Who Is Trying to "Set Up a Separate Central Committee" at the Jingxi Hotel? The PLA Daily Brings Up Zhang Guotao Again: The Seat Can Be Given Up, but Not One Inch on Direction! Why Is It Precisely 84-Year-Old Hu Jintao Who Comes Back to "Watch the Guns" as Xi Jinping Hands Over the Top Post of the CMC? [Jiang Feng's View, 20261024, Issue 522]

This article analyzes the political game behind the PLA Daily invoking the Zhang Guotao Incident, pointing out that in the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session, the Central Military Commission (CMC) will face major personnel adjustments. The article discusses strategic arrangements such as Hu Jintao temporarily taking charge of the CMC, Hu Chunhua taking over as successor, and Zhang Shuguang being nominated as vice chairman, as well as using personnel setups and inspection/rectification materials from 36 central state organs as a "deposit" to prevent various factions from reneging, thereby ensuring Xi Jinping hands over power of the CMC.

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Full transcript:

Hello friends,

Welcome to Jiang Feng Vision. The Central Military Commission, which commands two million Chinese troops, is down to just two members; orders can no longer even reach the military theater commands. At next Monday's plenary session, new members must be added to the Central Military Commission. Right at this critical juncture, the PLA Daily devoted half of its fourth page to dredging up Zhang Guotao, the top splitter of the CCP from 91 years ago. The article is titled "The Anchor at the Critical Moment." But prying open Zhang Guotao's coffin lid at this moment of CMC replenishment is equivalent to someone slapping a blood-stained warning letter onto the long wooden table at the Jingxi Hotel. Listen closely to two coded phrases in the article: one accuses Zhang Guotao of stalling after the meeting under the pretext that the issue of unified command structure was unresolved, even using his superior numbers and guns to demand power from the Central Committee; the other reveals the Central Committee's bottom card in dealing with him—appointing Zhang Guotao as vice chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, showing that organizational and personnel matters could be flexibly adjusted, but not an inch would be yielded on strategic direction. As we discussed in our October 12 episode, Hu Jintao wanted to replenish the Central Military Commission and specifically reserved a CMC vice chairman's seat for the conservative faction led by Zeng Qinghong, using this seat to half-silence Zeng Qinghong. On Friday, the PLA Daily laid out the exact origin of this seat. Of course, today's situation is not entirely identical to 91 years ago: back then, the Central Committee gave up a seat because Zhang Guotao had guns in his hands; today, Hu Jintao gives up a seat because Zeng Qinghong has votes in his hands. Guns have been exchanged for votes, but the logic remains the same: positions can be given, but the direction cannot be changed. What direction? To put it plainly, three rules: First, Xi Jinping must hand over power, and the position of CMC chairman can no longer remain in his grasp. Second, the successor is Hu Chunhua, and nobody should think about swapping candidates mid-way. Third, one-man rule can no longer be tolerated; personal dictatorship must be criticized, and collective leadership must be restored—the CCP cannot turn into a giant North Korea. If the conservatives want seats, they can have them, and no post-settlement of accounts can also be negotiated; but if anyone tries to reverse these three rules after taking a seat, Zhang Guotao's fate will be their end.

