CCP Health Check Before the Fifth Plenum: Can Expel but Cannot Appoint! Three Politburo Members Ousted in One Year, 17.6% of Central Committee Members in Trouble, Only Two of Seven CMC Members Left! Xi Jinping Rants About "Jumping Ship" in Qiushi, Stability Maintenance Defended All the Way to the Case-Handling Center! Huang Qifan Sacrificed as a Warning to Talk Less About the Economy! Three Numbers in the Communiqué to Reconcile the Purge

This video analyzes the political dynamics ahead of the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP, discussing the reality and falsehood of the viewpoints held by the decentralization and reinforcement factions. By sorting out the proportion of fallen Central Committee members, the vacancies in the Military Commission, Xi Jinping's speech published in Qiushi magazine, and rumors about the eighteen stability maintenance rules, it points out that the regime is facing anxiety over internal wait-and-see attitudes and a wave of "jumping ship." At the same time, it analyzes the background of the investigation into former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan, suggesting that it is intended to warn officials to talk less about economic issues. Finally, it proposes verifying the scale of the purge through the actual number of attendees, the number of posthumously confirmed members, and the number of skipped-rank members in the communiqué.

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Official business requires truth, rejecting fragmented understanding. There is less than a week left before the Chinese Communist Party holds that fucking Fifth Plenary Session. There is Xi Jinping writing various articles emphasizing the bullshit of strengthening strict party governance, and there is rounding people up before the meeting to gather momentum, making things quite lively anyway. So let's take a look at what the actual situation is. I have also looked at several of the more popular theories online recently. Summing them up, the main views actually fall into two camps. One camp believes that this fucking Xi Jinping is going to consolidate his power once again, using the paradigms of the CCP's rectification campaigns to purge the party's slaves, primarily setting rules for the major reshuffle before the Twenty-First National Congress, with the core focus being that whoever pledges loyalty to this fucking guy stays. The view of the other camp is precisely the opposite, roughly implying that the economy is about to collapse, finances are running dry, and he cannot control the military. They argue that these objective circumstances are forcing this fucking Xi Jinping to devolve power, leading to the conclusion that either there will be a resurgence of the "nine dragons ruling the water" approach from the Jiang Zemin era, or a transition to collective leadership. So how should we judge between these two camps? Let's first control a variable: who is paying the cost? Let's first look at whether the devolution camp has taken any actions that involve paying a cost. I roughly reviewed all public institutional actions from January to October of this year, and there is not a single document concerning the expansion of the State Council's economic decision-making power, nor did any non-Xi faction figure secure a seat on the Military Commission or the Politburo, nor was any new collective leadership institution established. In other words, up to now, all the information regarding the power-devolution faction consists of rumors, and these rumors contradict each other. Politics relies on a framework; it's not a matter of casually mentioning someone and giving them a post, and expecting this power framework to run on its own. You need people to execute it and devolve power in a timely manner. Never mind who it is devolved to; according to the CCP's succession methods, there must be clear signals. But so far, there are no clear signals at all. Rumor essays are flying everywhere; I've seen the most ridiculous versions, even including one where Hu Chunha is making a comeback, which is sheer bullshit. In other words, if this were a decentralization structure, whatever power someone is supposed to take, the current framework must reflect it. With only one year left until next year's Twenty-First National Congress, whether a successor can handle taking over is a question we can put aside for now. First, the structure has to be built, right? But obviously, the entire structure still points to this fucking Xi Jinping, continuing to grab everything with a heavy hand in this system. Let's look again at the actions of the consolidation camp. Within a year, three Politburo members were directly expelled from the Party: He Weidong in October of last year, Zhang Youxia in January of this year, and Ma Xingrui, whose expulsion was officially announced in July of this year. Following closely on September 22 to 23, the party secretaries of six provinces—Gansu, Tibet, Qinghai, Anhui, Henan, and Fujian—were replaced all at once. By October 13, Huang Qifan was arrested. So far, all the actions we have seen are subtraction, with no addition of power devolution. Therefore, I believe that at this stage, the power-devolution faction has essentially been counted out. However, I don't entirely buy the conclusion of the consolidation camp either. Why? Because the other half of the fact is hidden within the exact same set of numbers. Let's take a look: the Central Committee elected at the Twentieth National Congress consists of a total of 205 members. To this day, 36 of them have already been purged by the CCP itself. Let's see what kind of creatures these 36 fellows are. Among them, 14 have already been officially expelled by the previous two plenary sessions, and their vacancies have been filled by alternate members. Another 8 have been expelled from the Party, just waiting for the Fifth Plenary Session for retrospective ratification. These 8 individuals are Lan Tianli and Wang Lixia.

