Xi Jinping has blockaded the island of Taiwan! Taking advantage of Taiwanese people being busy with the election, a silent encirclement to cut off Taiwan's supplies? Are the PLA deployments suppressing bases in Okinawa and Guam? Is China really going to take action in 2027?

On November 6, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) released a report pointing out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting what may be the largest military and fishing boat drill in recent history, simulating the encirclement and blockade of Taiwan while cutting off its external connections. The program analyzes the strategic intent of this normalized military deployment, the coordination among three theater commands, and the background of high-level purges, while discussing the impact of the 2027 political and military timeline on Taiwan's elections and U.S.-Japan intervention.

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We Taiwanese are being imperceptibly numbed; a major event has really happened these past few days. I saw it reported in the news, but everyone doesn't care, yet it is extremely important. I know that Taiwanese people are currently crazy about the elections, especially the Taipei mayoral race. With just a little over two weeks left until the November 28 voting day, everyone looks every day at whose poll numbers are higher, whose poll numbers are more accurate, and whose rally turnout is larger. As a result, do you know that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) released a report on November 6, discovering through satellite and exercise maps that the CCP is conducting an unannounced military and civilian fishing boat drill, which may be the largest in scale in recent history, encircling and blockading Taiwan. This simulates cutting off Taiwan's connections with the outside world and even preventing U.S. and Japanese military forces from entering the waters around the Taiwan Strait.

Of course, is our government doing anything? Yes, it is, but everyone might not care that much. According to data released on November 3 by Joseph Wu, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, in the Western Pacific—specifically off the coast of Hualien, across the Pacific—there were over 100 Chinese coast guard vessels and warships, including the Liaoning aircraft carrier battle group that passed by the Philippines. Strangely enough, Beijing's Xi Jinping did not officially announce this massive military drill and blockade against Taiwan through official media like CCTV. In the past, whenever the Chinese military made a move, they would announce Joint Sword A, B, C, D, Strait Thunder A, B, C, D, or Justice Mission, giving them increasingly flashy names and even drawing heart-shaped blockades around Taiwan, right? CCTV would also pair it with promotional footage of missiles bombing fish, fighter jets, and warships to intimidate us. Yet this time, American research institutions believe that the scale of deployment is already larger than last year's Justice Mission 2025, yet Beijing did not make a big fuss about it as usual. Therefore, this is what we need to pay attention to. If they don't talk about it, it means they are shifting from intimidation to actual combat, because what is spoken out loud is obviously intimidation; but if they don't talk about it and do it quietly, it means they might really be predicting a shift to actual combat in the next year or two. Xi Jinping might actually do this in order to secure his third or fourth term in 2027, right?

And where are these military planes and warships of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appearing, not just around Taiwan, but in four maritime formations? Beyond the first island chain, where is Guam? The second island chain is a very important military location for the U.S. military. The CCP has already pushed the positions it needs to take Taiwan and perhaps defend against to the area between the first and second island chains, surpassing the Okinawa base, right? Look at these points; they happen to cut off support from Japan's Okinawa base, the Philippines to the south, and U.S. military bases coming directly from Tokyo, right? These places may all involve military activity support from the U.S. and Japanese militaries. So is the CCP this time practicing the blockade of Taiwan, or is it practicing preventing the U.S. and Japan from assisting Taiwan? If the CCP wants to fight Taiwan, its first shot should be at the nearest U.S. military base, then the people of Taiwan will panic, and subsequently Kinmen and Matsu will be taken. At this time, Taiwan might not even need to be fought; the majority of pro-unification factions and centrist voters would want to take to the street to protest against the government signing a peace agreement, and thus turn to surrender, right? Then 2027 is also a critical year for Xi Jinping facing the 21st National Congress of the CCP, so could this wave of military deployment also be showing off his achievements for next year's power arrangements?

