Peng Liyuan's People Purged, Xi Jinping Plans to Secretly Step Down at the Fifth Plenum; Going Public Must Wait Until the 21st Party Congress; CMC Vacancies Must Be Filled; Jiangsu Party Secretary Trapped, Cai Qi's Arrest Machine Under Investigation [Jiang Feng's View 20261009 Episode 509]

This episode analyzes how the "Shandong Gang" power network, built behind Xi Jinping's governance by Peng Liyuan, is being gradually dismantled by party elders like Wen Jiabao, with multiple key fellow provincial natives and close confidants falling from grace or being reassigned. Meanwhile, the CCP's Fifth Plenum is approaching, facing Central Military Commission replacements and personnel reshuffles; the episode points out that Xi Jinping plans to secretly resign at the Fifth Plenum, with the transition and handover arrangements lasting until the 21st Party Congress next year.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng's Perspective. Over the past decade or so, Xi Jinping has been walking with a crutch; to put it more precisely, Xi Jinping's rule has relied on a massive web cast by Peng Liyuan over these years. Peng Liyuan is from Shandong and places great importance on fellow provincial natives, setting a very low bar—anyone who can trace ancestral roots to Shandong is considered one of their own. Gathering them like this, the top leaders across seven or eight provinces from Beijing to Tibet include her fellow natives, and her people also sit in the central judicial and propaganda organs. So over the past decade or so, Xi and Peng have effectively co-ruled. In the military, this web was cast even deeper. Peng Liyuan enlisted at age eighteen; she knows who controls which factions. The 2016 military reform dismantled the original seven military regions into five theater commands, instantly breaking apart factions across the entire military. That knife was wielded for Xi Jinping by Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, and Xu Qiliang was precisely a Shandong native brought in personally by Peng Liyuan. Xi Jinping's audacity to pursue dictatorship over the past decade was emboldened by Peng Liyuan's web, but this web is now being dismantled piece by piece by Wen Jiabao. In June last year, the party elders established a decision-making and consultation coordination body, with central personnel matters headed and decided by Wen Jiabao. As soon as this body was established, the first person taken down was Ma Xingrui, who had been amassing wealth for Peng Liyuan. In September this year, two of Peng Liyuan's Shandong natives—Wang Junzheng in Tibet and Liang Yanshun in Anhui—were taken down in succession. Just on October 8, the first working day after the holiday, another large chunk of this web was torn open: Jiangsu changed its full-time deputy party secretary and its discipline inspection commission secretary, and earlier on September 14, Jiangsu's organization department head was also replaced. Peng Liyuan's Shandong native Xin Changxing is still sitting in the party secretary's chair, but from now on, who Jiangsu promotes or investigates will no longer be his call. On the same day, two other events occurred: Zhang Shuofu, deputy director of the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress, was placed under investigation. In 2017, when Cai Qi went to Beijing as party secretary, Zhang Shuofu was the Beijing discipline inspection commission secretary who handled arrests for Cai Qi. The other was that Xu Chuanzhi, a former subordinate of Wang Qishan in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, was sentenced to only twelve years in the first instance, with the verdict specifically noting that after being brought in, he voluntarily confessed to most of the criminal facts not yet known to the investigating organs. His wife's faction has scattered, his former subordinate Cai Qi's man was arrested, and his former partner Wang Qishan's man opened his mouth; a comeback for Xi Jinping has become impossible, leaving only one path open for him by the party elders. As we mentioned before, he intends to resign as General Secretary and Central Military Commission Chairman citing health reasons. That still stands, but with one addition: this Fifth Plenum will see a secret resignation, very likely with not a single word published in the communique. A true public announcement will have to wait until next year's 21st Party Congress. With the General Secretary and Central Military Commission Chairman secretly resigned, the title of State President will still be held; he will meet foreign guests as usual, and ordinary people watching TV will see nothing unusual.