Three seats are left vacant. He Weidong's chair has been empty since last October, for a full year now, and simply no one has sat in it. As for Zhang Shengmin, he was promoted to the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenary Session last October. According to decades of precedent, a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission should enter the Politburo, but as it turns out, he did not. He is someone capable of purging three Politburo members, yet a year has passed, and sigh, this vacancy has not been filled either. Look, not even a single member of the Central Military Commission has been replaced. Is this what you call strong? This is called distrust; isn't it just that he cannot find anyone he dares to trust to fill these positions? So he just leaves these seats empty. To put it bluntly, when it comes to arresting people, that fucking idiot Xi Jinping can still get it done as long as he makes the call, but appointments are different; he has to find someone to whom he dares to hand over power. But right now, he doesn't have such people in his hands; he doesn't trust anyone. So what we see is these positions being left empty on such a large scale. Well, what is the prerequisite for delegating power? You have to trust people, right? Even at the level of the Central Committee, it is completely empty. As for the power of the central government, he dares to distribute it, or this kind of person who is obsessed with power to a perverted degree—I don't believe he is willing to share power. Even if his health is poor, I think his anxiety about the decentralization of power is definitely greater than his concern for his own health.

How does Xi Jinping himself, that fucking idiot, view this situation? This fucking idiot published a speech in the October 15 issue of Qiushi magazine titled "Advancing Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party with Higher Standards and More Practical Measures." Note that this speech was delivered at the plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on October 12 this year. Less than two weeks after this speech, Zhang Guoxia was arrested. Nine months later, less than two weeks before the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session, hey, this draft popped the fuck up again. I even compared the summary published by Xinhua News Agency in January with the full text this time paragraph by paragraph, and there are a few paragraphs that were only released this time. What did he say? He said that some people engage in political opportunism, trim their sails according to the wind, drill into wherever there are profits, and are ready to jump ship at any time. This fucking idiot said that the implementation capacity of systems in some localities is decreasing layer by layer, resulting in paper dragons and entering tigers. What else did he say? This fucking idiot said that official seals are inferior to notes. He also asked a question that all the people of the country could answer for him, saying why there are so many people with political criminal records and political swindlers active in Chinese society? At this moment, everyone should synchronously bombard the screen with a string of barrage comments: because you are this fucking idiot! What else did he say at the end? He said that no matter how much resistance is faced and no matter how heavy the price is, the anti-corruption struggle must be carried through to the end. No matter who it is, no matter how high the position, no matter how great the contribution, hey, the three "no matters" have come out. Well, this fucking idiot answered it himself, but I believe everyone is probably not very satisfied with the answer. At this moment, we should instead ask a question, which is, does it include Your Majesty yourself? Among all the nonsense he said, those two words, "jump ship," caught my high attention. What is the accusation in the mouth of Xi Jinping, this fucking idiot? The accusation is that officials are jumping ship, which proves a widespread external speculation, that there is definitely a faction of bureaucrats within the CCP, and perhaps even he himself is powerless against them. And now that this passage has been thrown out again, who is it targeting? In all likelihood, it is because during the transition year, a batch of provincial and ministerial cadres are watching the political landscape of the 21st National Congress. Through the words of Xi Ming, this fucking idiot, what is it? Isn't it that a bunch of bureaucrats now want to ride two horses with one foot and are ready to transfer their political investment to a new master at any time? Xi Ming, this fucking idiot, knows in his heart that this group of people exists, and he also knows that he cannot buy these people back through the method of promotion. Who is this article written for? In fact, it is also very clear, because in this draft, the term "top leader" appeared five times, and the term "transition" appeared four times. The original words are that starting this year, local regions will undergo successive transitions, and it is necessary to prevent the wait-and-see and inaction behaviors approaching the transition. There is also the behavior of seeking quick success and instant benefits and flipping the pancake after the transition. When I saw the words "flipping the pancake," I burst out laughing. Aren't these all terms used by overseas observers to describe him? Governing a big country is like flipping a big pancake? Now he can also use this term to describe others. After saying this sentence, hey, there is a kind of feeling, what kind of feeling? It is just like a cult founder lamenting the solid basic skills of the subordinates. Then who is the implicit reader of this text? Isn't it the top leaders at the provincial, ministerial, and military levels, plus the local lords in the era of transition? Let's savor it a little deeper. As early as the Sixth Plenary Session in 2016, which was two years before the constitutional amendment in 2018, what was this fucking idiot copying? He was copying the "Seven Nevers" (the seven points to guard against), such as forming cliques and engaging in factionalism. At that time, this fucking idiot was afraid of people forming party factions. This year, what this fucking idiot is copying is jumping ship, and he is fucking afraid of people running away. From being afraid of forming party factions to being afraid of running away, how has the direction called out by this fucking idiot in the past decade gone? Well, it has ended up unfinished. Now this pancake has been flipped back again. People just think, a fucking idiot who has already highly centralized power openly admitting in party publications that what he faces is not confrontation, but wait-and-see, this in itself is a self-confession that his trust in his subordinates has hit rock bottom. Moreover, the act of wait-and-see is a completely rational decision under this kind of environment. Why? The probability of a Central Committee member getting into trouble has been driven up to 17.6%. Those who do the work get fucking no reward, and those who make mistakes are directly finished. Then the optimal strategy is not to move, just wait and see. This fucking idiot coming out to scold this thing now, I think isn't this just saying that wait-and-see is the correct strategy?

