks, PCR testing, health codes, quarantines—that’s how everyone got through the last lockdown. Yet if you read these nine rules from start to finish, not a single one is about epidemic prevention. What they are controlling are things flying in the sky, walkie-talkies in hands, people standing on rooftops, and gasoline at gas stations. The last lockdown was about shutting people inside; this time, it's about keeping eyes fixed on people. So this is not at all about using an epidemic as an excuse for a lockdown—it’s the exact opposite. So what are they watching? First, look at the sky: drones, FPV drones, hot air balloons, paragliders, not even sky lanterns are allowed to be launched. There's an even more detailed rule: positioning signals across the entire city are subjected to random offset drift. Why mess even with positioning? Drones rely on positioning to find their targets; once the positioning drifts, no matter how accurately it flies, it won't hit the mark. In the past couple of days, Ukrainian drones just bombed the data center of Russia's largest internet company, turning the entire server room into a sea of fire. That is precisely what Beijing is guarding against. Next, look at the ground: thirty streets in the core area, high-rises along the streets must have seals pasted and curtains drawn, clutter on balconies must be cleared away, and overpasses, elevated bridges, and rooftops are all stationed with guards. Drawing curtains on high-rises and stationing personnel at high vantage points is meant to guard against snipers taking potshots. On top of that, loose gasoline sold in cans is halted, some gas stations have been shut down, hazardous chemicals are barred from cross-district transport, and every single parcel shipped in from the outside must be inspected. Controlling gasoline, explosives, and parcels all together is aimed at preventing car bombs and package bombs. Finally, look at communications: all unregistered radio frequencies are strictly prohibited, and walkie-talkie bands are among them. For a unit to mobilize, it relies on shouting orders over walkie-talkies; once those frequency bands are controlled, no one can even think about secretly deploying troops. As for the internet, speeds are throttled, and deliberate latency has been added. If anything really happens, news from the inside won't get out anytime soon. Some friends might say that Beijing always tightens controls when holding major meetings or military parades, so what’s so unusual about this? What's unusual is who they are guarding against. In past years during meetings, they were guarding against petitioners and troublemakers—at most someone pulling a banner or lighting a fire. This time, they are even controlling positioning, gas stations, and walkie-talkies; they are guarding against professionals carrying guns, organized cliques, people who can fly drones, take sniper shots, and mobilize troops. This is quasi-martial law, and it is aimed at guarding against internal traitors. The defensive deployments for the Fifth Plenum were arranged long ago. The inside of the venue falls under the Central Security Bureau, whose director Zhou Hongxu was brought up personally by Zhang Youxia; the outside of the venue falls under the Beijing Garrison troops, overseen by Zhu Chuansheng of the Joint Staff Department, who was groomed personally by Li Zuocheng in the 41st Group Army. Inside the city, special operations brigades from the 38th Group Army maneuver back and forth; outside the city, Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan lead the 38th Group Army in defensive positioning. The city of Beijing and the military are currently clenched in the hands of the decision-making group led by Wen Jiabao. Now look at who is being guarded against: Old Xi also wanted to keep a card up his sleeve in Beijing. His wife's henchman, Shanghai Armed Police Commander Chen Yuan, was originally slated to take over as commander of the Beijing Garrison, but the Central Military Commission and the Garrison troops pushed back together. Instead, Chen Yuan was brought under control by the Military Commission for Discipline Inspection. Over the past few days, rumors outside the Great Firewall also say Chen Yuan has vanished, and the upper echelon of the Garrison has been emptied out. With the path to the gun barrels severed, what does he have left in his hands? Wang Xiaohong's police apparatus, plus the clandestine armed forces he nurtured. On January 20 this year, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were suddenly taken down precisely in this manner; no one can afford a repeat. Therefore, these nine rules were laid out by the party elders and the military. The last lockdown was him locking the party elders and veteran generals in their courtyards; this round of control is the party elders and the military pinning Old Xi's clique tightly inside Beijing. On Monday, they were still talking about physically escorting him out of the venue, and just a few days later it has escalated; Beijing's defensive deployment escalated right along with it. The phrase "sending him on his final way" wasn't just lip service. But you might ask: Beijing is in someone else's hands, the Security Bureau and Garrison troops don't listen to him, he is already a turtle trapped in a jar, so why the rush? Is there really a need to go so far as saying "sending him on his final way"? The urgency lies entirely in one single chair: Chairman of the Military Commission. At the Fifth Plenum, if he does not hand over this chair, no matter how well the jar is set, it won't be easy to legitimately pull in the net. That is where the dead knot lies. Yet he stubbornly clings to it and won't let go—so what on earth is he after?

