Hu Jintao Shut Zeng Qinghong's Mouth with a Vice Chairman of the CMC Post! Xi Jinping Stepped Down Entirely, but It Wasn't Reported for at Least 206 Days; Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and He Lifeng Queuing Up to Resign? 【Jiang Feng Vision 20261012 Episode 511】

This episode analyzes the trends of the upcoming fifth plenary session of the CCP Central Committee. It points out that Hu Jintao achieved political balance by reserving the position of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission for Zeng Qinghong, while discussing the drafting of the seven major crimes against Xi Jinping, the voting variables facing the Zhang Youxia case at the plenary session, the latest appearances of Standing Committee members such as Wang Huning, and the networking reactions of local officials.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiangfeng Perspective. The Fifth Plenary Session is about to open on October 26. Many people think that this time it is nothing more than letting Xi Jinping step down decently, replacing him with someone else to take over, and turning the page. Not necessarily. Judging from the recent wind, this plenary session is likely to have major moves, far beyond simply making him step down; it is to criticize and discredit him first. There have been two leaks outside the wall recently that are worth studying. The first is that Hu Jintao wants to restore the Central Military Commission and specially left a seat for the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission for the conservative faction led by Zeng Qinghong. It seems that Hu Jintao has shut Zeng Qinghong's mouth, at least half of it. With their own seat in the Military Commission, the conservative faction will no longer single-mindedly stand up for Xi Jinping at the plenary session. Another even harsher leak says that the charges against Xi Jinping have been drafted, totaling seven items, which will be put before the members of the Central Committee for discussion and voting. Every single one of these seven items matches up and is indeed what he did. It seems that he really is going to be taken down this time. Throughout the history of the CCP forcing a top leader to step down, the first step has always been massive criticism. Hua Guofeng was like this, and Hu Yaobang was also like this. But have you noticed that this criticism is heavier than any previous one? The very first of these seven items is messing up the military. Extending this statement a step further, things get big. On September 21, officials expelled Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the Party and the military, and the official release left a sentence at the end: to be ratified when the plenary session of the Central Committee is convened. The problem is, if the plenary session ratifies it, and Xi Jinping messed up the military, how can it ratify it? Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli should be expelled, so following this leak, the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli probably won't be able to be voted on at the plenary session. The military is going to turn the tables. This expulsion order was decided under Xi Jinping's chairmanship. If the plenary session doesn't ratify it, it's a slap in the face to him. Hu Jintao, who never stirs up trouble, is going to stir up serious trouble this time.

As soon as rumors start to swirl, top regional officials are always the first to sense the shift. You can imagine that if the charges can be exposed one by one outside the firewall, and decision-making or coordinating bodies have already made this happen, how could provincial party secretaries—each with their own channels of information—not know? These shrewd individuals have already begun networking. At the same time, across various regions, trouble is popping up everywhere; reports of explosions, fires, and accountability investigations come one after another. Right at this critical juncture, on the October 11 broadcast of Xinwen Lianbao, a member of the Standing Committee finally made a public appearance. More than ten days after the National Day holiday, the first to step out was Wang Huning, who met with Tran Thanh Man, Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam. Interestingly, Tran Thanh Man was a guest invited by Zhao Leji, yet the one who came out to meet him on the first day was Wang Huning. Therefore, today we are not speculating on the exact date Xi Jinping will step down; what is truly worthy of attention is why Zhang Youxia’s case might not be approved at the plenary session, why Wang Huning chose this exact moment to step forward first, and what major problems Xi Jinping is actually facing.

