The CCP's Sieve for Selecting Officials Has Been Swapped Out! Two Days Before the Fifth Plenum, Eight Provincial Chiefs Are Replaced to Clear Seats for the 21st Party Congress; a Propaganda Department Speechwriter Now Directly Runs Yunnan; the Doers Are Out and Eunuchs and Secret Police Are In; Those Sent Down Won't Rescue the Economy but Only Go After People; Private Investment Plunges 10.4%; the Plenum Doesn't Even Talk About the Economy Anymore!

This video discusses the large-scale reshuffling of provincial-level officials on the eve of the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session. The speaker points out that this round of personnel changes is not based on standard retirement ages, but is instead a preparation for the seat distribution at the 21st National Congress next year. The traditional logic of selecting officials, such as being a member of the Central Committee, has been broken, with a large number of "three-non" officials—those with backgrounds in propaganda, discipline inspection, and secretarial work—rising to power. This reflects the Xi administration's pursuit of absolute security and its distrust of local officials. At the same time, the article analyzes the negative impact of this shift in selection logic on the local economy, debt resolution, and private investment, arguing that the new officials focus on "suppressing people and managing affairs" rather than saving the economy, which will lead to further accumulation of economic risks.

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Today, the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session, after much anticipation, has finally produced its results. Just two days before the opening of this session, the CCP replaced the provincial party secretaries of Hunan and Yunnan in a single day, and also replaced the governors of six provinces: Hunan, Yunnan, Fujian, Qinghai, Hebei, and Jiangxi. These individuals are Wang Zhijun, Mo Gaoyi, Zhuge Yujie, Guo Ningning, Chen Yongqi, Liu Qifan, Zhao Zhenxin, and the last one is Xie Weijiang. These eight people all took up ministerial-level positions on the same day. Counting back to the present, the CCP has already replaced party secretaries in ten provinces and governors in eleven provinces. One-third of the provinces have had all their top officials replaced within this year alone. From this, we can see one thing: the CCP's current logic for selecting officials has become completely chaotic—or perhaps the word "chaotic" is more accurate. Let's look at the people who were replaced; I will put the specific list and their ages on the screen for everyone to see, so I won't list them one by one. Among them, except for Wang Ning in Yunnan who just turned 65, others like Shi Xiaoming in Hunan are only 63 this year, still a year and a half away from 65. However, the official press release says they stepped down due to age. The other governors and secretaries are also in the 63 to 64 age range. If you put their ages together, the pattern emerges. Everyone can judge for themselves; this is not at all about the 65-year retirement line, but is aimed at the 21st National Congress next autumn. The standard is that by the time the meeting is held next year, if you are over or approaching 65, you have to be shown the door this year. To put it bluntly, age is not a retirement rule here at all; it is purely for the purpose of distributing seats for next year's 21st National Congress. In short, it is to clear out these old guys in advance and vacate the positions.

Let us look again at these eight newly replaced individuals and examine their public resumes one by one. First, let us check whether they hold seats among the CCP Central Committee members. Over the past thirty years, positions like provincial party secretaries and governors have all been filtered out of this pigpen, and the logic is very simple. When the Party Congress elects the Central Committee members, these seats have already been arranged by province. Among these eight people, Wang Zhijun is a full member of the Central Committee, while Guo Ningning, Zhuge Yujie, and Chen Yongjie are alternate members, and Liu Qifan is only a member of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. As for the other three fellows—Mo Gaoyi, Xie Weijiang, and Zhao Chenxin—none of them are even alternate members. Ah, these are the so-called "three-non" officials. What three non’s? Non-Central Committee members, non-alternate Central Committee members, and non-Discipline Inspection Commission members. Four out of these eight people are not even in the Central Committee. Caixin labeled Mo Gaoyi as the first "three-non" provincial party secretary since the 20th National Congress. If we also include the eleven new governors appointed throughout this year, it gets even more amusing: not a single official Central Committee member among them. What does this show? It shows that the CCP's classical logic for selecting officials has completely broken down. The pigpen of the Central Committee has transformed from a reserve pool into something like... boarding the train first and buying the ticket later.