Let's look directly at this military deployment map published by the Institute for the Study of War. First, let's talk about late December 2025, Justice Mission 2025. At that time, the Eastern Theater Command of the CCP made this military exercise public, mobilizing this army, navy, and air force, including the Rocket Force, to practice the blockade of important ports in Taiwan, as well as sea and air combat readiness police ship patrols. On the first day of the exercise, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense had already detected 89 sorties of CCP aircraft and 15, wait, 5 CCP warships along with 13 coast guard ships, followed by live-fire shooting, right? It counts as a high-intensity military exercise against Taiwan. But this wave of activity detected this November, the scope observed by the Institute for the Study of War is even broader. In addition to warships and coast guard ships near Taiwan, there are also vessels from three coastal theater commands operating outside the first island chain. So why does the CCP want to disperse its forces around Taiwan and even push them further away into the Philippine Sea and close to the Guam base?

This report mentions that the Liaoning aircraft carrier formation, from October 23 to 26—which happened to be the day the Fifth Plenary Session was held—passed through the Bashi Channel south of the Philippines and sailed all the way into the Western Pacific. On November 2, satellite maps photographed China's newest Fujian aircraft carrier leaving the Sanya base in the South China Sea. In addition, at least 3 large surface combat ships also left their bases between October 26 and November 2. Many Taiwanese people are used to watching things like CCP military aircraft flying across the so-called median line and CCP military aircraft appearing in eastern Taiwan, thinking this is the full picture of the CCP's military threat to us. However, if the People's Liberation Army really wants to blockade Taiwan in the future, controlling the Taiwan Strait is far from enough. All maritime supplies from the east side of Taiwan all the way to the Pacific, as well as our natural gas, our oil, and our foreign capital—if Xi Jinping wants to increase the efficiency of the blockade, he must study how to deal with external forces approaching from the east of Taiwan, including our latest natural gas purchase signed with Alaska. If this industrial chain is built, it might start from Keelung Port or Suao Port, nobody knows.

But the question is, if the CCP imposes a blockade, first, do these U.S. merchant ships dare to come in? Second, if they dare to come in, does the CCP dare to attack, and dare to learn how the German army blockaded the English Channel during World War I and II? But if the CCP really blockades and really attacks, we will have to see whether the US military at that time will be as indecisive as it was in the Iran War, and whether it will keep thinking that a dictator can be bought off through intimidation. So this time, the four maritime formations appearing between Taiwan and Guam have very great military significance, but this does not mean that the CCP already has the ability to block U.S. and Japanese military aid to Taiwan. Of course, Japan and the Philippines also have their respective strategic positions. If the CCP really wants to prevent these external forces from intervening in the Taiwan Strait, it still needs to master air supremacy and maritime supply coordinated combat capabilities. These are not things that can be solved and proven just by having an aircraft carrier sail a circle. And the most important thing is how the U.S. military can be broken through, utilizing contradictions in U.S. domestic politics and conflicts among voters. The biggest thing is to make decision-makers indecisive. Under this, no matter how strong the U.S. military's capabilities are and how powerful its military is, it may be constrained by these, thereby failing to support Taiwan at the most effective time and the most critical moment.

Of course, some scholars have suggested that this might just be the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responding to the Keen Sword 25 joint military exercise held by the U.S. and Japan from late October to early November. However, I believe that if they were truly responding to the U.S.-Japan exercise, the CCP would certainly have mobilized its largest propaganda apparatus and engaged in maximum jingoism, shouting things like, 'Taiwan is our sea, how dare you conduct drills there? Are you trying to interfere with our China's Taiwan? We, the Chinese people, will never agree to this; we will defend China's sovereignty even if it means getting our heads broken.' They didn't say any of that, which suggests that this time, they might be quietly trying to play for real. As just mentioned, this time it's not just the Eastern Theater Command; naval vessels from the Northern and Southern Theater Commands have also joined in. If the People's Liberation Army (PLA) only wanted to demonstrate its military capabilities around Taiwan, the Eastern Theater Command's own operational capacity would have been more than enough. So why involve the integration of three major theater commands? Normally, each fleet practices in its own assigned waters, which is a different level of difficulty compared to the cross-theater coordination required during wartime. Although the main combat commanders and political commissars of each theater are currently vacant, and the PLA's top brass is undergoing very intense personnel turmoil, Xi Jinping truly believes that the reason the PLA has failed to take Taiwan so far is, first, your corruption, and second, your lack of loyalty to me.