The most urgent matter at the Fifth Plenary Session is filling vacancies on the Central Military Commission (CMC). Why the rush? Because at the 20th National Congress, the CMC had seven members; over four years, five of them have fallen, and now the CCP military can't even mobilize troops. Following the 2016 military reforms, to actually mobilize a unit, the CMC Joint Staff Department must first draft the plan, calculate troop strength, and determine routes; the Political Work Department handles personnel, vetting whether the troop commanders are trustworthy; equipment and logistics are allocated by their respective departments. Once the plan is drafted, it is sent to the CMC Chairman for signature. After signing, it passes down tier by tier through the Joint Operations Command Center to the theater command, which then dispatches the troops. Normally, the Chief of the Joint Staff drafting the plan was Liu Zhenli, the head of the Political Work Department managing personnel was Miao Hua, equipment was overseen along Li Shangfu's line, the one monitoring theater commands and combat readiness for the Chairman on the CMC was He Weidong, former Eastern Theater Command commander, and the one overseeing day-to-day CMC affairs and gatekeeping for the Chairman was Zhang Youxia. Not a single person among these five gates remains. The two remaining individuals are Chairman Xi Jinping, who comes from a civilian background, and Zhang Shengmin, who comes from a political work and discipline inspection background. Arresting people is fine, but deploying troops and planning formations isn't his field. So this is the current situation of the Central Military Commission: the Chairman can still sign off as usual, but before the signing there is no one to draft plans, after the signing there is no one to transmit the orders down, and even if transmitted down, no one monitors their execution. Some friends might ask: commanders of the five theater commands all wear military uniforms—once the Chairman signs off, on what grounds would they disobey? Look at who is sitting in the theater commands right now. Central Theater Command commander Han Shengyan and Eastern Theater Command commander Yang Zhibin are both Hu Jintao's Air Force personnel. Their general's stars were only conferred this past December. These caps were not something Xi Jinping wanted to give, but what he was forced to give. Those sitting in these seats know very well whether they should listen to Xi Jinping. Look further at how many generals have fallen in the military over these past few years; every commander keeps his own tally. If you move troops today following an order of murky origins, tomorrow as soon as the CMC is restaffed, the very first person questioned will be you: Who authorized your movement? Were the procedures complete? Who drafted the plan? Who transmitted the order? If you cannot answer any of these, you become the next Miao Hua, the next He Weidong. So smart commanders don't move a thing; they wait for the Fifth Plenary Session to restaff the CMC, wait for the roster and procedures to settle, and then take orders from the new CMC. Most critical of all: in January of this year, things went down with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. After that incident, whatever little sentiment the military held toward Xi Jinping evaporated. When loyalty is lost, the pen that signs the orders loses its worth. The current reality is that theater commands can only make their own calls, while orders from the central leadership cannot penetrate down. Therefore, the Central Military Commission must be restaffed at the Fifth Plenary Session, and Old Xi must also step down before the CCP's military can function again.

So who will fill the vacant spots? Let’s talk about the Central Military Commission (CMC) members first. Ready-made candidates are among the recent two batches of full generals: Han Shengyan, commander of the Central Theater Command; Yang Zhibin, commander of the Eastern Theater Command; and Wang Gang, commander of the Air Force. All three are Air Force personnel belonging to Hu Jintao’s faction. Their general promotions were awarded during those two rounds in December last year and July this year. Along with Wang Gang, Zhang Shuguang from the Ground Force was also promoted to general on July 3; we will discuss him when we turn to the vice chairmen.

Now, about the vice chairmen. Our judgment is that Hu Chunhua takes one seat and Zhang Shuguang takes the other. Some friends might immediately ask: Aren't there only two vice chairmen? Zhang Shengmin already occupies one, so wouldn't adding two make it three? Having three vice chairmen is nothing new in CCP history, especially when a designated successor enters the Military Commission. In September 1999, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee, when Hu Jintao joined the CMC, the vice chairmen were Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, plus him—making three. In October 2010, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee, when Xi Jinping joined the CMC, the vice chairmen were Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, plus him—also three. Further back, from 1995 to 1997, Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen, Zhang Wannian, and Chi Haotian once made four vice chairmen. It is only over the past decade or so under Xi Jinping’s tenure that there have consistently been just two. Hu Chunhua’s seat is the successor's seat.

So who gets the remaining seat? Some friends might say that since both Han Shengyan and Yang Zhibin are theater commanders with actual military experience, why not just promote one of them to vice chairman? Look closely at this list again: Han Shengyan, Yang Zhibin, and Wang Gang are all from the Air Force and all belong to Hu Jintao’s faction. If the member level is filled this way, it becomes dominated by the Air Force. If another Air Force general is appointed as vice chairman, the Military Commission becomes an Air Force-monopolized shop. But the branch with the largest personnel and the most factions in the Chinese military is the Ground Force. Both Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli belong to the Ground Force; once the two of them fell, there wasn't a single Ground Force representative left in the Military Commission. What would Ground Force generals think? What would the conservative faction think? Therefore, this seat must go to someone from the Ground Force, and it must be someone the conservative faction is willing to accept.

After counting through candidates, the most suitable one is Zhang Shuguang—an old Ground Force veteran and a die-hard former subordinate trained by Zhang Youxia. Currently, he serves as Secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Domestic mainland bloggers mentioned long ago that Hu Jintao conferring the general rank on him this July served a dual purpose: stabilizing the Ground Force on one hand, and providing an answer to the conservative faction on the other. This time, handing him the vice chairman seat is simply building further upon that same account.