And before the Fifth Plenary Session this year, there was another document circulating, claiming that the Office of the Central Stability Maintenance Leading Group had issued a work notice on stability maintenance during the Fifth Plenary Session, totaling eighteen points. Let me clarify the source first: it was first posted on X on October 12 by an account called Baodian Weekly, and immediately after, Taiwan's Central News Agency cited a portion of it that same day. Therefore, I have labeled it as speculative material; while its authenticity remains to be verified, the format of these eighteen points is completely consistent. It uses CCP-style bureaucratic jargon like "thirty-one articles," and includes duty requirements such as reporting the day's situation before 18:00 daily and having personnel on duty 24 hours a day, which are written exactly like a real document. Even if it is a forgery, the person who forged it is well-versed in this style of official document writing. Among these eighteen points, twelve are aimed at preventing social unrest—preventing flash mobs, preventing the projection of slogans on electronic screens, preventing drones, preventing petitioning, and preventing mass incidents. These are routine actions for every major conference, but two of them are unconventional: one is called "effectively maintaining the order of provincial party committee leadership transitions," and the other is "strengthening the security management of detention centers, prisons, and discipline inspection case-handling centers to ensure the internal security of law enforcement units." What kind of place is a discipline inspection and supervision case-handling center? After these CCP party slaves are investigated, they don't go to detention centers first; they are first locked up in the CCDI's detention facilities, and only after the interrogation is completed are they transferred to the judiciary. Listing this place alongside prisons in this security checklist—what does that mean? It means that the number of people from within the system locked up inside has become so large that they have become a security variable. What can you prevent there? You are merely preventing things like suicides, collusion, or attempts to bail people out from within. The point about provincial leadership transition order also has a corresponding context: Henan is holding its provincial party congress in late October, Hebei and Fujian are holding theirs in November, Liaoning's is in December, and Jiangsu's is also in the fourth quarter. Moreover, the party secretaries of these six provinces were just replaced between September 22 and 23. Listing leadership transition order as a stability maintenance item during the Fifth Plenary Session is something that has truly never happened before, so this Fifth Plenary Session will certainly be very lively. If this document is real, then it is truly interesting, because the CCP's security paradigm has changed; this fucking regime has identified that its risk points have shifted from the public to within the system itself—that is to say, it is guarding all the way from the bottom of society to inside the doors of its own case-handling centers. If this document is fake, then the person who forged it has grasped the same anxiety, and this anxiety can also find its counterpart in CCP texts, which makes these eighteen points, even if they are not an official CCP text, something that was precisely concocted by someone who is well-acquainted with the CCP system.