Here is how I view this issue: getting the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli ratified at the Fifth Plenary Session will not be easy. Originally, when the news broke on September 21, many people said it had become an open-and-shut case, and by the Fifth Plenary Session, the Central Committee members would have no choice but to follow along and raise their hands. Is that really the case? Let's make a comparison with last year. At the Fourth Plenary Session in October of last year, He Weidong, Miao Hua, and seven other full generals had already been expelled by the Political Bureau first. Once the plenary session opened, it simply confirmed the disciplinary action previously decided by the Political Bureau to expel them from the Party, and that was that—nobody made a big deal out of it. Why was it so straightforward that time? Because those nine individuals were the Fujian faction personally promoted by Xi Jinping, and removing them was a move executed by Zhang Youxia, with nods of approval from both the party elders and the military; not a single person spoke up for them. This time, the situation is completely reversed. The one being expelled is Zhang Youxia, a senior veteran leader of the military, and the document expelling him was drafted under the auspices of Xi Jinping. Last year, when Xi's people were removed, the elders nodded; this year, when Xi Jinping wants to remove the military's people, the elders refuse to nod. The faction led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao intends to rehabilitate Zhang Youxia, making this ratification extremely difficult to pass. Some friends might ask: what about the votes from the military itself? Among the Central Committee members elected at the 20th National Congress, over forty wear military uniforms, but after wave upon wave of purges over the past few years, only six are confirmed to still be in their posts, and they cannot be counted on. What truly blocks this ratification are the reformists. If these reformists refuse to raise their hands, that already accounts for forty percent of the votes. Can the required two-thirds majority still be reached? As we have previously mentioned, no matter how reluctant the reformists are at heart, when they get to the meeting hall, they will likely just have to hold their noses and raise their hands to ratify it. Since the reformists only hold forty percent of the votes, ultimately removing Xi Jinping from power cannot be achieved without the conservatives. If the ratification of Zhang and Liu is blocked, and the conservatives turn their backs and join Xi Jinping's twenty percent, that would make sixty percent, and the prospect of Xi stepping down would completely vanish. However, once these two exposés came out, the calculation changed. Hu Jintao first reserved a vice-chairman seat on the Central Military Commission for the conservatives, half-closing Zeng Qinghong's mouth. The conservatives have already obtained the benefits they wanted, so they have no reason to fall out with the reformists for Xi Jinping's sake, and the reformists will no longer need to use Zhang Youxia as a bargaining chip for votes.

Let's look at the original charges against Zhang Youxia. Back in January, when Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli first got into trouble, the Liberation Army Daily published an editorial on January 25 setting out their primary charge: severely trampling on and undermining the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Who is the chairman of the Central Military Commission? It is Xi Jinping. In other words, Zhang Youxia's crime was simply refusing to obey Xi Jinping, which means the mess in the military was being blamed on Zhang Youxia. The seven major sins exposed outside the firewall point in the exact opposite direction: the military was thrown into chaos by Xi Jinping himself. Out of the seven members of the Central Military Commission he personally picked at the 20th National Congress, five fell over the span of four years, leaving only himself and Zhang Shengmin, which has resulted in the Chinese military currently being unable to function fully, let alone fight a war. Exactly who should this blame be assigned to? If Zhang Youxia's expulsion were to be ratified first, it would be equivalent to declaring that the military chaos was caused by Zhang Youxia's disobedience, and the primary charge among the seven major sins would instantly become untenable. Therefore, when Hu Jintao criticizes Xi Jinping, the mandatory first step is to stall Zhang Youxia's case. Overturning a case that was settled by the stroke of a top leader's pen has indeed happened in the history of the CCP. Let us first turn the clock back to December 1978. At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee that year, what people remember is reform and opening up, but that communique also contained another matter of considerable weight: correcting the erroneous conclusions previously reached regarding Peng Dehuai and others. Founding Marshal Peng Dehuai had served as Minister of Defense, but at the Lushan Conference in 1959, he was labeled the head of an anti-party clique and never rehabilitated until his death. The Third Plenary Session reversed this case, overturning a verdict personally handed down by Mao Zedong. Please note that when that case was overturned, Mao Zedong had already been dead for over two years. This time is different: the person who handed down the verdict is still sitting in the general secretary's chair, and the case was decided under his auspices just last month. Overturning a verdict made by a dead man and overturning one made by a living man carry completely different weight. If the plenary session truly leaves Zhang Youxia's ratification hanging, it would be equivalent of flipping the table right in front of all the Central Committee members. This is a step Hu Jintao has no choice but to take.