However, from the perspective of professional military analysis reports, after generals are replaced, whether the new commanders can become familiar with their original units, whether there are problems with cross-theater coordination, and whether combat experience can be successfully passed on—all these require actual training and the trust of the leader and various high-level military officials; this is very important. Will it be that while we are quietly complaining about some things, you go and report me, you go and snitch on me? Then, when I make a decision, will I be reported? Will I be suspected by Xi Jinping of wanting to defect? Will I be suspected by Xi Jinping of wanting to sell intelligence to the U.S.? This long-range deployment of the three major theater commands, in addition to exerting military pressure on the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan, may also be the PLA testing the joint operational response after their high-level purge. After all, these people now also want to use these normalized blockades to trade for a seat on the Central Military Commission in 2027. Xi Jinping is also using political purges to replace these generals, but he cannot rely on expelling them from the Party to make the remaining officers automatically capable of winning battles. Political loyalty and combat professionalism are, after all, two different things, right?

After the Fifth Plenary Session, the only Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Shengmin, entered the CCP Central Committee Politburo. On November 3, he also met with the Russian Defense Minister, which indicates that Zhang Shengmin has been recognized by Xi Jinping and can take on some of the military's external exchange activities. But this precisely proves that Xi Jinping may have no one else to use. If you let a person who manages discipline and rose to power by snitching become your second-in-command, it means you have no generals left to use. The key point everyone must know is that even if Xi Jinping knows he cannot win, even if he knows he will lose this war and eventually retreat, Taiwan would still be a pyrrhic victory. It is possible that our pyrrhic victory would result in more casualties than his minor defeat, after all, the battlefield is not on the land of the People's Republic of China, not in Beijing, and certainly not in Shanghai; it is on Taiwan's own soil—the west, the north, and even parts of the east. It would severely damage our Taiwan's stock market, economy, and so on. Therefore, I believe we should not hold the mentality that 'the CCP won't be able to take it anyway' and look down on them. How can you use normal logic to view a madman?

If Xi Jinping truly hopes to achieve substantial progress and victory by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army in 2027, having the Fujian aircraft carrier, new types of destroyer-carriers, and a large number of Dongfeng missiles is not enough. He must also prove that this military truly obeys him, has no ulterior motives, and possesses cross-theater coordinated combat capabilities. Furthermore, since Xi Jinping took power and reorganized the theater commands, the primary purpose of these theaters has been to restrict local warlords from building up their own power bases; this is the most important point. For example, if Xi Jinping orders the commander of the Eastern Theater Command to take Taiwan within a week, he will only provide one week's worth of military aid. If the commander finds that by the fourth or fifth day they cannot take Taiwan, they must submit a request for ammunition and supplies to the political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command in Beijing. After submitting such requests once or twice, over time, Xi Jinping, much like the Chongzhen Emperor, will start to think: 'You take so much money from me, yet you still can't win; are you planning to rebel? Are you building up your own power?' If internal friction occurs within the Eastern Theater Command at this time, and the Eastern Theater commander feels that the officers below him are not listening to him, Xi Jinping will wonder if this is like the Ming Dynasty situation where Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Wenlong. Of course, he might not have that level of historical knowledge, given his elementary school education, but that is the problem.

However, this latest exercise not only involves blockades of far-sea activities but also lacks a formally announced name for the large-scale military drill. For Xi Jinping, what kind of political and military deterrent effect could not announcing it bring? After Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022, although many Little Pinks were left humiliated and devastated, the CCP immediately announced large-scale military exercises, right? At that time, there was clear military propaganda and political warning. Once these exercises are announced, international news will follow up, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and the Taiwanese people will be highly alert, and the United States and Japan will continue to monitor the CCP's military. But if the CCP stops formally announcing large-scale military exercises in the future and instead makes high-intensity military deployments a routine activity, while also using various fishing boats to conduct this kind of interference warfare—of course, this does not mean that we in Taiwan will not know where the PLA is just because the CCP has no formal name for the military exercise. The real difficulty is that when CCP warships or coast guard vessels continuously and routinely operate around Taiwan and outside the First Island Chain, military intelligence units must judge whether this time, this day, is a routine drill, political pressure, or if they are preparing to transition from exercises and routine training into an actual blockade. You cannot tell; you have to make high-intensity judgments every day, and this is extremely draining on our resources and manpower.

