Is the Xi Family Army Starting to Fall Apart? Hu Chunhua Suddenly “Goes into Hiding” Before the Fifth Plenum — Can Xi Jinping Change the Leadership Without Giving Up the Presidency? Ding Xuexiang Consolidates Data Power in Xiong’an, Li Qiang’s Former Jiangsu Subordinates Airdropped to Yunnan! The CCDI and Six Departments Simultaneously Block Three Escape Routes: Retirement, Family Members, and Medical Parole! [Jiang Feng Perspective 20261022 Episode 520]

This article explores the changes in the political situation on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee, pointing out that signs such as Ding Xuexiang establishing the National Data Group in Xiongan to centralize power, Li Qiang's former subordinates parachuting into Yunnan, and the League background of He Lifeng's close secretary emerging indicate that the "Xi faction" members are each looking for a way out. At the same gtime, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and multiple departments have intensively issued strict new regulations targeting retired cadres, family members taking bribes, and medical parole, cooperating with multiple cases of officials falling from power and young sculls of private enterprises being investigated, showing that high-level tremors are intensifying. In addition, the article analyzes the power transition trends that Hu Chunhua's recent disappearance from the public eye may imply, and discusses the feasibility of changing leadership at the Fifth Plenary Session by referring to the precedent of Jiang Zemin's transitional succession during the Deng Xiaoping era.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiangfeng Horizon. How can you tell that the Xi faction is breaking up? With the Fifth Plenary Session just five days away from opening, several of Old Xi's most loyal followers are no longer waiting for him to arrange things after him, and are each finding a way out for themselves. On October 20, Ding Xuexiang, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and Executive Vice Premier, rushed to Xiongan to personally unveil a new state-owned enterprise. While Premier Li Qiang was still visiting abroad, an appointment popped up domestically, cramming his former Jiangsu subordinates into the Standing Committee of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee. Even the close-in confidential secretary of He Lifeng, who manages the purse strings for Old Xi, had his Youth League background dug up by people. The chief stewards are not guarding the gate for the boss, but are busy leaving back doors one by one. Why? Because within this past week, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the political and legal systems have successively released signals: you will still be investigated after retirement, money taken by family members will still be counted against you, and if you want to get out with a medical record after being sentenced, the door is narrowing even further. When the ship is about to sink, who is still willing to stay on board and be buried with it? And the person who truly wants to take over this ship has been completely silent over the past half month.