So the question arises: why did Jiangsu replace three key officials in just this one month? Why was the former secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, who was under Cai Qi, arrested on the very first day of work after the holiday? Why was Wang Qishan's old subordinate given such a light sentence? And if Xi Jinping resigned, why wouldn't it be published in the official bulletin? The Fifth Plenary Session is set to open on October 26, and there are currently only two people left on the Central Military Commission; who exactly is going to be added in these four days? When people mention the "Shandong Faction," many think of places like Inner Mongolia or Tibet, but the most valuable piece in Peng Liyuan's network is actually Jiangsu. Jiangsu has the second-largest economy in the country, and Suzhou is the most profitable prefecture-level city in China. Liquid capital flows into its factories, foreign trade, and banks every day. Yet, in the thirteen years that Xi has been in power, this major economic province has not produced a single member of the Politburo Standing Committee, except for Ding Xuexiang, whose ancestral home is Jiangsu, and he only entered the Standing Committee at the 20th National Congress; for the first ten years, there were none. The previous two General Secretaries were both from Jiangsu, but under Xi, the chair in Jiangsu has become a place to pad resumes and plant his own people. Li Qiang served as secretary here for less than two years, padded his resume as a top leader, and was promoted to Shanghai. Later, Lou Qinjian sat there for four years, followed by Li Qiang's chief of staff, Wu Zhenglong. Currently, the seat is held by Xin Changxing, who is on the list of the Shandong Faction. The organization department head who was replaced a while ago, Liu Jianyang, was a member of the Fujian Faction. On August 31, Liu Jianyang was taken away by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee held a standing committee meeting that same day. In recent years, there are a few phrases of loyalty that must be written when holding meetings in various places: one is the "Two Establishes," one is the "Two Safeguards," and another is the "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core." That day, Jiangsu wrote all three, and even specifically added a phrase about "maintaining a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core." When trouble happens at home, you shout your loyalty first. On September 14, Hu Lijie came to take over as head of the organization department. This person started his career during the years Li Keqiang was in charge of Liaoning, and was handpicked by Shi Taifeng. Shi Taifeng is the one currently in charge of the Central Organization Department, which I will elaborate on later. This is equivalent to driving a nail into Li Qiang's old base, and once the nail was in, the tone changed. On September 18 and 28, Xin Changxing presided over two standing committee meetings; the "Two Establishes" were gone, the "Two Safeguards" were gone, and the "core" was also gone. The standing committee meeting on the 28th discussed "comprehensively strictly governing the Party," which is the theme of the Fifth Plenary Session. According to the rules of these years, such meetings must put Xi's name at the very front, but in the official press release, only the bare words "Party Central Committee" remained. It also included a sentence about "deepening exchanges and cooperation in areas related to the United States in accordance with the arrangements of the Party Central Committee." For years, Xi has been shouting about struggle and that "the East is rising and the West is declining." When has he ever proactively said he wanted to deepen cooperation with the United States? His name is not mentioned, and the tone toward the U.S. has changed. You can understand what this "Party Central Committee" is arranging as soon as you hear it. Some friends might say that missing a few words in a press release about what was said at a meeting doesn't mean much, but in the CCP officialdom, whether or not to mention Xi's name is never a casual matter. There is a guideline from above, and this guideline has a history. After the Fourth Plenary Session last year, the lecture groups sent down by the military to explain the spirit of the meeting set a rule: only mention the "Party Central Committee," do not mention Xi's name. The military said it first, and now it's the turn of the boss's fellow Shandong villagers to write it this way. On October 8, two more people arrived: Fan Bo, the 57-year-old Suzhou Municipal Party Committee Secretary, was promoted to full-time Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee—the one who doesn't serve as governor but specifically manages party affairs—and Bian Xuewen, the Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, was transferred to Jiangsu to serve as the Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection. Where Bian Xuewen comes from is the most worth thinking about. Heilongjiang is where Li Zhanshu started his career. Xin Changxing is close to Li Zhanshu, and Li Zhanshu can be considered his old backer. In June of this year, Jiang Hongwei, the Deputy Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, fell from grace. Jiang Hongwei was Bian Xuewen's deputy. The deputy fell, but Bian Xuewen was not only fine, he was sent to the second-largest economic province to continue managing discipline, which shows that the people above trust him. Now, the person who managed arrests in the home of Xin Changxing's old backer has moved next door to him, attending meetings in the same conference room every day. Look at this tactic: Xin Changxing himself hasn't moved a hair, he is still the secretary and still presiding over meetings. From the outside, Jiangsu looks calm, but the organization department head, deputy secretary, and discipline inspection secretary by his side are all new faces from this month. From now on, when a vote is taken at the standing committee, the count will no longer be what it used to be. If he wants to promote one of his own people, he won't get past the organization department. If something happens to someone around him, the discipline inspection commission doesn't need to ask for his instructions. By the time Jiangsu holds its provincial party congress at the end of the year, whether he can still be the secretary is no longer up to him.

