Xi Jinping Visits Inner Mongolia and Doesn't See a Single Soldier; Provincial Party Secretaries Flock to Pledge Allegiance to Hu Jintao's Protégé Chen Xiaojiang; Eight Central Committee Members Unaccounted For, the Fifth Plenum to Vote First and Hand Down Punishments Afterwards [Jiang Feng's Perspective 20261017 Episode 516]
This episode analyzes the changes in the power structure of the CCP's top leadership. The speaker points out that Xi Jinping's recent inspection of Inner Mongolia without any military personnel by his side indicates that military power has slipped from his grasp. Meanwhile, provincial party secretaries from multiple provinces have flocked to Xinjiang to pay visits to Chen Xiaojiang, a protégé of Hu Jintao, reflecting the local officialdom's acute shift in political alignment. Furthermore, the recent dense resignation of several high-ranking provincial and ministerial officials, whose whereabouts remain unknown, suggests that the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session will face intense political purges.
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Hello friends,
Welcome to Jiang Feng Vision. The CCP has completely changed; how can we tell? The gun has stopped recognizing Old Xi; he can't even enter the gates of a military camp now. Just on October 16th, Old Xi took a trip to Inner Mongolia. In the past, this would be called inspecting the frontier and reviewing the three armed services. He visited Inner Mongolia in 2014, 2019, and 2023; every time, he was accompanied by vice chairmen of the Military Commission, and every time, he met with the garrison to show off his military power. But this time? There wasn't even a shadow of anyone in uniform by his side. Upon arriving in Inner Mongolia, he couldn't see a single soldier. With military power lost, the supreme power has changed hands; power has already quietly shifted to Hu Jintao's side. It could be covered up before, but the Fifth Plenary Session the week after next will bring a showdown. Who holds real power? The local governors have the keenest noses; the threshold in Xinjiang is almost being trampled down. From June until now, a full 9 provincial party secretaries have personally led teams to Xinjiang. In just the one month from mid-August to mid-September, six of them flocked there. This scene, which seems familiar, was played out three years ago. In 2023, 13 provincial party secretaries swarmed to Xinjiang to pay respects to the then-popular figure Ma Xingrui, and to his backer, Old Xi. This year, the 9 who went to Xinjiang have completely changed their tune; they are paying respects to the new administrator Chen Xiaojiang, and to the man behind Chen Xiaojiang, Hu Jintao. You must know that Chen Xiaojiang spent 31 years deep-rooted in the Ministry of Water Resources. The old minister who promoted him, Wang Shucheng, was a classmate and ironclad ally of Hu Jintao at Tsinghua. Everyone in the officialdom knows exactly whose person Chen Xiaojiang is. Some use the excuse of "pairing assistance to Xinjiang," but why is it that for Tibet, which also receives paired assistance from 17 provinces, only two provincial party secretaries led delegations there this year? Why do the provincial party secretaries flock to Xinjiang? Because officialdom never looks at advertisements, only at results. Three years ago, power was in Old Xi's hands, so they lined up to flatter Ma Xingrui. This year, power is in Hu Jintao's hands, so they immediately switched sides to flatter Chen Xiaojiang. The provincial secretaries certainly wouldn't dare say it out loud, but their legs have already betrayed the situation Old Xi is in. As for the "Xi Army" who didn't manage to jump ship in time? Eight Central Committee members have already vanished into thin air. At the Fifth Plenary Session the week after next, a political purge awaits them, where they will vote first and be dealt with later.