The military has been holding back its anger and is on the verge of mutiny. Before the Fourth Plenary Session last year, Zhang Youxia suggested that the military should step in directly, but Hu Jintao did not agree. For the past year, it has been Hu who has been suppressing the generals and old military leaders, insisting that things be handled according to party rules at the plenary session. However, if party rules cannot even overturn the case against Zhang Youxia, why should the generals continue to listen to him? If it truly came to that point, the military would take action themselves and directly remove Xi Jinping. The task would be accomplished, but the one calling the shots afterward would not be Hu Jintao. That is why this time, the 'seven deadly sins' are being criticized so heavily—more fiercely than ever before—to showcase the capabilities of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Some complain that Hu Jintao is too steady, only knowing how to endure rather than stir up trouble, but this time he is stirring up trouble to thoroughly discredit and denounce [Xi]. These words are meant for the generals: 'I can get the job done regarding Xi's stepping down; you all should not resort to arms yet. The first account to settle will be with the military; we will first suppress the case against Zhang Youxia at the plenary session to give the generals an answer.'

After the Fourth Plenary Session last year, Xi Jinping was effectively unable to intervene in the daily operations of the Central Military Commission (CMC) or the daily affairs of the CMC Chairman's office; Zhang Youxia entrusted these to Liu Yuan to oversee. In Xi Jinping's view, this meant he, as the CMC Chairman, had been sidelined. Therefore, when Zhang and Liu ran into trouble this January, the first label slapped on them was 'seriously trampling upon and undermining the CMC Chairman responsibility system.' However, by the time of their expulsion on September 21, this label had disappeared, leaving only the charge of 'suspected of serious duty-related crimes.' Who made it disappear? It was the conservatives who mediated. If you think from Zeng Qinghong's perspective, this change accommodates both sides. On one hand, if it were a political crime by the military, it would be difficult to overturn. 'Trampling upon the CMC Chairman responsibility system' is a direct challenge to the CMC Chairman himself; if this case were to be overturned, the first question would be who the CMC Chairman was, and that question would lead straight to Xi. 'Duty-related crimes' are different; they require evidence—which year, which month, how much money was received from whom, and what was done. If one day it is found that the investigators were wrong, the case can be overturned. The door for overturning the case is left open for the military. On the other hand, if Xi investigated it wrongly, the fault lies with the investigators and does not implicate him. The conservatives want to save face for him. If the label of 'trampling upon the CMC Chairman responsibility system' remained on Zhang Youxia, any future overturning of the case would inevitably lead back to Xi. By removing the label, that line is cut. The military wants the ability to overturn the case; the conservatives want to ensure that when the case is overturned, the sky doesn't fall. Removing the label of 'trampling upon the CMC Chairman responsibility system' provides a way out for both sides. This connects back to the beginning: regarding the most critical charge against Zhang Youxia, the conservatives spoke up for the military. Therefore, today, when Hu Jintao leaves a vice-chairman seat for the conservatives in the CMC, the military is willing to concede, not feeling that they have given it to an outsider, but rather as a way of returning a favor. 'You spoke up for me, so I'll save a seat for you.' Once the favor is returned, Zeng Qinghong's mouth is also shut. The shrewd people in the local regions understand this deal as soon as they see it.

