Xi Jinping Forced to Step Down, Wen Jiabao Gets the Toughest Leverage! Offshore Trusts Traced Before the Fifth Plenum — Qi Qiaqiao, Deng Jiagui, Xu Zaisheng, and the BVI White Gloves of the Xi Family All Exposed; The US to Reveal Politburo Wealth by Year-End — Are Xi's Loyalists Turning Against Him to Save Themselves? [Jiang Feng Vision 20261008 Episode 508]
This episode analyzes the deep-seated reasons and political maneuvers behind the abdication of Xi Jinping. The Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation of China issued Announcement No. 21 to investigate the ultimate beneficial owners of offshore trusts. Coupled with the US Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act which will make the wealth of the Politburo public, facing pressure from both inside and outside, the commercial network surrounding the family of Xi Jinping is facing comprehensive penetration and liquidation, which has become a key leverage for the redistribution of power within the party and the forcing of Xi's step-down.
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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng Horizon. Yesterday we discussed that the stepping down of the person at the very top has already entered the practical implementation stage. Today, Jiang Feng will reveal to you why he has to step down and whose grip is choking his fatal weakness. Let's state the conclusion right here: if Xi does not step down, his family fortune will be upended; not only will he lose his position, but his family's assets, white-glove agents, and overseas assets will be turned over layer by layer and then completely confiscated. What we are discussing today is a political deduction based on the newly published Chinese fiscal and tax regulations, the historical asset network of the family of Xi, relevant US laws, and the background of the power struggle at the Fifth Plenary Session. One knife has just dropped, and another knife has long been set in place, and now they happen to collide right before the Fifth Plenary Session. The first knife is in Beijing's own hands: on July 24, 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation jointly issued Announcement No. 21, starting to pierce through overseas trusts and various deformed arrangements to reach the ultimate beneficial owner. It doesn't matter if the name is not yours, and it doesn't matter how many layers of companies are in between; as long as the money is actually put up by you, the risks are actually borne by you, and you are ultimately the one in control, this account can be traced all the way back to the true owner. And that ninety-day reporting window hits the deadline on October 22. The second knife is across the ocean: the US Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act has taken effect, requiring an investigation into the wealth of the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and even the entire Politburo, and demanding the tracing of those true owners hidden behind business tycoons, financial agents, commercial partners, and offshore entities. Therefore, what is most worth examining today is that these two systems, one domestic and one foreign, have provided a ready-made tool for the power struggle in Zhongnanhai—the domestic side can investigate ultimate beneficial owners, and the foreign side can expose white-glove agents. Yesterday we talked about how Old Xi has reached the step of exiting the stage, and today we will dig further into what has caused him to start losing even the capital that allows him to refuse stepping down.
Let's first look at the fire that is currently burning right under our noses. On October 7, the Financial Times published a very significant report with a title that could not be more direct: Tax officials are targeting China's offshore wealth. The report revealed that Beijing is conducting a large-scale investigation into the overseas investments, trusts, and undeclared income of wealthy Chinese individuals. What has truly made private banks and family offices in Hong Kong and Singapore uneasy is a deadline that is fast approaching: October 22. On July 24 of this year, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration issued Announcement No. 21, providing a 90-day window to settle relevant overseas income that had not been properly handled in previous years. Once these 90 days are up, the issue will no longer be whether to voluntarily disclose, but rather the tax authorities beginning to pursue payments in accordance with the Tax Collection and Administration Law. Back taxes, late fees, and fines—any of these can follow. The Financial Times also disclosed a detail worth noting: Chinese financial institutions are re-examining the overseas investments and declarations of high-net-worth clients, with some audits going as far back as 2000. A tech investor interviewed stated bluntly that regulatory authorities hold the investment and capital systems; if they really want to act, they have the ability to pry open those trusts layer by layer. In recent weeks, government departments have also begun directly contacting individuals. An executive at a Beijing internet company was contacted by local development and reform commissions and other departments, requiring them to address relevant overseas tax issues. This shows that the matter is no longer just a new regulation on paper; the administrative machine has begun to descend upon individuals.
