Hu Chunhua Succeeding? Taking Revenge for Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang! Huang Qifan's Fall Exposes Xi Jinping's Confidant Li Zhanshu's Family; The Original List for the 20th Party Congress Resurfaces: Why Did Li Keqiang Suddenly Retire Completely? [Jiang Feng's View 20261014 Episode 513]

This article analyzes the downfall of former Chongqing Mayor Huang Qifan on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session and the high-level political maneuvering behind it. It points out that the Huang Qifan case involves funds and IPO approvals, tracing the leads to the family of Li Zhanshu. It also explores the possibility of Hu Chunhua launching a political purge using the inspection and discipline inspection mechanism, and discusses the profound impact of the treatment of Tuanpai figures like Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, and Hu Chunhua at the 20th National Congress on the current political situation.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng Vision. The Fifth Plenary Session is less than two weeks away, and the winds blowing through Zhongnanhai these past two days have been bone-chilling. Jiang Feng will put the conclusion on the table first: Hu Chunhua has begun to settle the old score from the 20th National Congress four years ago on behalf of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. The knife in his hand is heading straight for the closest confidant of the man in Zhongnanhai.

Just at 6:00 PM on October 13, the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission quietly dropped a bombshell: former Deputy Party Secretary and Mayor of Chongqing, Huang Qifan, is under investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and law. How did this 74-year-old retired "God of Wealth," who has navigated the cracks between various factions for decades and is known as a political survivor, get dragged from behind the scenes into the spotlight at this critical juncture? Meanwhile, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges was completely taken over by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences early this year. Former Chairman Bi Jingquan was heavily sentenced to 14 years last month. The official report clearly stated that he "voluntarily confessed to most facts not yet known to authorities," and the very next day, internal calls to "eliminate the toxic influence" were made with great fanfare. Overseas, reports have even traced the capital trail of Huang's descendants all the way to the daughter of Li Zhanshu.

Everyone saw clearly on camera four years ago at the closing ceremony of the 20th National Congress how Hu Jintao was forcibly escorted from the venue, how Li Keqiang retreated in gloom, and how Hu Chunhua was kicked out of the power center. The big question that could truly collapse Zhongnanhai today is: why, on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session, was the secret ledger of high-level money bags that Huang Qifan had buried for over a decade suddenly flipped open right at the door of Li Zhanshu's family safe? What kind of lethal institutional tool does Hu Chunhua actually have in his hands?

On October 13, a joint announcement by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission sent Huang Qifan into the investigation and review process. If one only looks at his official rank, this matter could easily be mistaken for yet another retired senior official having his old accounts settled. Huang Qifan is 74 years old and has been away from the post of Mayor of Chongqing for nearly ten years. However, this person is different from ordinary retired senior officials; his true value was never how high his official rank reached, but rather that he stayed in China's most complex financial webs for far too long. Early in his career, Huang worked in the Shanghai Industrial Economic Commission and Pudong development, and later went to Chongqing, where he stayed for 15 years. During these 15 years, the party secretary of Chongqing changed wave after wave, from He Guoqiang, Huang Zhendong, and Wang Yang to Bo Xilai, Zhang Dejiang, and Sun Zhengcai. Especially after Bo Xilai's downfall, the entire Chongqing officialdom was turned upside down, yet Huang Qifan managed to stay and continue serving as mayor, which is quite interesting. Officials like Huang Qifan are not quite like people who charge into battle for a specific faction; they are more like an abacus that whoever sits at the top needs to help them calculate: how land is sold, how state-owned enterprises are restructured, how local financing is done, where investment funds come from, and how the capital market connects. Therefore, he was able to pass through the Bo Xilai era, continue working under Zhang Dejiang and Sun Zhengcai, and later retire to join the Financial and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress, and further enter various think tanks and financial forums. While political figures changed batch by batch, what he always talked about was money. Such people are actually safer in peaceful times for a simple reason: everyone can make use of them. But once the top leadership truly prepares to settle old accounts, people like this get into trouble. Someone who has only served one boss only knows about one family's affairs, but someone like Huang Qifan, who went from Shanghai to Chongqing, and from local posts to the central financial circle, has touched an untold number of projects, enterprises, financing deals, and officials. Therefore, what is truly worth watching today is not how much money Huang Qifan himself took, but who is preparing to investigate backward starting from him.