Yuan Jiajun of Chongqing led a party and government delegation, visiting two provinces in four days. On October 8th and 9th, they were in Guangxi, holding a symposium with Chen Gang in Nanning. On the 9th and 10th, they arrived in Guizhou, holding a symposium with Xu Lin and Li Bingjun in Guiyang. The reports mentioned the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor and the Chengdu-Chongqing economic circle. These things could have been said any year, yet they chose to say them during the sensitive period before the Fifth Plenary Session. Who is Yuan Jiajun? Among the Politburo, there are few reformers left, and Yuan Jiajun is leaning toward the reformist side. Since the beginning of this year, there have been leaks that at the Central Plenary Session, several vice-national-level officials—Chen Jining, Yuan Jiajun, and Shi Taifeng—will stand up one by one to report Xi Jinping for forming cliques, abusing power, and creating a 'Xi family dynasty.' If you look at these two things together, the person who is going to stand up and criticize the 'Old Xi' at the plenary session is knocking on the doors of the top leaders of surrounding provinces half a month before the session. What is he doing? He wants to know beforehand whether the people next to him will follow him when he speaks at the session. There is another detail from the Guizhou side that commentators outside the firewall have noticed: the next day, the front page of the Guizhou Daily published the symposium. The part about Xu Lin's speech praised Chongqing, saying they 'firmly support the Two Establishments and resolutely achieve the Two Safeguards.' But if you flip to the part about Yuan Jiajun's speech, there is not a single word about the 'Two Establishments' or 'Two Safeguards.' The host tried to force the 'Two Establishments' into the guest's mouth, but the guest did not repeat a single word. This back-and-forth speaks volumes, more than any symposium summary. There was also movement in Guangxi. Just after Yuan Jiajun left on the 9th, Nanning held a city-wide meeting of leading cadres on the morning of the 10th to announce a change in the city's top party leader. The successor is Tan Pichuang, the head of the United Front Work Department of Guangxi, and Chen Gang presided over it personally. The host changed the top leader of the provincial capital right after the guest left. Changing a provincial capital's party secretary half a month before a plenary session is not a normal occurrence. There are also those who are still singing the old tune. On October 8th, Heilongjiang Party Secretary Xu Qin held a standing committee meeting, still insisting on 'deeply comprehending the decisive significance of the Two Establishments.' In the same week, some are singing along while others are not; there is no longer a single voice in the provinces. How do the provinces determine their true stance at such a time? The CCP has a precedent. On October 6, 1976, the Gang of Four was arrested in Beijing. The next day, the central government summoned Ma Tianshui from Shanghai to Beijing, and on the 9th, they also summoned Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen. In those few days, the central government summoned the heads of various provinces and major military regions to Beijing in batches to brief them behind closed doors. The leaders of the Shanghai militia, which had over 70,000 guns, were all sitting in a conference room in Beijing, and not a single shot was fired. That time, it was Beijing summoning the provinces, and Beijing had the final say. But this time? There is no word of anyone summoning the provinces to Beijing for a briefing. Instead, the provinces are running around everywhere, visiting each other. Why? Because the person who should have been summoning everyone can no longer do so. The subordinates dare not fully believe the briefing from the General Secretary, and the briefing from the party elders cannot be put on the table. The provinces have no choice but to go out and find their own allies. If Beijing does not summon people, the localities will link up themselves. But no matter how lively the networking is, there is still someone holding a pen at the plenary session.

On October 11, the very first to step forward was Wang Huning. Why did Wang Huning, of all people, choose this moment to be the first to appear? We will discuss this in detail shortly. But first, let's chat a bit about everyday life. As soon as October arrives, mornings and evenings suddenly turn chilly. Being busy all day and staring at your phones at night makes people easily exhausted, and your eyes take the hardest hit. Jiang Feng's small shop, Jiang Feng Youpin, has two items that are just right. One is the Black Ointment Capsule with Seven Herbal Ingredients—take three capsules at a time to supplement energy and maintain stamina during the day. Friends who often feel their energy lagging and find it hard to recover from fatigue can use this as a foundation. To thank everyone for your support, it is now 55% off at 166 dollars a bottle, and buying three bottles at once even comes with a box of German vitamins. The other item is the Eye-Soothing Cold Compress Eye Patch. Applying them for a while before bed cools the eye area and greatly relieves the dryness and fatigue from looking at screens all day. One box contains a ten-day supply and costs under 30 dollars. The shop also has sleep-aid capsules and Italian coffee beans. Click the Jiang Feng Youpin link in the pinned comment below the video to browse at your leisure. The eye patches cannot be used by pregnant women, and friends who are pregnant or taking long-term medications should consult