Let's start with Ding Xuexiang. On October 20th, the National Data Group was unveiled in Xiong'an, Hebei. Ding Xuexiang not only personally unveiled the plaque and delivered a speech on stage, but also spent the entire day touring Xiong'an, even visiting China Satellite Network. This company is the 100th central state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), ranking 28th on the list of central SOEs. The top 55 central SOEs are at the vice-ministerial level, meaning it was born at the vice-ministerial level. Who ranks ahead of it? The three major operators—China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile—plus China Satellite Network, which handles satellite internet. From satellites in the sky to base stations on the ground, and the mobile phones and networks of all the people in the country, the next link in the chain is this company. Once the list of shareholders is laid out, its weight becomes even clearer: the State Council's Xiong'an Management Committee, China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile, plus the State Grid and China Southern Power Grid. The three major operators manage the calls and internet usage of everyone in the country, and the two major power grids manage the electricity usage. Just think about it: what does it mean when all this data is funneled into one plate? Which factory is running how many shifts, which residential area turns off its lights at what time, whose phone stopped at which base station last night—it's all in there. The leadership team was also assembled according to this plate. Once the group's official website went live, the leadership team appeared collectively, but only their names were listed; not a single word about their dates of birth or work history was posted. A quick check of the names reveals: Chairman Jian Qin, former General Manager of China Unicom; Deputy Party Secretary Cheng Jianjun, former Deputy General Manager of China Mobile; Chen Haibo, former General Manager of China Unicom's Beijing Branch; Chief Accountant Luo Laifeng, former General Manager of China Telecom's Human Resources Department; Deputy General Manager Hu Xiao, former Director of the Network Data Administration of the Cyberspace Administration of China; and Discipline Inspection Team Leader Wang Dayu, transferred from his post as Deputy Secretary of the Jilin Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection. The three major operators, the Cyberspace Administration of China, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection—not one is missing. Look at the people sitting in the audience: Vice Minister of State Security Yuan Yikun was present, and Li Jun, the post-75s General Manager of China Electronics, was sitting to the right of the new General Manager. A company that does business in data holds its founding ceremony, and a Vice Minister of State Security is sitting in the audience—I don't need to say much more about what is being stored in this plate. The most worth noting is this General Manager, Chen Ronghui. Chen Ronghui is from Fujian and has spent over twenty years in digital construction in Fujian, rising all the way from the Digital Fujian office. What is Digital Fujian? It was a project personally proposed by Xi Jinping when he was governor of Fujian in the year 2000, which was later packaged as the source of Digital China and is one of the political achievements Xi loves to talk about most. In 2023, the National Data Bureau was established, and Chen Ronghui was transferred from Fujian to Beijing to serve as Deputy Director, guarding the gate of national data for Xi. The Deputy Director of the National Bureau is at the department level, but this time, entering the Data Group, he was directly promoted to the vice-ministerial level. Some friends might ask: Chen Ronghui is Xi's man, and Ding Xuexiang is also Xi's man; if people are just moving from one pocket to another, how is this considered a split? The difference lies right here. The National Data Bureau is a ministry that manages rules and documents; the Data Group is a company that manages concrete data and real money. This brand, which Xi's old Fujian team has guarded for over twenty years, has now been packed into a new central SOE, along with the people and the business. The one standing on stage unveiling the plaque for it is Ding Xuexiang. Think about the location again: Xiong'an is the millennium plan personally set by Xi, his most prominent political achievement project. Ding Xuexiang deliberately chose to hold this event in Xiong'an, and his speech was filled with references to the important decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee with "that person" at the core. What can Xi say? In his own political achievement project, under his own banner, his old Fujian foundation is being taken over, and he can't even say a word against it. This is how the CCP officialdom works: if they really want to undermine you, they will never fall out with you to your face; they will only shout your name while moving your things away. Moreover, Xiong'an has been very busy these past few days. Just after Ding Xuexiang left on the 20th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Wang Yi would also be going to Xiong'an on the 23rd to attend the opening ceremony of the Global Governance Forum, deliver a keynote speech, and meet with foreign guests. Everyone is flocking to his millennium plan, using that person's banner to do their own business. Ding Xuexiang knows better than anyone that after the Fifth Plenary Session, no one can be sure which chair they will be sitting in. Holding the key to national data in his hands, whether it's negotiating terms with the elders or dividing power with the new team in the future, is a strong card to play. This isn't called guarding the house for Xi; this is called preparing a life-saving card for himself.