Let us put several time points of this year together: on January 17, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) was overall transferred to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Huang Qifan had always served as the vice chairman of this CCIEE, and an important figure presiding over this reception work at the time was Peng Jinhui, the vice president and deputy party secretary of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Viewed in January, this matter looked like an ordinary think tank system adjustment, but by September, the flavor changed. On September 15, Bi Jingquan, the former chairman of the CCIEE, was sentenced to 14 years in prison in the first instance. The court determined that he accepted bribes totaling more than 57.42 million yuan. There was a sentence in the verdict worth remembering: Bi Jingquan proactively confessed to most of the bribery facts that the investigating organs had not yet grasped. Translated into plain language, this means the discipline inspection commission found out quite a lot of things they did not know originally because he spoke up. The next day, on September 16, the Party Committee of the CCIEE immediately held a meeting and publicly put forward a very heavy phrase: resolutely eradicate the poisonous legacy of Bi Jingquan. Look at this rhythm: in January, the CCIEE changed its competent authority; in September, the former chairman was sentenced; the day after the sentencing, the internal organization began to eradicate the poisonous legacy; and in less than a month, on October 13, Vice Chairman Huang Qifan also went in. Therefore, Huang Qifan's downfall today does not look like someone suddenly remembered this retired old mayor on October 13; this ledger had already been looked back into by someone for at least the past few months. Previously, some public events that Huang Qifan was originally scheduled to attend were suddenly canceled, and the outside world had already begun to spread rumors that he was in trouble. Now that the official announcement has landed, those previous abnormalities all have new explanations, and the problem arises. Bi Jingquan has already spoken once, the CCIEE has shouted about eradicating the poisonous legacy, and now Huang Qifan has gone in as well. What on earth do the investigators want to dig out from this place? More importantly, who has the qualification to settle this ledger?

This brings us to Hu Chunhua. Four years ago, after the 20th National Congress, many people felt that Hu Chunhua being kicked out of the Politburo to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meant he was essentially sidelined for the rest of his life. But in the political system of the CCP, whether an official position is empty or not cannot be judged solely by its ranking; one must look at what tools are actually held in hand. Hu Chunhua is not only a Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National Organization, but also the Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the CPPCC National Organization. What is even more noteworthy is that he holds another public post: Deputy Leader of the Leading Group for Inspection Work of the Party Leadership Group of the 14th CPPCC National Organization, where Shi Taifeng is the Leader, and Hu Chunhua and Wang Dongfeng are the Deputy Leaders. On April 13 this year, when the CPPCC launched its third round of special inspections, it was Hu Chunhua who announced at the meeting the authorization of inspection group leaders and their task division. By July, when the inspection work leading group met again to listen to reports from various inspection groups, review comprehensive reports, and deploy rectifications, Hu Chunhua attended once more in his capacity as deputy leader. In other words, this is not just an empty title printed nicely on a business card; he indeed undertakes specific work within this inspection mechanism. Of course, a distinction must be made here: the inspection by the CPPCC Party Leadership Group publicly targets the internal specialized committee party leadership groups of the CPPCC. It is not a special investigation team of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) handling the Huang Qifan case, and the two cannot be directly equated. However, the truly interesting political aspect lies precisely here. Back then, everyone thought sending Hu Chunhua to the CPPCC was removing him from the arena of power. Looking at it now, at least along the lines of intra-party supervision and inspection, he has not completely left the poker table. Four years ago, the chair he lost was in the Politburo; today, the tool left in his hand is a key capable of flipping through internal account books. Once this background is placed into the picture, looking at the so-called liquidation group list recently circulating overseas takes on a completely different flavor. Rumors place Hu Chunhua in the leading position, and around him point to Peng Jinhui, Hang Yuanxiang, Yang Xiaochao, and Qiu Xueqiang. Of course, the Central Committee has never announced any such Hu Chunhua liquidation group, but what is truly interesting is taking the public posts of these individuals one by one, only to find they are not randomly put together.