a doctor before using health supplements. Alright, let's get back to Wang Huning. Let's return to the Xinwen Lianbao news broadcast on October 11. After a holiday of some ten days, none of the seven Standing Committee members had shown their faces on Xinwen Lianbao. The first one to come out was Wang Huning, meeting with Tran Thanh Man, Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam, in Beijing. Wang Huning stepping out first after the holiday was meant to let everyone clearly see in whose hands the pen that drafts the resolution lies. Tran Thanh Man was a guest invited by Zhao Leji, but Tran Thanh Man himself is also a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam. As early as July this year, leaks revealed that the party affairs in Cai Qi's hands had gradually been transferred to Wang Huning. Meeting the delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam was taken over from Cai Qi back then. Vietnam's line follows party-to-party relations, and the person in charge of party affairs showing up first before the plenary session is not just about receiving foreign guests. So what does his management of party affairs have to do with the Fifth Plenum? It has everything to do with it. The document to be passed at this Fifth Plenum is precisely a decision on governing the party. Every time a major document is passed at a central plenary session, someone must take the stage to give an explanation to all central committee members, accounting for how this document was written. During Hu Jintao's ten years, who took the stage to read it was chosen by the person in charge—Wen Jiabao read it, Zeng Qinghong read it, and the 2009 party governance decision was read by Xi Jinping in his capacity as Vice President. Things changed after Xi Jinping came to power. Starting from the Third Plenum in 2013, he has taken the stage to read it every single time, with the opening sentence almost always the same: "Chaired by me..." But while the group leader is the one who reads it on stage, who is in charge of the drafting work? It is the deputy group leader. For the decision at the Third Plenum the year before last, the first deputy leader of the drafting group was Wang Huning, followed by Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang. For the 15th Five-Year Plan proposal at last year's Fourth Plenum, the deputy leaders were Li Qiang, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and Ding Xuexiang. Over the past decade or so, the one reading the manuscript on stage has been Old Xi, but the one holding the pen behind the scenes every single time has been Wang Huning. At the end of September, we mentioned that this time Hu Jintao is insisting that Xi Jinping himself take the stage and read out this decision—which has had the Two Establishes removed—sentence by sentence before more than 300 full and alternate members of the Central Committee. Yet this time, the pen is no longer on his side. The Policy Research Office was handed over at the end of last year to Hu Jintao's man, Tang Fangyu, and party affairs were transferred to Wang Huning. In other words, the manuscript Xi Jinping will take the stage to read this time is not written by his own people. With the Two Establishes removed and the one-man rule system reverting to collective leadership, every sentence he reads is equivalent to him acknowledging it himself.

Why did Wang Huning rush to be the first to come out? He has two major debts hanging over him: the old debt from the 19th and 20th National Congresses, where those two major documents represented the peak of Xi Jinping's arbitrary rule. They were led and drafted by Jiang Jinquan, but during the 19th Congress, Wang Huning simultaneously held the post of director of the Policy Research Office. Before the Fourth Plenary Session last year, he changed his tune, claiming those two documents were put together by Jiang Jinquan and Cai Qi, and that he had long stopped managing the daily affairs of the Policy Research Office. The new debt is from September 21, when the Politburo convicted Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. People like Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi were each playing their own political games, and in the end, Zhang and Liu became scapegoats. If Zhang Youxia's case is overturned at the plenary session, what does that make of those who sat in the Politburo and raised their hands back then? With these two debts weighing on him, waiting for others to overturn them means taking the blame; stepping out first might buy him a new position. What is even more critical is that this time it is not just quietly deleting a few characters, but a severe denunciation with seven major charges. Who drafted this narrative for him in the first place? The first person to be questioned is him. Therefore, he had to rush to the front and stand on the side of the pen-wielding faction, rather than waiting for Hu Jintao's people to write him into the list as well. This is a path someone in the history of the CCP has walked before: Hu Qiaomu served as Mao Zedong's secretary for more than twenty years and was the top pen by Mao's side. After Mao Zedong died in 1980, Deng Xiaoping wanted to draft a historical resolution to pass judgment on the Cultural Revolution. The person specifically responsible for drafting it was still Hu Qiaomu. The very pen that used to write articles for Mao Zedong turned around and wrote for Deng Xiaoping. That resolution negating the Cultural Revolution required changing the pen-pusher, but the craftsmanship remained the same—just change the employer. Today, Wang Huning stands right in the position Hu Qiaomu occupied back then.