Some friends might ask what reshuffling a few people in Jiangsu has to do with the "Boss's Wife" (the First Lady). The connection lies in that network, and Jiangsu is just the latest piece being torn away. If you count across the entire network again, you will see the extent to which it has been shredded: after Ma Xingrui, Inner Mongolia's Sun Shaocheng was also double-expelled (stripped of Party membership and public office), completely ending his political career for good. The aforementioned Wang Junzheng and Liang Yanshun had press releases claiming their departures were due to age, but anyone can see that age is just an excuse. Wang Zhonglin of Hubei is the most intriguing: he was promoted early on by Li Keqiang and should have had a clean background, but later got too close to the Shandong faction; with Wang Xiaohong's Minister of Public Security post about to be vacated, the turn ultimately never came to him. Savor the rules at play here: even if you have a clean origin, once you align yourself with the Boss's Wife, that door to move upward gets slammed shut by Wen Jiabao. Look again at the military: Zhong Shaojun served as Old Xi's secretary in Zhejiang, later entered the military to become Director of the Central Military Commission General Office, keeping an eye on both Old Xi and Xu Qiliang for the Boss's Wife; in March 2024, he was ousted from the Central Military Commission, and since then, the Boss's Wife has never set foot inside the building where the Central Military Commission conducts its work. She wanted to extend her reach into the Central Military Commission and directed Miao Hua to first make examples of Defense Minister Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Fenghe to establish authority, but Zhang Youxia didn't buy that at all; with a countermove, Miao Hua himself fell first. At the central level, her fellow provincials still occupy seats in the Supreme People's Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Central Party School, but the regional top leaders have scattered, and the eyes and ears inside the military have been rooted out; the remaining few sitting in Beijing offices can no longer sustain a whole network. Not long ago, outside observers said the Boss's Wife's "coterie of wives" was being purged: Liu Yu's double-expulsion represented the cultural and artistic circle, but the scattering of this cohort in officialdom is what truly broke bones and tore sinews, because the Boss's Wife herself holds no official rank or post within the Party, and her power rested entirely on this group of people. Once her ranks scatter, she remains an imperial consort in title only; from now on, if she wants to speak on someone's behalf or arrange a post, she will find no one left to carry it out. Her crutch was not broken on herself, but on her personnel. Of course, it isn't that not a single one of Old Xi's people is left: on September 22, when Wang Junzheng stepped down, the one taking over Tibet was Hu Changsheng, who had served as Organization Department head and concurrently Deputy Party Secretary of Xiamen in Fujian, belonging to Old Xi's line. Last month's leadership swaps across several provinces came after a round of quarreling between both sides where each yielded a step. So, accurately speaking, the Boss's Wife's regional Shandong faction has disintegrated, while Old Xi's Fujian faction is still bargaining with their rivals. But life is not easy for the Fujian faction either: with his wife's personnel scattered, how are Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, the two old subordinates Old Xi brought out of Fujian, doing right now? On October 8, a seemingly inconspicuous figure was put under investigation, and this blade struck right next to Cai Qi. Let us first talk about Zhang Shuofu. On October 8, Xinhua News Agency and People's Daily Online simultaneously reported that Zhang Shuofu, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress, was undergoing review and investigation. A provincial people's congress vice-chair is supposed to be a second-line retirement post, but if you lay out his entire life, you will understand who this shot was aimed at. Zhang Shuofu, born in 1965 in Changsha, Hunan, came from a water conservancy background and worked his way up step by step from the Hunan Provincial Water Resources Department and the Dongting Lake Water Resources Engineering Administration. Hu Jintao himself graduated from Tsinghua's water conservancy department, and during the Hu-Wen decade, a large cohort of cadres emerged from the water conservancy system. By background, Zhang Shuofu originally belonged to Hu Jintao's camp, but later he pledged allegiance to Old Xi. How did Old Xi use him? In 2015, he dispatched him to Yunnan as Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary; in 2017, he entered Beijing as Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee member and Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary. Why place him in discipline inspection twice in a row? The Discipline Inspection Commission is the knife handle for arresting people; whoever you hand the knife handle to is someone you trust to slash according to your own intentions. With Zhang Shuofu serving as Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary across two terms in Yunnan and Beijing, the career prospects of others all passed through his hands. In officialdom, this is called submitting a pledge of