First, Peng Jinhui is currently the Vice President and Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the ministerial level, and concurrently serves as a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) and Vice Chairman of the Supervision and Judicial Committee. Even more coincidentally, when the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) was wholly transferred to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in January this year, he was among the management system taking over this organization. Hang Yuanxiang is a member of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the leader of the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group stationed at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences by the CCDI and the National Commission of Supervision, as well as a member of the Party Leadership Group of the Academy of Social Sciences. Just on October 10, three days before Huang Qifan's official downfall, Peng Jinhui and Hang Yuanxiang appeared together at the 5th Symposium on Inspection Theory and Practice of the Inspection Theory Research Center of the CCP, with one delivering a speech and the other hosting the opening ceremony. The public topic of this meeting was comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and inspection theory; it cannot be called a secret special case meeting, but it at least shows that these two individuals are openly within the work chain of inspection and discipline inspection. Looking further down, Yang Xiaochao is the Chairman of the Supervision and Judicial Committee of the 14th NPC, and Qiu Xueqiang is the Vice Chairman. Yang Xiaochao previously served as Deputy Secretary of the CCDI and Deputy Director of the National Commission of Supervision, while Qiu Xueqiang worked in the Supreme People's Procuratorate system for many years, rising to become Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Putting the public posts of these people together, you will find a very interesting phenomenon: there are people from the Academy of Social Sciences taking over the CCIEE, people stationed there by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, people from the NPC supervision and judicial system, and people who have long engaged in procuratorial work. Therefore, what truly gives people goosebumps is not the four words 'liquidation group,' but the fact that the people on this list happen to hold the tools needed to flip through accounts. If a batch of high-ranking cadres is truly to be dealt with—from disciplinary investigations to representative qualifications in supervision and judiciary on the NPC side, and all the way to procuratorial and judicial interfaces—these positions would naturally appear along the institutional chain. Looking back at Hu Chunhua, things get even more dramatic. Four years ago, what he lost was the most prominent power seat in the Politburo. Four years later, if a liquidation phase truly begins, what proves most useful might not necessarily be the biggest chair, but a set of mechanisms capable of mobilizing materials, reviewing reports, assigning tasks, and investigating problems downward. This is just like how someone invited him out through the front door back then, only to look back and find the key to the side door was still in his hand.

The question then follows: if Hu Chunhua is truly prepared to settle old scores, why is the first drawer worth opening precisely that of Huang Qifan? Investigating Huang Qifan, who has been retired for nearly a decade, is certainly not just about a few cases of Moutai or a few properties. At this level, what is truly valuable is how many people he has done favors for over these decades, how many projects he has touched, and how much he knows about how money flows out of the hands of power. Let us first look at two other cases that have already landed. On April 30 of this year, Yi Huiman was expelled from the Party and public office. Several terms in the CCDI notification were very eye-catching: "approval of listing, financing, and loans for relatives." Officials stated that he connived at and acquiesced to his relatives using his authority to seek personal gain, and also used his official convenience to handle matters and collect money for others in areas such as listing approval, financing, and loans. By the end of September, the case against Yi Huiman had been formally prosecuted. Looking at Bi Jingquan, the court verdict mentions "corporate operations, administrative approval, and project settlement," and he also proactively confessed to most of the bribery facts that the investigating authorities were previously unaware of. With these two cases placed together, the outline of how money moves in official circles has actually been revealed: in front are the approval of listing and financing projects, and behind them often follow relatives and those in their inner circle. Just before the official notification of Huang Qifan's investigation was released, a set of more detailed claims had already circulated overseas: Huang Qifan was taken away by the CCDI special task force at noon on the 10th; at the same time, others were controlled in Yunnan, and some of Huang Qifan's specific associates were handled through the line of the Shapingba District Commission for Discipline Inspection in Chongqing. By the 13th, the CCDI officially announced that Huang Qifan was under investigation, and the previous rumors had essentially collided with part of the public outcome. What is truly interesting next is that the leaks began to focus on the money, rather than continuing to guess when Huang Qifan was taken away. The same set of leaks pushed a name to the forefront: Huang Ranfei. The leaks claim he is Huang Qifan's son and has long been active in the Shenzhen capital circle. This father-son relationship currently comes mainly from this leak line, but one thing that can be publicly verified is that Huang Ranfei is indeed doing investment in Shenzhen. In listed company documents, one can find that he is the legal representative of Hongqiao Investment Holding (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. This company has a registered capital of 1.5 billion yuan, and its business includes investment, venture capital, and corporate management. In a public corporate survey in 2023, Huang Ranfei even accompanied Huang Qifan as the chairman of Hongqiao Investment. Digging further, the leaks began to touch on truly sensitive areas. It continued to link the Huang Ranfei line to Li Zhanshu's daughter, Li Qianxin, and brought in keywords such as Shenzhen Stock Exchange listings, Hong Kong IPOs, capital operations, and nominee holdings, even dragging in the old cases of Fang Xinghai and Yi Huiman. Which of these transactions will eventually end up in the case files, we do not know today, but if you put it together with the official notification of Yi Huiman mentioned earlier, you will discover one thing: what is being dug up overseas now is precisely the same money scene of listing, financing, approval, and relatives.

