Once Huang Qifan Falls, Why Can't Xi Jinping Step Down and Still Protect the Xi Family? Li Xi and Wang Huning Reportedly Suspended and Interrogated, and Xi Yuanping Also Implicated! The Military Escorts, Wen Jiabao Tears Apart the Xi Faction's 13-Year Web! [Jiang Feng's Vision 20261015 Episode 514]

In this episode, Jiang Feng provides an in-depth analysis of the high-level power struggle behind the investigation of former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan. Huang survived under multiple Chongqing municipal party secretaries without falling, and his political career was closely tied to the old Shanghai faction forces such as Wu Bangguo as well as the Xi faction. With Huang Qifan's downfall and his son being investigated for involvement in the capital circle, figures like Li Xi, Wang Huning, and Xi Yuanping were implicated, shaking the core interests of the Xi faction. Veteran forces led by Wen Jiabao and others used this to settle old scores, turning the high-level maneuvering white-hot and leaving the Xi faction facing a severe crisis.

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Hello friends, and welcome to Jiang Feng Horizon. With the downfall of Huang Qifan, Jiang Feng's assessment is that the person in Zhongnanhai has completely lost this round of power struggle, and the Xi family is facing the biggest crisis in thirteen years. The question before him now has become whether stepping down can still secure safety for the Xi family.

At 6:00 PM on October 13, the website of the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission issued an announcement stating that Huang Qifan, former deputy secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and former mayor of the municipal government, is suspected of serious violations of discipline and law, and is undergoing disciplinary review and supervisory investigation. Immediately following this, the latest batch of overseas leaks dragged CCDI Secretary Li Xi and CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning into the list of those being questioned over the Huang Qifan case, and also pointed to the family interests of Xi Jinping's younger brother, as well as those of Han Zheng and Li Zhanshu. Today, we will follow this clue and review the old accounts behind Huang Qifan. The most fatal part of this story is that the things Xi Jinping wants to protect are becoming fewer and fewer. Initially, he wanted to protect his political power; stepping back, he wanted to protect his confidants. If the investigation really implicates Xi Yuanping, even his own family members will have to be put on the negotiating table.

Fourteen years ago, Wen Jiabao mentioned Chongqing by name at a press conference in the Great Hall of the People, and the one who ultimately fell was Bo Xilai, yet Huang Qifan remained. Today, overseas rumors reconnect these two lines—Wen Jiabao's liquidation of the old Shanghai faction and Hu Jintao and the military providing escort—back to Huang Qifan. After Bo Xilai's downfall, who was it that allowed Huang Qifan to continue serving as mayor? Wu Bangguo departed two years prior; why did this life-saving amulet only fail today? Only by figuring out these two questions can we understand how much of Xi Jinping's family fortune was shaken by the fall of Huang Qifan.

Let's pull our focus back. On October 12th to 13th, the National Health Conference was held in Beijing. In the footage from CCTV, all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee were present. Xi Jinping gave a speech, Li Qiang delivered the concluding remarks, and the other five attended. This conference has historical precedents; a National Health Conference was held in Beijing in August 2016, where Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang spoke, and the other Standing Committee members were present. Ten years later, it was held again with the same protocol. Based solely on the conference name and the attendance list, one cannot deduce who has already succeeded to power. However, this time, the conference was held before the Fifth Plenary Session, and the entry footage left behind a detail worth examining: Xi Jinping walked in front, Li Qiang was close to his side, while Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, and others were a distance behind the first two. Some overseas observers have used this to speculate about Li Qiang's succession, even discussing a duopoly. Feng Jiang is more concerned with another matter: before the Fifth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping needed this photo of the seven Standing Committee members appearing together to maintain the impression of a complete leadership team and a stable political situation. A leader's authority can usually be proven by subordinates executing orders, but at critical moments, it must be demonstrated by the entire team appearing together. This display is useful, but it cannot answer the most pressing question: if those who follow you get into trouble, can you still protect them? Especially for those who are about to enter the venue of the Fifth Plenary Session, they are watching the Xinwen Lianbo, and they are also watching who they should follow in the future. With the seven of them sitting together today, after the meeting ends, who can still decide personnel matters? Whose words still count? This is what determines how they will choose their next step. Xi Jinping needs everyone to believe that there is still security in following him, but confidence in the officialdom must be fulfilled by one event after another. When people are investigated, when people leave their posts, and when things that were promised to be taken care of cannot be done, a single group photo makes it very difficult for those below to put their minds at ease.