Moreover, such high frequency will naturally increase the burden on both sides. Chinese warships need a lot of fuel to go to sea, and they need maintenance and supplies. Taiwan, of course, needs a lot of such supplies, right? Taiwan also needs many pilots working overtime flying every day, right? And we are a democratic country; over time, we will feel that this is unbearable. But in China, no matter how they vote, they can only vote for the National People's Congress representative designated by the principal or teacher, right? Both sides are trapped in a long-term war of attrition, and the CCP also has the opportunity to use this to test the reaction speed and response capabilities of Taiwan, the US, and Japan. You know that our scale cannot afford a war of attrition with the CCP. Why? Because we are a democratic country; we cannot just eat grass for three years to fight the CCP. A big reason why Trump lost the midterm elections was the Iran war, right? Can Iran's economy compare to the United States'? But Americans bear the price inflation brought by war, letting their own economic and material life decline. The endurance of Americans is not as good as that of the Iranian people; Iranians can eat grass for three years, but Americans will protest after three days of eating grass and will use their votes to replace you. The same logic applies here. Taiwanese people cannot do it, but the Chinese can. Look at this issue of mandatory social security payments on November 1st; even the Little Pinks are unhappy, but has anyone organized to protest like they do in democratic countries? So once this happens, Taiwanese people will gradually vote for pro-China parties due to military pressure, right, to avoid issues like the cost of living. And at this time, the pro-China parties will come out and say, 'We will cut the defense budget, and we will distribute this money to everyone in the amount of over 100,000 yuan; aren't you happy with that?'

So, suppose one day the People's Liberation Army is conducting routine drills, and suddenly it turns into substantial action, starting maritime control or even taking coercive measures against foreign ships. Therefore, I believe that Xi Jinping and Beijing might not make a high-profile announcement right now, possibly considering diplomatic risks. After all, Taiwan is holding local elections on November 28, and Shenzhen, China is hosting the APEC Leaders' Meeting from November 18 to 19. If Beijing suddenly announces a large-scale military exercise against Taiwan at this time, it will inevitably face high-level attention and condemnation from the international media, and it will also affect the political atmosphere before Taiwan's election—helping Shen Pao-yang campaign instead, right? So when we talk about the most realistic issue, if the Chinese Communist Party really wants to blockade Taiwan, how much economic pressure can it actually cause? On July 31, 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States released a study conducting 26 wargaming exercises of a CCP blockade of Taiwan. This study has very important results: a blockade could indeed cause serious damage to Taiwan, especially regarding energy supply, but for Beijing, the cost is likewise not low. Taiwan's current natural gas reserve standard is 11 days, and it will be increased to 14 days next year. However, this does pose a huge risk to us: whether our energy can come in on time, whether American ships dare to come in, and if they do, whether the CCP dares to attack. All three parties are engaged in a game of mutual maneuvering.

Furthermore, if marine insurance costs suddenly rise, natural gas and resource costs will also rise. Even if not a single missile falls on Taiwan proper, businesses will begin to worry about production costs and supply chain risks. But a blockade is not just parking hundreds of warships at sea to block all ships from Taiwan; China must also face the military and diplomatic reactions of countries like the United States and Japan, as well as measures faced by the international community and shipping. Most importantly, China's own economy is actually highly dependent on the Taiwan Strait. In 2022, the value of cargo traffic through the Taiwan Strait was approximately 2.45 trillion US dollars, accounting for over 1/5 of global trade value, with about 1.4 trillion US dollars involving China's own import and export trade. So have you all noticed this problem? If China really turns the Taiwan Strait into a highly dangerous maritime zone, other countries will also form a blockade externally, and China's economy will face a severe recession as well. Therefore, this is actually a result of mutual destruction. Because Chinese people can eat grass for three years while Taiwanese people cannot survive past three days eating grass, since we will use our ballots to replace a president or ruling party whose internal pressure becomes unbearable. This US midterm election is a great example. If totalitarian countries and democratic countries play this game, you must resolve it quickly. If a hot war drags on, democratic countries are bound to win. The US think tank's wargaming on the 26th also found that a blockade could lead to uncontrollable escalation of military costs, eventually evolving into a large-scale multi-country war.