Let us first examine these two proposed rosters. To understand Old Xi's exit scheme, one must look at what it leaves for him. Both schemes leave him the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Why step down from everything except CMC Chairman? The first reason is widely known: the gun barrel. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"—anyone in the Communist Party can recite this line. The Party commands the gun, which means the CMC Chairman commands the gun; other official posts amount to nothing in comparison. As long as one speaks from the seat of CMC Chairman, one's words carry weight. Deng Xiaoping was an example: in the 1980s, he claimed neither the title of General Secretary nor President of the State, yet as CMC Chairman, his word was final. In 2002, Jiang Zemin handed over the General Secretary post to Hu Jintao, but stayed on as CMC Chairman for another two years. Looking back four years ago, what did Jiang Zemin promise Old Xi? Another two years as CMC Chairman. That is the ostensible reason. But if it were solely about the gun barrel, that would be taking too shallow a view. Even sitting as CMC Chairman, Old Xi cannot simply mobilize the military. The daily affairs of the CMC are still managed by Zhang Shengmin, and Zhu Chuansheng, who oversees operations at the Joint Staff Department, is an old subordinate of Li Zuocheng; they all stand on Hu Jintao's side. If it really comes down to mobilizing troops, would those below listen to Old Xi? Last summer, when the Fourth Plenum was repeatedly delayed, the factions fought over whether he would step down fully or halfway. Back then, what he wanted to retain was the State Presidency; according to the plan at the time, the CMC chairmanship was to be acted by Zhang Youxia until the 21st Party Congress. At the time, Zhang Youxia declared that he wouldn't even let him retain the State Presidency, calling it a stalling tactic, and issued a warning: if he insisted on staying, troops would be moved to take him down. A year has passed, and what he demands has shifted from State President to CMC Chairman. Why? Isn't it simply because Zhang Youxia was inside the CMC last year, whereas this year Zhang Youxia was arrested by Old Xi? Right now, only two people remain in the CMC. During these four days of the Fifth Plenum, the CMC must be replenished, and the entire command structure will have to be rebuilt from scratch. What Old Xi wants right now is that he must remain in the CMC. Sitting in the chairman's seat grants him a say in how the roster is drafted; the newly added vice chairmen and members would nominally still rank beneath him as chairman. If circumstances shift in the future, he would still hold onto the supreme title of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces—the most critical legitimacy of all. So this chair is vital because he happens to be facing the restructuring of the leadership team. Clinging tooth and nail to the CMC chairmanship this time is aimed at keeping a foothold in the military and waiting for an opportunity to turn the tables. The problem is that this roster they put out amounts to nothing at all. In the CCP's succession process, there is a convention of alternate-generation designation. Old Xi belongs to the fifth generation; back then, he was designated across a generation by Jiang Zemin of the third generation. According to this rule, if Old Xi were to draft a roster, he could only name the seventh generation; the sixth generation is not his to decide—it must be settled by Hu Jintao of the fourth generation. Hu Jintao had already asked Wen Jiabao long ago to pass word to the conservatives: proposing Hu Chunhua for the sixth generation conforms to the rules; other candidates can also be discussed at the Plenum, but it first depends on who nominated them. Old Xi's slate at the 20th Party Congress was illegitimate, so he is no longer qualified to make nominations. Furthermore, any nominee must pass the military's hurdle before going to a vote; the military holds veto power. Frankly speaking, no matter who nominates a successor, unless it is put forward by Hu Jintao, the military will block them all. With things having come to such a point, Old Xi still shamelessly pushes out rosters, arranging Li Qiang and Ding Xuexiang into sixth-generation seats. No matter how loudly the propaganda trumpets it, it is just a