Ding Xuexiang is collecting data in Xiong'an, but what about Li Qiang? Li Qiang is moving people. Starting on October 17, Li Qiang first went to Uzbekistan, then to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, to attend the SCO Prime Ministers' meeting, and after that, he is scheduled to visit Russia. While he is abroad, personnel matters back home have not been delayed in the slightest. On October 21, Xinhua News Agency released a one-sentence appointment: Comrade Wang Jinjian is appointed as a member and standing committee member of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee. Who is Wang Jinjian? Born in September 1973, he is 53 years old this year, and his previous position was Secretary of the Yangzhou Municipal Party Committee in Jiangsu. According to his public resume, he worked in Jiangyin, Wuxi for a long time, served as Secretary of the Jiangyin Municipal Party Committee, and later went to Yangzhou to serve as Mayor and Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee. From 2016 to 2017, who was the Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee? Li Qiang. Friends who understand the officialdom will have their eyelids twitch when they see this. A prefecture-level municipal party secretary is at the department level; conventionally, one must first be promoted to vice governor to reach the vice-ministerial level, and then wait a year or two before being eligible to enter the provincial standing committee. A jump like this from a prefecture-level secretary directly into another province's standing committee only happens at one time: when scrambling for positions around a leadership transition. The Yunnan Provincial Party Committee is expected to undergo a transition next month; the person inserted at this time is a nail driven into the new team in advance. Of course, provincial standing committee members are appointed by the CCP Central Committee, not something that can be done by a single order from the Premier. But in the CCP officialdom, whether a person can move up has never depended on who signed the document, but on who spoke for them. You can imagine how such an appointment comes about. The Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee needs to assign a standing committee member to Yunnan, so they first list a roster and then seek opinions one by one. There are several people on the list; who can be ranked at the front? At this time, someone drops a word: "Wang Jinjian from Yangzhou is good at managing the economy, and his age is appropriate; I thought he was good when I was in Jiangsu." If the person who says this has enough weight, the order of the list changes, and the matter is done without a single note being written. Li Qiang is in Dushanbe, and his old subordinates from Jiangsu are parachuted into Kunming; this is about leaving someone in a local position who can speak for him. If you connect this with what happened in the previous two weeks, in late September, the party secretaries and governors of Henan and Anhui were wiped out within two days, and the organization department head and discipline inspection commission secretary of Jiangsu province also changed to new faces one after another. Li Qiang's old foundation in Jiangsu is about to be dug up piece by piece; he is saving whoever he can by moving them out.

The last one is He Lifeng. He Lifeng can be considered one of the longest-serving people around Xi. He worked with Xi in Xiamen in the 1980s and later served as Secretary of the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee. He is now Vice Premier and Director of the Office of the Central Financial Commission, and the nation's purse strings are under his control. In March of this year in Paris, he was also the one discussing economy and trade with U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent and Trade Representative Greer. He holds all the details on how China and the U.S. negotiate, as well as the bottom lines of foreign exchange, the bond market, and banks. No matter who takes over in the future, they cannot bypass this ledger. As long as he is willing to hand over the ledger in a different direction, he won't have to worry about not having a way out. On October 19, He Lifeng was busy all day. During the day, he co-chaired the 30th meeting of the China-Russia Prime Ministers' Regular Meeting Committee with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, and in the evening, he met with members of the International Advisory Committee of the National Financial Regulatory Administration at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. Sitting behind him on both occasions was the same person, confidential secretary Jia Anlu. On the nameplate at the China-Russia meeting, the Russian translation printed was his name. How closely does this person follow He Lifeng? In July of this year, when He Lifeng went to Inner Mongolia for a three-day inspection, he was sitting right behind He Lifeng. In a 2018 report by the National Development and Reform Commission, his unit was listed as the Director's Office of the General Office of the NDRC, which is He Lifeng's own office. He has followed him for eight years from the NDRC to the State Council. But if you look further back, in the 2000s and early 2010s, Jia Anlu worked at Zhejiang University and served as Deputy Secretary of the Communist Youth League Committee of the Guanghua Law School. Just think, in an officialdom that values background and cliques the most, the head manager of the Fujian Gang, Xi's most trusted purse-holder, has someone closest to him, the one who knows all the secrets, who actually has the "red ribbon" background of the Communist Youth League. It seems He Lifeng's door does not only open in one direction.

Ding Xuexiang is collecting data, Li Qiang is moving old subordinates, and He Lifeng's aide has a Youth League background—three people in three directions, and not one of them is guarding the gate for Xi. So the question arises: why did this group of people who have followed Xi for more than a decade choose this critical moment to not even bother with superficial efforts? Let's look at a detail: on October 15, Qiushi magazine published an article by Xi, which contained a sentence: "Power must be locked in the cage of institutions; there are no exceptions and no privileges before discipline." Xi has been shouting this for 14 years, always for others to hear. But today, what the Fifth Plenary Session is about to review is precisely a decision on strict party governance. This sentence, when turned back, is aimed precisely at himself first. And following closely, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Justice have closed three doors in succession.