On the surface, this set of rules is easy to explain: local governments are short of money, the national treasury is short of money, and Beijing naturally needs to find new sources of tax revenue. Coupled with the talk of "common prosperity" in recent years, the overseas income of the wealthy has naturally become the easiest piece of fat to target. But what we really need to look at today is how far this new regulation actually reaches. The most ruthless sentence in Announcement No. 21 is that it no longer recognizes only the names on business registrations. The document explicitly stipulates that so-called offshore trusts include not only things honestly written as "Trust" in legal documents, but also foundations, special purpose entities, and family arrangements you might set up under different names; as long as they are essentially doing the same thing, they can be included. For those who used to rely on layering multiple companies, switching jurisdictions, and hiding names behind the Cayman Islands, BVI, or Singapore, thinking everything was fine, there is now a very troublesome problem: tax authorities can continue to ask who this money really belongs to. Next, the second point is even more critical: if an individual transfers property through other individuals or organizations, as long as the property is actually funded, borne, and controlled by the person themselves, tax law can deem that the property is still yours. Translated into plain language, this means names can be changed, people can be changed, and shells can be changed, but who provided the money, who is managing it, and who ultimately benefits—all of this can continue to be investigated. Further down, Article 14 also defines "control" in great detail: holding more than 25% of equity, voting rights, or income rights directly or indirectly counts as control. Even if the percentage is not reached, as long as there is substantive dominance in key links such as capital, operations, procurement, sales, and distribution, one can still be identified as the controller.
Friends, this is where it gets interesting. In the past, what the Chinese power elite were best at was separating ownership from control. The company name is not mine, the shares are not mine, and the chairman is not my person, but I can make calls on financing, I can approve projects, and the profits can ultimately return to me. From the outside, it looks like a private entrepreneur; from the inside, the hand that can truly decide life and death is not at the front desk. Now, Announcement No. 21 is asking exactly whether the front desk and the backstage are the same thing. Some might say this is just a set of tax collection rules; it is still a long way from confiscating family assets. That is true. Looking at this announcement alone, it primarily deals with declarations, back taxes, late fees, and fines. There is not a single word in black and white that says to loot the entire family property of any leader. But the true power of the CCP's machine is that it does not rely on a single document to handle everything. Tax authorities first find the actual controller, banks dig out the capital flows, and foreign exchange departments match the cross-border routes. If further investigations reveal tax evasion, illegal transfers, or the delivery of benefits from unknown sources, the discipline inspection, economic investigation, and judicial systems can naturally take over. Once it reaches that point, the issue changes from a tax bill to the nature of the assets, and from the nature of the assets to illegal gains. Assets that should be frozen will be frozen, those that should be recovered will be recovered, and those that should be confiscated will be confiscated. The whole chain is connected just like that. Therefore, when we say today that if Xi does not step down, assets will be confiscated, we mean that this system has opened the entrance to finding the true owners. As long as political infighting truly moves toward liquidation, the CCP will not lack any of the tools needed to follow through.