On the morning of October 16, Old Xi arrived in Ulanqab and only inspected two stops: one was Huangqihai, a lake that had almost dried up and was revived, and the other was the Ulanqab High-Tech Zone, a place focusing on computing power. You must know that Inner Mongolia has experienced a major reshuffle in the past two years. The former party secretary Sun Shaocheng and former chairperson Wang Lixia fell from grace one after another, and both of them were Old Xi's direct cronies. The newly appointed secretary Wang Weizhong and chairperson Bao Gang are both people brought up by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Therefore, Old Xi was full of anger during this trip. Midway, he casually dropped a remark, saying that all regions must follow the strategic decisions of the CCP Central Committee, establish and practice a correct view of political performance. Translated into plain language, this was pointing at the noses and beating the current anti-Xi leadership in Inner Mongolia, telling them not to forget who is still the nominal boss. But the problem is that to beat people, you need a knife in your hand. The current Old Xi doesn't even have a poker in his hand; what does he have to beat anyone with? If you don't believe it, let's dig out and compare his imposing manner from his previous three visits to Inner Mongolia. In 2014, when he went to Arxan, he visited border outposts and company barracks, with Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang following him step by step, and the commanders and political commissars of the Beijing Military Region all waiting on the spot. In 2019, he received the division and regiment cadres of the garrison in Hohhot, and Xu Qiliang accompanied him again. In 2023, he went directly into the headquarters of the Inner Mongolia Military Command. The Northern Theater Command Army's border defense brigade and the Inner Mongolia Military Command lined up four units to report to him, with Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong standing nearby—it was quite a scene of stars surrounding the moon, full of murderous intent. But look at this trip again: it was very shabby. Ding Xuexuan, the chief of the imperial household who followed him three years ago, was nowhere to be seen this time. The Zhurihe base, only 150 kilometers away from Ulanqab, was where Old Xi wore camouflage and held a grand military parade in 2017—the most glorious moment of his life. This time, right under his nose, he simply didn't dare to step half a step into it. Why? Because the two Central Military Commission vice chairmen who accompanied him to review the troops back then are gone: Xu Qiliang died last year, and He Weidong was taken down. This year, Old Xi went to Xiong'an, Shandong, Shanghai, and Inner Mongolia—four places, and not a single trip was to see the troops. What is even more humiliating is that in the week before he arrived in Inner Mongolia, the Inner Mongolia Military Command of the Northern Theater Command did not release a single news report about a meeting or expressing loyalty. The commander of the Northern Theater Command has not shown his face since last year, and the political commissar of the Inner Mongolia Military Command has been vacant since January this year. Even if he wanted to see the troops, the principal officers couldn't even be gathered here. Some friends might ask: he is still nominally the chairman of the Central Military Commission; isn't visiting any unit just a matter of a single sentence? Oh, that is oversimplifying the CCP's military power. A Central Military Commission chairman visiting the troops has never been a matter of just grabbing a bag and walking away. In the past, whenever he said a word to go take a look, it had to go through four hands. First, the General Office of the Central Military Commission arranged the dates and greeted various units; then the Joint Staff Department decided which unit to visit, and the principal officers of the theater and military commands had to prepare reports and accompany him for the cameras; the Central Guard Bureau cleared the field in advance by scouting the location; and finally, a Central Military Commission vice chairman went over the plan and accompanied him in person. These four hands were all his own people back then. Zhong Shaojun, his close confidant, sat in the General Office of the Central Military Commission, and Xu Qiliang accompanied him to visit the troops. He opened his mouth one day, and the itinerary was scheduled the next day. But now, these four hands have all changed masters. Zhong Shaojun was even stripped of his qualification as a National People's Congress deputy in August, the daily affairs of the Military Commission are being presided over by Zhang Shengmin, and Zhang Shengmin, this vice chairman, was nominated by Hu Jintao to the Fourth Plenary Session. Even the close Central Guard Bureau now listens to the orders of the Military Commission. Elders like Hu Jintao do not even need to show up in person; they just need to exchange a look with Zhang Shengmin. With stability overriding everything before the plenary session, Zhang Shengmin's heart is as clear as a mirror. You can completely imagine the scene: Old Xi says, let the troops in Inner Mongolia make arrangements; the General Office of the Central Military Commission delays for two days and replies with a smile: Chairman, the theater command is currently conducting training and reorganization, and the principal officers are all busy outside, so maybe we should postpone it. Then look at the list of companions: Zhang Shengmin is the only Central Military Commission vice chairman left, and he happens to have other arrangements that day. Finally, the Guard Bureau submits another report: Zhurihe is a place for live-fire practice with thousands of guns, the route cannot be cleared, and the safety of the leader cannot be guaranteed; it is suggested to switch to inspecting local projects instead. With just a few words and a few soft rebuffs, Old Xi was dismissed directly. Thus, the itinerary was left with nothing but looking at lakes and computing power centers—places without even half a gun barrel where Wang Weizhong could afford to host him and the elders could feel at ease watching.