Some friends may also ask: Zhang Shengmin comes from a disciplinary background, and Zhang Shuguang also comes from a disciplinary background. Is it appropriate to have two people with disciplinary backgrounds as vice chairmen simultaneously? Consider their ages: Zhang Shengmin was born in 1958 and will turn 69 at the 21st National Congress next year; according to custom, it will be time for him to step down. Thus, during this transitional year, two vice chairmen with disciplinary backgrounds sit side by side—one preparing to step down and the other preparing to take over. By the 21st National Congress, when Zhang Shengmin retires, it will be Zhang Shuguang who presides over the daily operations of the Military Commission.

Then who will handle operational combat affairs? Among the members, theater commanders like Han Shengyan and Yang Zhibin are well-versed in battle deployments, with Hu Jintao presiding over them from above. Therefore, this vice chairman seat is precisely the chip Hu Jintao used in exchange for Zeng Qinghong's approval. On October 12, when we mentioned muzzling Zeng Qinghong, this seat was precisely what muzzled him. Zeng Qinghong is already 87. Over these years, it's not that he hasn't tried to place his own men in the military: last year he courted Zhang Youxia, promising him the rank of Marshal and acting CMC Chairman; this year he tried to recruit Li Zuocheng, promising he could nominate a CMC vice chairman. Mainland bloggers stated bluntly: no matter how great the promised benefits are, they cannot surpass a soldier's honor—in the end, he failed to sway either of them.

Even more critical is that the conservative faction currently lacks people in the military and has actually offended military figures. In late August, when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress removed Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, mainland bloggers noted that it was orchestrated by the conservative faction. This move deeply angered military figures like Li Zuocheng, Zhu Chuansheng, Zhou Hong, and Xu.

Thinking from Zeng Qinghong's perspective about what might happen next: after Hu Chunhua takes power, if a purge begins and reaches into the military, investigating who promoted Miao Hua and He Weidong, or who had financial dealings with them—all these records sit within the Military Commission for Discipline Inspection. As investigations proceed, if a general reveals a name that happens to connect to a business or child belonging to the conservative faction, will the case be pursued further or stop right there? Whether interrogation transcripts are entered into official archives is decided by the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. If the person heading the discipline commission is Hu Jintao’s man, Zeng Qinghong won't even be able to get inside information and can only wait for officials to come knocking on his door. But if the head of the discipline commission is Zhang Shuguang, things are completely different: news can be tipped off in advance, decisions on how to phrase pages in the archives can be made, and someone inside the room will speak up for the conservative faction.

Therefore, this seat is more practical than anything else for Zeng Qinghong. With one of his allies sitting inside the Military Commission, Zeng Qinghong no longer has to worry about Xi Jinping's power transfer leading to a purge that reaches his own head. Only when it comes to forcing Xi Jinping to hand over power at the Plenum will the votes of the conservative faction align with the reformists. However, once the seat is secured, will allegiance shift? That is precisely where Hu Jintao needs to remain vigilant.

Now that the vice chairmen and members are in place, who will sit in the top position—the Chairman of the Military Commission handed over by Xi Jinping? The most interesting theory among them comes from an overseas blogger, who claims that Hu Jintao is serving as the acting Chairman of the Military Commission, and the relevant decision is temporarily not being made public. Hearing this, many friends feel skeptical: Hu Jintao retired completely fourteen years ago and isn't even a member of the Central Committee, so by what right could he control the Military Commission? Let's turn back the clock to the 13th National Congress in 1987. That year, 83-year-old Deng Xiaoping was about the same age as Hu Jintao today. He no longer joined the new Central Committee, stripped off all his official titles, and became an ordinary party member. But according to the 1982 party constitution, the Chairman of the Military Commission had to be selected from among the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo, and an ordinary party member couldn't serve as Chairman of the Military Commission, right? Guess what Deng Xiaoping did? Right at the 13th National Congress where he retired, he revised the party constitution and directly deleted that sentence. After deleting it, only one sentence remained in the party constitution: the members of the Military Commission shall be determined by the Central Committee. As a result, the First Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee decided on the spot that ordinary party member Deng Xiaoping would serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Just like that, he legitimately held onto command of the military for another two years, until November 1989 at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee when he finally handed over the party's Chairman of the Military Commission post to Jiang Zemin. Fifteen years later, the same script played out again. At the 16th National Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin retired from the Central Committee, and the First Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee decided that he would remain as Chairman of the Military Commission. You see, after that clause was deleted in 1987, the system no longer required the Chairman of the Military Commission to be a Central Committee member. Even today, the current party constitution still contains that same sentence: whoever the Central Committee decides on is who it will be. As long as the people raising their hands in the Jingxi Hotel acknowledge this arrangement, even if Hu Jintao is merely a commoner without office, that grand armchair of the Chairman of the Military Commission is still his. However, there are three differences this time that we need to clarify. First, both instances with Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were decisions publicly made by plenary sessions and stated in black and white in official communiqués, whereas this time it might not be published externally. Second, both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin stayed on without stepping down, remaining in office by stepping down from other positions first while staying on at the Military Commission for two more years; Hu Jintao is different, as he retired completely at the 18th National Congress in 2012, handing over his positions as a Central Committee member and Chairman of the Military Commission simultaneously. Having him manage the Military Commission this time means returning after having retired, which has no precedent in the history of the CCP. Third, by the 21st National Congress next year, this position of Hu Jintao's should be handed over, so we are not talking about Hu Jintao staging a full comeback to take office, but rather serving as temporary manager. Final approvals and signatures rest with him, while concrete tasks are handled by veteran military figures like Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan, along with the newly added vice chairmen.