loyalty—using others' official hats to prove that one is firmly committed to Old Xi, cutting off any return path to Hu Jintao's side. In 2017, less than a year after arriving in Beijing, Cai Qi became the Municipal Party Secretary. The first task for a newly arrived secretary is to sit firmly; Beijing's officialdom is deeply entangled, and establishing authority relies on the Discipline Inspection Commission. During those years, the one arresting people and establishing authority in Beijing on Cai Qi's behalf was Zhang Shuofu. What Cai Qi did in Beijing, whom he offended, and how certain matters were suppressed—Zhang Shuofu knew better than anyone. The following year, Zhang Shuofu was promoted to Party Secretary of Guangzhou. Guangdong was where Xi Zhongxun once governed, so Old Xi had to install someone he trusted; later, the indiscriminate cutting down of banyan trees throughout Guangzhou, which sparked national controversy, also occurred during Zhang Shuofu's tenure. When such a figure was investigated on October 8, just imagine how Cai Qi felt inside upon seeing this news. Cai Qi is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee; moving against him directly requires a major procedure, but moving against his former Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary only requires a single announcement. This is sawing off the branches one by one—when the tree trunk stands there alone, it can no longer stand firm on its own.

On the same day, there was another case that went in the exact opposite direction. Xu Chuanzhi, a former deputy ministerial-level inspection commissioner of the Central Inspection Team, was sentenced to twelve years in the first instance. Born in 1957, he joined the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) right after graduating from university and worked there for over thirty years before leaving in 2016. During the five years that Wang Qishan headed the CCDI, Xu worked directly under him. This case resulted in a surprisingly light sentence: for the two crimes of accepting bribes of over 25 million yuan and abusing influence to accept bribes, he was sentenced to twelve years with a fine of 1.5 million yuan. In recent years, there have been many cases with similar amounts that resulted in sentences of over a decade or even twenty years. Why was this one sentenced this way? As mentioned earlier, the verdict specifically included a phrase. Normally, a judgment only needs to state that the defendant pleaded guilty, showed remorse, and actively returned the illicit gains, with the reasons for leniency usually covered in a few words. However, this verdict explicitly wrote out the words 'matters not yet grasped by the investigating authorities.' This is written for outsiders to see. The phrase 'matters not yet grasped' carries significant weight. A person who worked in the CCDI for over thirty years knows far more than the small amount of bribes he accepted. The verdict does not mention a single word about what he confessed or whom he implicated, but the light sentence itself is a message. To whom is this message directed? Those in the know understand immediately that it is meant for Wang Qishan. Of course, we cannot assert that Xu Chuanzhi traded information about Wang Qishan for these twelve years, but the timing—the verdict was announced eighteen days before the Fifth Plenary Session—and the location—Ningbo, Zhejiang, which is Li Qiang's old power base—are telling. These two coincidences are aimed at two different people: the message to Wang Qishan is that the person who worked under you for thirty years has already opened his mouth, and you have no idea what he said; the message to Li Qiang is that the case is being tried in your old territory, letting you see with your own eyes what someone who opens their mouth can get in return. A few days later, the former Inner Mongolia Chairwoman Wang Lixia will also be sentenced; she is on the list of those whose punishments are to be ratified at the Fifth Plenary Session. If you look at these three events together—one who followed Xi Jinping was arrested, one who opened his mouth received leniency, and one is about to be made an example of—with eighteen days left until the Fifth Plenary Session, there are about two hundred Central Committee members and one hundred and seventy alternate members sitting in the venue. These three events are a performance for them. They can see clearly what happens to those who follow Xi to the end and what happens to those who speak up early. When they get to the venue, they will naturally know how to raise their hands. As for Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong themselves? Cai Qi is nominally still a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, but he has basically not been doing the work of the General Office lately; even tasks like visiting North Korea have been transferred to Wang Huning. He still sits in that chair, but he is no longer allowed to do the work. On Wang Xiaohong's side, on the same day of September 9, Beijing Public Security Bureau Chief Qin Yunbiao entered the Ministry of Public Security as a Vice Minister, and Gao Qi joined the Ministry of Public Security's Party Committee as a counter-terrorism commissioner—nominally in charge of counter-terrorism, but actually keeping an eye on the situation in Southeast Asia. Recently, news about Southeast Asian telecom fraud has been coming out one after another, and the