This is what is truly terrifying about Huang Qifan. He is not just a local official who only served in Chongqing; from Shanghai Pudong to Chongqing, and all the way from local finance and state-owned enterprise restructuring to the NPC Financial and Economic Think Tank and financial forums, he has seen too much over the decades about how enterprises are restructured, projects approved, funds entered, and capital exited. When such a person sits on stage talking about macroeconomics, he is an expert, but when he actually sits across from investigators, his mind is filled not just with his own affairs, but with name after name and project after project. Therefore, what truly keeps people awake at night regarding the investigation into Huang Qifan is not how many years he will be sentenced to, but whom he will drag down with him. Huang Qifan is not the end point; he is more like a financial directory. Yi Huiman has already written the words "listing approval, financing, loans, and relatives" into the CCDI communique, Bi Jingquan has handed over things he did not previously grasp, and now Huang Qifan has also gone in. The three lines may not be the same case, but if the investigators are tracing back along this money trail, the political weight of whoever's name is on the next page will be entirely different. Now that this page has turned to Li Zhanshu’s family, the matter is no longer just Huang Qifan's personal problem, because Li Zhanshu's relationship with that person in Zhongnanhai is completely different from ordinary members of the Xi faction. Investigating this far means touching the absolute closest inner circle of the boss—whether they can still be protected is the question. If Huang Qifan's financial directory only exposed a few financial officials and state-owned enterprise bosses, the matter would still remain at the level of anti-corruption. Now, however, the lead is being dug toward Li Zhanshu's daughter, and that is different, because Li Zhanshu's relationship with that person in Zhongnanhai is not a standard superior-subordinate relationship, nor is it a political alliance temporarily cobbled together after the 18th Party Congress. Their friendship goes back more than 40 years. In the early 1980s, one was in Zhengding, Hebei, and the other was in neighboring Wuji; both were county party secretaries in the Shijiazhuang prefecture. What era was that? County party secretaries went down to villages, sitting on clay kangs at night drinking and discussing matters, figuring out each other's tempers and whether they dared to trust each other with their backs. A few drinking sessions were probably enough to figure each other out. Later, their official careers took different paths. By 2012, when that person in Zhongnanhai was preparing to take the top position, Li Zhanshu suddenly moved from Guizhou to Beijing, first presiding over the routine work of the General Office and quickly taking formal charge of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. After the 18th Party Congress, he entered the Politburo Secretariat and continued to head the General Office. Who this position is handed to in itself demonstrates the level of trust. Therefore, Li Zhanshu is not an ordinary minion who gathered around the boss later; he is more like someone who knew the boss early on and truly guarded the gate for him. Every day at the highest level, what documents are read, who enters which meetings, which matters are submitted first, and which matters are suppressed—the General Office stands at the very doorway of this power hub. When Li Zhanshu later entered the Standing Committee to serve as Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, he was no longer living off a single official position, but had become one of the most core political elders of the entire Xi era. This is also why, four years ago at the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Li Zhanshu happened to be standing in that exact position.