What is more ironic is that this machine has been sharpened over the past thirteen years. During the years when the boss was in power, layers of financial regulation, foreign exchange controls, bank credit lines, anti-money laundering, and tax big data were added one after another. If someone's overseas acquisitions were too aggressive, their credit lines were investigated; if someone's capital was moving out too fast, their foreign exchange was blocked; if someone's enterprise was disobedient, the bank would turn off the tap, and bosses with hundreds of billions in net worth would have to immediately scramble for cash to survive. Wang Jianlin is a ready-made example. In May 2017, he was still sitting next to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib, high-profilely discussing the Bandar Malaysia project, an overseas project worth tens of billions of dollars. By June, the financial system began to investigate the credit risks of several major overseas acquisition players such as Wanda, HNA, Anbang, and Fosun. By July, Wanda suddenly put more than 70 hotels and a dozen cultural tourism projects on the table, with a total transaction scale of more than 60 billion yuan. Whether Bandar Malaysia was the final straw, no one today can produce a directive from Zhongnanhai to prove it, but these forty-some days left a lesson that all Chinese bosses could understand: how much your enterprise is worth is one thing, and whether the financial system is still willing to give you oxygen is another. Bank credit is not yours; it is lent to you by power. Back then, the handle of the knife was in the hands of the boss, and the purses of many old capitalists and old elites were tightened one by one in this way. But if the power at the highest level really begins to be redistributed after the Fourth Plenary Session, the most troublesome thing will come. The laws have not changed, the banks have not changed, the tax system has not changed, and the big data has not changed. All that needs to change is the hand holding the knife. The same set of rules that could be used to investigate others yesterday can of course be turned around today to question the boss's family. The names of your family have indeed faded from industrial and commercial registrations in recent years; some companies have been sold, some shares have been transferred, and some people have retreated from the front stage. But what Announcement No. 21 is now questioning is not the names at all; it is asking who actually provided the money, who the company really listens to, and whose pocket the profits ultimately ended up in. Once these three questions are poked into the asset network that the boss's family has built over the past twenty years, the real trouble will not be that tax payment notice on October 22. To answer these three questions, one must dig back into the commercial network that has surrounded the First Family for over twenty years.
Today, we will not tell stories based on a list of the boss's family assets circulating on the internet. We will start with things that can be found in black and white in securities documents, company archives, and international investigation materials, and then move layer by layer toward those relationships that are not written in industrial and commercial registrations. First, let's look at the brother-in-law closest to the boss, Deng Jiagui. For years, the official propaganda system has been trying hard to shape a narrative that the eldest sister's family had long ago disposed of their past businesses. But if we pull the timeline to 2024, the records left in the public capital market show that things are not that clean and neat. As of 2024, Shenzhen Yuanwei Investment Co., Ltd. still publicly appeared on the shareholder list of Guodu Securities. This company holds more than 192.91 million shares of Guodu Securities, accounting for about 3.31% of the total share capital. On March 29, 2024, Zheshang Securities signed a share transfer agreement with Yuanwei and several other shareholders. The price of the shares in Yuanwei's hands was 2.673 yuan per share, with a total price of more than 515.64 million yuan. What is truly worth noting here is not just the more than 500 million yuan; publicly disclosed materials show that one can still trace Yuanwei Investment back to Deng Jiagui all the way. In other words, at least until 2024, the eldest sister's family had not completely disappeared from the public commercial world. We certainly cannot say because of this that every cent of Yuanwei's money is the boss's own money—those are two different things—but if someone wants to investigate the asset network around the First Family, Yuanwei is definitely not an old business card that has already been thrown into the shredder.