Then why temporary management? Why not directly hand it over to Hu Chunhua in one step? To put it plainly, Hu Chunhua doesn't have enough weight right now. Currently, he is a Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC, didn't even make it into the Politburo at the 20th National Congress, and hasn't led troops for a single day in his life. The Military Commission operates under the chairman responsibility system. After filling the vacancies, among the three vice chairmen, one presides over daily affairs but cannot command authority, another is the successor of the reformist faction, and the third belongs to the conservative faction—who would listen to whom? There must be someone sitting at the top who convinces both sides, and searching all across China, the only person both sides accept is Hu Jintao. What's more, the tasks in the military this year are all offensive work: settling accounts with people like Miao Hua and He Weidong, wrapping up the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, and settling positions in the Air Force and Ground Force. Someone who just joined the Military Commission cannot make final calls on these matters. The general ranks of Han Shengyan, Yang Zhibin, and Wang Gang were granted by Hu Jintao; Zhang Shuguang was brought up by Zhang Youxia; and veteran generals like Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan are more senior than anyone else. If Hu Chunhua sits at the top and speaks, how many people underneath would actually take him seriously? Hu Jintao is different. He served as Chairman of the Military Commission for eight years, and many of the current generals sitting in the Military Commission and theater commands today were personally promoted by him back then. When he speaks a word, both sides have to accept it. Therefore, the Fifth Plenary Session first appoints Hu Chunhua as Vice Chairman to sit in the Military Commission for a year to get familiar with the people and bring the troops into order, while the top position is watched over for him by Hu Jintao for this year. By the 21st National Congress, when both General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission are handed to Hu Chunhua together, his weight will be sufficient. And what about Xi Jinping? The communiqué will not mention a change in the Chairman of the Military Commission, and Xinhua News Agency reports will still list him with three titles—General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission—without changing a single character. The CCP has used this tactic before: from November 10 to December 5, 1980, the Politburo held nine consecutive meetings to criticize Hua Guofeng. At the meetings, Hua Guofeng offered to resign as Chairman of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which the Politburo accepted on the spot. From then on, Hua Guofeng no longer presided over the work of the Central Committee and the Military Commission. But when did the ordinary people across the country find out? In the communiqué of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee on June 29, 1981—a full 206 days later. For Xi Jinping, the titles remain attached, and when he comes out for meetings or to receive foreign guests, all the pomp and circumstance remain unchanged. Those below look on, thinking he still holds gun power in his hands; this outward face is his life-saving tool. But he won't be the one signing papers at Military Commission meetings, nor will troop movement orders pass through his hands.

Of the two vice chairman seats, one was given to the successor and the other to the conservative faction. The biggest fear regarding the seat given to the conservative faction is one thing: taking the seat and going back on their word later. Ninety-one years ago, someone did exactly that. Speaking of which

Let me chat with everyone for a bit. A PLA Daily reporter traveled along the route taken by the Red Army back then to Lianghekou. They said the vehicle wound round and round in the mountains, making people inside feel dizzy and chest-tight. On the plateau, oxygen deficiency makes breathing the number one priority. Living on the plains, we don't need to cross snow-capped mountains, but by late October, when the temperature difference between morning and evening is large, and the indoor heating is turned on, making the air dry, your throat and breathing are still the first to feel uncomfortable. Speaking of lung care, Director Seo Hyo-seok from Korea once said that only when the lungs are well-nourished does the body's overall health care have a foundation. Pyunkang Pill was developed based on this exact approach. This Korean herbal formula has been used for over 50 years, helping more than 160,000 friends condition their body constitutions and maintain daily lung health. Many friends who used to experience breathing discomfort as soon as winter arrived have found that after sticking with it, their discomfort was relieved, their breathing became smooth, and their daily lives became much more comfortable. If you or the elderly in your family would like to give your lungs some care before winter sets in, you can click on the links in the pinned comment or description box below the video to learn more about Pyunkang Pill. You can also directly call the Pyunkang hotline at 800-210-5501. Friends of our program also get a special token of appreciation: enter promo code JF at checkout, and for every bottle of Pyunkang Pill purchased, you will receive a raw root of Xuanbao Black Ginseng. Friends who are pregnant or taking long-term medications should consult a doctor first.

