Hu Jintao Seizes Power on Wednesday, Military Newspaper Calls Out to the Entire Army on Thursday: Extremely Urgent! The Responsibility System of the Chairman of the Military Commission Completely Deleted, 'Two Establishments' Not Mentioned at All! Wen Jiabao Holds the 21st National Congress Personnel List Firmly After 44-Minute Delay [Jiang Feng Vision 20261030 Episode 527]
This episode provides a detailed analysis of the power struggle behind the communique following the conclusion of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee. Hu Jintao and the elder faction secured actual command of the Military Commission internally through the
Why was the afternoon communiqué delayed by 43 minutes? The problem lay in the final moments after the afternoon closing session and voting concluded, right as they prepared to issue the official press release. Xi Jinping was privately scheming: since they had agreed not to publicly print in the communiqué that Hu Jintao was acting as head of the Military Commission, and not to print the list of new Military Commission members, giving him some face, then according to past convention, the communiqué should surely continue to include the "Chairmanresponsibility system of the Military Commission" and "Xi Jinping's Thought on Strengthening the Military" for him, right? As a result, military representatives and elders slammed the final proof of the communiqué onto the table right then and there, not yielding an inch. Last night, on Wednesday, the meeting hall had just confiscated your military command power according to internal procedures, and this morning's final edition of the Liberation Army Daily had already sent out the secret signal to all officers and soldiers of the entire army that a new commander-in-chief had taken over military orders. If the public communiqué issued at 5 PM still printed the "Chairman responsibility system of the Military Commission," then whose orders were the major theater commands and the entire military supposed to listen to? The military and elders laid their cards on the table: if you don't sign and cross out these words, don't issue tonight's communiqué at all, and they might as well directly leak the power-seizure trump card from last night's meeting hall to the public. Seeing that continuing to push back stubbornly would result in even the empty title of General Secretary and the host status to meet Trump in Shenzhen three weeks later being overturned on the spot, Old Xi could only swallow this bitter pill, signing the communiqué proof that had been red-penciled beyond recognition. And you must not read this communiqué at face value. Everything Old Xi desperately protected at the signing table consisted entirely of empty titles. Things like "Xi Jinping's Thought on Party Building" being written into the communiqué for the first time, or the retrospective determination and characterization of Zhang Youxia's old case—all of these were just retroactive patches on past accounts. If Old Xi had truly retained military command in the meeting hall and appointed Li Qiang as his successor, he would have beaten drums and gongs to have it written into the communiqué. Therefore, for Old Xi, these empty titles printed in the communiqué were all the spoils he could grab in the meeting hall, representing Old Xi's ceiling. But what about Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's side? It was completely the opposite. Taking back military command in the meeting hall and internally setting up a new Military Commission team—such things could only be done internally, and internal military orders sent directly to the theater commands must never be explicitly written in a public communiqué. What could be revealed in the communiqué was only the complete deletion of the "Chairman responsibility system of the Military Commission," the complete deletion of the "Two Establishes," inserting Zhang Shengmin alone into the Politburo, and burying at the end of the communiqué the tightening spell for Wen Jiabao to take over the ballots of the 21st National Congress. Therefore, what was written in the communiqué was merely the tip of the iceberg that the Hu-Wen faction actually secured in the meeting hall, which was their floor. One was a ceiling, and the other was a floor.
So, from the opening on Monday to Hu Jintao's night of seizing power on Wednesday, how step-by-step did they corner Old Xi to the signing table inside the Jingxi Hotel? Which leaked sentences were actually published in the final edition of the Liberation Army Daily on the morning of the closing day? From Monday to Thursday inside the Jingxi Hotel, it couldn't be seen from the outside, but the newspapers of the next day compiled by the mouthpiece reporters inside after the meetings ended each day recounted the true clashes in the meeting hall from the previous day. On Monday, October 26, the plenary session officially opened. On Monday morning, Old Xi took the podium at the Jingxi Hotel, delivered a work report on behalf of the Politburo, and gave an explanation on the draft "Decision." In the afternoon, as more than two hundred full and alternate members of the Central Committee entered group discussions, the meeting hall instantly exploded. How do we know it exploded? Just look at the two newspapers printed on Tuesday, October 27. Tuesday's People's Daily was still desperately running interference for Old Xi, with the front page shouting Old Xi's name 34 times. Looking again at the front page of Tuesday morning's Liberation Army Daily, Old Xi's name wasn't mentioned even once, and it directly threw out underworld-style jargon stating that grassroots units now form "small systems" and "small coalitions" on their own, capable of coordinated operations without relying on the big organs above. Flipping to page 6, an article titled "Returning to the True Qualities of Revolutionary Soldiers" was published, pointing fingers and fiercely criticizing certain leading cadres for engaging in "official-based careerism" and throwing their weight around, "treating the subordinate's obedience to orders as a matter of course."