Next up, this person is even more interesting: Xu Zaisheng. On October 8, 2013, a critical equity change took place at Beijing Qinchuan Dadi Investment Co., Ltd. Ownership of the company, which was previously closely tied to Qi Qiaoqiao and Deng Jiagui, was transferred to Xu Zaisheng. Later, New York Times investigative reporter Michael Forsythe specifically tracked this person down and found that Xu was not a random stranger who suddenly popped up in the market; he had been working in Qi and Deng's Shenzhen Yuanwei system since 2000, following them for thirteen years, and had also served as a legal representative or director in other companies of theirs. Forsythe was very cautious at the time, stating one couldn't say those shares still belonged to the eldest sister, but such a transfer relationship deserved suspicion. Friends, looking at this sentence in the year 2026, it has a completely different flavor. Thirteen years ago, the only question outsiders could ask was whether this was a real sale or a nominee holding. Today, Announcement No. 21 provides regulators with an extra set of questions: whoever provides the money bears the risk, and whoever exercises actual control ultimately takes the profits. In other words, Xu Zaisheng holding 100% of the shares on the industrial and commercial registration is only the first layer of the answer; what really needs to be pierced through is the second layer. What is even more coincidental is that the name Xu Zaisheng appeared again ten years later. In September 2024, official Beijing civilization system reports showed that a Xu Zaisheng, who serves as the general manager of Beijing Zhongminxin Real Estate Development Co., Ltd., donated 140,000 RMB to Cixiaotang in a village in Pinggu. Meanwhile, administrative licensing data from the Xicheng District Government of Beijing for 2018 and 2019 show that the legal representative of Beijing Zhongminxin is named Qi Lianxin. In long-term public investigative reports, Qi Lianxin is widely identified as an alias used by the eldest sister in the business world. Although there is currently no ID number or other unique identifying information to nail down 100% that the Zhongminxin general manager in 2024 and the Xu Zaisheng who took over Qinchuan Dadi in 2013 are the exact same person, the clues are already glaring. The same name connects on one end to the core equity transfer of Qi and Deng's old company, and on the other end appears ten years later in another company intersecting with the Qi family's historical commercial network. If the two Xu Zaishengs are indeed the same person, then this is no longer a business that was finished and dissolved thirteen years ago, but a commercial relationship spanning over twenty years. This is precisely where piercing through to the actual controller is best applied. Wang Jianlin's remarks back then also left a very interesting piece of circumstantial evidence for this history. In 2015, when asked at Harvard about that relative acquiring shares in Wanda, he did not deny that Qinchuan Dadi had once invested in Wanda, but instead emphasized that the shares had since been transferred, explaining the matter as strict family discipline. Back then, everyone argued over whether it was sold or not; today, the new regulations will truly pursue another question: who was it sold to, and did the real interest relationship completely sever after the sale? This is a question Wang Jianlin did not answer back then.
Moving another layer inward leads from Beijing and Shenzhen to the British Virgin Islands, where a BVI company named Excellence Effort Property Development Limited directly appears in the listing documents of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The document clearly states that Excellence Group holds 50%, while the other 50% is held by Deng Jiagui. The offshore data subsequently published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) completes this connection further: Deng Jiagui is both a director and a shareholder of this BVI company, while the other side connects to an offshore structure controlled by the brothers Li Hua and Li Xiaoping. This layer is no longer an urban legend; the elder brother's brother-in-law and the Shenzhen large-scale real estate developer Li Hua's brothers once jointly owned a BVI company with a 50-50 split, which is a matter of public record. As for another set of rumors circulating overseas, a considerable portion of Excellence Group's deeper interests was allegedly held on behalf of the Deng family for a long time; currently, there is no beneficial ownership agreement or judicial document to substantiate this claim, so this part can only be discussed as a black-box leak. Yet precisely because that nominee-holding agreement is absent, the three characters of the actual controller in 2026 appear particularly glaring, because the new logic of penetration never asks whether you dare to print the three characters Deng Jiagui in the company's annual report; it asks something entirely different: where the capital comes from, who calls the shots on major matters, and where the benefits ultimately flow. Therefore, the Excellence pipeline regains its value today because a 50-50 offshore capital cross-ownership truly existed between Xi Jinping's core in-laws and this large private enterprise. Next, let us look at rare earths, a topic that makes daily international news. In 2008, Shanghai Dynasty Investment, controlled by Deng Jiagui, spent 450 million yuan to acquire a 30% stake in the Jiangxi Rare Earth and Rare Metals Tungsten Industry Group. Calculated according to the shareholding structure at the time, Deng Jiagui thereby formed an indirect interest of about 18%. This investment was later exited, so today one cannot casually claim that Jiangxi Rare Earth still belongs to the Xi family, but the history itself is already interesting enough. Today, as Beijing negotiates chip tariffs and supply chains with the United States, rare earths are one of the most frequently played strategic