Alright, back to business. This PLA Daily article talks about events from 91 years ago. In June 1935, the Central Red Army joined forces with Zhang Guotao's Red Fourth Front Army in Maogong. The Central Red Army had at most 10,000 to 20,000 troops, while Zhang Guotao claimed 80,000. The Lianghekou Conference decided to march north; Zhang Guotao raised his hand at the meeting, but after the meeting he sat tight and claimed that organizational issues had not been resolved. The Central Committee gave him a post as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission and Red Army Political Commissar, but he still dragged his feet and refused to leave. In the end, he turned his troops south and set up another Central Committee in Zhuomudiao. Eight months later, he dissolved this Central Committee himself, his forces depleted from battle and his people's hearts scattered. Why did the PLA Daily bring up this person just three days before the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session? If you compare the two timelines, Lianghekou corresponds to the Fifth Plenary Session; adding Zhang Guotao as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission corresponds to the seat given to the conservative faction this time; flexible adjustments in organizational personnel while refusing to yield an inch on strategic direction corresponds to this current transaction—seats can be given to your people, but on the three points of Hu Chunhua succeeding and restoring collective leadership, not a single step will be yielded. Therefore, this article is warning Zeng Qinghong. It points out that in the years since he got a seat, not a single person he wanted to place in the military succeeded. This time, Hu Jintao took the initiative to offer a Vice Chairman seat, marking the first time Zeng actually placed someone inside the Military Commission. Now that he has it, based on Zeng Qinghong's tactics over the past decades, will he stop here? Match it against Zhang Guotao's three tricks line by line, and what he could do becomes clear. The first trick: raising his hand at the plenary session is not hard. Raising his hand for adding to the Military Commission, raising his hand for Hu Chunhua entering the Military Commission, and raising his hand for Xi Jinping handing over power—he raises his hand for all of them. But a resolution is just a piece of paper, and every step requires people to execute it. The conservative faction still has people in ministries and provinces, and still has votes among Central Committee members. When it comes time to execute, as long as they say "conditions are not yet mature," things can get stuck halfway. The second trick: having gained a Vice Chairman seat, what does Zeng Qinghong want next? He wants a promise in black and white that there will be no post-facto reckonings, and that a few spots must be reserved in the Standing Committee list for the 21st National Congress. What a single seat brings is not satisfaction, but the next price tag. The third trick is the most important to guard against: today Zeng Qinghong has no guns in his hands and cannot establish a second Central Committee, but he can do another thing—go back to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping's three titles have not been altered by a single character; the title and status still hang on him. What does Zeng Qinghong have? Votes at the plenary session. One has the title and status, the other has votes. If the two of them come together before the 21st National Congress, the guns Hu Jintao guarded and the personnel he appointed for Hu Chunhua over the past year could all be overturned. Ninety-one years ago, Zhang Guotao wanted to grasp both status and guns in one hand. Today's "setting up another Central Committee" means joining status and votes together. That is precisely where the PLA Daily lands its warning blow. But the hardest hit is not about what Zhang Guotao wanted to do, but where Zhang Guotao ultimately lost: his soldiers stopped following him, his southward march met with a bloody rebuff, his 80,000 troops grew thinner and thinner as they fought, and people's hearts followed the strategic direction, not the position. That is what Zeng Qinghong should weigh carefully. Who is sitting in that chair? Zhang Shuguang, an old Army general trained by Zhang Youxia, was given it by Hu Jintao. At the end of August, when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress removed Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the military held the conservative faction accountable. If such a person takes the seat, and Zeng Qinghong really tries to turn back the clock, will he go along with it? Back then, Zhang Guotao at least had a solid 80,000 troops, yet when he broke his word, the soldiers still scattered. Today, Zeng Qinghong does not have a single soldier or officer in the military, only a chair yielded by Hu Jintao, and the person sitting in that chair is still a diehard loyalist of Zhang Youxia. If Zeng Qinghong takes the position and then plays tricks, what does he have to play the game of "setting up another Central Committee" against Hu Jintao, who controls the Air Force? Therefore, this article is written for Zeng Qinghong to read, and also for Zhang Shuguang to read. To Zeng Qinghong, it says: the seat was given to you, don't follow Zhang Guotao's path. To Zhang Shuguang, it says: the seat was given by the organization, not by Zeng Qinghong.