Let's lay out the timeline first. On September 21, the Politburo held a meeting and decided that the Fifth Plenary Session would be held from October 26 to 29, primarily to deliberate a resolution on several major issues regarding the persistent and strict governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On the same day, the Politburo also announced the expulsion of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the Party and the military. Xi Jinping's calculation was made this way: with the economy, diplomacy, and the military all failing to produce any respectable results, only the anti-corruption card remained. Having all Central Committee members raise their hands to pass this resolution would be equivalent to stamping a historic achievement on his 14 years of purges. Once that seal is stamped, when he eventually steps down in the future, this document would serve as an amulet. However, for this resolution to pass, it depends on the votes in the hands of the Central Committee members. As we discussed a few days ago, since September, the substantive positions of chief officials in eight localities have been stripped, though their identities as Central Committee members remain; where they will go next has not been announced, leaving them all hanging in mid-air to await the conclusion of the plenary session before their fate is decided. When these people raise their hands, what they are thinking about is not Xi's ledger of merits, but the second half of their own lives. The harsher the resolution is written, the more frightened they become; the harsher it is written, the more they look at who is holding the pen when considering whom it will be used against in the future. Xi thought he was the one writing this document, but after the Fifth Plenary Session, the person enforcing it might not necessarily be him anymore.

What was the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) busy with during the very week before the plenary session? The first door: you cannot escape even if you are retired. On October 21, the CCDI website published an article titled "Qualitative Analysis of Illegal Acceptance of Property by Retired Party Members and Cadres." There is an old routine in official CCP circles called option corruption: approving land, projects, and loans while in office without taking a single penny on the spot, not even bringing a tea canister home, waiting until the safe retirement age of 65, and then having bosses transfer the accumulated funds over ten years with principal and interest through consulting fees, antique calligraphy and paintings, or overseas funds. In the event of trouble, sitting in the interrogation room and spreading both hands, saying I was already retired when I took the money and no longer held public power, at most counting as a disciplinary violation rather than a bribery crime. Some friends might say, wasn't this rule already in place? That's right, the judicial opinions of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate in 2007 clearly stated that agreeing in advance to receive money after retirement would still be treated as accepting bribes. Therefore, the article itself is not new; what is new is the timing. Five days before the Fifth Plenary Session, the word 'retired' was deliberately singled out and placed on the homepage for discussion. Looking again at the people brought down during this period, on October 13, former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan was investigated; this veteran is 74 years old this year and has been retired from the post of Chongqing mayor for a full ten years. When Bo Xilai fell, he was fine; when Sun Zhengcai fell, he was also fine. Official circles called him a tumbler, yet ten years later he was still dug up. According to the CCDI's announcements, these past few days two other veteran department-level officials who retired many years ago from the State Taxation Administration and the National Development and Reform Commission were also investigated. In mid-October, Wang Wenling, former deputy director of the National Council for Social Security Fund, was also subjected to the 'double expulsion' (shuang开). Putting these events together, the meaning couldn't be clearer: don't think that handing over the official seal guarantees a safe landing. Next year at the 21st National Congress, whoever becomes a retired cadre will face the standing committee members and Xi himself coming up at the 20th National Congress.