cards in hand; yet looking back over a decade, the brother-in-law did indeed put real money into this industry back then, investing directly into an important resource platform like Jiangxi Rare Earth. Timewise, this investment fell precisely during the period when China was gradually tightening its production and export management of rare earths, and rare earth prices subsequently rose sharply. Thus, the truly worth-remembering picture is that the Xi family's in-laws indeed engaged in major business in the past involving one of the nation's most sensitive strategic resources. Moving further along, we arrive at Hengli, the target that requires the closest monitoring today. Hengli's rise has indeed been astonishing: in 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) gave its in-principle approval to Hengli's integrated refining project on Changxing Island in Dalian, utilizing 20 million tons of imported crude oil annually. Caixin's report at the time directly referred to it as the first major petrochemical project opened by the state to private enterprises. Where did the money come from? The support from the China Development Bank (CDB) presents a clearer picture. In 2018, building upon its initial commitment of a syndicated loan totaling 17.8 billion yuan in both RMB and foreign currency, the CDB led the formation of the largest syndicated loan in the Dalian region at the time in less than three months: 31 billion RMB plus 1.2 billion US dollars, in addition to another 3 billion RMB and 300 million US dollars in working capital loans. The NDRC subsequently explicitly stated that this project belonged to the major petrochemical industry layout projects deliberated and approved by the State Council Executive Meeting, becoming the first private integrated refining project among the seven major petrochemical industry bases to be completed and put into operation. Moving to 2022, Hengli entered the shipbuilding sector. The massive shipbuilding assets of STX Dalian in South Korea had been bankrupt and idle for many years, failing to sell through multiple auctions. In the fifth round of the disposal phase for the relevant bankrupt assets, a company under Hengli ultimately acquired the idle assets of STX Dalian Shipbuilding and others for a total of 1.729 billion yuan, subsequently restarting the base. Some claim the government gave away 20 billion yuan worth of assets to Hengli for 1.7 billion; in reality, these were bankrupt assets that had remained idle for many years and went through multiple rounds of failed auctions. The question truly worth asking is another: why was Hengli able to continuously cross so many capital and policy thresholds—from refining, crude oil, and state development finance to large-scale shipbuilding—with each step scaling up to a new tier? Public data can prove the national-level projects, crude oil usage rights, and massive financial support; beyond that lies the realm of black-box leaks. There is a very specific version circulating overseas claiming that when Chen Jianhua and Fan Hongwei encountered a corporate crisis around 2016, they used connections to reach Mr. and Mrs. Deng Jiagui, resulting in an arrangement of frontline management with backstage profit-sharing, with some even directly citing a 50% proportion. Today, this 50% has no industrial and commercial documents, no bank beneficial ownership data, and no court documents to officially stamp it, so we cannot treat the notion that half of Hengli belongs to the Xi family as verified fact; yet neither can we discard this thread simply because that piece of paper is missing, because the rules Beijing itself has just established today do precisely one thing: do not just show me the list of industrial and commercial shareholders; I want to know who is truly in control.
This is the reason why this revelation about Hengli has become sensitive again today. If it were just a story fabricated by overseas independent media, there would be nothing to find upon investigation. However, if there truly exists profit-sharing, hidden shareholding, or nominee holding behind the scenes, the safest practice in the past was to never let the name appear. Yet, the three most dangerous words today happen to be 'actual controller.' So, friends, if you look at this whole circle, you will find a very distinct change in the Xi family's business relationships. In the early years, Deng Jiagui opened his own companies, entered the rare earth industry, and made his own investments, with his name still on the surface. Later, more and more, we saw long-term subordinates, private entrepreneurs, BVI company funds, and other business partners appearing. Of course, this cannot prove that everyone standing around is a white glove, but conversely, if one were to investigate white gloves, one could only start by checking those who have already left real capital intersections. Now that Beijing has just opened the door to 'actual controller' disclosures, and the U.S. side is preparing to investigate financial agents and business partners, the real trouble begins right here.
After discussing the power struggles of these elites amidst the turbulent waves, we ordinary people must realize even more that fame, fortune, and status are fleeting. In these volatile times, protecting the vitality and well-being of ourselves and our families is the only true blessing that no one can take away.