issues involving those cross-border criminal syndicates and Wang Xiaohong will sooner or later be pinned on him. Some friends might ask, will Xi Jinping come forward to persuade these two old subordinates to resign voluntarily? To persuade someone, you have to offer them something. Xi himself is about to resign secretly; what does he have to protect these two? The only thing he can do is not protect them; the arrest of Zhang Shuofu was the first signal of this. The military is currently most on guard against these two people. The military suffered a loss when Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were taken down in January this year. Around the time of the Fifth Plenary Session this time, the guns are aimed at preventing Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong from causing any more trouble. Throughout his life, whenever Xi Jinping reaches a critical juncture, he always pushes those around him out first. This time, the ones carrying the burden for his decade-long mess are Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong. Now that Chen Xi has long since retired from the Politburo and the boss's wife's faction has scattered, Cai Qi is not even allowed to do the work of the General Office, and people have been inserted around Wang Xiaohong. The only calculation left for Xi is to resign, but it cannot be written into the communiqué. As for why it cannot be written into the communiqué, we will discuss that in detail in a moment.

Let me chat with you for a moment. Once October arrives, it gets chilly in the mornings and evenings. After a busy day, staring at your phone to check these news updates makes you feel exhausted and strains your eyes. Jiang Feng's own small shop, Jiang Feng Youpin, has two items that are just right. One is the Seven-Herb Black Paste Capsules; take three at a time to replenish energy and maintain stamina. Friends who often feel their energy lagging or have trouble recovering from fatigue can use these as a foundation. To thank you for your support, they are now 45% off at $166 per bottle, and if you buy three, you get a box of German vitamins for free. The other item is the Eye-Brightening Cold Compress Eye Mask. Applying it before bed makes the area around your eyes feel cool, and it significantly relieves the dryness and fatigue from staring at screens all day. A box is a ten-day supply and costs less than $30. The shop also has sleep-aid capsules and Italian coffee beans. Click the link to Jiang Feng Youpin in the pinned comment below the video to browse at your leisure. Pregnant women should not use the eye masks, and friends who are pregnant or taking medication long-term should consult a doctor before using health supplements. Alright, let's get back to it. Let's clarify how this secret works. The Fifth Plenary Session lasts four days. At the meeting, Xi Jinping hands over his positions as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the Central Committee members raise their hands to approve it. Once the meeting concludes on October 29, the communique released will likely contain a decision on strict party governance, confirming disciplinary actions against certain individuals and filling vacancies in the Military Commission, but it will notably lack the words 'Xi Jinping has resigned.' On television, he will still be Chairman Xi, meeting foreign guests and giving speeches as usual. By the time the new General Secretary is elected next autumn at the 21st National Congress, and his name is not on the list, it will look to the outside world like a normal transition of power, a smooth handover. From beginning to end, there will never be a day where his resignation is announced. Some friends might say this is too bizarre—can a resignation be hidden for a year? In fact, this was already played out once last year. During the Fourth Plenary Session last October, there were specific reports that Xi Jinping made a self-criticism at the meeting and handed over both the General Secretary and Military Commission Chairman roles, with party affairs managed by Wang Yang and military affairs by Liu Yuan. Yet, if you open the Fourth Plenary communique, there isn't a single word about it. People outside the Great Firewall jumped out to say he was fine and nothing had happened. This time is merely a more thorough performance of last year's play. So why would the party elders help him hide it? The first reason is the economy. Everyone knows what the Chinese economy is like right now—deflation, debt, young people unable to find jobs, and capital flight. This isn't something that will get better overnight just by changing one person. Personnel can be replaced in a night, and military control can be seized at any moment, but the economy can only be endured slowly. If the communique announced Xi's resignation, the ledger would be flipped immediately. From the next day on, this mess would be blamed on his successor, Hu Chunhua. Therefore, letting Xi stand at the front for a while longer ensures he bears the burden of this disaster. The second reason is that there are still many people underneath who believe in him. Outside the system, there is a large group of people who watch state media commentators and patriotic bloggers every day, believing in the 'East rising and West falling' narrative and the rise of a great power, feeling that this Party is this country. If someone who has been held up to the heavens for over a decade