Xi Jinping Strikes! A Coup Against CCP Elders — Does the Teflon Huang Qifan Fall? Third Term at the Fifth Plenum, Beijing Takes Taiwan's Nine-in-One Elections by Year End — Can Taipei Be Lost?

This video discusses the sudden downfall of Huang Qifan, former mayor of Chongqing and a prominent figure in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political scene, on October 13, 2026. It analyzes the financial history behind the event, the Chongqing Yufu model, and the local fiscal crisis. Combined with the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session, the video examines Xi Jinping's purge of former subordinates, the strengthening of centralized power, and the far-reaching impact on the 2027 power handover and the situation regarding Taiwan.

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What kind of rumors are spreading now? Xi Jinping hasn't shown his face for over 14 days, and he must have been overthrown in a coup and placed under house arrest again. As it turns out, on October 13, Xi Jinping is laying out his plans for the end of the month, and the chances of him securing another term are extremely high. In November, Taiwan will face the largest wave of CCP internet trolls in history. So what did Xi Jinping do this week that exploded across the entire Chinese-speaking world? He took down Huang Qifan—the miraculous political survivor who was dubbed the one who could fall, but could never be brought down. Of course, I know many Taiwanese people don't know who Huang Qifan is, but if you listen to my detailed explanation, you will find it deeply chilling. I also know what everyone wants to hear: because Huang Qifan's biggest patrons, Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo, passed away one after another, out of desperation—in order to save the new China, resolve the cross-strait crisis, unite with Bo Xilai's surviving former subordinates, cooperate with Wang Qishan and Wen Jiabao, form an alliance with Zhang Youxia's protégés, and awaken Hu Jintao (who was pretending to be sick like Sima Yi) in a miraculous manner reminiscent of a coup against Cao Shuang—Xi Jinping supposedly arrested Hu Chunyang, Wang Yang, and Li Zhanshu. This allegedly included the physical fitness influencer Guantong (who is far away in Taiwan, heart-bound to the motherland as Peng Liyuan's son-in-law), cooperating like the blue-white political coalition to force Beijing's hand before the Fifth Plenary Session, engaging in a fierce gunfight with Xi Jinping and others in Zhongnanhai, and even launching Dongfeng missiles at each other. Beijing residents were completely oblivious and unaware, yet Wang Qishan, in order to save his own skin, betrayed Huang Qifan at the final critical moment. You probably want to hear stories like this, or perhaps that Huang Qifan's downfall is a bitter-pain stratagem, intentionally setting up a scenario to be sent to Qincheng Prison so he can rescue his former boss, Bo Xilai. Come on, these are all unrealistic fantasies. I know you all hate Xi Jinping, and we Taiwanese hate him to death as well, but the facts show that Xi Jinping's grip on power is only growing more secure.

Why is that? Huang Qifan is already a retired veteran cadre of over 8 years, belonging to the same era as Xi Jinping. Furthermore, in the financial and economic construction of Shanghai and Chongqing, Huang Qifan made significant contributions and development, combined with economic networks in Europe and Central Asia which I won't go into detail about here. Back in Chongqing, Huang Qifan and Bo Xilai were cooperative partners like fish in water—not in a romantic sense, and we won't go into the details of that process either. However, Huang Qifan experienced massive purges, including the downfall of Bo Xilai, as well as the successive first, second, third, and fourth major purges of military factions associated with Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. He survived all these struggles, which is why outsiders dubbed him the political survivor, right? After his retirement, he became a retired-cadre influencer, much like many political figures in Taiwan do after retiring, such as Chen Shui-bian or Tsai Ing-wen. They have retired, but they often attend events and manage their own social media accounts. He talked at length about China's economic crisis, the Chinese real estate crisis, and how China should find a way out of this predicament. Many people began to speculate: is he like Ren Zhiqiang (Big Cannon Ren), speaking recklessly, causing Xi Jinping to think, 'Are you now denying my path? You're unhappy that I didn't make you and Bo Xilai disappear together last time, aren't you?' Alright, now I'll take care of you. But is the matter really that simple? Therefore, on October 13, Xi Jinping officially announced that Huang Qifan, the political survivor, has officially fallen.