Everyone is familiar with the old footage, so today we don't need to reheat leftovers frame by frame; just remembering a few actions is enough: Hu Jintao wanted to touch the documents on the table, Li Zhanshu controlled the documents, turned sideways, and spoke unilaterally to Hu for a long time. Later, that person brought in staff to intervene, and Hu Jintao was led away. Before leaving, he said a few words to the person in Zhongnanhai and patted Li Keqiang on the shoulder. Hu Chunhua was right there on the scene, sitting in the front row with his arms crossed. What's even more interesting is that as soon as the incident happened back then, rumors were already circulating overseas that the name list had been changed. The version that leaked recently is even more specific: in the original plan, the person in Zhongnanhai was to continue as General Secretary and President, Li Keqiang was to move to Chairman of the NPC, Li Qiang was to be Premier, Zhao Leji was to go to the CPPCC, Cai Qi was to head the Secretariat, Li Xi was to head the CCDI, and Hu Chunhua was to be First Vice Premier. Everyone knows the final announced result: Li Keqiang withdrew completely, Hu Chunhua didn't even enter the Politburo, Zhao Leji went to the NPC, Wang Huning went to the CPPCC, and Ding Xuexiang later became the top-ranked Vice Premier. Therefore, bringing up the 20th National Congress today is not to retell how Hu Jintao was led out, but because four years later, those exact same people have crossed paths again. Hu Chunhua was a loser back then, and Li Zhanshu was right beside that table; today, a liquidation list involving Hu Chunhua's side has leaked, and Huang Qifan has suddenly fallen from grace. Overseas leaks are now digging this financial trail of Huang Qifan straight into Li Zhanshu's family. Four years ago it was a personnel list; four years later it has turned into a financial ledger. This is the real new drama today. You must know that the Xi faction was never a monolith to begin with; if Li Zhanshu loses a person, someone from Cai Qi's or Li Qiang's faction can grab an extra spot. Therefore, the Big Boss might not necessarily be unhappy, and this logic makes complete sense when applied to official positions—factions within that group need to scramble for turf just the same. When the Big Boss sits firmly, he can balance things from the middle while the factions below bite at each other. Giving you one less hat today and one more chair tomorrow is just dividing the cake within the family. But if what is being overturned now is not hats, but the family's money, that is an entirely different story. Giving one of Li Zhanshu's old subordinates fewer positions is just brothers fighting for chairs in the living room, but tracing the daughter's capital relations, public listings, and financing all the way inside means someone has walked into the study and started pulling open the old butler's drawers. Whether a Big Boss truly still has power cannot be judged solely by who is standing next to him on Xinwen Lianbao; it depends even more on whether he can protect the people closest to him. When a lesser underling gets into trouble, one can say it's sacrificing the rook to save the king; when a local old subordinate is transferred away, one can also call it a reshuffle. But Li Zhanshu is different—this is the person who, right when he first took the supreme position, dared to hand the keys of the General Office to him. If even this layer is being pried open by someone, what people inside the system see is not Li Zhanshu falling out of favor, but another question: does the person in Zhongnanhai still have the ability to draw a line for his old butler and say, "Stop investigating here"? This is the real step forward for this Huang Qifan trail. How much money Huang Qifan himself took is no longer the most interesting part, and how much money is implicated in Li Zhanshu's family is not even the ultimate question. What truly matters is that if this door is genuinely pushed open, can the person standing behind that door still manage to close it again? At this stage, the real opponent in Hu Chunhua's revenge drama is actually no longer Huang Qifan nor Li Zhanshu; Huang Qifan is a ledger, Li Zhanshu is a door, and the one truly standing behind the door is still the person in Zhongnanhai.