is suddenly announced to be stepping down, the idol in these people's hearts would collapse instantly. The elders fear most that these 'Little Pinks' might have their faith shattered overnight and cause unpredictable trouble. Hu Jintao has always lived by the motto that 'family scandals should not be made public'; even if the Party is in chaos, it must appear stable and united to the outside world. The third reason is appearances. The title of President is still useful. China is currently isolated internationally; if the change of leadership were made public, every country would have to re-evaluate whether their deals with China still hold. Letting Xi keep the title of President to meet guests and attend meetings maintains the facade while the people inside are slowly replaced. So why wait until the 21st National Congress? Because the elders want a smooth transition. The decision-making body the elders set up is essentially preparing the way for Hu Chunhua, like a tutor for a crown prince. Personnel are being sorted out layer by layer, cadres are being placed one by one, and the economic foundation is being stabilized. By the time the 21st National Congress arrives, everything will be ready. On that day, Xi won't need to announce his resignation; he will simply reach his stop and get off the train. Historically, Hua Guofeng stepped down exactly like this—it wasn't made public until more than half a year later. This time, the elders intend to stretch that period out even longer.

Then the question arises: since the resignation is kept from the public, what on earth are these four days of the Fifth Plenum supposed to accomplish? Let’s first look at a roster—the Central Military Commission (CMC). At the 20th Party Congress, the CMC had seven members in total: Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, and members Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin, filling every single seat. Now, count them again: out of seven chairs, only two people are left sitting—Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin. This is precisely one thing that the Fifth Plenum absolutely must do. If Xi Jinping is to hand over the CMC chairmanship, someone has to take that chair. Right now, with only two people left on the CMC, fighting wars, deploying troops, managing generals—none of it can function at all. Candidates for the Central Military Commission can only be decided by a Central Committee Plenum; no other meeting has that authority. Therefore, during these four days, everything else can be put on the back burner, but these vacant chairs on the CMC simply must be filled. Who will fill them? As mentioned earlier, Hu Chunhua will enter the CMC first. His current official title is still Vice Chairman of the National CPPCC, but there is a nuance here: Hu Chunhua can enter the CMC without having to enter the Politburo first. The party elders simply do not recognize this 20th Politburo, believing it was formed in violation of party rules by Old Xi without formal Central Committee decision-making. That is why during last year’s Fourth Plenum, not a single person was added to the Politburo; this time is the same—they may leave the Politburo untouched for now and seize control of the gun first. Beyond filling CMC seats, these four days have two other items on the agenda. One is settling accounts: disciplinary actions against a batch of Central Committee members—Ma Xingrui, Sun Shao騁, Wang Lixia, Yi Huiman, plus Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli—need to be packaged and retroactively endorsed by the plenum. The second is laying down rules: the official title of what is to be passed at the meeting has long been set as the *Decision on Persistently Promoting Several Major Issues of Comprehensive and Strict Party Governance*—it is a 'decision,' not a 'historical resolution.' What these four days of the plenum will most likely accomplish is settling accounts, filling seats, and establishing rules; the true handover will not take place at the Fifth Plenum, but at the 21st Party Congress next autumn. And how was that roster written in the first place? The 20th Party Congress was held in October 2022, but Old Xi had already formed a cadre inspection leading group back in March 2021 specifically to handpick the next term's lineup, with himself as the group leader. That summer, 45 inspection teams were dispatched in three batches, visiting all 31 provinces without exception, investigating each one to see who could be used and who could not. By April of the following year, Old Xi took the field in person, summoning a total of 30 incumbent Politburo members, Secretariat secretaries, the Vice President, and CMC members one by one for individual talks. Many of these 30 people were themselves candidates on the next term's list. The congress was not held until October, yet the work on the roster had begun a year and a half in advance. Old Xi valued this roster more than anyone else. Before the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the CCP tried holding a meeting to vote on recommendations: over four hundred people, including Central Committee members, alternate members, and relevant responsible comrades, sat in a single hall, each holding a ballot printed with the names of nearly 200 ministerial- and theater-command-level cadres. Everyone ticked boxes for who could newly enter the Politburo, and those with more votes were ranked near the top. In 