Now let us talk about Huang Qifan again, since he has also been added to the list of those brought down. Why was he dealt with at this particular juncture? Let me lay out two threads for everyone to see. One is the think tank thread. I checked, and after Huang Qifan retired, he held a title called Vice Chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges. This center is a high-level think tank affiliated with the CCP State Council National Development and Reform Commission, and it is also a place where retired sub-state-level officials and ministerial-level officials are clustered. Bi Jingquan, the executive vice chairman and later chairman of this center, was investigated as early as May of last year, and on September 15 of this year, he was sentenced to 14 years by the Jinan Intermediate People's Court for taking more than 57 million in bribes. The other thread is Chongqing. Hu Henghua, the mayor of Chongqing, was investigated on March 20 of this year. The officialdom in Chongqing is really quite interesting. If Afghanistan can be called the graveyard of empires, then Chongqing is simply the graveyard of CCP bureaucrats. Hu Henghua broke another Chongqing record because he was the first sitting mayor to fall since Chongqing became a municipality directly under the Central Government, followed by Xie Wenhui, chairman of Chongqing Yufu Holdings, who was also investigated on September 12. Xie Wenhui was previously the chairman of Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank, and how was this Yufu platform operated? Back in 2004, when Huang Qifan was the executive vice mayor of Chongqing, under his leadership, the municipal government established this state-owned capital company. The operation was like this: first, a batch of land and party-enterprise equity was allocated to this company as its foundation, and then the company used this foundation as a guarantee to borrow money from the China Development Bank. After the money was borrowed, it negotiated with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. What was negotiated? It bought back 1.57 billion in bank bad debts owed by more than 1,100 state-owned enterprises in Chongqing at the time as a package for 2.2 billion. That is to say, 100 yuan of bad debts were bought directly for 14 yuan, and moreover, it was buying its own bad debts. From then on, the debts of these state-owned enterprises were written off in one stroke, and after the land occupied by these factories was cleared, it belonged to this Yufu. Then Yufu, through the operation of the municipal government, turned the land into commercial and residential land, sold it off, and paid back the loan to the China Development Bank. The price difference in the middle was the profit. Later, Yufu used these funds to buy shares in the Bank of Chongqing, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank, and Southwest Securities, which meant that all the financial equity of the entire city was pressed onto the same platform. Xie Wenhui was transferred from the rural commercial bank to manage this Yufu, and what he managed was this pocket. Both threads had already begun making arrests before him. Then on October 13, it was Huang Qifan's turn. In my view, what does this look more like? It looks more like the completion of an encirclement. I brought up this passage because I want to tell everyone one thing: Huang Qifan's method is entirely likely to become the CCP's game next year, so you must stay far away from these city commercial banks in China. Let us look at the phrasing of this announcement again. It writes him as the former deputy secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and former mayor of the municipal government. It only wrote about his old post in Chongqing, and did not write about his later identity as the deputy director of the Financial and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress. This is a standard drafting method for the Communist Party to settle old accounts, so my judgment is this: the old account is the framework of this matter, and the real signal is another matter, which is Xi Jinping's move to strip away the right to interpret economic routes. Huang Qifan has been retired for 8 years, and almost every month he speaks in public about how the Chinese economy should go. Combined with the timing of this guy's arrest, he was pulled out 13 days before the Fifth Plenary Session. It is more like what? He was set up as a symbol, or a warning to other attendees, meaning that there is no fucking need to talk nonsense about economic issues. Don't you know that this fucking idiot Xi Jinping has no other way? Furthermore, economic issues are also this fucking idiot Xi Jinping's biggest Achilles' heel. If an inference is made in this direction, I think it is reasonable. This fucking idiot Xi Jinping should have had the intention to strike at Huang Qifan for a long time, and moreover, doesn't he fit the typical image of jumping ship? In addition, this fucking idiot Xi Jinping now feels unhappy in his heart with anyone talking about the economy, because after all, this whole pile of things is sitting right here. If someone really uses economic issues to make trouble, since Xi Jinping is a fucking idiot, he really cannot handle it. Then, right before the plenary session, this fellow was sacrificed. In fact, two benchmarks were set up: one is to demonstrate what it means to jump ship, and the other signal is to talk less shit about the economy at the plenary session.