Then you might ask, since he doesn't have a knife in his hand, why did he run out this time just to make a fool of himself? Let's flip the calendar back a year, and you'll understand everything. Since the 18th National Congress, every time a plenary session is held in autumn, after the National Day he almost always goes out of Beijing for a trip. Except for the years of the 19th and 20th Party Congresses, there are only two times Old Xi holed up in Beijing without going out: once in 2014, and the other is last year. In 2014 he didn't go out because back then he was holding a knife and hacking people: at the end of June he expelled Xu Caihou from the CCP, at the end of July he put Zhou Yongkang under formal investigation, and at the Fourth Plenary Session he retroactively expelled several Central Committee members in one breath. That was holding down the fort in Beijing with all power concentrated in his own hands. But last year when he didn't go out, the nature of it was completely reversed. Before last year's plenary session, he didn't even attend North Korea's October 10 military parade; Li Qiang went instead. Why was he so well-behaved? Because last year's plenary session was a critical moment for the handover of party power and military power, and the party elders had to keep him pinned down tightly in Beijing, not allowing him to go anywhere. So why let him out again before this plenary session this year? Look at the way he came out: a day trip, going and returning on the same day, not entering a military camp, not bringing Cai Qi, with only He Lifeng, who manages the economy, left by his side. The reason the elders dared to let him out for a stroll is precisely because he is now a tiger with its teeth pulled out. Letting him come out for a tour so the whole world can see that he can't even enter a military camp isn't this announcing to the whole party that state power changed hands a long time ago?
So the question arises: with the skies changing up top, how are those regional warlords at the bottom rushing to pledge loyalty to the new masters? Let's turn our camera to Xinjiang. Chen Xiaojiang was parachuted into Xinjiang as party secretary last July, and so far a total of 12 provincial party secretaries have led delegations to Xinjiang. The weirdest thing is that just since June this year, 9 of them arrived in a cluster. Chen Xiaojiang received them one by one, refusing none, but if you lay out the official press releases of the Xinjiang Daily and compare them one by one, you will find that even though they all came to pledge loyalty, the respect Chen Xiaojiang showed varied greatly, perfectly acting out the warmth and coldness of human relationships in official circles. In the official media press releases, the most perfunctory and standard phrase is: "Chen Xiaojiang participated in relevant activities." This means you came from afar, so I'll show my face, hold a symposium, read a couple of welcoming remarks, and be done with it. Out of 12 provinces, 11 received this phrase. But there was one exception: the phrase in the press release changed to "Chen Xiaojiang accompanied the inspection." Who had such a big face? Chen Jining, Shanghai party secretary and member of the Political Bureau. For two whole days on August 19 and 20, Chen Xiaojiang put aside everything on hand and accompanied him from beginning to end. How exaggerated was it? You'll know by looking at a comparison: on that very same day, August 19, Liaoning Party Secretary Xu Kunlin also arrived in Xinjiang with a delegation. As a result, Chen Xiaojiang didn't pay any attention to him at all, directly dumping him on regional chairman Erken Tuniyaz to accompany, while he personally accompanied Chen Jining the whole time. It wasn't until Chen Jining left on the 21st that Chen Xiaojiang squeezed out some time in Urumqi to hold a symposium with Liaoning.
Some friends might say, Chen Jining is a member of the Political Bureau with a high rank, isn't it natural to accompany him for a couple of more days? Well, let's pick out others who are also Political Bureau members and compare them. Huang Kunming of Guangdong and Yuan Jiajun of Chongqing should have enough weight, right? Chen Xiaojiang accompanied Huang Kunming to Kashgar and Yuan Jiajun to Hami, but the four characters "accompanied the inspection" only appeared in the press release for Chen Jining. Why look at Chen Jining with such high regard? Because Chen Jining is now the benchmark of the ship-jumping faction. Although he is a Shanghai secretary promoted by Old Xi, this man is sensible and saw through the wind direction a couple of years ago, and is desperately trying to jump off that sinking ship of Old Xi's, though his footing isn't completely stable yet. For such a technocrat who has strength and wants to turn over a new leaf, Hu Jintao's side of course wants to continue using him, and the key depends on how to win him over. Therefore, Chen Xiaojiang accompanied him for two whole days. This was acting on behalf of Hu Jintao to personally give Chen Jining a reassurance pill: as long as you come over, the door on our side is always wide open for you. This is the first-tier VIP level.