On the very evening the health conference concluded, the announcement of Huang Qifan's investigation was released. Huang Qifan spent fifteen years in Chongqing, serving under six municipal party secretaries: He Guoqiang, Huang Zhendong, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Zhang Dejiang, and Sun Zhengcai. As the leadership changed round after round, he rose from vice mayor to mayor, and his position always remained secure. In 2012, after Bo Xilai was removed from office and subsequently investigated, Huang Qifan continued to head the municipal government. Today, this veteran who had long left the front lines of Chongqing has been taken down, and the accounts that the officialdom needs to settle have changed. How much of the power that was able to block investigations fourteen years ago remains now?

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Now that we've replenished our energy, let's go back to the key figure outside the lens: Wu Bangguo. Let's return to the autumn of 1994. In Huang Qifan's official resume, there is a very short experience: from October 1994 to May 1995, he was seconded to work at the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. At that time, he was already a bureau-level cadre, having just been transferred from the Pudong New Area Management Committee to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, serving as deputy secretary-general and director of the research office. These eight months, when placed next to Wu Bangguo's resume, become interesting. In September 1994, former Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Wu Bangguo was added as a member of the Central Secretariat. In March 1995, he was appointed Vice Premier of the State Council. Huang Qifan's entry into the Central General Office happened exactly after Wu Bangguo entered the Central Secretariat. So the question arises: why this person, and why at this time? After the Bo Xilai case broke in 2012, there were reports overseas that linked this experience to Wu Bangguo's patronage, calling Huang Qifan a former subordinate of Wu during his time in Shanghai. After Wu went to Beijing, he brought him into the central network of connections. This is also a starting point for the rumor that Wu Bangguo protected Huang Qifan.

If we look at this personnel relationship, when Wu Bangguo moved from Shanghai to Beijing, he needed to handle affairs across various central ministries and commissions. He required someone familiar with local economies, someone who understood industry and could come up with solutions. Huang Qifan had worked in the Shanghai Economic Commission and the Pudong system, and had served as the director of the Municipal Party Committee Research Office; he knew how to crunch numbers and translate them into the policy language that leaders needed. For a local cadre like him, the value of those eight months far exceeded just an extra line on his resume. He entered the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, learned how central government procedures worked, and gained opportunities to get close to central leaders and staff. After returning to the local level, when others looked at him, they would factor in this central government experience. Huang Qifan's participation in the development of Pudong occurred before this secondment; he joined the Pudong Development Office in 1990 and served as deputy director of the Pudong New Area Management Committee in 1993. Later, he returned to Shanghai and held positions such as deputy secretary-general of the municipal government and director of the Municipal Economic Commission. In 2001, he was transferred to Chongqing as vice mayor. A year later, the 16th National Congress was held, and Wu Bangguo entered the Politburo Standing Committee, ranking second. In 2003, he took charge of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. From then on, Huang Qifan's local resume was linked to a central leader who ranked higher than the Premier of the State Council. The National People's Congress institutionally holds the power of legislative oversight and a series of important personnel appointments and removals. With Wu Bangguo sitting in that position and ranking second in the Standing Committee, for a local cadre, the weight of his word far exceeded that of an old leader who had already left Shanghai. From Shanghai to the General Office, and then from Shanghai to Chongqing, the scope of Huang Qifan's work grew larger and larger. The cadre who once handled materials in the research office later became a vice mayor capable of mobilizing local economic resources. The role of the Wu Bangguo connection thus shifted from providing opportunities to ensuring that others had to think twice before dealing with Huang Qifan. When such a person arrives at the local level, the top leader finds him easy to work with and also takes note of his Beijing connections. If Huang Qifan could get things done for the Municipal Party Secretary without making the other party feel that he was competing for political credit, his position would remain stable. The Secretary gets the political achievements, and he keeps his ability to manage operations; both sides get what they want. For the Chongqing Municipal Party Secretary, Huang Qifan had two uses: one was his ability to implement projects, combining land, state-owned assets, and bank credit to ensure the government had money to do things; the other was the connection he had behind him that led to Beijing. If the Municipal Party Secretary wanted to achieve political success, he needed projects, and once he had projects, he needed someone to connect the funding. Huang Qifan was in that position. When a new Secretary came, he would change his method of cooperation to ensure his role continued to exist. When Bo Xilai governed Chongqing, he cooperated very closely with Bo in public. Bo wanted to turn Chongqing into a political showcase, and Huang was responsible for producing the economic achievements to support that showcase. But following this old connection with Wu Bangguo, he also left himself a way out. Bo Xilai could use him, but Huang Qifan did not have to bet his entire future on Bo alone. This is the survival skill that allowed him to span several terms of different Secretaries. There were people at the local level who used him, and there were people in Beijing who recognized him, until another person appeared before Wu Bangguo who wanted to question this political-economic model: Wen Jiabao.