piece of paper. So why does he keep releasing them, one after another? He used this exact trick last year: when the Fourth Plenum was repeatedly stalled, his side tossed out one scheme after another—full retirement, half retirement, letting Ding Xuexiang take over as General Secretary while he pulled the strings from behind the curtain. Why float so many? Because he saw one thing clearly: the various factions demanding that he relinquish power wanted different things. Hu Jintao wanted to push Hu Chunhua but could also accept Wang Yang; Wen Jiabao recognized only Wang Yang; Zhang Youxia cared only for his own military authority and security, and was fine with whoever took power. Once there were multiple schemes, the unified demand that "you must step down" fractured into everyone calculating "what can I get out of this." That trick worked last year. As each faction pursued its own calculations at the Fourth Plenum, he slipped through with a mere verbal promise to step down, and overturned the board three months later. With the two rosters this year, the ones he wants to pull over are the conservatives. Zeng Qinghong's camp nominally does not oppose Hu Jintao putting forward Hu Chunhua, but their calculation is to tie Hu Chunhua's hands once he takes office, requiring him to consult them individually on major matters; they also want to grant Old Xi treatment similar to Hua Guofeng's—no purges and no guilt by association. Look at the roster again: General Secretary Li Qiang, Premier Ding Xuexiang; Hu Chunhua, who openly vowed to seek justice for Li Keqiang, appears nowhere on it. The roster plays into the conservatives' private calculations even more loudly. As long as Zeng Qinghong nods in agreement, the only ones holding out stubbornly would be the military and the Hu-Wen faction. When that happens, the label of "sabotaging unity" will fall onto their heads: even Zeng Qinghong is willing to negotiate, yet you refuse to let go—who is the one truly disregarding unity? So was Zeng Qinghong won over? No. The first reason is that the two people on the roster are entirely out of the question. Over the past two years, Li Qiang jumped off Old Xi's ship long ago. As soon as his name was brought up on the roster, an old case from Zhejiang landed. On October 9, the Supreme People's Procuratorate announced that the case against Chen Weijun had been indicted in Chuzhou, Anhui. Li Qiang saw this clearly: would Li Qiang dare accept this post? If Wen Jiabao doesn't send him to Qincheng Prison, Li Qiang should count his lucky stars. As for Ding Xuexiang, even Zeng Qinghong refused to back him this year, and the Red Families vetoed him back in March; Old Zeng simply won't take the bait.

There is another even more critical point: if Old Xi is truly allowed to hold onto the Central Military Commission chairmanship and keep ruling, turning the CCP into a family enterprise of the Xi clan, Zeng Qinghong will sooner or later share the fate of Kim Jong Un's uncle, Jang Song-thaek. On the issue that Old Xi can no longer continue in power, Zeng Qinghong and the Hu-Wen faction have long seen eye to eye. A name list that leaves the CMC chairmanship to him would only give Zeng Qinghong the creeps; the Hu-Wen side got nothing out of it either, not to mention the military. None of the three factions buys Old Xi's game. The list serves another purpose, aimed at subordinates inside the Great Firewall. Lately, the elders have gained significant momentum, and outside the Great Firewall the consensus is overwhelmingly that the elders have the upper hand, all hoping that this time Old Xi can be pulled down. Can Old Xi accept this? Absolutely not. But he cannot hold out in a head-on confrontation, yet he is unwilling to concede defeat. In plain words, he has run out of tricks, so he has no choice but to leak the list. Such talk outside the Great Firewall inevitably filters back inside. Those officials inside the Great Firewall are the best at reading the political winds; if the only message transmitted back was that he is doomed to total defeat, wouldn't his subordinates scramble to find their next patrons? Regardless of which of the two lists it is, the CMC chairmanship remains in his hands. This is to tell the people below: I am not finished yet, don't rush to jump ship. Releasing the list is still a war of words; now, even half a physical brawl has begun.