Because just across the ocean, the United States has already set up another set of machinery, and time is moving forward. Section 6704 of the U.S. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 has officially taken effect. The law gives the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) a deadline of one year—meaning no later than December 18 of this year—to place a report on the wealth of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party on the public ODNI website. Because the law explicitly requires the public version to be published in an unclassified form, the copy sent to Congress can include an additional classified appendix. Who are they investigating? First is the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, followed by the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and then expanding outward to the entire Political Bureau of the Central Committee. This is critical because this time the Americans are not satisfied with just listing a property inventory showing how many houses and bank accounts someone has; the law requires tracing assets directly or indirectly controlled, domestic and overseas real estate, high-value personal property, overseas investments, and financial accounts, and specifically points out three types of people and institutions: financial agents, business partners, and companies and entities specifically used to hide the real owners. Friends, as soon as these three terms come out, the layers of BVI entities and various long-term business partners belonging to Xu Zaisheng and Zhuoyue that we discussed earlier immediately connect with this U.S. law. Furthermore, Section 6704 specifically demands something else: unclassified information. Of course, U.S. intelligence agencies still need to protect intelligence sources and methods, but this sentence itself has made it very clear that this report cannot rely solely on piecing together Google, corporate annual reports, and real estate websites; it is inherently designed to ingest materials that the outside world normally cannot see. In March 2025, ODNI actually submitted a basic version. When discussing the family of the big boss, that report was very cautious. Public data showed that as of 2024, his family still maintained commercial interests and financial investments worth millions of dollars, but existing data could not directly prove that those assets belonged to that person himself. In other words, the Americans already knew what money existed around them at that time; what was truly lacking was that final connecting thread: how this money is actually linked to the top power holder himself, who is holding it on whose behalf, and who the ultimate beneficiary really is. This is what is most worth looking at today. The United States does not lack laws nor the technology to investigate overseas banks, real estate, and offshore companies; what it truly lacks are those pages of accounts inside Zhongnanhai that outsiders can never get. If a company registration lists Zhang San, the United States can investigate it; it can also investigate which senior official Zhang San has had dinner with. But whether the 30% stake in Zhang San's hands actually belongs to himself or was held on behalf of a certain family ten years ago, who the true oral beneficiary of a certain trust is, and which sum of money was detoured from Hong Kong to Singapore before entering a fund under the name of a confidant—the people who know these things best are those who used to handle matters for them, people in the banks, people in the discipline inspection system, and people who hold the original archives. Therefore, standing from the perspective of the Hu-Wen party elders, this U.S. law is almost like a ready-made lever delivered right to their hands. There is no need to personally run overseas to hold press conferences, nor is there any need to publicly expose whose account books in Beijing. The U.S. is scheduled to submit its homework at the end of the year anyway, and what actually needs to be done is simply deciding whether or not to let those most valuable internal materials in hand flow outward. The most ruthless aspect of this game is not that it targets only the family of the old Xi; don't forget that the U.S. law covers the entire Political Bureau. Therefore, before the Fifth Plenary Session, during this life-or-death power redistribution phase, those who were previously promoted by that person and are still sitting on the fence have to recalculate a ledger. Why did they follow that person in the past? The logic is simple: supreme power is right there, and following him is the best political insurance. As long as that big umbrella is still being held open, who would dare to touch them or dig up the old accounts of their families? But now the situation has reversed. If old Xi still insists on stubbornly pushing for a fourth term, this war within the party will have to continue downward. The fiercest the fight, the easier it is for the things at the bottom of everyone's chests to be dug out. You have my materials and I have your accounts; what Beijing cannot make public can go overseas. Coupled with the fact that the U.S. side has a legally mandated public report waiting to be filled at the end of the year, those people in the Political Bureau have to ask themselves: Why on earth should I accompany you to fight this war to the bitter end? Whether your fourth term can be saved or not is secondary; in the end, if the fighting gets desperate and my family's overseas companies, business partners, agents, and those relationships that were originally known only within the circle are instead delivered to U.S. intelligence agencies first, and once an unclassified report is posted on the official ODNI website for global media, banks, judicial institutions, and competitors to see, that will no longer be a matter that can be resolved by writing a self-criticism or changing positions within the party. Conversely, if everyone pushes that person off the table together and redistributes power, this internal struggle will also have the conditions to stop. Friends, it is not saying here that the United States has promised anyone that if you replace that person, I will not publish it. U.S. laws will still take their course, and U.S. reports will still be submitted; what can truly be controlled is how many more fatal materials inside Beijing continue to flow outward.