During the decade when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were in power, Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao, both serving on the Standing Committee, publicly voiced two very different sets of views. On March 10, 2011, Wu Bangguo delivered the work report of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, proposing the "Five No's": no multi-party rotation in power, no diversification of guiding ideologies, no separation of powers and bicameralism, no federalism, and no privatization. Four days later, on March 14, at the Two Sessions press conference, Wen Jiabao spoke about political structural reform. He proposed that political reform is the guarantee for economic structural reform, and also mentioned the need to eliminate the soil that breeds corruption, reform systems and institutions, and create conditions for the people to criticize and supervise the government. One year later, on March 14, 2012, Wen Jiabao pushed his point a step further: without the success of political structural reform, economic structural reform cannot be carried through to the end, the achievements already gained will be in danger of being lost, and a historical tragedy like the Cultural Revolution could happen all over again. In 2011, Wu Bangguo closed the door, while Wen Jiabao argued that power needs to be constrained. By 2012, the Wang Lijun incident had already occurred, and when Wen Jiabao brought up this historical account of the Cultural Revolution again, the "singing red and striking black" campaign in Chongqing became unavoidable. Wu Bangguo ranked second and Wen Jiabao ranked third; both had served as vice premiers in Zhu Rongji's State Council and were very familiar with how the administrative system, state-owned enterprises, and local governments operated. This divergence would ultimately come down to who could decide on projects, who could allocate assets, and who would audit these decisions. In Wu Bangguo's "Five No's," "no privatization" protected the institutional status of state-owned assets, while "no separation of powers and checks and balances" safeguarded the framework where the Party holds the ultimate decision-making power. Wen Jiabao's call for supervising the government and reforming institutions touched precisely upon whether those in power were willing to hand over their accounts. Wu Bangguo had also spoken of the "three favorables": all work of the people's congress must be favorable to strengthening and improving the Party's leadership, favorable to consolidating the Party's ruling position, and favorable to ensuring that the Party leads the people in effectively governing the country. Connecting the words of the two men, the divergence found its landing point. Wen Jiabao said the government must accept the supervision of the people, while Wu Bangguo emphasized that the work of the people's congress must consolidate the Party's leadership. Whether government power should be held accountable, and to what extent, still had to return to that Standing Committee meeting table within the Party. This connects back to Huang Qifan. The land ticket system, the Yufu model, and government-led investment and financing that he promoted in Chongqing all relied on administrative power to organize land assets and credit. How a project was executed, how an asset was valued, and why banks were willing to lend—the hand of the government was everywhere. Once a project was completed, it could be called economic development, but when the accounts were laid out bare, they also had to answer whose hands the assets ended up in and who bore the risks. These two questions would make those who lived off approvals, connections, and information gaps very uneasy. To the network of interests within officialdom, a slogan about political reform would not immediately hurt anyone, but if power were truly subjected to external supervision, if budgets and transactions needed to be made public, and if matters that a leader could settle with a single word had to leave behind an auditable procedure, it would disrupt the livelihoods of many. There is also an old piece of news disclosed by Hong Kong media between Huang Qifan and Wen Jiabao. In January 2013, the Hong Kong magazine Frontline published relevant claims, which were later relayed by overseas media outlets. Around the time of the 17th National Congress, Huang Qifan reportedly criticized Wen Jiabao's understanding of economics at a dinner party, accusing the State Council's macroeconomic control policies. Someone recorded these remarks, and the materials were sent to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The same rumor also claimed that Wu Bangguo stepped in to mediate, and Bo Xilai provided a guarantee, so Huang Qifan ultimately did not lose his position because of this. There is no publicly available complete material for this recording, so let us view it as a political story circulating at that time. The story contains an element that fits the psychology of officialdom very well: a local official daring to comment on the premier at a dinner table usually happens because he has someone backing him up behind the scenes, and if he can speak and still survive unscathed, that sense of security becomes even stronger. The next time he encounters the premier's policies, he will first calculate whether this person can control him and whether his backer will shield him. What Wen Jiabao saw, however, was the other side. When the State Council wanted to push a matter forward, people below could stall, and local officials had central backers, making it very difficult to hold anyone accountable for administrative responsibilities to the end. The premier talked about reform, but in the end could not even move a mayor who should have borne responsibility. Such accounts naturally lingered. By the spring of 2012, when Wang Lijun walked into the US consulate, the grievances at the dinner table and the policy divergences were all pushed into the public eye. Wen Jiabao finally singled out Chongqing before the cameras of the entire world. On March 14, 2012, at Wen Jiabao's final Two Sessions press conference, a reporter asked about the Wang Lijun incident. Wen Jiabao stated that the current Chongqing municipal Party committee and municipal government must reflect and earnestly draw lessons from the Wang Lijun incident. This sentence pointed to two entities: the head of the municipal Party committee was Bo Xilai, and the head of the municipal government was Huang Qifan. By listing the municipal Party committee and municipal government together, the premier placed the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of both the Party secretary and the mayor. The next day, on March 15, the central authorities removed Bo Xilai from his post as Party secretary of Chongqing, with Zhang Dejiang taking over concurrently. Yet Huang Qifan remained on the podium, publicly expressing support for the central decision and cooperating with Zhang Dejiang's work. Wen Jiabao assigned responsibility to two people, but in the end replaced one and left the other. This gap is precisely what is worth digging back into today. Huang Qifan's situation at the time was actually not easy. He had cooperated with Bo Xilai for several years, Chongqing's economic policies were organized and promoted by him, and the municipal government was also within the scope of those Wen Jiabao demanded should reflect. After Bo fell, he had to make Beijing believe that keeping him would allow Chongqing to continue operating, whereas replacing him would require a newly appointed successor to sort everything out from scratch.