Suppose today in Taiwan, a former mayor who has been retired for over a decade is suddenly announced to be under investigation and then vanishes without a trace—no confession, no press conference statement. The next day, the entire municipal government leadership collectively declares their firm support for the supreme leader and the decisions of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, rather than questioning whether there might be a misunderstanding. Yet, this is exactly what is happening in China right now. And it is not just about the official Huang Qifan; he is not the typical corrupt official you might imagine. He is a staffer and mayor who was hailed by Chinese media as the one who best understands the economy. What is worth noting? There are less than two weeks left until the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session on October 26. Once this session ends, as I briefly mentioned earlier, we in Taiwan will feel very tangibly why the social media accounts we love to use are seeing an explosive growth in the volume of overseas cyber-army attacks and negative campaign rhetoric. Everyone needs to pay attention to this Fifth Plenary Session. Therefore, what I want to discuss with you today is not just whether Huang Qifan is, as Xi Jinping himself claims, under investigation for so-called corruption or power-for-money deals. Under the CCP's system, who doesn't pull strings? Why don't you, Xi Jinping, step down first? Setting aside the fact that everyone is collectively involved in corruption as a pledge of allegiance, because everyone is the same, what exactly is happening to the political structure of the Chinese government right now? Is Xi Jinping worried about money and looking for funds? That is why everyone has felt so strongly this year about the chaotic policies and the imposition of miscellaneous taxes. Or is he clearing out all the remnants of the old factions to consolidate his own power for a fourth term? Is it possible he is also making early arrangements for his power succession in 2027? Because I have found that if you look at the downfall of officials who understand economic policy over the past few months alongside the agenda of this Fifth Plenary Session, you can see a possibility that Xi Jinping is strengthening not just his ability to collect money, settle accounts, or audit taxes, but his ability to decide who has the capability and qualifications to remain in the power structure and the ability to make money.

Taiwanese viewers, let me introduce you to this Huang Qifan. The most remarkable thing about this person is not how well he speaks about the economy, nor how well he understands how to get out of the current economic predicament, and certainly not how much Zhu Rongji praised him. It is that in the CCP's officialdom, Huang Qifan worked in Shanghai in his early years, and in 2001, he began his tenure in Chongqing, where he stayed for 15 years. He worked with six successive Chongqing Party Secretaries, two of whom I just mentioned: Bo Xilai and Sun Zhengcai. In 2012, Bo Xilai's downfall attracted global attention due to the Wang Lijun incident, right? As it turns out, his son, Bo Guagua, married a Taiwanese girl and continued to lick the boots of the CCP on Twitter—licking the CCP is one thing, but licking Xi, the very person who turned his father into something neither human nor ghost. Yet, Huang Qifan did not fall at that time; instead, he continued to serve as the mayor of Chongqing until 2017, when Sun Zhengcai also fell. Although Huang Qifan had already left the position of Chongqing mayor by then, he was still not investigated or punished. By 2018, he even retired smoothly. But think about it: a person who served and even collaborated with two Party Secretaries who were personally named by Xi Jinping as having committed serious problems—such a person survived in the CCP's officialdom. Perhaps there is an element of luck, or perhaps he has lost his political value, or perhaps it is because he managed a vast amount of financial, state-owned enterprise, and land-related business. Lastly, he spanned two different bureaucratic systems—Shanghai and Chongqing—and was familiar with leadership teams from different eras, backgrounds, and even different economic sectors. In the political ecology of the CCP, the survival of an official sometimes depends not just on whether they have ability, but on whether they have utility and whether their political connections still serve as their protective umbrella.