Just in the last few days, something happened near Lake Baikal. The incident took place in Irkutsk at an anti-plague research institute, where a 28-year-old female laboratory technician died in the hospital between the night of October 1st and October 2nd. The Russian side stated the cause of death was pneumonia of unknown origin. For someone working at an anti-plague research institute to die of pneumonia of unknown origin, outsiders are saying there is something fishy going on. The U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. President have both made statements, and several Central Asian countries and Mongolia have strengthened inspections at their borders. On October 6th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing replied that China and Russia maintain close communication and cooperation in the field of infectious disease prevention and control, including plague. This matter has another layer of connection to China: at the end of August, Fuyuan in Heilongjiang just held a China-Russia cross-border joint emergency drill for infectious diseases, involving over 300 people and more than 40 vehicles. One of the scenarios simulated the plague being transmitted from abroad. Some friends hearing this might feel suspicious, wondering how it could be such a coincidence that something happened right after the drill. Even more coincidental is that people outside the Great Firewall noticed that as soon as the drill ended, the Party Secretary of Fuyuan disappeared. Looking at the last two days, Ukrainian President Zelensky told reporters that Chinese personnel are helping Russia build an alternative system to Starlink, and the development is almost complete; once finished, it will be used by Russia. This pair of brothers-in-distress, China and Russia, are even building satellites together in the sky, so it is no surprise if they pass something over on the ground. This time, as soon as the incident at Lake Baikal occurred, people immediately thought of Xi Jinping. Some have been very blunt, asking whether Putin, in order to help his brother-in-distress Xi, would proactively cooperate by releasing something so that Xi would have a reason to lock down cities again and delay the day he steps down. This theory is scary enough, but this card won't reach Xi's hand. On October 8th, the Governor of Irkutsk announced that the quarantine for close contacts had ended and medical observations were completed, and that the female lab technician had community-acquired pneumonia, the kind one catches in public. Russia has already closed the case itself. Even if it were really the plague, the plague is caused by bacteria and can be treated with antibiotics; it is not the same as COVID-19, which no one recognized at the time and for which there was no cure. In 2003, SARS also caused panic in Beijing, but Wen Jiabao removed Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong, and the situation was suppressed without large-scale city lockdowns. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Beijing is no longer in his hands; Li Qiang, who locked down the city for him last time, has already jumped ship. In the Ministry of Public Security, people from Hu Jintao's faction entered in September and were placed right beside Wang Xiaohong. Even if he wanted to lock down, there is no one to do it for him. The epidemic cannot help him, but it has forced a harsh warning out: even though Russia says it is just ordinary pneumonia, the Northeast is still panic-buying medicine because they have been scared by him before. If Xi dares to use the epidemic as an excuse at this time, whether to delay meetings or lock down cities, the military might stop negotiating with him and simply send the couple on their way. It was also at this time, around October 10, 2025, about ten days before the plenary session, that the person who said this was Zhang Youxia.

Let's look at what kind of life Zhang Youxia was living a year ago. At that time, the party elders had already issued an ultimatum to Old Xi: step down at the Fourth Plenary Session. Old Xi couldn't eat or sleep, but Zhang Youxia had it even worse. He worked at the August 1st Building during the day and didn't go home at night, sleeping instead at the wartime command center in Beijing's Western Hills. He had already dodged several assassination attempts. When Liu Yuan exposed Gu Junshan back in the day, he was also targeted for assassination three times; he survived, but his driver and guards were killed. To avoid being wiped out in one go, he and Liu Yuan worked from separate locations. Liu Yuan and Liu Zhenli were stationed in Baoding, ready to reinforce Beijing at any time, while Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin remained in Beijing to hold the fort. The 38th Group Army, in addition to keeping an eye on Old Xi's forces, also had to protect the elders and Hu Chunhua, fearing that someone might strike a blow against them just as they did to Li Keqiang. Living day by day, watching the clock tick, Zhang came up with an idea: to catch the bandits, first catch the ringleader. Taking down Old Xi was something he could have done himself with his own team in five minutes—just like the Romanians did when they executed the Ceaușescus. Once the couple was gone, their subordinates would scatter like birds and beasts, and there wouldn't even be anyone left to cry for them. Zhang Youxia once said, 'For a professional soldier, losing the initiative is equivalent to losing one's life.' By this time last year, the military had already shown its hand: if Old Xi was willing to hand over power, he would be left to the disposal of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao; if he refused, Zhang Youxia and Liu Yuan would handle him. House arrest was the most direct option, or they could arrange for him to 'pass away due to illness' to get justice for Li Keqiang. The military's own term for it was 'no retreat until the end.' If he didn't step down at the Fourth Plenary Session, what awaited Zhang Youxia and his group was a counter-offensive and settling of scores. Wen Jiabao actually agreed with this idea, believing in cutting the Gordian knot. Once the couple was gone, his own people would naturally emerge to clean up the mess, and once the propaganda machine was turned on, the common people would just think they had celebrated the New Year early; no major trouble would arise. The one who stopped this was Hu Jintao. He told Zhang Youxia, 'Don't be impatient, follow the organizational procedures; we can talk about other options if that doesn't work.' What Hu Jintao feared was this: they had placed Old Xi on a pedestal; if they really used guns to drag him down, the pedestal would collapse with him, and the brand of 'Great, Glorious, and Correct' would be ruined. More than a month earlier, Old Xi had proposed presiding over the September 3rd military parade to draw a perfect conclusion to his political life. Wen Jiabao, Zhang Youxia, Liu Yuan, and