The next tier down consists of those who accompanied him on trips out of Urumqi. This tier was originally reserved for Politburo members, but there were two provincial party secretaries who were not Politburo members whom Chen Xiaojiang also accompanied out of Urumqi. One was Xin Changxing of Jiangsu, whom Chen Xiaojiang accompanied to Yili; the other was Liu Ning of Henan, whom Chen Xiaojiang accompanied for two consecutive days all the way to Hotan. What did these two rely on? They relied on their keen insight and old connections. As for Xin Changxing of Jiangsu, he was the first to visit this year. In July, he even made a special trip to Taizhou, Jiangsu, for research—that is the ancestral home of Hu Jintao. Since he was the first to come and pay his respects, and was so sensible as to show support for the old leader's hometown, Chen Xiaojiang naturally had to accompany him on a trip. As for Liu Ning of Henan, it is even more interesting. Remember that Chen Xiaojiang came from the Ministry of Water Resources? During the years he served as the director of the General Office at the Ministry of Water Resources, Liu Ning was the chief engineer and vice minister there. Now that his old colleague has become the top leader of Henan and is a key figure to be won over from Xi's side, Chen Xiaojiang naturally had to hold his old brother's hand and accompany him all the way.
The next tier down is purely a formality for the masses: Heilongjiang, Anhui, Liaoning, Jilin, Shaanxi, Hubei, and Shandong. When the secretaries of these seven provinces arrived, Chen Xiaojiang would meet them in Urumqi for a meeting, and then turn them over to Chairman Erkin to deal with. Do you see it clearly now? This year's grand New Year visit to Xinjiang was a way for provincial secretaries to bring their 'letters of intent' to pledge allegiance to a new master, while Chen Xiaojiang used the reception standards as a sieve to carefully select and divide people on behalf of Hu Jintao.
How did the political winds shift overnight? Looking at the timeline makes it clearest. When Chen Xiaojiang first arrived in Xinjiang last July, only three provinces came sporadically. For the next eight months, not a single one came; everyone was watching and waiting, unable to gauge whether Chen Xiaojiang's backing was truly solid. The turning point was this summer. In mid-June, Xin Changxing of Jiangsu was the first to come and test the waters. Immediately following that in July, Ma Xingrui, the ironclad loyalist of the former Xinjiang secretary Xi, was expelled from the Party and dismissed from his posts as a warning. At that moment, all high-ranking provincial and ministerial officials across China instantly understood: Ma Xingrui had fallen, and Chen Xiaojiang was secure. The person behind him, Hu Jintao, is now the one truly in charge and calling the shots in Zhongnanhai.
Does this plot sound familiar? It played out exactly the same way three years ago, except that time, it was Xi returning from South Africa and landing in Urumqi to support Ma Xingrui. Once that signal was sent, provincial secretaries came one after another over the next two months. Three years ago, the gathering was to support Xi's henchman; this year, the gathering is to recognize Hu Jintao's man, Chen Xiaojiang, as the new master. However, when watching political drama, one must look not only at who came, but also at who did not. Among the 19 provinces and cities providing aid to Xinjiang this year, six did not dare to step foot in Xinjiang at all: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, plus Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi. Zhejiang and Fujian were the base camps where Xi started his career. When Ma Xingrui was there in previous years, they visited Xinjiang more diligently than anyone else. Why did these six collectively play dead and not dare to come now that Chen Xiaojiang is in charge? Those who came did so because they saw clearly who the new master was and rushed to grab a spot. Are the six who didn't come blind? It is not that; it is because they are tied too tightly to Xi. Showing their faces in Xinjiang at this time would be equivalent to publicly betraying Xi. But if they don't go, they know the trend is gone. They want to jump ship but no one will take them; if they don't jump ship, they can only wait to be buried with him. Either way, it is a dead end.