After saying all this, let's take a look at how to reconcile the accounts when the communiqué comes out on October 29. All the things mentioned earlier—like purges, vacancies, jumping ship, and Huang Qifan—are all signals before the meeting. They are my judgment; are these judgments correct? Once the October 29 communiqué comes out, we can verify it. What should we mainly look at? We should look at how the replacement mechanism operates. According to the so-called rules of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), if a full member of the CCP Central Committee vacates their seat, alternate members are supposed to be promoted sequentially based on their vote counts from the 20th National Congress. But in reality, someone is often skipped over, and being skipped is basically a signal that something has gone wrong. Look at this: the Third Plenary Session in July 2024 filled three vacancies, skipping Ding Xinglong, the deputy commander of the PLA Rocket Force who was ranked second. The Fourth Plenary Session in October 2025 filled eleven vacancies and skipped seven military-related individuals. Among them, four were military: Wang Liyan, deputy commander of the Rocket Force; Wang Kangping, head of the Joint Logistics Support Department; Fan Yongxiang, director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission; and Shi Zhenglu, commander of the Northern Theater Command Army; plus three civilians. Fang Weihong was investigated two weeks after being skipped. Anyway, most of those who happened to be skipped ended up eating prison food later on. So what we need to look at is: which of these so-called alternate members of the CCP Central Committee are skipped over again? We also need to look at the attendance numbers. The baseline for full members of the CCP Central Committee is 205. We already know for sure that some cannot come: eight are awaiting retroactive confirmation, two have already had cases filed against them, and twelve have had their representative qualifications revoked, making a total of 22. Then 205 minus 22 equals 183. Overseas statistics show there are still about 20 full members who have been out of contact for a long time or unusually removed from office, such as Liu Jianchou, the former minister of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee; Jin Zhuanglong, the former minister of Industry and Information Technology; and Lei Shanshun, the party secretary of Anhui Province who was removed from office on September 23 without a new post yet—they can all be put in this category. Subtracting these roughly 20 as well, only about 161 can attend. Therefore, the expected range for the attendance count is roughly between 161 and 183. If the communiqué shows a number below 160, the discrepancy represents the scale of new, undisclosed purges. On the alternate members' side, 171 minus the 14 already promoted equals 157, minus the 7 who have already gotten into trouble equals 150, and minus the 5 who went missing after being skipped equals 145. Thus, the number of alternate members at the Fourth Plenary Session should be around 147. If the Fifth Plenary Session falls below 143, that would be a new wave of turmoil. This is how we judge whether there are signals of further expanding purges from the attendance numbers.

Rumor has it that there are a few things to verify over there. Some say Peng Liyuan is going to become an alternate member of the Politburo? The Politburo is elected by the CCP's plenary session from among the Central Committee members. Peng Liyuan is not even a Central Committee member, so this claim is pure nonsense. There is also talk that Li Qiang will become General Secretary, and Xi Jinping will only retain the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin managed to do this back in the day, and it is not exactly new in the CCP. But what does it take to accomplish this? It relies on having a whole set of one's own people in the Military Commission. Deng had Yang Shangkun, and Jiang had Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, which is how they formed a dual-center structure within the CCP. Back then, that fucking idiot Hu Jintao served as General Secretary for ten years and couldn't even command a pinky finger of the military. Everything that fucking idiot Xi Jinping has done since taking power—the Chairman Responsibility System of the Military Commission, the 'Two Upholds,' and the 2018 constitutional amendment to abolish term limits for the President—was all aimed at dismantling this dual-center structure. If he really intended to only keep the position of Military Commission Chairman, he wouldn't have needed to amend the constitution at all. The Chairman of the Military Commission has never had any term limits. That fucking idiot paid such a huge price to amend the constitution; what was he after? He wanted to wear all three hats until he dies. Besides, there are only two people left on the Military Commission now; he doesn't even have anyone to watch the guns for him. How the fuck is he going to act as the supreme ruler? So, I don't think this claim is reliable either. A reasonable deduction would be these few points: Zhang Shengming and the Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Xiaojiang should, according to convention, not enter the Politburo, and Zhang Shuguang of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission should, by convention, not enter the Military Commission. So, after this 'physical examination,' the conclusion is very clear: that fucking idiot Xi Jinping can purge people now, but he cannot appoint them. This is the current state of this regime. You can shout orders as loudly as you want, but when it comes to execution, it is definitely empty, because filling positions requires trust, and trust is exactly what that fucking idiot Xi Jinping has spent fourteen years exhausting. Now, the only thing left in the CCP system that can still function normally is the tool of purging. So, at this plenary session, that fucking idiot simply wrote the purges into a report on 'seeking truth.' Inside this thing, it still talks about the current criteria for selecting officials by that fucking idiot Xi Jinping, like not looking for 'two-faced people' and so on. The danger for that fucking idiot Xi Jinping right now is not that someone is going to rebel, but the 'jumping ship' he himself has been cursing. The probability of someone at the level of the CCP Central Committee being purged has reached 17.6%. As I said before, under these circumstances, 'wait and see' is the most rational choice for everyone. When the communiqué comes out on the night of October 29, everyone can even skip all those cliché-ridden CCP articles. But there are three numbers you must check: first, the number of people actually present; second, the number of people confirmed; and third, the number of people who skipped ranks. These three numbers added together constitute the physical examination this fucking idiot regime has done for itself. We will be here to watch the CCP's political spectacle as soon as it happens. Alright, that's all for today's broadcast. If you want to support me, you can join the membership channel. Welcome to listen to every program, welcome to join the 'Hai Ren Tou,' and see you in the next episode.