Wang Yang all opposed it. Hu Jintao's view was that canceling the parade would be bad for the CCP's image, and there was no rush to take him down. The procedures Hu Jintao spoke of were not empty talk; the script was already set. If Old Xi refused to acknowledge the situation at the Fourth Plenary Session, Hu Chunhua would move a motion to investigate the Li Keqiang case. Several members of the Standing Committee would take turns to expose him, and the plenary session would vote to strip him of all his positions. Wang Yang would act as General Secretary, and as for the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, as just mentioned, Zhang Youxia would act in that capacity until the 21st National Congress. While the meeting was in session, Liu Zhenli would command the 38th Group Army to secure Beijing and Zhongnanhai, and all major military regions would be on Level 1 combat readiness with no leave allowed. Hu Jintao held the trump card of Li Keqiang, so he was confident and not afraid that Old Xi wouldn't comply. How did that procedure turn out? As just mentioned, at the Fourth Plenary Session, Old Xi got through it by verbally agreeing to hand over power, and the Li Keqiang trump card wasn't played. After the meeting, the entire Politburo conducted self-criticism. Everyone thought the power had truly been handed over, but the title of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which was supposed to be handed to Zhang Youxia, remained on Old Xi's head. By early October last year, someone had already calculated the risks: if Zhang Youxia were assassinated, the military would be leaderless, and with the title of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Old Xi could easily reclaim control of the military. Next in line for the chopping block would be Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and even Zeng Qinghong. Three months later, on January 20th, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were taken down. The charge pinned on them was 'undermining the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.' Simply put, the hat of Chairman of the Central Military Commission that remained on Old Xi's head last year became the blade that struck Zhang Youxia this year. Zhang Youxia's words about losing the initiative being equivalent to losing one's life were finally fulfilled in his own case. The counter-offensive the military spoke of last year came to pass, down to the very last word.

After January 20, sitting in his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he sent Chen Yuan, a person of the boss's wife, to take over the Beijing Garrison Command. As just mentioned, it did not succeed; the Military Commission and the garrison forces resisted, and Chen Yuan was instead detained by the Discipline Inspection Commission. He was resisted this time, but he is still the Chairman of the Military Commission. Will there be a problem next time? Looking back at this time, why did the military refuse to budge on the Chairman of the Military Commission? Because they suffered losses last time. Why has the phrase 'send the two of them on their way' returned? Because a year ago, the person who said this was gone before he could make a move. The difference is that this time the person saying this is no longer just Zhang Youxia; it is the entire group behind him, the generals who came down from the Vietnam battlefield. The day that Zhang Youxia did not live to see, they will wait for it in his place. A year ago, the person who stopped these words was Hu Jintao. Will he dare to stop them this time? First look at the military. The Jing-Nine Articles just mentioned—skylights, rooftops, and walkie-talkies are all controlled; inside and outside the meeting place, inside and outside the city, they are all their own people. To put it bluntly, this means that armed struggle has already been set up. The military has only one demand this time: drive old Xi out of the military. Whoever dares to oppose bringing things back to normal is an enemy of the military, and then we will talk with the gun barrel. The posture is set, and it is only missing someone to nod. Last year, the one who shook his head was Hu Jintao, but the one who stopped it last year was not just him. Zeng Qinghong's faction insisted on giving old Xi a Hua Guofeng-style decent exit, saying that even if he had no great achievements, he had worked hard. Hu Jintao talked about unity and followed Zeng Qinghong's wishes. And the result? Decency was given, but Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were gone. Zhang Youxia was originally the main force of the conservatives in the military. This time, his own people were also dragged in. Therefore, after January 20, Zeng Qinghong deeply regretted it. From someone who originally protected old Xi, he became the person who most opposes him now. As for Hu Jintao himself, the conservatives later sentenced Zhang and Liu, and he did not agree, only saying that the dead cannot be brought back to life. This year, his tune has changed. The word that came out in early September was that talking about unity now is different from talking about unity in the past. The conservative faction of the CCP should not mistake politeness for good fortune. Under Hu Jintao, there is Wen Jiabao's civil struggle and Hu Chunhua's armed struggle. If the conservative faction insists on destroying unity, Hu Jintao can also use force. Hu Jintao is not unfamiliar with using force. In 1989, when he suppressed the rebellion in Tibet, he wore a steel helmet and went to the front line personally. It was because of this that he was noticed by Deng Xiaoping. Hu Chunhua was also at the scene that time. Hu Chunhua's current meaning is that if there is really a need to suppress a rebellion in Beijing once, he is also ready to wear a steel helmet with the military and go to the front line. If Hu Chunhua wants to settle accounts, Hu Jintao will neither stop nor criticize him. There is also a more crucial layer: who gave the military power in Hu Jintao's hands? It was given by generals like Zhang Youxia and Li Zuocheng. Zhang Shengmin manages the daily affairs of the Military Commission, but he comes from a political work background and has never fought a war. If troops are really to be moved, they still rely on veteran military leaders who have been on the battlefield like Li Zuocheng. As early as March this year, some people said that if Hu Jintao had not suppressed it, generals would have mutinied long ago. The words coming out of Beijing these few days are even more direct: if old Xi dares to use the epidemic to make trouble again, the military may trigger a gun misfire. What does this mean? It means they will not wait for anyone to nod. Therefore, Hu Jintao cannot afford to stop it this time. If he stops it one more time and the military takes action on its own, the military power will no longer be in old Hu's hands. If he wants to keep the military power in his grip, he can only nod.