The second door: family members taking money counts as your own. On the same day, the CCDI website published another article clarifying the boundaries of criminal responsibility for joint bribery with relatives. High-ranking CCP officials never carry sacks to load cash themselves; it is always wives, children, brothers, and sisters at the front opening companies, running funds, and setting up trusts. Once trouble strikes, the most common trick is to bite down and claim that family members did it behind their back, that they were busy with state affairs and completely unaware, pushing relatives out as scapegoats to save themselves. This path was actually blocked by the judicial interpretation in 2016 as well; officials who know their relatives receive money and fail to return or hand it over are still considered to be accepting bribes. Yet precisely five days before the Fifth Plenary Session, this is brought out and discussed again. Who is it aimed at? The one sitting on pins and needles these days is Cai Qi. On October 16, Xi went to Ulanqab, Inner Mongolia, and Cai Qi, who usually follows him like a shadow, did not show his face. What is Cai Qi's role? Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee; every person Xi meets, everywhere he goes, and every document he reads passes through his hands. Such a chief steward of the inner court failed to accompany the top leader on an out-of-town inspection. Either that person didn't let him follow, or he couldn't break away himself; neither of which is a good omen. Over the past two days, news has spread that one of Cai Qi's older brothers in his hometown in Fujian has been taken away for over a month. With the backyard catching fire in his hometown, how could this chief steward have the mind to accompany the tour? But one thing is in black and white: in that British Chinese spy case, two British men were prosecuted in April 2024, and prosecutors dropped the case last September. However, the witness statement subsequently made public by the British government stated that one of them, named Berry, had met Cai Qi in July 2022. The Daily Telegraph in the UK also reported that these two men taught English at Hangzhou Oriental Middle School back then, and Cai Qi's son Cai Erzhan once worked in the Hangzhou Education Bureau which oversaw this school. On one hand are rumors about hometown relatives, and on the other is a transnational case dragging in his son. Just at this moment, the CCDI redrew the boundaries of joint bribery involving relatives. Whose body this ruler will measure first is something Cai Qi knows best in his own heart.

The third door: even after being sentenced, it is now difficult to get out using a medical record. On October 19, the Ministry of Public Security website published a document jointly issued by six departments—the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the National Health Commission, and the National Administration of Disease Control and Prevention—outlining the scope of serious illnesses eligible for temporary execution outside prison and the identification standards for inability to care for oneself. Put bluntly, this is resetting the threshold for medical parole. Some friends might say, weren't the regulations on medical parole established back in 2014? Yes, the 2014 rules were issued jointly by five departments. This time, the Administration of Disease Control and Prevention has been added, and the definition of what constitutes a serious illness and how one is determined to be unable to care for oneself are being redefined line by line. Over the years, how many senior corrupt officials have suddenly fallen ill after being sentenced? Their families pull strings to find a hospital, the hospital president calls the attending physician into an office and closes the door: the senior leader is getting old, he has coronary heart disease combined with hypertension, write the medical record a bit more severely and I will take responsibility if anything happens. With one medical record and one set of expert opinions, the person is moved from prison to the hospital, and then from the hospital back home. Where were the loopholes in the past? They lay in a few ambiguous phrases. How severe is severe? Does inability to care for oneself mean needing someone to feed you or someone to help you walk? The more ambiguous the phrases, the more valuable the doctor's pen becomes. Now, the six departments are scrutinizing these phrases into specific indicators, leaving fewer areas where doctors can play tricks with their pens. The finer the standards, the smaller this loophole becomes. Which doctor would dare to write a heavier medical record for a senior corrupt official at the critical and high-stakes moment of the Fifth Plenary Session? Looking at the three doors together: stepping down leads to past accounts being investigated, staying in power leads to family members being investigated, and even after being sentenced, finding a hospital bed to lie on is difficult. Xi's decision was originally intended to serve as an amulet, but it has now become a checklist, entirely outlining the path that Xi's faction must walk in the future. Therefore, the top administrators are not waiting any longer. Once the doors of the Fifth Plenary Session close, those who do not hold a lifebuoy in their hands need not expect to swim ashore.