On Monday, just as Old Xi finished reading his report on stage, trying to force the military to continue recognizing his "Chairman responsibility system of the Military Commission," the military group discussions in the afternoon saw generals directly taking aim at the corruption of Miao Hua and He Weidong, as well as their abuse of privilege and chaotic orders, opening fire and refusing to listen to Old Xi's preaching. Tuesday morning's military newspaper directly wiped Old Xi's name from the headlines, with the entire page condemning privileges and shouting about "not listening to blind commands from above." Then came Tuesday, October 27, the second day of group discussions, which happened to be the third anniversary of Li Keqiang's death. Just how heated did the arguments in the meeting hall get on this day? Let's look at the newspaper from the morning of Wednesday, October 28. The front-page headline of the People's Daily unexpectedly brought back Old Xi's past era-defining response about having "no self, not failing the people." Because in the meeting hall, the old military generals had slammed the hard motion to take over the Military Commission onto the table, and Old Xi couldn't hold his ground anymore, forcing him to use the phrase "no self" to find a way out in the meeting hall, meaning he wasn't clinging to power and could back down on personal real power, being "selfless," but they had to preserve his dignity as a fifth-generation leader.
How did the military force Xi to back down at the meeting that Tuesday? Just look at the front-page headline of the PLA Daily on Wednesday morning, titled "Thoughts on 'Actual Combat' on the Path of Tackling Tough Issues." It only mentioned Xi once, but it contained this harsh message in black and white: one must have the determination to use strong medicine to cure the illness and scrape the bone to remove the poison, and calculate the overall account of combat effectiveness. If Xi were allowed to continue dominating the Central Military Commission (CMC) alone, the CCP's military would be unable to even fight a war. It had to scrape the bone to remove the poison, with Hu Jintao stepping out to preside over the overall situation and rebuild the actual framework of the CMC. After the arguing finished the next day, the most critical third day arrived: October 28. According to the rules of previous plenary sessions, each group had to summarize their bottom lines, and the Politburo Standing Committee meeting would last until late at night to finalize the personnel plan and the draft of the communiqué. So, did the matter of Hu Jintao taking charge of the CMC and the internal decision on the new CMC team pass on Wednesday night? The answer was printed in the PLA Daily on the closing day, October 29.
The front-page headline that day was "Our Military's Grassroots Construction: A More Stable Foundation and Greater Vitality." Xi's name was mentioned only once, and right next to it was a commentary titled "Leading by Example in Studying War and Deeply Engaging in Frontline Breakthroughs." It directly named and criticized the impractical style of sitting in offices and preparing for war by reading materials. The prestige of leading cadres is built by taking the lead in fighting wars. Who was this scolding? Everyone in the military knows that the person who has never been a soldier for a single day and only knows how to sit in an office reading materials is Xi. And the one that truly exposed the bottom line of the Wednesday night meeting was the last page of the PLA Daily on the closing day, which specially published a reading article titled "Reading the Long March on the Long March Road," discussing the several meetings that determined the life and death of the Red Army during the Long March. The first paragraph discussed the "Tongdao Meeting." The military newspaper said that the Tongdao Meeting had no formal meeting procedures; it was just a temporary stop during the march where a few people met, and at that time, Comrade Mao Zedong had been away from military command positions for more than two years.
On October 29, the Fifth Plenary Session closed, and the last page of the military newspaper suddenly told the entire military that the old commander who had been away from military command positions for many years had his proposals "supported by the majority" at the high-level meeting. And the most brilliant part was the following sentence: the meeting did not form a formal resolution, but at 19:30 that day, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order. The military newspaper had already given the bottom line to the entire military with the four words "Tongdao Meeting" in the morning. At the meeting on the third day, that old commander who had retreated behind the scenes for many years, Hu Jintao, had already obtained the support of the majority of votes at the high-level meeting. For the sake of overall stability, this meeting did not "form a public formal resolution text" externally, but internally, the command of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission had already changed hands and been issued on Wednesday night.