2012, at the 18th Party Congress, they did it again, including votes for Politburo Standing Committee members as well. In 2017, Old Xi abolished voting and replaced it with individual consultation talks, on the grounds that vote-canvassing was taking place—Zhou Yongkang and Sun Zhengcai had both engaged in canvassing and vote-buying during meeting recommendations. A vote meant four hundred-odd people each cast their own ballot; a consultation talk meant one person sat there listening, and once done listening, he alone made the decision. What about this time? In February of this year, the CCDI, the Central Organization Department, and the National Supervisory Commission jointly issued a notice: leadership teams at all levels, from province down to township, would sequentially undergo reshuffling. Provincial-level party congresses began late this month in Henan and are scheduled all the way through the end of the year. Old Xi's home turf of Fujian and Li Qiang's roots in Jiangsu are both convening during these final two or three months of the year. The provincial party committees elected in this round will go on next year to select delegates to the 21st Party Congress and recommend candidates for the Central Committee. In other words, the draft of next year's master list is being drafted right now during this year-end round of reshuffles. Whoever occupies the provincial seat overseeing personnel matters this year will hold the pen that drafts the roster next year. Through whose hands will the draft pass? In Jiangsu, there is Hu Lijie, as mentioned just now. On that same day, September 14, the head of the Fujian Organization Department was replaced by Xu Qingsen, and the vacant post of Shanxi Organization Department head was taken over by Zhao Hongyan. All three were born in the 1970s, two are female cadres, and behind all of them lies the Li Keqiang faction. Xu Qingsen served for many years as the Personnel Department Director at the Ministry of Education, dealing with cadre dossiers his entire career. Zhao Hongyan was sent to Shanxi for grassroots tempering before Li Keqiang retired. Fujian is Old Xi's power base, Jiangsu is Li Qiang's roots, yet the chairs in charge of the roster are filled with Li Keqiang’s people. Why specifically those born in the 1970s? The decade when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao governed was precisely when this group was climbing from the division level up to the bureau and department levels. Then Li Keqiang served as Premier for another ten years. Today, the core of 1970s-born cadres was cultivated under Hu, Wen, and Li. Going higher up, the head of the Central Organization Department is Shi Taifeng, a Peking University law graduate and a classmate of Li Keqiang. He also served for many years at the Central Party School as deputy to President Hu Jintao. The Central Party School has a nickname, the 'Second Central Organization Department'; Shi Taifeng worked there, so he already carries a mental ledger of who belongs to which camp among party cadres without needing to check. Hu Jintao was a person who did not meddle much in other affairs, focusing solely on personnel; in his view, as long as the right people were placed in the right positions, everything else would naturally fall into place. According to the timeline from five years ago, the inspection for the 21st Party Congress should have been well underway by now. Five years ago, the leader of that inspection leading group was Old Xi himself. This time around, the authorities have not uttered a single word about who the group leader is. But one thing is clearly visible: those who rose to power through faction-building will have no place on the roster going forward.

Finally, back to the First Lady. Old Xi learned from Mao Zedong's mistakes. Mao let Jiang Qing into the Politburo but didn't give her a position on the Central Military Commission, so as soon as Mao was gone, Jiang Qing had no soldiers or officers under her command and was arrested within a month. This time, it's different for Old Xi. The First Lady joined the army at eighteen, was promoted to major general before the 20th National Congress, and even entered the military cadre assessment committee. If she had taken one more step to become a general and a member of the Central Military Commission, the Party would have truly become the Xi family's domain. It was people like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, who have actually fought in wars, who didn't yield that step to her. Later, the party elders pulled down her fellow Shandong natives one by one. The only person left who wanted to get into the Central Military Commission was just there to help Old Xi walk up and down the stairs, and now even this walking stick has been broken. If Old Xi retires, he might be able to protect her, but the web she has cast throughout her life can never be reeled back in, and next year, that list for the 21st National Congress will fall into the hands of people brought up by Li Keqiang. Do you have any friends inside the system? What kind of people have been promoted in your area during this round of leadership changes? Feel free to share in the comments section. If you found today's episode interesting, please like, subscribe, and hit the notification bell. Also, share it with friends who care about China. That is all for today's Jiang Feng Vision. Thank you for watching, and see you in the next episode.