However, the situation in 2026 is slightly different. The previous leadership teams are gradually logging out of this 'Earth Online' game. It is not just Wu Bangguo and other older-generation officials who are under investigation, right? In January of this year, Zhang Youxia and others, who hold the most prestige in the military and have won battles, were targeted. This includes his military faction; in March, the current mayor of Chongqing, Hu Henghua, also fell from grace. In April, a former high-ranking local financial official in Chongqing was also investigated and fell. By September, many former chairmen of Chongqing companies, such as Yufu Holdings, and veterans of the securities industry were targeted. On October 13, it was Huang Qifan's turn. Judging by his public schedule, it seems he was suddenly investigated, as he originally had many activities scheduled to appear and speak publicly as a political and economic influencer. Huang Qifan previously promoted a very famous financial and state-owned asset model in Chongqing. What is interesting about it? This model is called the 'Yufu Model.' To explain it in a way that we Taiwanese can better understand: suppose a state-owned enterprise is not performing well and a bank has many bad debts and non-performing loans. The government wants to save it but cannot keep throwing money at it. So, what do they do? They create a state-owned capital platform to help handle these bad debts, restructure enterprises, arrange financing, and integrate assets from different companies. If it works well, the company that was about to go bankrupt has a chance to stand up again, and the local government can also use this state-owned capital platform to promote more industrial construction. But is this system really corruption, or is it a layer that is not equivalent to corruption? It does have an economic function; it does have the function of swapping one thing for another. But the problem arises: when a person has been familiar with these financial platforms, banks, enterprises, and personal connections for many years, what they control is not just government documents, but an entire supporting mechanism. In other words, wherever this person goes, that place can become their purse. The resources involved exceed what ordinary people can imagine.

And who becomes even more interesting? In 2020, Huang Qifan mentioned in a speech that Jack Ma had approached him in 2013, saying he wanted to operate a small online loan business, but it was delayed in the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Shanghai region, so he went to Chongqing to find Huang Qifan. Huang Qifan suggested, 'Why don't we set up a P2P business?' and said he could help facilitate it. What was this? It was what everyone later became familiar with as Huabei (Ant Pay Later)—the thing that Little Pinks are urged to pay back every month: 'Hey Little Pink, how much do you owe on Huabei? Tell us how much you owe every month.' We won't go into the details of how they operated here, but a very important political question arises: if Beijing wants to re-examine the financial transactions of the past two or three decades in Chongqing and other provinces, and re-trace the equity of state-owned enterprises, bank loans, and private investments, as well as potential interest exchanges or networking exchanges, will it all circle back to the staff of the most important decision-makers of that time, or a few individuals among them? Ming Pao (a slip of the tongue) even cited news on October 16 indicating that Huang Qifan's son, Huang Ranfei, was even involved with Li Zhanshu's daughter. So, exactly how much money did Huang Qifan and his interest-linked family embezzle? Of course, he certainly won't say. Look at the former defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, who were sentenced to death with a reprieve, and even Zhang Youxia, who was defined as having 'serious corruption' before the Trump-Xi meeting. They all say 'serious corruption,' right? But they never state exactly how much money was embezzled. The CCP Central Committee will only ever announce which influencer, which celebrity, or which small or medium-sized enterprise evaded how much tax and how much they should be fined. Or, if a crosstalk comedian told an unapproved joke at a crosstalk event, they will not only confiscate all ticket revenue but also impose a fine ten times that amount.