It wasn't over yet. Immediately following the second paragraph, page 12 of the military newspaper wrote about the "Zunyi Meeting." The original words were very clear: the book wrote the order of speeches very clearly. Bo Gu made the main report, emphasizing that the enemy was too strong; Zhou Enlai made the secondary report, admitting military leadership errors and taking the initiative to take responsibility; Zhang Wentian spoke third, taking out the outline jointly drafted with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, and systematically criticizing the erroneous military line. If you compare this to the four days at the Jingxi Hotel: on Monday, Xi, like Bo Gu back then, took the stage to make the main report, desperately shifting the blame by saying the military had "serious hidden dangers." Immediately after, in the meeting hall, Hu Chunhua, Zhang Shengmin, and the old military leaders stood up to speak like Zhang Wentian back then, directly taking out the outline jointly drafted with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, and criticizing Xi's erroneous line of recklessly arresting generals and destroying the Great Wall to the point of being completely shredded.
The plenary session lasted four days. The Party newspaper carried Xi on a sedan chair on the front page every day, and Xi's name was shouted more than a hundred times in four days. But what about the military newspaper? In the four days, the front-page headlines only mentioned Xi four times in total. On the closing day, it directly brought out the "Tongdao Meeting" and the "Zunyi Meeting," declaring that the old commander had obtained majority support, and although no public resolution was issued, military orders had already been taken over. Therefore, by the afternoon of the closing day, the military and the elders struck three times in the communiqué, each strike hitting the bone. The first strike: cutting off the crown on Xi's head; "2442" was not mentioned at all. Last year's Fourth Plenary Session communiqué still wrote about the Two Establishes, the Four Consciousnesses, the Four Confidences, and the Two Maintenances. In this nearly 5,000-word communiqué, from beginning to end, not a single "2442" remained. As early as a month ago, on September 26, our 498th issue, "Hu Jintao Abolishes the Two Establishes," had already put it out there. When the October 29 communiqué came out, that sentence about the Two Establishes would no longer exist. The sentence "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" was still there; today's communiqué came out, and it was word for word.
The second strike: the "system of overall responsibility by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission" was completely deleted. Last year's communiqué was still about implementing Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the military and implementing the system of overall responsibility by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission; today, these two sentences are gone. Even the word "strengthening the military," which was written four times last year, did not appear once this year. The third strike: cutting the military directly away from Xi's name. Last year's communiqué ended with a call to "the whole Party, the whole military, and the people of all ethnic groups in the country"; this year, it directly became the whole Party uniting more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, and the words "the whole military" were gone. Some people still want to use the fact that the end of the 2020 Fifth Plenary Session also did not write "the whole military," or that "this year is a Party building meeting, so the military is not mentioned," to make excuses for Xi. Don't be ridiculous. When "the whole military" was not written in 2020, "Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the military" and "the Two Maintenances" were all there. The 2016 Sixth Plenary Session was also a special meeting on Party building, and Xi's "core" status was established precisely at that Party building meeting. How is it that at this year's Party building meeting, even the top iron rule of Party building, the "Two Maintenances," and the "system of overall responsibility by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission" are all gone together?
Speaking of this, many friends might ask, what evidence is there that the new Central Military Commission (CMC) list was definitely passed? The composition of the CMC only requires a majority vote at the plenary session. Look, the list of 34 people to be disciplined was passed unanimously by a show of hands. Even Ma Xingrui, a Politburo member personally promoted by Xi, and Zhong Shaojun and Fang Yongxiang, the CMC office chiefs who had been by Xi's side for decades, were not saved by him at all. If, as some outsiders claim, Xi was blocking the door at the venue, refusing to let the military move, just think: he couldn't even save his own personal secretary Zhong Shaojun, and the "CMC Chairman Responsibility System" was even scraped out of the communique. What could he possibly use to block the CMC's door? The ones who truly decided not to print the CMC list in the public communique and not to have military generals go through public replacement procedures were precisely Hu Jintao and the old military leaders who were in control at the venue. This is the "channel meeting" tactic specifically pointed out on page 12 of the PLA Daily on Thursday: no public resolution is issued, and power is exercised directly internally.