, a mess of projects and financial relationships, for an official trying to survive in a political storm, making quick statements is one thing, but making those in power feel that you are still useful is another. The fact that Huang Qifan continued to serve as mayor later on shows that at least in the personnel handling at the time, Beijing chose to keep his position. Looking back at the period before Bo Xilai fell, which central officials visited Chongqing and what did they say? From December 6 to 8, 2010, Old Xi visited Chongqing for research in his capacity as Vice President of the State Council and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xinhua News Agency's reports from that year clearly recorded that he affirmed Chongqing's "singing red, reading classics, telling stories, and spreading good values" activities, and also affirmed the security achievements of the crackdown on the underworld and evil forces. In the footage from that year, Bo Xilai, Huang Qifan, and Wang Lijun all appeared. Central leaders such as Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang also visited Chongqing successively and supported the related activities there. Bo Xilai indeed had several central endorsements he could pull out at the time. Wu Bangguo also went; from April 8 to 10, 2011, he conducted research in Chongqing, inspected materials on the crackdown on the underworld, and watched the performance reporting on the "singing red, reading classics, telling stories, and spreading good values." The timing happened to be one month after the speech on the "five no's." The route drawn by Beijing had a showcase model in Chongqing that could be displayed. For Bo Xilai, the visits of these central leaders could be turned into political capital to lobby for support upwards. For Huang Qifan, with the Chongqing model being affirmed, the economic achievements made by the municipal government were included in it. His cooperation with Bo Xilai could both yield achievements and let Beijing see that he was still useful. Li Keqiang had also been there; public reports from July 2009 focused on the development of the western region, the Yangtze River shipping industry, and people's livelihood, without recording that he made the same affirmation of the activities of singing red songs. Visiting the same city, the contents of the public endorsements were different. Putting these reports together, we can at least see that Bo Xilai's political experiment in Chongqing back then received public support from multiple central leaders. Later, when Bo got into trouble, these supports also became a difficult problem: how to separate Bo Xilai's personal responsibility from the entire set of practices that had previously been affirmed. In Jiang Feng's view, this was precisely a political space that Huang Qifan was able to retain. Taking down Bo Xilai could end his succession ambitions, but taking down the mayor as well would mean continuing to probe the municipal government's policies, projects, and assets, along with questioning those who had once supported the Chongqing model. Coupled with overseas reports at the time about Wu Bangguo protecting Huang, this story connected. Wu Bangguo had a reason to protect his old subordinates, Chongqing needed someone to continue handling economic affairs, and those who had once supported the Chongqing route also had a reason to concentrate the responsibility on Bo Xilai. Several forces could find their own interests in keeping Huang Qifan. This also explains why Huang and Bo shared the stage for many years, but ultimately walked two different paths. The successor Zhang Dejiang was a Vice Premier of the State Council and also a member of the Political Bureau. His arrival in Chongqing could take over the political situation left by Bo Xilai, while Huang Qifan staying in the municipal government could continue to handle projects, debts, and administrative affairs. Changing personnel politically while retaining personnel administratively—the personnel outcome of Chongqing was thus decided. Bo Xilai was later sentenced to life imprisonment for accepting bribes, corruption, and abuse of power, while Huang Qifan continued to serve as mayor successively during the tenures of Zhang Dejiang and Sun Zhengcai until he stepped down in late 2016, and was transferred to become the Vice Chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress in 2017. In the same political storm, the political life of the party secretary ended, while the mayor was able to complete the rest of his official career. For Huang Qifan himself, what kind of lesson would this close call leave behind? He would feel that he had chosen the right backer and also proved his capability. Even with an event as huge as Bo Xilai's downfall, he managed to ride it out, so in the future, anyone wanting to move against him would first have to weigh things carefully. But for Wen Jiabao, the responsibility from back then was only half handled; the municipal government had been named, but the mayor did not follow along. The contest between reform and conservatism did not draw a full stop in 2012. Today, fourteen years later, with Huang Qifan being investigated, this gap has reopened. Back then, who could shield him, and today, who is still willing to shield him? The answer must begin from October 2024.