So, coming to this point, we Taiwanese viewers should ask: does this have to do with the Chinese government lacking money? Well, let's ask a question first: doesn't China always emphasize that its exports are extremely strong? The last person who debated with me seemed to be a Little Pink from Chongqing, or maybe Sichuan, I kind of forgot. Didn't he also keep emphasizing this to me? Isn't China's trade surplus very high? Then why are local governments short of money? I don't want to get into how the CCP beautifies its numbers, but a very important source of fiscal revenue for Chinese local governments in the past was leasing and selling land. Even Huang Qifan, in a 20-plus-minute interview program which I watched through, spoke with brutal honesty. Of course, I won't put it here because it might be too boring for everyone, but what is the current situation in China? You all know it yourselves: land revenue is down 28% year-on-year, and Chongqing is even more exaggerated—as of the first half of this year, land revenue was down 35% year-on-year. But here comes the strange part: total tax revenue actually grew by 0.3%. Everyone, what does this mean? This means that not only was the lost 35% made up for, but an extra 0.3% was added. If you look closely at the accounts, you will find various miscellaneous levies and taxes, various retroactive tax audits, various supplementary tax payments for tax evasion, as well as expanded fines by the chengguan, including the police (Public Security) and traffic departments. Because they have the final say, provinces and cities across China are using these methods to fill their fiscal revenues. As local finances become increasingly tight, the Beijing central government not only needs to increase this revenue, but may also need to pay attention to what state-owned assets and financial platforms local governments can control, which resources can be reorganized, and to drag out all these corrupt industrial chains from the past so that I can come and save this economy, or perhaps Xi Jinping feels from the bottom of his heart that the Chinese economy is so terrible because it was messed up by my former leadership team and the leadership team before that, so I must purge all of these things and make China's economy move toward a North Korean style.

Of course, this does not mean that arresting Huang Qifan or confiscating his family-related assets can save Chongqing's economy or fiscal revenue, nor is it very likely that arresting a few high-ranking officials will solve the structural financial problems of all local provinces in China. Whoever holds the information has the ability to decide which transactions and which acts of corruption can be investigated, who needs to account for past financial relationships, hand over your connections and all the ways you acted as a white glove, and wash all overseas money back. What everyone cares about the most this time is actually the timing: why did it happen to fall right around the time approaching the Fifth Plenary Session? The theme of this Fifth Plenary Session in late October is strictly governing the Party. From these charts, we can find that Xi Jinping is purging more officials faster year by year, but the economy is getting worse and worse. The money has not flowed into the market because of the downfall of so many corrupt officials, forcing China's domestic demand to get better, right? Where did the money go? Let me give an example that everyone can understand better: a restaurant catches more and more rats and cockroaches every year, and even publishes reports. I caught one rat 10 years ago, and every year I added 1,000 more rats to the top of it. The rats I caught in the first half of this year have already exceeded all the totals combined. The rats and cockroaches I caught in the first half of this year reached 100,000. At this time, would you feel that the restaurant environment is great, so many rats and cockroaches have been caught, and I should go spend more money there, or would you feel, wow, oh my god, it's too terrifying, the more cockroaches and rats you catch, do you dare to go eat there?

Then comes the key point: after Huang Qifan's downfall, the Chongqing government instantly expressed its stance to completely eradicate toxic influences, to tackle the Pao Ge culture and dock culture, and demanded a stance aligned with the CCP Central Committee under Xi Jinping. Taiwanese viewers might not quite know that in Chinese political terminology, dock culture refers to the interpersonal network diagram formed around local power centers. I want to ask everyone: if the Beijing central government were just dealing with the personal finances of a retired mayor or his personal disputes from the past, why would it be necessary to make the local government reaffirm political discipline on such a large scale? One of the explanations is that the Party Central Committee hopes to use his individual case to remind all Chinese officials, including retired officials, that retirement does not mean you are truly safe. You have handed over power, you have handed over money, but your past connections and your backer do not necessarily guarantee your position forever. But what is Xi Jinping worried about? Today, Xi Jinping can use central orders to replace a mayor or a provincial governor, but that does not mean Xi Jinping can purge local banks, local state-owned enterprises, local enterprises, the commercial networks connected to them, and all kinds of relationships formed in the past, and retake control of these networks of connections, right? Then you have to push forward, investigating retroactively for a dozen, twenty, thirty years, or even earlier retired decision-makers.