Let us look at their ages. Mo Gaoyi was born in December 1964, making him only one year younger than Shen Xiaoming, who was born in 1963—ah, the one who was forced to retire. Yet he was directly promoted from vice-ministerial rank to ministerial rank as the party secretary of Yunnan Province. What was the CCP's previous officialdom rule? It was that once a vice-ministerial cadre passed the age of sixty, they were basically no longer promoted to full ministerial rank. Mo Gaoyi clearly crossed this line. On the other end, Xie Weijiang was born in 1973 and is fifty-three years old this year, while Guo Ningning is fifty-six. If she manages to take office by the end of the year, she will be the first post-1970 female official at the ministerial rank. Look at this: one person at sixty-one is promoted across systems, while another at fifty-three becomes a governor. This age combination allows us to falsify one thing: age steps are no longer a variable for the CCP in filtering officials. What matters most? Background. Mo Gaoyi also defies the CCP's rule that senior local officials must have rich local work experience. This fucking idiot started from the Southern Media Group system, worked his way up to the Propaganda Department of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, came in through that channel, and then went to the Beijing Municipal Party Committee as head of the propaganda department, and then to the Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee and Director of the State Council Information Office. His entire official career was confined to the propaganda system; he never spent a single day as a top local party or government executive. This fucker's resume is similar: he spent a little over a year taking a "bath" in Shaoguan before returning to the propaganda system, and now he is taking over Yunnan. And what does this fucker Liu Qifan do? He spent seven years investigating other people, coming entirely from the factory-guard background of the discipline inspection commission. Let us look at his resume: starting in 2016, he served as the secretary of the discipline inspection commission in Inner Mongolia, and then in 2021 he transferred to Liaoning to serve as discipline inspection chief. Chen Yongqi was in charge of organization and political-legal affairs, having served as the head of the organization department in Tibet and the secretary of the political-legal committee in Jiangxi, but he never spent a single day as a primary local leader. Then there are the three fellows Wang Zhijie, Zhuge Yujie, and Zhao Chenxin, who all originated as eunuchs. Look at this: Wang Zhijie is the Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, Zhuge Yujie served as the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, acting as the political secretary for both Han Zheng and Li Qiang. What did Zhao Chenxin serve as? He was the Secretary-General of the National Development and Reform Commission before being sent down to Hebei last May. Guo Ningning's background is even loftier: she came from the Agricultural Bank of China as a vice president and was parachuted into Fujian only in 2018. Xie Weijiang is even more absurd, coming entirely from a corporate background without ever having served as a local official for a single day. He came from Datang Corporation and Harbin Electric Corporation, and was parachuted into Hunan only in 2020. Among the eight people, the only two who truly worked their way up step-by-step from county to city level and served as party secretaries of prefecture-level cities are Liu Qifan and Chen Yongqi. And there is something even funnier: I have seen the "bath crabs" of Yangcheng Lake—hairy crabs shipped in from elsewhere, soaked in Yangcheng Lake water for two days, and then sold as genuine Yangcheng Lake hairy crabs. The CCP is now practicing this craft of "washed officials".

Let's look at the prefectural-level city experiences of Xie Weijiang and Guo Ningning. In December 2023 and May 2023 respectively, they took concurrent posts as party secretaries of Yueyang and Fuzhou in their capacities as members of the provincial party standing committee, thus filling those vacancies. To put it bluntly, they came up through the path of determining the person first and then padding their resumes later. Aren't these two just parachute officials who drop in for a wash? Let's look at the changes. Compared to whom? In the round of personnel reshuffles from 2016 to 2018, what was the mainstream? It was the provincial governor being promoted to the top post. But among this year's ten provincial party secretaries, only five are promoted governors—namely Zhao Hailong in Fujian, Luo Dongchuan in Qinghai, along with Hu Changsheng, Wu Xiaojun, and Zhou Zuyi. What category do they belong to? They belong to provincial transfers. The rest are all parachuted in. Hey, directly parachuted from Beijing. Some people say this is because of excessive purges that wiped everyone out, hey, that there is no one left to use. This claim, I won't adopt it, because of a very simple issue: the 20th Central Committee originally had 205 full members and 171 alternate members. Although their whereabouts are unknown—neither seen alive nor dead—the total number of missing full and alternate members is 57. But even after deducting this 57, there are still over a hundred cabinet-level incumbent officials in the Central Committee who can be mobilized. Yet Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, specifically sent a three-non propaganda official to manage Yunnan. This is completely not a case of having no one available, but rather what? It's that the available people don't fit Xi Jinping's aesthetic rules. There are still pigs in stock in the pigpen, but the standards for selecting pigs have changed.