So what would the military do? If he steps down and hands over the CMC chairmanship on the spot at the plenary session, it will be handled gently without political purges or collective punishment—the Hua Guofeng treatment. But if he clings stubbornly to the CMC chairmanship, tries to use an epidemic to delay the plenum, or insists on turning it into a video conference, they will put him under house arrest right then and there, and submit a resignation letter to the plenum in his name. That was the solution Wen Jiabao already mapped out last year. Beyond that, it leads back to the phrase from the very beginning, the precedent Zhang Youxia once weighed in his heart: Nicolae Ceaușescu. In December 1989, his regime collapsed first; he fled with his wife in a helicopter, got captured halfway, and three days later on Christmas Day, the couple was executed by firing squad. So is there still a way out for Old Xi? Yes, just one: hand it over voluntarily. The elders keep him around because he is still useful; someone has to take the blame for the accounts of the past decade or more. Across provinces and departments, his appointees are everywhere, and he must personally step forward to replace them one by one so it appears legitimate without leaving behind trouble. To put it bluntly, keeping his life spares a signing pen. The price was laid on the table long ago: back down, step down from power, and his wife stays safe, while Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong take the fall. Back then, Hua Guofeng was willing to step down on his own because his close circle turned against him first: Hu Yaobang took the lead in criticizing his "Two Whatevers," Ye Jianying engaged in intra-Party self-criticism, admitting to blind loyalty and blind faith in him. Once Hua Guofeng saw that everyone had deserted him, he made his own self-criticism. Last year, Old Xi dared to agree readily only to renege immediately, because Chen Xi, Cai Qi, He Lifeng, and Wang Xiaohong still guarded key posts. This year, Chen Xi was brought down by Wen Jiabao, Ma Xingrui fell, Li Qiang abandoned ship, leaving only a handful like Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong by his side. Wang Xiaohong still controls the police (Public Security) and a secret armed force of several thousand men; that was how they acted so abruptly on January 20. The military is on highest guard against him right now. As early as February, Old Xi already contemplated putting Wang Xiaohong forward alone to take the blame. So this time, Hu Jintao cannot stop it, and Old Xi cannot renege either. The first thing he hands over is that hat, and the first person pushed out is Wang Xiaohong. Finally, I will leave two things for everyone to watch. On October 29, when the communique of the Fifth Plenum comes out, let us verify it together. First, look at the line for the CMC chairman—did he hand over the hat? Look at who gets promoted into the Military Commission. If it is people like Zhang Shengmin and Zhu Chuansheng, it means the military took the hat back. Second, watch Wang Xiaohong. His most recent public appearance was on September 22, hosting a nationwide public security video conference. For more than half a month up to today, he has not appeared again. Will he show up before or after the plenum? Is he still the one calling the shots at the Ministry of Public Security? If he vanishes without a trace, that pen has already begun signing. A year ago, Zhang Youxia said, "Send the two of them on their way," but was held back by a word urging patience. A year later, those words have returned. Who can stop it this time? What do you think? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comment section. If you enjoyed this episode, please like, subscribe, hit the bell notification, and share it with friends who care about this matter. That is all for today's Jiang Feng's Vision. Thank you for watching, and see you next time.