However, speaking of which, it is not just Hu Jintao who is worried about Zeng Qinghong going back on his word; the elders are also worried that Old Xi might change his mind. There are reports that during the Fourth Plenary Session last October, the elders had already reached an agreement with Old Xi for him to step down gracefully, following the path of Hua Guofeng. However, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli ran into trouble this January. Having learned their lesson, the elders are very clear that if the plenary session lasts four days and then concludes, with the Central Committee members returning to their respective regions and the decision on the Chairman of the Central Military Commission not being published, who could stop Old Xi if he changes his mind again a month later? Therefore, they must hold something of his as collateral, and this collateral was deposited at the Politburo meeting on October 23rd. The draft decision for the plenary session had already been discussed at the Politburo meeting on September 21st. In the last five sessions, there have only been two instances where a Politburo meeting was held again right before the opening; in 2020, it was held ten days in advance, but this year it was held only three days in advance. Li Qiang was still in Russia for the regular meeting of Chinese and Russian heads of government on October 21st and only returned to Beijing on the evening of the 22nd. The next morning, the Politburo was fully assembled. The meeting reviewed a comprehensive report on the situation of the seventh round of inspections by the 20th Central Committee. This round inspected 36 units of the central and state organs. Looking at these sentences in the official press release: "The work of the central and state organs has made positive progress, but there are also some problems that must be highly valued and seriously resolved. It is necessary to consolidate the responsibility for rectification, strengthen the supervision of rectification, and take real action to make genuine changes." These words sound like boilerplate, but one must consider when they were said. The problems discovered by the inspection teams over the past six months were originally a stack of materials sitting in the cabinets of the Central Inspection Office and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. There is a lot of flexibility in when they are taken out and how they are handled. But once reviewed by the Politburo, this stack of materials becomes an official document of the Central Committee, with the entire Politburo present and having handled it. Coupled with the phrase "supervision of rectification," there will be people watching unit by unit from now on: have the problems been corrected? Who is responsible? What if they are not corrected well? These 36 units are all ministries and commissions of the central and state organs, and most of the heads are people Old Xi has promoted himself over the years, and many are even Central Committee members. On Monday, they will sit in the Jingxi Hotel to vote. Now it is clear what this meeting is for: it is to collect a deposit before signing the contract. If Old Xi agrees to hand over power at the plenary session, the deposit is the accounts of these 36 units. If he keeps his word, holds the meeting, writes the report, and makes the changes, the matter will pass. If he goes back on his word later, the "supervision of rectification" can turn into accountability overnight. Following that, it would be case filing and transfer, and the people he has placed in the ministries over the years could all fall one by one. The deposit also controls the other side: the votes at the plenary session. When these ministers sit in the Jingxi Hotel, they all know clearly in whose hands their accounts are held. When the moment comes to raise their hands, will they stand firm with Old Xi or go along with everyone else? Why wait until Li Qiang landed to hold the meeting? Because this deposit must be fingerprinted by every single person in the Politburo. Li Qiang is Old Xi's most loyal person; if he were not present, someone could later say, "I did not participate in this." With him sitting there, this account is the account of everyone, and no one can deny it. The most interesting thing is that the meeting was chaired by Old Xi himself. The press release still contains the phrase "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" without missing a word, and it also says that the central and state organs are the "first phalanx" in practicing the "Two Upholds." Yet, on the account of this very "first phalanx," he personally stamped his seal. At the end of the press release, there is also a sentence: "The meeting also studied other matters." This sentence is common in Politburo press releases, but what was studied under "other matters" three days before the opening? Ninety-one years ago, the CCP gave away a vice-chairman's chair but did not gain unity, yet it secured the direction of moving north. Today, on the long wooden table at the Jingxi Hotel, a chair was given to Zeng Qinghong's side, and a deposit was placed on Old Xi's side. With both sides holding something in the hands of others, this time, no one should think about changing their mind again. If you find today's program interesting, please like, subscribe to Jiang Feng Perspective, turn on the little bell, and share it with friends who care about the situation in China. That is all for today's Jiang Feng Perspective. Thank you for watching, and we will see you in the next episode.