Just in these past few days, there has been another matter even more direct than the issuance of documents and setting of standards. On the evening of October 16, a listed company released an announcement stating that its former chairman, a post-90s scion, had been subjected to criminal coercive measures. The rise of this company can be traced back to Hebei, connecting on one end to Xi and Li Zhanshu where they first started out, and on the other end to a propaganda heavyweight personally promoted by Xi. What is going on here? The company is called ST Hengxin, and on the evening of October 19, it issued an announcement stating that it had learned from public security and judicial organs that the company's former chairman, Meng Nan, had been subjected to criminal coercive measures. The details are quite intriguing: Meng Nan had already been removed from his position as a director by the shareholders' meeting on June 30 this year, but the legal representative on the company's business license remains him to this day. The company tried to contact his father, the actual controller Meng Xianmin, to inquire about the situation, but received no response. When a 34-year-old son is taken away and the father cannot be contacted, the usual routine when a listed company runs into trouble is for the China Securities Regulatory Commission to first open a case, send personnel to audit the accounts, and after tossing and turning for several months, finally issue a fine. This time, the announcement lacks these preliminary steps; it straight out begins with criminal coercive measures. What is the background of this company? Its predecessor was Hengxin Mobile, which started in Hebei, grew big through mobile sales and mobile value-added services, and was listed on the Growth Enterprise Market around 2010. According to circulating online accounts, it once secured the exclusive agency for Hebei's mobile television business, backed by officials within the Hebei broadcasting system at the time. Who stood behind this approval document? Following the timeline reveals the answer. The provincial standing committee member and head of the propaganda department who managed Hebei's entire propaganda and broadcasting sectors during those years was Nie Chenxi. Nie Chenxi became the head of the Hebei Provincial Propaganda Department in 2006, later served concurrently as vice governor of Hebei, and was transferred to Beijing in October 2012 to serve as deputy director of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television. After the 18th National Congress, he was continuously promoted by Xi, taking charge of CCTV in 2015, becoming director of the State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, Film and Television in 2016, and serving as the first director of the newly established National Radio and Television Administration in 2018 while concurrently serving as deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee. He was a member of the 19th Central Committee. Look at the two ends of this line: one end is Hebei, where Xi once served as county party secretary of Zhengting, and Li Zhanshu served as county party secretary of neighboring Wuji County. The two forged their friendship back then. Later, Li Zhanshu returned to Hebei and served as secretary-general of the provincial party committee for several years. Hebei is the earliest political root for both men. The other end is the person personally placed by Xi in the position of the national mouthpiece to guard his ideological lifeline. Some friends might ask: a young scion gets arrested, how does that connect to a Central Committee member and Li Zhanshu? Let us think from another perspective: a private company doing mobile and mobile business in Hebei needs to obtain licenses, secure channels, and deal with telecom operators and the broadcasting system. Behind every door stands someone. Now that the police have directly taken the boss away, the very first thing they will ask is who opened these doors back then. What the investigators are asking the Meng father and son to clarify is likely far more than just the accounts of a single company. How franchise operations were approved in Hebei over the years, how propaganda channels were run, and how hidden shares and interests were divided—once this ledger is opened and burned down, no one can say for sure where the fire will spread.

The people at the forefront are busier than ever. On October 15, Li Qiang delivered a video address for the opening of the new China-North Korea Yalu River Bridge. On the 17th, he went abroad, visiting Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for the SCO meetings, then heading to Russia—one stop after another. Ding Xuexiang unveiled a plaque in Xiong'an, and He Lifeng met with foreign guests at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. Yet, there is one person who has been almost invisible in official reports for the past half month: Hu Chunhua. In September, Hu Chunhua's appearances were quite frequent. Observant friends noticed that on September 11, Wang Huning met with the Speaker of the National Assembly of Angola and arranged for Hu Chunhua to sit at his right hand; he was also present at the National Day reception on September 30. However, as soon as the National Day holiday ended, for two full weeks now, his figure has been absent from the reports. Some friends might say, what does it mean for a Vice Chairman of the CPPCC to not appear for two weeks? Let us recall how Hu Chunhua has spent the past four years. Hu Chunhua is 63 years old this year. After graduating from Peking University, he went to Tibet and spent nearly 20 years there. Later, he served as the First Secretary of the Communist Youth League, Governor of Hebei, Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia, Party Secretary of Guangdong, and Vice Premier of the State Council. He entered the Politburo at the 18th National Congress and was recognized at the time as the successor from the post-60s generation. At the 20th National Congress in 2022, Hu Chunhua was only 59 years old. By age, he was fully eligible to remain, yet he did not even enter the Politburo and was sidelined as a Vice Chairman of the CPPCC. At the closing ceremony of that same congress, Hu Jintao was escorted off the stage in front of the world's cameras; that day, Xi Jinping had removed Hu Jintao and his people from the center of power. For these four years, Hu Chunhua has barely spoken, expressed opinions, or sought the spotlight in the CPPCC. However, in the second half of this year, his seating and appearances gradually moved forward, only to suddenly go quiet again at the end of September. Let us look at what true successors in the history of the CCP looked like before their positions were finalized.