There are three layers of consideration here. As long as it is not publicly announced today that Xi has stepped down, he still holds the nominal, empty shell of "Chairman of the Central Military Commission." If they were to print in today's public communique that so-and-so was added as a CMC member without announcing a change in the CMC Chairman, then according to the rules of the entire Party, the entire military, and the world, these newly added members would nominally still have to report to Xi, the titular Chairman. This would be equivalent to providing a new team for Xi's empty shell for nothing. So, could they simply announce in tonight's communique the removal of Xi as CMC Chairman and announce that Hu Jintao is acting CMC Chairman? Absolutely not. This broken machine of the CCP is most afraid of a sudden public interruption. If the Xinhua News Agency communique suddenly published that Xi had handed over the military commission and Hu Jintao was acting chairman, the officialdom in all provinces and all major theater commands across the country would immediately fall into chaos, and the external financial and international situation would immediately suffer an earthquake. Since they can neither publicly abolish Xi's title in the communique nor publicly assign a team under Xi's name, how is the military command issue resolved at the venue? The answer is internal establishment with a blank space on the public stage.
Personnel appointments for the military and the new CMC decision-making team do not follow the public communique procedures mixed with local civil officials. Therefore, those six alternate generals were all withdrawn from the public list and transferred to a special internal military channel. Inside the venue, the old military leaders' proposal had already been implemented, with Hu Jintao coordinating and taking charge of the CMC's overall situation from behind the scenes, and Hu Chunhua, Li Zuocheng, and several combat-hardened generals forming an internal CMC command task force. The Joint Staff Department has been effectively operated by Deputy Chief of Staff Zhu Chuansheng since January of this year. The internal military order channel, just as written on page 12 of the military newspaper, was directly issued to the major theater commands on Wednesday night, just like the urgent telegram issued by the Central Military Commission at 19:30 that day. As for the public communique, they only did one most decisive thing: the plenary session elected Zhang Shengmin as a member of the Central Politburo. Logically, with three Politburo seats vacated, all three should have been filled. However, Zhao Yide, whom Xi was obsessed with promoting, did not get in. Throughout the entire Fifth Plenary Session, only Zhang Shengmin was elevated to the Central Politburo.
Why only elevate Zhang Shengmin? Because in the new CMC team that Hu Jintao is managing from behind the scenes, the only CMC Vice Chairman on the public stage, Zhang Shengmin, is Hu's own man, and he had to enter the Politburo immediately. Coupled with the simultaneous abolition of the "CMC Chairman Responsibility System" and the removal of the words "the entire military" in the communique, the entire closed loop was completely locked. Within the CMC, Hu Jintao and the newly assembled CMC task force call the shots, and on the Party's Politburo stage, Zhang Shengmin alone represents the entire military to sit in and sign off. Xi, the titular CMC Chairman, has not a single member under him who can relay messages or mobilize troops for him, and even the "Shangfang sword" of the "Chairman Responsibility System" has been confiscated. There is a ready-made historical precedent for this in CCP history. In October 1976, Hua Guofeng became Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. By the following year, in July 1977, at the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping returned to power as CMC Vice Chairman and Chief of General Staff. From that moment on, the PLA actually listened only to Deng Xiaoping. But the empty title of "Chairman of the Central Military Commission" above Hua Guofeng's head hung there until the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in June 1981, a full four years before it was officially removed. Is the move that came out of the Jingxi Hotel this time exactly the same as back then? Xi is now the Hua Guofeng after 1977, but the inside has long been a world where Hu Jintao is at the helm and Zhang Shengmin is the executive manager in the Politburo. If you don't step down, you won't be given any CMC members under your public name; you can't even mobilize a single platoon, and you can completely forget about fighting a war.