Speaking of three years ago, when the party secretaries of various provinces went to fawn over Ma Xingrui, they thought they had grabbed onto a powerful patron. Little did they expect that once the house dealer changed, Ma Xingrui would be unable to protect himself, and everyone ended up empty-handed. But when it comes to betting on the wrong horse in officialdom and ending up with nothing, Ma Xingrui is really not the most miserable. The funniest collective misstep in the history of the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) occurred in Chongqing in 2010. From August 2010 to June 2011, a mere ten months or so, out of the nine Politburo Standing Committee members at the time, a full five went to Chongqing one after another: Li Changchun, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Wu Bangguo, and Old Xi, who was still the crown prince back then. Dignitaries at the national-leader level swarmed to Chongqing to pander to Bo Xilai's "singing red and striking black" campaign. After watching it, He Guoqiang remarked that this activity had a huge impact nationwide. Old Xi's trip was even more aggressive; he held symposiums and viewed the anti-gangster exhibition, giving a high evaluation to the crackdown. Chongqing back then was even more bizarre than Xinjiang today. Everyone felt that Bo Xilai would definitely enter the Standing Committee and seize power at the 18th National Congress. With five Standing Committee members going there one after another, it was equivalent to endorsing him one after another. Yet, the two most important figures in Zhongnanhai remained completely silent from beginning to end: one was Hu Jintao and the other was Wen Jiabao. When others went to show support, the two of them did not join in the fun, nor did they come out to say it was unacceptable. Hu Jintao's approach has always been like this: if the other party wants to put on a show, let them perform; once you act wildly and crazily enough to expose your own flaws, I will deliver the fatal blow. Sure enough, by 2012, without Hu and Wen having to lift a finger, Bo Xilai's own backyard caught fire. He slapped his right-hand man, Wang Lijun, which resulted in a complete rupture. In February, Wang Lijun rushed headlong into the US Consulate General in Chengdu. Wen Jiabao, who had remained silent all along, sat before Chinese and foreign journalists immediately after the Two Sessions concluded on March 14 and dropped a heavy statement: the current Chongqing municipal party committee and municipal government must reflect deeply. The very next day, on March 15, the central leadership issued a decision, and Bo Xilai was taken down on the spot. The queue of five Standing Committee members who had fawned over him for ten months overnight became a joke to the entire world. What brought down Bo Xilai back then was Wang Lijun and his infighting within the inner circle. And today, isn't the reason Old Xi lost military power precisely because Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Miao Hua, and other military bosses turned on each other? Dictators can never escape the doomed fate of internal infighting. Hu Jintao's greatest skill is his composure, sitting behind the scenes watching them fight like dogs, and finally coming out to clean up the mess.
If back then in Chongqing, high-ranking officials were still flattering Bo Xilai, a rising star on the surface, and did not know that Hu and Wen held the knives behind the scenes, then by today, provincial secretaries have smartened up. They no longer look at who is performing on stage, but instead directly look at who is the dealer behind the scenes. The moment Ma Xingrui fell, they immediately turned and rushed toward Chen Xiaojiang. This shows that in the eyes of senior cadres throughout the entire party, Hu Jintao retaking the role of the dealer is already a settled fact without a shadow of a doubt. As we mentioned earlier, whether it is Old Xi being unable to enter the military camps or provincial party secretaries swarming to Xinjiang, these are still undercurrents within officialdom. The next matter I want to talk about is laid out in black and white, overt and direct, printed in the CCP's official personnel bulletins. Exactly eight provincial- and ministerial-level heads are currently hanging in the balance, their lives and deaths uncertain. From early September until now, eight local heavyweights in power have been densely purged: three are provincial party secretaries—Wang Junzheng of Tibet, Liu Ning of Henan, and Liang Yanshun of Anhui; four are provincial governors and mayors—Ren Zhenhe of Gansu, Gong Zheng of Shanghai, Wang Kai of Henan, and Wang Qingxian of Anhui. Pay attention to the two provinces of Henan and Anhui; within just two days on September 23 and 24, both the party secretary and governor were wiped out in one fell swoop. There is also Zhang Chaochao, the party secretary of Shijiazhuang, who was just taken down on October 12. Among these eight people, the first seven are all full members of the CCP Central Committee, and Zhang Chaochao is an alternate member of the Central Committee. Where is the bizarre part? For the three provincial party secretaries, the official bulletins all stated it was "due to age reasons," which is purely talking nonsense with eyes wide open. According to the rules, provincial- and ministerial-level principal officials serve until the age of 65, but among these three secretaries, one is 64 and two are 63, none of them having reached the age limit yet. Therefore, the phrase "due to age reasons" cannot be considered a polite excuse for retiring upon reaching the age limit. If we look a layer higher today, not a single one of these eight people has had their next destination announced up to this day.