Some friends might ask: Wang Huning is just coming out to meet a foreign guest, is there any need to read so much into it? Let's compare this with last year. Before the Fourth Plenary Session last year, after National Day, the first member of the Standing Committee to show up on the evening news was Li Qiang, who went to Pyongyang on October 9. A few days later on the 13th, old Xi himself came out to speak at the Global Women's Summit. The vanguard was the Premier ranked second, immediately followed by the General Secretary himself. Those ranked ahead came out first; in past years, this was always the order. What about this year? Among the seven Standing Committee members, Wang Huning ranks fourth. The ones ahead of him—old Xi, Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji—had not appeared for over ten days. Old Xi's invited guest from Togo arrived in Beijing and waited for three days without seeing him. The very first to appear happened to be Wang Huning, ranked fourth, and he met the guest invited by Zhao Leji. First, why wasn't it Li Qiang? Last year Li Qiang came out first, and nobody thought much of it because a few days later the General Secretary himself would appear. This year, if the General Secretary stays out of sight for over ten days and the Premier stands up first, the outside world would immediately speculate whether he is about to succeed him. This signal is too heavy; no one wants to release it before the plenary session. Wang Huning is different: the chairman of the CPPCC is a nominal position, so sending him out will make no one think of succession. The appearance that the Standing Committee is operating as usual is also maintained, but the person in this nominal position holds a grip on things that is far from nominal. As we mentioned earlier, party affairs have been transferred to his hands, and the pen for that plenary decision is in his hands. The vanguard before the plenary session is precisely the person holding the pen. The decision does not explicitly name old Xi, but the matters listed in the seven charges require an explanation. Does old Xi admit to these seven points or not? There are leaks saying that old Xi's side has been spreading word that there have been no major mistakes in party governance since the 18th National Congress, but this time they have listed seven major crimes against him. The first charge is disrupting the military, as mentioned before; the second is the 2018 constitutional amendment that removed term limits for the state presidency; the third is that the 20th National Congress term was forcefully clung to, and the Politburo name list was altered; the fourth is the three-year lockdown and zero-COVID policy; the fifth is ruining the economy; the sixth is ruining the nation's image by binding wolf warrior diplomacy with Russia, Iran, and North Korea; and the seventh is miscarriages of justice, with the charges against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli repeatedly altered, and Li Keqiang dying under unclear circumstances. You tell me, do these count as major issues? Any single one taken out is enough to force someone to step down, and putting all seven together is much weightier than the case of Hua Guofeng. Therefore, whether there is a problem is no longer up for debate; what needs to be debated is how to acknowledge him as the top leader. The method of acknowledgement is different from others. In the political lexicon of the CCP, the phrase "major issues" comes in two types: one is called an error, and the other is called a crime. When they present it now, it is called the seven major crimes; this is the terminology of a crime, while old Xi wants to frame it as errors. The difference of this single character represents two distinct paths. In the 1981 historical resolution, what Mao Zedong committed were errors—errors of his later years—while the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques committed criminal acts. That is why Mao Zedong's portrait still hangs in Tiananmen Square today. After the Gang of Four was arrested in 1976, the materials issued downward by the CCP Central Committee were titled "Evidence of Crimes" and were transmitted level by level. The four individuals ultimately ended up in Qincheng Prison. Those who committed errors could still retain the title of Vice Chairman, but those who committed crimes faced a different path entirely.