In May 1989, Beijing was in chaos. The eyes of the outside world were fixed on those few people on stage. Jiang Zemin, who truly received the seal of the General Secretary, was then the Party Secretary of Shanghai. He was quietly summoned to Beijing in late May to meet Deng Xiaoping. Almost no one outside had guessed it was him. After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee in late June, Jiang Zemin became the General Secretary. It was not just Jiang Zemin; Xi Jinping himself went through the same process. In March 2007, Xi was transferred from Zhejiang to become the Party Secretary of Shanghai, where he stayed for seven months. During these seven months, he made no big moves and uttered no harsh words. Outsiders were all guessing it would be Li Keqiang. When the Standing Committee members walked out to appear at the First Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee on October 17, Xi was ranked ahead of Li Keqiang. The more bustling the front stage, the more likely it is just a distraction. The person who is truly going to take over is often silent before the cards are revealed. Moreover, the current situation is even more dangerous than it was back then. Zhang Youxia was just expelled from the Party and the military in September, and the top military leadership is still in turmoil. If the elders and the military want to push someone up, the last thing they want is for that person to be targeted or scrutinized before the meeting. Keeping him out of the spotlight is the safest arrangement.

However, there is a question from overseas: even if the Fifth Plenary Session allows Hu Chunhua to take over as General Secretary, the title of President is still held by Xi Jinping, which cannot be changed until the National People's Congress next March. In those four-plus months, in what capacity would Hu Chunhua sit as an equal with other heads of state? Someone provided the answer to this question 37 years ago. When Jiang Zemin became General Secretary in June 1989, who was the President? Yang Shangkun. It was not until the Eighth National People's Congress in March 1993 that Jiang Zemin took over as President. For nearly four years in between, the title of head of state remained with Yang Shangkun. What did Jiang Zemin have in his hands? He took over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 1989, and the NPC added the title of Chairman of the State Military Commission in April 1990. The Party's top leader plus the gun was enough. Did foreigners recognize him? Less than a year after taking office, in March 1990, Jiang Zemin made his first visit to Pyongyang, where Kim Il-sung personally greeted him at the airport. In May 1991, Jiang went to Moscow, where Gorbachev received him in the Kremlin, and the foreign ministers of China and the Soviet Union signed the Eastern Section Border Agreement in their presence. In April 1992, Jiang visited Japan, where Emperor Akihito hosted a luncheon at the Imperial Palace. You see, who is the true top leader of China? The world knows. They have never recognized the titles printed on a business card. Furthermore, note that Jiang Zemin was able to sit firmly back then not because of his own foundation; he had no base in Beijing and no seniority in the military. He was supported by Deng Xiaoping and a group of elders, plus the military power held by Yang Shangkun. The position of General Secretary was given to a newcomer, the position of President was left to an elder for the transition, and the gun was watched by the elders. That was how the setup was built back then. How similar the current situation is: the elders are in command behind the scenes, and the daily affairs of the Military Commission are managed by Zhang Shengmin. What does it matter if Xi Jinping wears that President's hat for a few more months? The hat is still there, but the power of the sword has long since left his hands. As for the title of Vice Chairman of the CPPCC held by Hu Chunhua, that is even easier to handle. If he becomes General Secretary, he cannot keep sitting under Wang Huning at every CPPCC chairmen's meeting to listen to reports, can he? The National CPPCC can just hold an extra meeting to dismiss him. Once this layer of window paper is pierced, there are no technical obstacles to changing the leadership at the Fifth Plenary Session. The busier the people at the front, the more conspicuous the person who has gone quiet becomes. The Xi faction is falling apart, not because someone shouted for it to disperse, but because everyone has seen clearly that the person on the boat can no longer protect anyone. The doors of the Jingxi Hotel will close on October 26. That is all for today.

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