On October 8, 2024, Wu Bangguo passed away in Beijing at the age of 84. With the death of a political elder, the people he promoted during his lifetime remain, and the personal connections persist. It is normal that Huang Qifan did not face trouble the very next day. Those below must judge how long the elder's network can still function and who is willing to continue looking after his old subordinates. However, this protection will gradually turn into a cost that others must actively pay. When Wu Bangguo was alive, speaking up for Huang Qifan was doing a favor for a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee. With Wu Bangguo gone, whoever steps up for Huang must bear the consequences themselves. Huang Qifan may not be willing to accept this change. After leaving the front line, he continued to attend economic forums, discussing real estate, foreign trade, and supply chains, and accepting media interviews. In public, he continued to speak as a former mayor familiar with the Chinese economy. Looking at his past survival experience, he has reason to believe that his value remains. Several municipal party secretaries have changed, yet he has remained; Bo Xilai fell, yet he passed the test. He has long understood that when the person in power changes, he must make the new master feel that this abacus is still useful. As Xi Jinping ascended to the throne, for Huang Qifan to continue passing the tests, he had to find his new position within the Xi family and the high-level Xi faction. Combining land, state-owned assets, and finance to provide resources for those in power, and then facilitating business for the network of connections, is exactly the specialty of such bureaucrats. He understands policy and the convenience that policy leaves for power. Following the revelations about those family businesses, Jiang Feng's judgment is that over these thirteen years, Huang Qifan has transformed from a staffer for the Shanghai elders into a personal financial advisor for the Xi family and the high-level Xi faction. On stage, he talks about the economy; behind the scenes, his value lies in knowing how to convert power into business and how to channel capital into the hands of those who need it. This explains his sense of security. He would feel that although Wu Bangguo is gone, the people who can use him are still there; he has done favors for these people and knows their accounts, so protecting himself is beneficial to everyone. However, he miscalculated one step: what his opponents are chasing is precisely these accounts. The connections that made him useful in the past have today given him investigative value. Whoever he has done favors for, he can lead the questioning right to their doorstep.