Four years ago at the 20th National Congress, what the Youth League faction lost was not just one or two positions. Hu Jintao was escorted out of the closing ceremony, and the next day Hu Chunhua failed to even enter the Political Bureau. What is truly intriguing is Li Keqiang's final choice to completely withdraw. If that original draft circulating recently is true, Li Keqiang was originally supposed to go to the National People's Congress and Hu Chunhua was supposed to have the position of Executive Vice Premier. That final outcome is worth pondering. After Hu Chunhua was dropped, if Li Keqiang had chosen to stay behind, what kind of effect would that have had? When the new leadership lineup made its debut, the outside world could at least say, "Who says they are all his own people? Look, didn't the Youth League faction still leave behind a Li Keqiang?" Objectively, Li Keqiang staying behind would have become the best-looking decoration on that list. But in the end, he did not stay. There is actually a reading of this that fits the human nature of officialdom very well: since you didn't even want Hu Chunhua, I am not going to help you keep up this appearance. If you want to purge the Youth League faction out, then purge them completely. Don't sweep away all the people behind him on the one hand while still leaving me, the former premier, sitting in the Standing Committee to make the whole world feel that this is still a set of leadership where things are discussed and various factions are balanced. Sometimes political figures do not need to bang the table or hold a press conference to make a statement; my refusal to sit in the chair you gave me is a statement in itself. And let's not forget, Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua were not two unrelated people. Both came all the way up through the Communist Youth League system, and both were connected behind the scenes to Hu Jintao's cadre succession pipeline. Hu Chunhua was originally one of the most high-profile successor pipeline figures left over from the Hu Jintao era. Watching the person behind him being entirely taken away, if he himself had stayed behind to continue serving as a Standing Committee member, whether he could get over that psychological hurdle in his heart is probably not something that could be glossed over by simply obeying organizational arrangements. Therefore, what was truly torn open on that night of the 20th National Congress was perhaps not just a name list, but the breath of three people. What Hu Jintao suffered was that public removal on the spot; what Hu Chunhua lost was his own political future; and if Li Keqiang really had the chance to stay but chose to withdraw, what he threw away was not his official position, but rather using his withdrawal to tell everyone that since this leadership has already become like this, don't use me to smooth things over for it. When these three things overlap, the flavor becomes completely different. A year later, Li Keqiang suddenly passed away, and the official announcement said it was a sudden heart attack—that is the public statement. But ever since then, rumors about the person who finished off the former premier have been endless, and the reason is not hard to understand. Truly deep grievances are often not forged by a single incident, but by a critical moment when several people suddenly realize that they are no longer in the same boat.

So four years later, if Hu Chunhua really has the opportunity to reopen the ledger, what is he most eager to investigate? It might not be touching the person in Zhongnanhai himself first—that is not the most common play in Chinese officialdom. First investigate the people, first investigate the money, first investigate those things that can become case files. Back then, who helped whom handle matters, who kept watch for whose door, which family's children got close to which financial officials, which project was approved by whom, and whose nod initiated which financing. Political grievances in the end are often not written into a polemic, but turned into individual case numbers. This is what makes revenge truly interesting. Real officialdom revenge is when not a single harsh word is spoken on the surface, people still shake hands when they meet, and documents still address each other as comrades, but underneath, people have already started pulling case files, looking for old associates, investigating businesses, and checking family members. You removed my people from the list back then; today I won't argue with you about the list, I will investigate your people. You made me only able to sit and watch back then; today I don't need to fall out with you either, I just need to make sure that the door which originally could not be knocked on now has people daring to knock on it. Therefore, by today, what the person in Zhongnanhai really needs to worry about is no longer just which hat he has left after the Fifth Plenary Session—whether General Secretary or Chairman of the Military Commission. Those are things on the surface. What can truly make those around him judge how much power a boss has left is something else: when I get into trouble, can you still protect me? The reason why Li Zhanshu's line is important lies right here. If it were just one of Li Zhanshu's former subordinates losing office, that would be called re-dividing the cake. If even the money line of the Li family itself is something people dare to dig into all the way inside, then everyone who has followed Old Xi will ask the same question: today it is Li Zhanshu, tomorrow will it be my turn? Once this kind of question spreads through officialdom, it is more effective than any editorial, because people are most realistic. Back then they followed you because you could give them a position and save their lives. If you can't give them positions now and can't protect them when trouble strikes, loyalty will be recalculated in terms of cost. Therefore, what truly needs to be watched before the Fifth Plenary Session is no longer the fall of another Huang Qifan, nor whose family Li Zhanshu's case will eventually implicate, but that most fatal question: regarding the accounts of the past 13 years, who actually has the qualification to say "investigate up to here and stop." In the past, the person in Zhongnanhai had the final say on that sentence. Now? When that ledger is flipped to the next page and Old Xi speaks up to say "enough," will the people below still be willing to close the ledger? This is what truly needs to be watched next. Alright, that is all for today's program.

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