So why are China's coast guard ships playing a very important role in this deployment? Beijing does not necessarily have to officially announce a naval blockade on the first day, but rather use coast guard law enforcement, maritime control, and other means to affect shipping around Taiwan. This has a different political effect and a different diplomatic-level effect compared to directly dispatching the PLA to blockade ports. In 2027, the CCP will hold its 21st National Congress, moving towards his fourth term, and the PLA will also welcome the 100th anniversary of its founding. Military purges, economic issues, international affairs, and achievements in military modernization have all become top priorities in studying China's power arrangements. Whether Xi Jinping needs to rely on a war in the Taiwan Strait or a blockade, or even taking Kinmen and Matsu, to consolidate his power, or whether letting the PLA possess higher military deterrence could produce considerable political effects. First, regarding a full-scale amphibious landing, if China really launches amphibious operations, it needs to cross the Taiwan Strait, face Taiwan's defense capabilities, sustain a large amount of logistical supply, and at the same time bear the risk of US and Japan intervention—after all, their drills also assume US and Japanese military intervention. The political blow to Xi Jinping within the party would become extremely huge. Therefore, if Xi Jinping hopes to complete the regime transition arrangements by 2027, a full-scale war is not the best choice, but rather localized, controllable, small-scale conflicts or small-scale blockades, such as taking Kinmen and Matsu. I believe that we in Taiwan, the Republic of China, do not have the ability to retake them, and we must also consider where the hearts and minds of the people in Kinmen and Matsu lie.

Moreover, the United States already issued an annual report in March 2026, in which they believed that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party likely had no plans to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor was there a fixed timetable for reunification. However, the People's Liberation Army is indeed continuously advancing the probability of using force against Taiwan and the possibility of preventing U.S. military intervention. In other words, 2027 is a critical turning point for the construction of Chinese military capabilities, and I believe that after so many years of military purges by Xi Jinping, strict demands are placed on the political loyalty of the PLA, where every step taken is met with suspicion. If Beijing makes larger-scale military exercises a routine practice and turns them into regular patrols in the future, the first issues to resolve will be whether the PLA has the capability to maintain such long-term deployments and the loyalty of these generals. Therefore, 2027 is not just a question of whether Xi Jinping wants to fight Taiwan, but also includes the extent to which the military is prepared and how much political leverage Beijing wants to gain in return.

Returning to us in Taiwan, local elections are to be held on November 28. The mayoral race in Taipei is currently in full swing, with daily news of polls, momentum-building, and political attacks across counties and cities. However, in early October, China dispatched a large number of military aircraft and warships in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific, which indeed involved military blockade operations simulating the isolation of Taiwan. Did Taiwanese media report on this? In fact, they did, but in recent days everyone has been dazzled by Yang Liu, Jiang Wan-an, and the election race. Taiwanese citizens have many legitimate reasons to care about the elections, such as local governments being responsible for livelihood issues like transportation, housing, and public childcare, which I can see with my own eyes, whereas the overseas blockade by the Chinese Communist Party is something I cannot see. This naturally directly affects our lives, especially since missiles have not yet directly bombed our front door—though by the time they do, it will already be too late. But this report also reminds us that Taiwan's security issues cannot be understood merely from how many PLA aircraft or warships sortie each day. The day a sudden, unannounced formal blockade or direct conflict occurs—I believe the period from after November 28 until the U.S. presidential transition in January, since the midterm elections are done and January is roughly when the transition happens—will be a very good window for Xi Jinping to strategically intimidate Taiwan.