On June 22 this year, news already appeared on overseas social media platforms that Huang Qifan had been summoned for questioning. On October 13, the official announcement was released. From the passing of Wu Bangguo to this official announcement, two years have passed. The favors he left behind ultimately could not shield him from this ordeal. The latest revelations point the breakthrough toward his son, Huang Ranfei, claiming that Huang Ranfei's business in the Shenzhen and Hong Kong capital circles involved the listing of Chinese-funded enterprises, equity, and the interests of specific related parties, and implicated the families of Han Zheng and Li Zhanshu, as well as Xi Jinping's younger brother. A father can describe himself as an expert who discusses economics after retirement, but once his son's business is questioned, he must answer: How did the projects come about? Who acted as the intermediary? Why did the other party approach you? Following these questions, the people who gave him face back then and the people who introduced the connections all have to provide explanations. At this point, asking old friends to step forward to protect Huang becomes difficult. If I make this phone call, am I helping a retired cadre, or am I helping myself cover up a transaction? If the call is not made, everyone can still pretend the relationship is not deep. If the call is made, one must be prepared to answer why it is you who is speaking up for him. The closer it gets to the Fifth Plenary Session, the higher this cost becomes. What Huang Qifan wants is for someone to save him, but others are first calculating whether saving him will drag them down as well. If we place this account into the three-faction power struggle currently circulating overseas—the reformist line of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Chunhua; Xi Jinping and his cronies; and the old Shanghai interest network represented by Zeng Qinghong—the three parties want different things. Zeng Qinghong wants a smooth handover, with Xi Jinping relinquishing real power while retaining dignity, and the Xi faction and the old Shanghai guard retreating safely together. What Wen Jiabao wants to pursue are the accounts that have not been touched for many years after the transfer of power—whether they will be investigated or not. With Huang Qifan taken down, this disagreement falls upon specific individuals. Zeng Qinghong can advocate for no liquidation, but Wen Jiabao can counter-question: why can't those who were already held responsible fourteen years ago be investigated today? With Wu Bangguo gone, whoever wants to uphold the handling results from back then must stand up and provide a guarantee themselves. This will also force the old Shanghai forces to reorder their priorities. How much safety can they trade for by continuing to protect Xi Jinping? As Huang Qifan's accounts are investigated further, whose family will it implicate next? No matter how important factional unity is, when faced with the interests of their own families, the elders must first calculate their own escape routes. The latest set of news pushes the questioning to the current Standing Committee members. Revelations claim that on the morning of October 14, Wang Huning was suspended from his duties to accept questioning by Liu Jinguo, and in the afternoon, Li Xi was suspended again, with Liu Jinguo presiding over relevant work. Looking at this set of news, both paths for Xi Jinping to protect his people have run into problems. Li Xi controls the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and those below pinned their safety on his ability to control the investigation process. Wang Huning spanned the Jiang, Hu, and Xi eras by remaining in the center and adapting to every leader. If even these two have to answer for their own problems, how much weight is left in the guarantees held by others? The name of the distant relative Wang pushes the investigation to the place Xi Jinping finds hardest to let go. If a crony gets into trouble, one can still talk about organizational handling, but if his own younger brother is involved in the same line of interests, the family will ask: what are you prepared to use to protect him? Xi Jinping wants to protect his family first, and those below will also keep an eye on his choices. Everyone works for you because they believe that if trouble arises, you can block it. Now that even your own family has to bargain, who will be ranked behind, and who will be used to trade for conditions? This doubt can change the actions of his cronies without waiting for the deal to be struck. Those with resources in their hands will find other escape routes for themselves, and those who only have the leader as their backer will be even more afraid of being left behind. The team that originally pledged loyalty together has begun to calculate their own accounts. If we connect the previous line of Hu Jintao and the military's escort, Wen Jiabao can continue to pursue the questioning, but Xi Jinping lacks the means to use force to turn the tables. He must use power, personnel arrangements, and the support of the elders to trade for what he wants to protect most. Huang Qifan once believed that because everyone had accounts with him, they would protect him together. Today, these accounts make every family want to protect themselves first. When this method of settling accounts reaches the core of the Xi faction, how many more people can Xi Jinping ask to bet their own future to protect him? Alright, that's all for today. Thank you all for watching. Please like, subscribe, turn on the notification bell, and share this program with your friends. We will continue our discussion in the next episode.