Some friends might say, what is so strange about announcing their whereabouts a few days late? Let's look at what normal personnel changes look like. On May 30th of this year, Hubei Party Secretary Wang Zhonglin stepped down, and the official press release stated he would be given another appointment. Less than a month later, on June 26th, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress met and appointed him as a vice-chairman of a special committee of the NPC. There is an even more recent example: on September 30th, Inner Mongolia Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary Liu Shuang stepped down, and at the time, no destination was mentioned. Then, on October 16th, the State Council appointed him as Vice Minister of Veterans Affairs. See? In normal personnel reshuffles, as soon as one steps down, a new position is immediately filled. But these eight people—the earliest one, Ren Zhenhe, has been left hanging for a month and a half, and the group from late September has been hanging for over three weeks—none of them have landed. While these eight people have been stripped of their real power as local leaders, they still hold their status as members or alternate members of the CCP Central Committee. When the Fifth Plenary Session opens the week after next, they can still enter the venue and still hold a very weighty voting ballot in their hands. There are only three paths before them: vote correctly at the Fifth Plenary Session and be given a real position in a central ministry to continue working; if their performance is average, be sent to the NPC or CPPCC to retire in a secondary position; or, if they are not sensible and stand on the side of Xi Jinping, as soon as the plenary session ends, they will be taken away by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to Qincheng Prison. You tell me, on the day of the big meeting, where would these seven people dare to cast their votes? This chain of tactics—first disarming them, then forcing their votes, and finally dealing with them—is not my wild guess. Last year, Inner Mongolia Secretary Sun Shaocheng already set an example with his own experience. At the end of September last year, Sun Shaocheng also stepped down as Inner Mongolia Secretary due to age, and the press release similarly did not mention his destination. It wasn't until late October, after the Fourth Plenary Session concluded, that just five days later, the NPC Standing Committee met and arranged for him a sinecure as vice-chairman of a special committee of the NPC. But he hadn't even warmed his seat in the NPC for three months before he was investigated at the end of January this year, and by September, he was completely expelled from the Party and public office. If you line up these dates, first they take your power, then they force you to vote at the plenary session, and after you vote, they give you a sinecure to stabilize you, only to settle the final score when they have the time. It is one ring after another, playing these officials like puppets. This year's script is almost identical to last year's. The Fifth Plenary Session runs from October 26th to 29th, and the NPC Standing Committee will hold another meeting in October. Last year, it was held right after the plenary session, and this year it will likely be scheduled after the plenary session as well. In other words, these eight people will, in all likelihood, have to wait until the plenary session is over and see how they raise their hands before their fates are announced together.
Finally, let's lift the curtain and see whose people these eight unlucky souls, who are left hanging in mid-air, originally were. Wang Junzheng of Tibet once served as the Party Secretary of Xiangyang, Hubei. Xiangyang is the ancestral home of the distant ancestors in the Xi family tree; Xi Yu, the Marquis of Xiangyang in the Eastern Han Dynasty, is the ancestor of this branch of the Xi family. In recent years, Xiangyang has even specifically used the Xi Family Pond to build an ancestral hall for the Xi family. Wang Junzheng has performed meritorious service by guarding this root for Xi Jinping, was promoted all the way to Xinjiang to control the 'knife handle' (security apparatus), and then went to Tibet to serve as the top leader—he is a pure member of the Xi family army. Liang Yanshun of Anhui is even more loyal. In 2009, when Xi Jinping was the President of the Central Party School, he personally arranged for him to be the director of the scientific research department at the Party School. During the years when Xi was the successor, there were few people he could personally promote, and Liang Yanshun was one of them. As for Liu Ning of Henan, we just talked about him earlier; he ran to Xinjiang in July to pay his respects, and Chen Xiaojiang accompanied him for two days. As a result, after returning for more than two months, his position as Henan Party Secretary was still stripped. Why? Accompanying you for two days is to give you a chance to win you over; removing you from office is because they don't trust you to continue managing a large province like Henan. As for whether you, Liu Ning, are truly surrendering or faking it, that vote at the plenary session will tell. Just think, if Xi Jinping still held absolute power today, even if the people he personally promoted, like Wang Junzheng and Liang Yanshun, were to retire, the press release would at least give them a decent 'another appointment,' and their retreat would have been arranged clearly. It wouldn't be like this now, where the guard dogs he raised are being pulled out one by one, left hanging in mid-air waiting to be dealt with, without even getting a polite parting word. The fate of these eight Central Committee members is a microcosm of the entire Xi family army today. The dealer has changed, and the butcher's knife of liquidation is already at their throats. That's all for today.
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