So how did the CCP's standards for selecting pigs change? Let's break open the entire process of how a provincial party secretary is produced. Cabinet-level officials are called centrally managed cadres, hey, cadres directly managed by the center. The appointment and removal process has a total of four steps: motion, democratic recommendation, inspection, and then discussion and decision. Hey, what does this motion mean? It means first proposing to move this position, and then who should this position go to? According to the CCP's current rules, what is it? It is first for the organization department to come up with a preliminary selection list, and then report the plan to Emperor You Xi, that fucking idiot. In other words, when it comes to cadres at the cabinet level, whose fate determines theirs? The only ones doing this are the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee and the General Secretary, because no one else even has the qualification to nominate. What were the past rules? It was the provincial governor succeeding in order to the position of provincial party secretary. But this year, Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, directly changed this sequential succession into personally designating generals. This change is extremely obvious. Then even for Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, his pig-selection standards are not designed in a vacuum; I think they are more like what? Like two forces squeezing out an unnatural shape. Look everyone, what is one force? One force is absolute security demanded by Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, plus preventing any local government from growing too powerful. What is the other force? Reality. The Central Military Commission originally had seven people, and now only Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, and Zhang Shengmin remain as these two stupid heads. Then the meeting attendance rate, by the way, even hit a new low. Last year's Fourth Plenary Session attendance rate was still 83.8%, hey, and this was already the lowest point since the Mao Zedong era. But now, there is no lowest, only lower. This Fifth Plenary Session will likely drop to 77.4%. So how has the selection standard actually changed? Let's directly compare the past with the present, and the abnormal places can be seen at a glance. What was the logic of the CCP selecting these regional potentates in the past? It emphasized accumulating seniority, and the provincial governor sequentially taking the position of secretary, with special exceptions being extremely rare. Now, hey, this rule has completely changed. Xi Jinping has turned these special exceptions into the main entrance. Now it can be said that this list exposes one problem, which is that from nomination to typesetting, he alone has the final say, and that so-called democratic recommendation in the middle is completely skipped over directly using that special school.

What is even more abnormal? It is this inspection official. What was the performance metric for CCP bureaucrats in the past? In the past, whoever could get things done, whoever could make money, and whoever was favored would get promoted. Now, what does the Discipline Inspection Commission want to do? They want to implement this 'one-vote veto.' If an official has really worked in a locality for twenty years, and you are the cadre who handled land sales and took on debt, your whistleblower letters will be accurate upon investigation, so all of them will be wiped out. Instead, what happens? Instead, those fucking idiots who have long been writing materials and purging people in the propaganda department and the General Office of the Discipline Inspection Commission, they don't touch projects or money, and hey, they all suddenly become 'clean' people. The result is that those who do the work are out, and the eunuchs and the secret police are in. So why does that fucking idiot Xi Jinping want to change the standards to this state? Because the Zhang Da of the past has imploded. The goal in the Deng-Jiang-Hu era was very clear: as long as you could make money, you could get promoted. But after you get promoted and walk away, the bad debts—now that Hu Jianbiao has returned—are all dumped on the central government to cover. And if you stay in a locality for too long, you will form cliques and become a local emperor. This is what Xi Jinping fears most right now. What is the situation now? Land sale revenue has already fallen by more than half. The old game of passing the parcel can no longer be played at all. In the eyes of that fucking idiot Xi Jinping, the capable local officials who could make money in the past have now all become bad debts. Not only are they bad debts, but they have also become a scourge. But he doesn't reflect at all that this was caused by his own hand. So even if the economy lies flat, he must completely smash the old logic of official selection.