The elders' words to him sounded quite polite: if you adopt a good attitude, admit your mistakes, and step down voluntarily, you will receive the best treatment, and everything will be provided for you—you will be treated just as Hua Guofeng was. Back then, Hua Guofeng made self-criticisms in the Politburo and resigned, and afterwards, he lived a peaceful life until his old age. But if your attitude is poor, then we will not be so polite. The only one who refused to admit fault was Zhao Ziyang, and the result was the revocation of all his positions and investigations that continued until his death. However, do not just listen to the polite tone; these people are actually not polite to Xi Jinping at all. These seven points come from a liquidation group led by Hu Chunhua. What do these seven points ultimately demand? First, that the plenary session removes him from his positions as Chairman of the Central Military Commission and General Secretary. Second, to establish a group liquidation committee to investigate the various crimes of the group in depth. Once the term 'liquidation' is brought up, it is no longer as simple as asking him to go home and retire. And what about Zeng Qinghong? Hasn't he always wanted to leave some dignity for Xi? This time, even he cannot say anything. The chair of the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission has already been reserved for his own people. Xi stepping down was something everyone had already nodded to. The seven points are laid out, and every single one of them hits the mark. He cannot stand up and say that Xi never did these things. So, on the surface, no one has flipped the table, and all parties seem to have been smoothed over, but in reality, no one is satisfied. At least Zeng Qinghong is definitely not satisfied. He wanted the Hua Guofeng approach—no liquidation and no collective punishment. Now that the liquidation group has started working, he has no choice even if he feels uncomfortable. Are these seven points just written on paper to scare people, or will they be implemented one by one, arresting those who should be arrested? Look at the Wuhan mayor Zhou Xianwang, who was sentenced to fourteen years in the first instance in Shangqiu, Henan, around the time of the lockdown on October 10. When such a major incident occurred in Wuhan back then, it was the Municipal Party Secretary Ma Guoqiang who stepped down to take the blame. Zhou Xianwang remained. The narrative outside the Great Firewall was that because he was Xi's man, he was protected for six years, but today he can no longer be protected. The first of the seven points to be implemented is the 'zero-COVID' lockdown. But if you look closely at the verdict, he was sentenced for bribery—60.5 million yuan, received from 2003 to May 2025. The charges did not mention a single word about the pandemic lockdown. Some friends might say, 'Isn't this letting him off easy? Not pursuing such a major event as the lockdown and only sentencing him for bribery?' In fact, it is exactly the opposite. Think about it: if someone wants to settle the account of the lockdown once and for all, the easiest way is to pin it on Wuhan. The local authorities concealed the truth and failed to handle it properly, the mayor is sentenced for dereliction of duty, the secretary has already been removed, and the account in Wuhan is considered settled. In 2020, Beijing intended to do exactly that; that is how Ma Guoqiang was removed. This time, they specifically chose not to judge that point. The lockdown is not counted against Zhou Xianwang, so this account remains hanging. Hanging for whom? Hanging on the seven points, hanging on the top leadership. Why is this person, Zhou Xianwang, so important? On January 27, 2020, just days after the Wuhan lockdown, he appeared on CCTV and said one thing in front of the national audience: 'As a local government, I can only disclose this information after being authorized.' The news was not something Wuhan wanted to cover up; it was waiting for the nod from above. According to the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, epidemic information is to be released by the health department of the State Council or by the local authorities authorized by it. In other words, the arrow of this statement pointed to the State Council. Coincidentally, on that very day, Li Keqiang arrived in Wuhan. The moment the Premier landed, the Mayor of Wuhan said on television that the news was waiting for authorization from above. Everyone knows who this pot was being passed to. But half a month later, Qiushi magazine published a speech by Xi from February 3, which contained a sentence: on January 7, he presided over a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee and put forward requirements for epidemic prevention and control. He knew about it on January 7, yet Wuhan covered it up for more than half a month. Who exactly did not allow it to be said? After saying that, Wuhan Secretary Ma Guoqiang was removed, and the Hubei Provincial Party Secretary was replaced by Ying Yong, an old subordinate of Xi from Zhejiang. Yet Zhou Xianwang remained and later even became the Vice Chairman of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPPCC. Think about it: if he had really pushed the blame onto Xi, he would have been put inside to shut up long ago; how could he still be outside? Keeping him and even promoting him was because he pushed the pot in the right direction—he pushed it to the State Council and blocked the bullet for the top leadership. In this verdict, there is a phrase: 'voluntarily confessed to most of the bribery facts not yet grasped by the investigating authorities.' The person who blocked the bullet for the top leadership back then has now opened his mouth. He knows better than anyone who did not allow Wuhan to speak about the matter that January. Leaving him a path—fourteen years is not life imprisonment; if he behaves well inside, he can still get a sentence reduction. In the future, when the liquidation group investigates the lockdown, he is a ready-made witness. There is also a point in the seven points about Li Keqiang's suspicious death. Hu Chunhua wants to seek justice for Li Keqiang. That pot that was passed to the State Council back then must also be overturned. Therefore, these 14 years are to keep him alive. The timing of the verdict, just half a month before the plenary session, is intentional. The words are meant for two sides: for Xi, it says, 'The person who knows the inside story of the lockdown is no longer in your hands.' For those around him, it says, 'The price for speaking up is 14 years; those who don't speak up should weigh the consequences themselves.'