A report can simply list publicly available assets that can be found, or it can include several internal clues accurate to companies, names, and transaction paths. The destructive power of these two types of reports is completely different. Therefore, the original logic of protecting Old Xi meaning protecting oneself begins to reverse at this point. Continuing to protect him might actually drag oneself down as well. This is precisely why this U.S. law has suddenly gained value today—a knife that has long been hanging outside the Great Firewall can suddenly be used before the Fifth Plenary Session to leverage those inside the wall. Therefore, the people who ultimately urge him to step down do not need to hate him the most; it is enough that they are the most afraid of being dragged down by him.
So, the problem then reaches the most realistic step: since positions can be negotiated and materials can be negotiated, money can certainly be negotiated as well. If that person is willing to step down, what can be kept? If they refuse to step down, how far will the investigation go? At this point, we can sit across the negotiating table and calculate this account. If I were on the side of the Hu-Wen elders, holding both the domestic tools to investigate actual controllers and a piece of U.S. legislation that requires a report by the end of the year, what would I use to negotiate with Xi? It is simple: the position is a card, the family is a card, and money is a card. If you are willing to hand over power, some matters can be handled within the Party; there is room to negotiate how far the investigation goes, which people are cut off, and which matters end there. If you insist on holding on for a fourth term, then keep turning the pages; aren't the Americans outside just waiting for materials? Then let that report grow thicker. What is more troublesome is that once this money card is played, Xi is no longer calculating the account alone; the entire Politburo is covered by that U.S. law. Who would be willing to bet their own hidden family assets just for his fourth term? At this stage, what he truly loses is not just a few support votes, but the community of interests that binds everyone together.
For Xi himself, this account is even more direct. Losing his position would at most mean the end of his political life, but once his family assets, white gloves, offshore companies, and business partners are all exposed, things will be completely different. It is not just about losing a few titles; the entire image he has built over the past thirteen years will collapse along with it. What banner has he been flying all these years? Anti-corruption, strict Party governance, and keeping family and those around him in check. Why is it particularly interesting today to bring up what Wang Jianlin said at Harvard about him governing the country strictly and his family even more strictly? Because once what is finally made public is not just a few houses, but a wealth network connecting relatives, old subordinates, businessmen, and BVI companies to the true beneficiaries, what gets smashed is not just money, but his most important political signboard. Therefore, when it comes to abdication negotiations, the conditions that can truly make Xi sit down will never be limited to personnel arrangements like who gets the General Secretary position or whether he keeps the Military Commission Chairmanship. What happens to his family, who can land safely, which white gloves must be cut off, which assets must be disgorged, and which matters can still be digested within the Party—these are the most realistic parts of the exit conditions. If I were sitting across from him, I wouldn't even need to speak harshly: you step down, and we talk; if you don't, we will investigate layer by layer domestically according to the actual controllers. We will collect back taxes where necessary, recover illegal gains, freeze assets, and confiscate funds. The U.S. report outside will continue its countdown. Every time you play another round, more people inside will have the motive to send materials out. Xi himself might still be tough, but those around him may not be willing to accompany him, especially his family. For that lady, no matter what the line or historical status is, in the end, nothing is more real than one thing: can her husband land safely, will their child be implicated, and how much of the family's assets can be saved? As long as these three things are placed on the table at the same time, the interests of his family and his political team will truly align for the first time, both hoping he stops immediately. This is why we said yesterday that abdication has reached the stage of practical operation, and if we look one step further today, we will find that what he is facing is not as simple as whether he still wants to do it. Alright, that is all for today. Please help like and subscribe to Jiang Feng Vision, and forward this episode to more friends. See you in the next episode.