Having looked at this dark move by the Military Commission, let's look at who will lead the Communist Party at the 21st National Congress. Before the meeting, the calculation in Old Xi's mind was known to everyone. If he were to step down at the 21st National Congress, he wanted to designate Li Qiang, striving to squeeze Li Qiang or Ding Xuexiang into the Military Commission during this Fifth Plenary Session. But once the communique came out, all of this fell through. Then conversely, what about Hu Chunhua, pushed by Hu Jintao and the elders? Why didn't the communique publicly write that Hu Chunhua entered the Military Commission? The logic is the same as the Military Commission not releasing a public list just now. There is still a full year until the 21st National Congress, and if future candidates are put out in the open at this time, the entire officialdom would have to fight over Hu Chunhua, which would inevitably lead to major chaos. Since the Military Commission has already been internally coordinated and taken over by Hu Jintao, and Hu Chunhua and others' roles are directly trained and positioned in internal working groups, there is no need to seek a public title in the empty-shell Military Commission where Old Xi holds a nominal position. When the 21st National Congress is held in the second half of next year, that new leadership team will make a one-time public appearance at the 21st National Congress on that day. So, who can grasp the representative list and personnel grand strategy of the 21st National Congress in their hands? The answer is written in black and white in today's communique.
If Hu Jintao managed the guns inside the meeting hall and took back military power through the "internal channel," then Wen Jiabao managed the knives, the rules, and next year's 21st National Congress list inside the meeting hall. Among the disciplinary action list of eighteen people reported by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in the communique, the one ranking first leading the charge was Ma Xingrui. He is a member of the 20th Politburo, former Governor of Guangdong, Secretary of Xinjiang, and an ironclad confidant from the hometown of Yuncheng, Shandong, of the boss's wife. A Politburo member leading the way to the execution block was followed by Lantian Li, Liu Jianchao, Wang Lixia, Jin Zhuanglong, Yi Huiman, plus Zhong Shaojun and Fang Yongxiang, who served as the Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission and have followed Old Xi for decades. With this slash down, all that were chopped were Old Xi's ironclad household retainers. Professionals have specifically audited the ledgers: in the past two years or so, among the big tigers taken down, there are six at the deputy national level and twenty-two at the ministerial level. Among those twenty-two ministerial-level figures, exactly twenty-one were promoted along Old Xi's line. The list in today's communique is ironclad proof that, in front of more than two hundred members of the Central Committee, Old Xi's wings were thoroughly trimmed.
Merely chopping people with a knife is not enough; Wen Jiabao's most ruthless move was hammering the tightening spells of the Hu-Wen era one by one back into today's Fifth Plenary Session communique. "Intra-party democracy" and the number one person were mentioned twice this year, "democratic centralism" was written a full five times this year, and the word "supervision" was written a full ten times this year. And these phrasing choices were absent in last year's plenary session. Who is the biggest "number one person" in the entire party? Isn't it that person? The communique writes, "improve intra-party democracy," "standardize the performance of duties and exercise of power by the number one person," and "eradicate unwritten rules." Translated into plain white talk, he is not allowed to have the final say alone. Removing the "two establishes" and "two safeguards" earlier is tearing down the signboard of Old Xi's dictatorship from the roof. Adding "standardizing the number one person" and "intra-party democracy" here is blocking the road to Old Xi's arbitrary rule from the foundation. Through this dismantling and blocking, within the Politburo and the Standing Committee, that person has completely become a "standardized target" supervised by collective leadership.
And in the entire communique, the most venomous sentence that truly determines the life and death of next year's 21st National Congress is hidden in the penultimate paragraph of the communique. Combined with the leadership transition, grasp the political performance view training of members of the newly appointed leadership team, especially the number one person. This sentence is the timetable for Wen Jiabao and the elders to take over the ballot of the 21st National Congress. From the end of this year to the first half of next year, all provinces, cities, and counties across the country will undergo a comprehensive major transition, and what is being changed is the number one person of each province and city. Just on the day before the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session, on October 25, Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Wang Zhijun parachuted into Hunan to take over as Provincial Party Secretary, and Mo Gaoyi parachuted into Yunnan to take over as Provincial Party Secretary, grabbing the lead for personnel changes and already taking synchronized action outside the meeting venue. Once the new number one persons of each province come up, the first major task they do next year is to preside over the election of party delegates from each province to attend the 21st National Congress in Beijing. Entering Beijing in the second half of next year to hold the 21st National Congress, these party delegates will raise their hands to elect the 21st Central Committee, and then the new Central Committee will elect the new term of the Politburo, the Standing Committee, and the Central Military Commission. Whoever seizes the review, training, and appointment and dismissal of the "number one person" in this round of transition will have pre-written the Central Committee list for next year's 21st National Congress.