How will these seven points be criticized at the plenary session? As usual, group discussions will be held with a dozen or twenty people per group, speaking one by one for several days straight. Whatever anyone says is recorded, and briefing reports are issued. With the seven points placed on the table, every member of the CCP Central Committee must speak up. Following along with the criticism is like submitting a pledge of allegiance; from then on, there is no turning back toward Old Xi. Just imagine, as the seven points are criticized one by one over several days, right up until the final vote, how will the Central Committee members raise their hands? Who would dare leave him any leeway by that point? If Old Xi steps down, it is a complete downfall with no leeway whatsoever. Whether these seven points are ultimately labeled as errors or crimes will no longer be up to him. If he wants to admit to an error, but the meeting is overwhelmingly one-sided and truly condemns him as a criminal, he will only be able to listen. But once a crime is established, will it be announced to the world immediately? Probably not. For a general secretary who has been in power for more than a decade, with two Central Committees having raised their hands under him, suddenly declaring him a criminal is equivalent to saying that the entire CCP over all these years has been completely wrong. Moreover, with only a year left until the 21st National Congress and a leadership transition approaching, the military must be stabilized; the heavens cannot be turned upside down overnight. Therefore, most likely, things will be decided internally while being covered up externally. This cover-up method was used once in February 1980, also at a fifth plenary session. Back then, four people around Hua Guofeng—Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, and Chen Xilian—were first made to resign, and not until the end of the year was it his turn. Behind closed doors, the Political Bureau held nine consecutive meetings to criticize him, criticizing him until the very end when he himself requested to resign as Chairman of the Party and Chairman of the Military Commission. The Political Bureau finalized a single sentence: the work of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the Central Committee shall temporarily be presided over by Hu Yaobang, and the work of the Central Military Commission shall be presided over by Deng Xiaoping, without even using formal titles. The contents of those nine meetings were only communicated to four thousand high-ranking cadres, with strict confidentiality demanded. His title still hung over Hua Guofeng, and it hung there for 206 days, all the way until the Sixth Plenary Session of the following year, when the communique finally published a sentence: the plenary session unanimously agreed to the request of Comrade Hua Guofeng to resign from the posts of Chairman of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This time, they will likely cover it up in the same way, keeping it covered all the way until the 21st National Congress. Outsiders have also figured it out. On the night of the 10th, Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao published a special feature titled "The Plenary Session Focuses on Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party, Unleashing Another Wave of Purges Ahead of the 21st National Congress." "Ahead of the 21st National Congress" means that this account will not be settled all at once at the plenary session, but will continue to be settled until next year. Here in Beijing, the front page of the People’s Daily still features the general secretary’s "people's sentiments," while the person himself does not show his face, though his name is still posted. His disappearance is identical to those 206 days of Hua Guofeng. Alright, that is all for today's chat with everyone. If you find Jiang Feng's words today making sense, please give us a thumbs up, subscribe to Jiang Feng Shi Jie, turn on the little bell, and feel free to share it with friends around you who care about the political situation. That is all for today's Jiang Feng Shi Jie. Thank you for watching, and see you in the next episode.