Well, after the CCP's official standards become this way, what will happen to the economy? I think the core incentive mechanism now is completely asymmetric. Look, for a provincial governor with a three-year term, no local roots, and who is subject to a one-vote veto by the Discipline Inspection Commission, what is his current state? If you succeed in a debt-resolution project, the benefits go to the central government; but if the project implodes, the loss is the provincial governor's personal political future. So what is the rational choice? Drag it out if you can, and report it only if you have to. Local officials like the entrepreneur-type ones from around the year 2000 in the CCP would basically be wiped out from the roots, because what is the prerequisite for that kind of local official? You have to stay in one place for at least ten years. A transient official with a three-year term simply doesn't have this return function, so the optimal strategy is still compliance, avoiding trouble, and mechanically executing indicators. Moreover, the positioning of these bureaucratic appointments is also very stupid. You send such a person over, the term is only three years, and they are completely clueless about the local situation. That fucking idiot Xi Jinping can indeed play this game of mutual checks and balances to prevent local officials from deceiving him. But for a guy like this, if you throw him into a locality, won't the local cities and counties deceive this stupid idiot? What are you thinking? The official rank has risen, but the brain doesn't grow along with the rank. So my further judgment is that this group of provincial governors or party secretaries who have emerged, their task is most likely not aimed at solving problems, but at what? It is to deal with the people who create problems. Because only under this system can the tenure and identity of these officials be matched. Think about it, if you really want to save the economy and balance the books, a guy who wrote drafts for the Propaganda Department, a guy who cleaned up party affairs for the Discipline Inspection Commission, you arrive in a province where you are unfamiliar with the people and the place, and your subordinates—the mayors, county heads, and those local bosses—which one of them isn't a local snake entrenched for ten years? Where the real accounts are hidden, how big the hole is, anyone can play a set of fake accounts to make this fool look like a monkey. So these parachuted high-ranking officials, these piglets, probably know it clearly in their hearts. I'm a layman at running the economy, and if I get deceived by those below, I still have to take the blame. So what is my choice? Just don't solve the economic dead knot at all. The simplest way is still to directly handle people. If the accounts can't be balanced, then arrest the predecessor to make up the numbers. If the treasury runs out and people cause trouble, use the propaganda mouth to gag them and use the knife to maintain stability. Whoever dares to expose the problem, just deal with them directly. To put it bluntly, these people are not going to be doctors at all, but undertakers and thugs. Although a three-year term cannot solve problems, it is just enough to find a few scapegoats to take the blame, press down all the thorns that stick out, and then walk away after finishing the job.

In fact, the economic side effects of this CCP official selection standard have already erupted. From which data can this be seen? How much has nominal fixed-asset investment dropped? It dropped by 7.2 percent. Furthermore, both corporate financing and household financing are plummeting by double digits. So why is it dropping like this? With the CCP officialdom causing such chaos, the private business owners below are not fucking idiots. Doing business in China has never relied on laws or credit; what does it rely on? It relies entirely on getting familiar with the local top leader before daring to make long-term investments. Now, it's great: party secretaries and governors are replaced every two or three years, and these newly arrived imperial envoys, in order to avoid suspicion and fear of investigation by the Discipline Inspection Commission, I estimate they don't even have the thought of wanting to know the business owners, and once the three years are up, they just pack up and leave. I'll ask one question: at this point, who among the business owners would still dare to shell out money? So you see, in the first nine months of this year, private investment plummeted by 10.4 percent, and national fixed-asset investment dropped by 7.2 percent. With this kind of performance, China is still fucking bragging that GDP grew by 4.6 percent? Who the fuck believes this? Isn't anyone who believes this mentally ill? The real growth rate is at most around one percent. So seeing this, are you still counting on some Third Plenary Session to save the economy or some big move? Don't dream. Previous Third Plenary Sessions were all about discussing economic planning, but this economic planning, after finishing it last year, hey, this time they aren't even pretending anymore, they just changed to studying what? They changed directly to studying disciplinary documents on strict party governance. What does this indicate? It indicates that in this political environment, the Chinese economy is already completely hopeless. Look at this bunch of goods sent out now; they are either eunuchs blowing horns or those running the secret police (Changwei). From beginning to end, this is not a mindset of solving problems; it is purely sending people down to suppress matters and cover things up. Business bankruptcies, fiscal bankruptcy, they can't manage any of it. However, who dares to expose the thunder? They will settle the score with whoever does, and whoever dares to cry out in pain will have their mouth gagged. But the bad debts in this world won't just disappear automatically because you changed the lock, right? When you replace everyone who understands the economy with eunuchs and secret police who only know how to cover things up, the final result will only be one: all the small thunders will inevitably be stifled into earth-shattering explosions. The day the treasury can't even pay for the guard dogs' food, the entire pressure cooker will definitely be blown to the sky. This can be seen from the current CCP official selection logic. To say something unpleasant, these fucking idiots sent down are not there to solve problems at all, because they simply don't have the ability to solve problems. It is more about what? It is about going to cover up the bombs that Xi Jinping, that fucking idiot, created himself. From this official selection logic, one can see that Xi Jinping is currently very anxious, and also that he doesn't dare to trust anyone. You say, does he know that these people sent down can't handle the problems? He definitely knows; having been an official for so many years, even if he hasn't eaten pork, hasn't he seen a pig run? But he sent them anyway, so from this official selection logic, one can see how obsessed he is with the fourth term at the 21st National Congress. But this matter is not a bad thing either; just accelerate quickly, the sooner you die, the sooner you are reborn.