Of course, the above are all my personal deductions and may not necessarily be the absolute truth. So, from the perspective of politics and power struggles, what can we discover? When Zhu Yuanzhang founded the Ming dynasty in its early years, he had to consider whether the founding officials and those who helped build the empire—people he trusted deeply—would try to seize credit, and even if they didn't betray him, whether they would rebel against his sons and grandsons after his death. Therefore, he began to use various matters to gradually purge those powerful and influential meritorious officials. Whether they would obey Zhu Yuanzhang's descendants was crucial, but in the end, he didn't anticipate that it would be his own people—those with the surname Zhu—who would launch a coup against their own family. That brings me to a question: if Xi Jinping hopes to continue holding power in 2027, why does he keep striking down or reshuffling bureaucrats, the military, aides, and even turning his blade against his own inner circle? These matters actually do not conflict. Assuming he continues to hold power, the central government can more directly control more forces, including the military, local factions, finance, and local wealth. Assuming a transition problem really does occur in the future, the weakening of existing local networks and independent power centers might also reduce the resistance faced by the new leadership team. This is what we call the Zhu Yuanzhang-style rectification approach, right?

As for just how bad Xi Jinping's physical condition is, we don't know; only his wife, Peng Liyuan, knows. We can learn this from leaks to reporters by White House personnel: Xi Jinping requested the White House to prepare a private, independent VIP room, and not even Cai Qi, other confidants, or Wang Yi were allowed to enter—only his wife could. This confirms one thing: Xi Jinping's physical condition indeed has problems, and it's not just his foot. There is something he doesn't even want his confidants to know. Even if they know, he doesn't want to let them know the extent to which his illness has worsened. You might think it's 30%, but in reality it might be 70%, and I don't want to tell you because telling you might trigger many variables beyond my control, and you might even stage a coup against me. You are also my own people, you belong to the house of Zhu, and you staged a coup against our own house of Zhu—you get my point, right?

So, if Xi Jinping's physical body cannot sustain him through the succession, where on earth is this successor to be found? People online are guessing Cai Qi or Li Qiang, but compared to Ding Xuexiang and Hu Chunhua, I think both of them have a better chance than Li Qiang. As for Cai Qi, by 2027 he will be over 70 years old, and age is a major long-term concern for succession arrangements. Although Ding Xuexiang is younger, currently there doesn't seem to be a more suitable candidate than what we've guessed, right? So is there a possibility that the rectification right now is not primarily paving the way for a predetermined successor, but rather centralizing power first, so that no matter what personnel arrangement comes in the future, the current Xi faction and the central core can grasp and control the leadership? That way, holding onto power and the future succession can be placed within the same set of power and integration logic. It's just that we still don't know what the real personnel arrangements in 2027 will look like—or maybe Guan Zhang? We were all looking forward to Guan Zhang staging a coup against him, but he just stays in Linkou and doesn't come over, I don't know why. Therefore, I think the Huang Qifan case can also be used to observe whether Beijing is currently clearing out old network systems that might hinder these personnel arrangements in the future, or if it is forming a set of institutions that can maintain a high degree of central control even without a clear successor?

Taiwanese viewers might ask me: Po-hsiung, these Chinese political struggles you talk about—right now there's the big clash between Ocean Currents and Chiang Wan-an—how can we ignore that? First, China's political turbulence will seriously impact Taiwan's national security and economic crisis. Let me ask you, after the Fifth Plenary Session, we will be able to see the initial clues of the 21st National Congress. Regardless of whether Chiang Wan-an or Puma Shen wins, if Xi Jinping actually does something after the Fifth Plenary Session and the 21st National Congress, or expands a step further in deploying coastal military operations, will the Taiwan stock market crash? Let me ask you, will whoever is the mayor of Taipei at that time be able to change that? Exactly. Might as well consider another question: why do these investigations form such a high-intensity political phenomenon in 2026? As for whether Xi Jinping has already decided to hand over power in 2027, what new political discipline will their central leadership establish after the Fifth Plenary Session? These changes are what can help us judge who succeeds whom, who manages whose resources, and who re-establishes the rules of the game.