What if, on the eve of next year's 21st National Congress, Old Xi sees that the list has all been replaced by Hu and Wen's people and wants to flip the table and renege? Don't forget that Wen Jiabao still holds a life-or-death trump card in his hand. On October 13, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection suddenly captured former Chongqing Mayor Huang Qifan. Huang Qifan has been an official in Shanghai and Chongqing for decades, managing white-glove money bags for several major red-family lineages, and the deepest thread among them directly links to Old Xi's biological younger brother and biological older sister. From now until next year's 21st National Congress, if Old Xi obediently follows the rules set by the "channel meeting," acts as his nominal head of state, and hands over power on schedule, this family ledger can remain untouched. If he dares to reach out and turn hostile on the 21st National Congress list, the things Huang Qifan spits out can ruin his entire family's reputation at any time.
After witnessing the life-and-death handover inside Jingxi Hotel, let's take one last look at the outside. With the release of this communique, probably the most relieved and satisfied person in the whole world is the US President across the ocean. In another three weeks, from November 18 to 19, the APEC summit will be held in Shenzhen, and Trump has long signaled his intention to come. Even more interesting is that on October 19, the Russians proposed a trilateral summit between the US, China, and Russia in Shenzhen. By October 25, the day before the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session, Ushakov of the Kremlin leaked to the outside world that the three parties had agreed in principle, yet Beijing alone remained silent. Why the silence? Because the accounts inside Jingxi Hotel had not yet been settled, and no one dared to make premature promises. In fact, in the days leading up to the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session, the intelligence networks of Western powers were all on high alert. On October 22, four days before the opening of the plenary session, the British government suddenly issued a notice telling citizens to prepare 72 hours' worth of water and dry rations at home. The Japanese Cabinet Office also forecasted a nationwide disaster prevention appeal for November 2.
What kind of political situation in Beijing does Trump actually want in his heart? To put it bluntly, what Trump wants most is an Old Xi who can sit across the negotiating table to sign agreements, but who can never go to war. The top titles of the party, government, and military must still be on his head so that three weeks later in Shenzhen, his words will count, and the major orders and trade agreements he signs can be implemented. At the same time, however, Trump definitely does not want an Old Xi holding military power who could risk everything in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea at any moment. Moreover, Trump knows very well that if the leadership were directly replaced by tai chi masters like Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao who have dealt with the US for thirty years, with their soft postures and meticulous calculations, he would find them harder to manipulate instead. As a result, look at the answer sheet delivered by today's Fifth Plenary Session; it is practically tailor-made for Trump. Old Xi's three hats remain intact on his head, and in three weeks he will still grandly go to Shenzhen to act as the host, shake hands with Trump, and sign with Putin. Yet inside Zhongnanhai and the August 1 Building, Hu Jintao has taken over the Military Commission following the model of the tunnel meeting, the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission is gone, the whole military has been stripped away, and Zhang Shengmin has been squeezed into the Political Bureau to guard the door tightly, leaving Old Xi with only the ability to sign and disburse funds, unable to mobilize even half a soldier.
Although the step taken by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao inside Jingxi Hotel may not feel completely satisfying from the outside, it is the only viable path at present that can completely abolish Old Xi's military power while keeping the CCP regime and the Shenzhen APEC from collapsing. As for this big chess game already finalized inside the conference hall, how it will be gradually revealed in the coming days requires us to keep a close eye on three checkpoints. In a couple of days, Xinhua News Agency will issue the full text of the Fifth Plenary Session's "Decision on Several Major Issues of Persistently Promoting Comprehensive and Strict Governance over the Party." Will the other half of the prophecy from our 498th episode still include the "Two Establishes" and the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission in the full text? After the plenary session concludes, the Central Military Commission will immediately hold an enlarged meeting to convey the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session. Let's see who presides over this military commission meeting, how the camera angles are given, and whether the official press release still contains the "responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission." Since the military newspaper has already revealed the trump card of issuing ultra-urgent telegraph orders under the tunnel meeting, the new generals appointed through the internal military channels will soon appear in various key positions. Alright.
Thank you, friends, for watching today's Jiangfeng Horizon.
Once you understand
page 12 of this morning's military newspaper regarding the tunnel meeting
you will understand
the true turbulence and danger
behind this communique
at 5:42 this evening.
Please be sure to like,
subscribe,
and hit the little bell,
and share this episode with friends around you
who are still scratching their heads over the communique.
We will see you at the same time tomorrow
to dissect the first wave of major moves after the Fifth Plenary Session.