The Fifth Plenary Session Ends! After the Taipei Election, Xi Jinping Wants to Take Taiwan; Did Hu Chunhua Appear to Stop Him? 53 Warships Surround the Taiwan Strait, Is War Really Coming in 2027?

This episode discusses the political changes after the CCP Fifth Plenary Session, the massive purge of military personnel, the movements of Hu Chunhua, and the risks of the Taiwan Strait situation and a military invasion of Taiwan by 2027. The host analyzes the number of absences at the Fifth Plenary Session, the promotion of high-ranking officials with military backgrounds, abnormal personnel replacements, as well as the CCP's military pressure on Taiwan and the tactics it might adopt against Kinmen and Matsu, reminding Taiwanese society to remain vigilant.

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Full transcript:

Xi Jinping has finally made a move regarding the Taipei mayoral election. Lately, isn't this election fierce? Everyone is closely watching the polls, and the CCP's CCTV military news specially reported on Puma Shen's so-called malicious election, absurdly babbling that the Taipei mayoral election can only be decided by Taipei citizens and is not up to mainlanders to decide—how ridiculous is that? Wait a minute, what the fuck are you talking about? Let's take a step back and ask: can the people of Shanghai vote for Beijing's National People's Congress, political consultative conference, or mayor? You don't even get to vote on who will be the state president or chairman of the Central Military Commission next year, yet you talk to me about mainlanders not being able to vote? You don't even know who your own village cadre or mayor is, and you're lecturing me about Taipei. It's totally baffling.

But the scarier point is this: on October 28, Taiwan's state security agencies and Japanese authorities released a series of astonishing military deployments. As many as 53 CCP warships, coast guard vessels, and aircraft carriers were distributed across the waters surrounding the Taiwan Strait, including the First Island Chain, all the way to Japan and the Philippines. So will a war actually break out next year?

While the CCP's warships were heading out in large numbers, wasn't Beijing holding the Fifth Plenary Session? This Fifth Plenary Session is supposed to decide how next year will go and show signs of who the new leadership team will be. But unfortunately, it seems that hasn't emerged yet, so Xi Jinping's chance of reelection might still be as high as 90%. Yesterday, the Fifth Plenary Session officially concluded, and the CCP itself published a list of 33 high-ranking officials. Do you know what unit 16 of them belong to? The People's Liberation Army. Even the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission is among them. What on earth is going on here? Can they really attack Taiwan under these conditions?

A heavyweight figure has spoken out. Who is he? US Army Pacific Commanding General Charles Flynn mentioned a few days ago that the US military has already incorporated the assessment of the CCP potentially acquiring the military capability to invade and seize Taiwan by 2027 into the planning of its Indo-Pacific strategic deployment.

More importantly, next year also marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, and the 20th National Congress of the CCP is also about to be held—meaning the path for Xi Jinping to rule for life. As Beijing simultaneously expands its maritime military activities and reorganizes military command and corruption issues, what does this mean for the situation in the Taiwan Strait by 2027?

Another very interesting figure appeared at this plenary session of the Central Committee: who? Former crown prince Hu Chunhua, who is also one of the most hotly discussed figures this week. A few days ago, many people guessed whether something had happened to him, but yesterday he appeared in the closing footage broadcast by CCTV. Hu Chunhua was absent from the opening ceremony. In the edited version of this plenary session released by CCTV, we can find that the previous type of group discussion footage was missing. It is rumored that the coverage throughout was entirely about what these expelled people did, and what you are not allowed to do. We can see from these what the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for 2027.

Let's first look at this image from October 28, which was clearly a blockade and encirclement drill targeting Taiwan, right? And it is being normalized, making foreign countries think the Taiwan Strait is Chinese Communist Party territorial waters, cutting off the supply lines of the US military stationed in Japan and the Philippines. Pay special attention: what did it send more of toward Taiwan? Coast Guard ships. Toward Japan and the Philippines, it sent warships. Armies are for fighting external enemies, while police, public security, and Coast Guard ships are responsible for domestic law enforcement. Therefore, it has already designated the Taiwan Strait as its own national waters, right? Taiwan is an island, right? Much of our energy, raw materials, and livelihood supplies must be imported by sea. How should this be solved? Trump announced a few days ago that Alaska in the US and Taiwan had reached an agreement to purchase natural gas. The '怀疑美国' (doubt America) crowd will of course say it's bad, but here is the problem: if an encirclement and blockade really happens, like the situation in World War I and World War II, like the blockade of Britain, then US natural gas ships coming over from Alaska in the Pacific and passing through Okinawa—they are US vessels. Would the Chinese Communist Party really dare to emulate the Germany of World Wars I and II, indiscriminately shooting down all ships and submarines entering the blockaded British waters? Would you really dare?

However, the strangest thing is that while China is expanding its military power at sea, declaring Taiwan a part of itself, and interfering in our Taipei mayoral election, Beijing's plenary session announced this startling military personnel list, with 16 members coming from the military. According to this footage, the number of military personnel attending this time is extremely small. Have you seen how few people in military uniforms there are? Xi Jinping took office in 2012, and it has been fourteen or fifteen years since then. When he first took office, he said he would vigorously crack down on corruption, hitting both 'tigers and flies.' In fact, an overwhelming number of Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission have fallen from grace, and those 'Northeast fierce tigers' were all knocked down. Now, in the 14th year of this crackdown, even staff members who worked closely by his side for a long time have been punished one after another, and even Cai Qi's former subordinates have been subjected to disciplinary investigation. This system can indeed catch problems, but whether it can effectively prevent problems from happening is a different level. Moreover, it's not just a few officials getting into trouble; even the leadership structure of the Central Military Commission has undergone major changes. In 2022, Xi Jinping selected seven people to lead the military, including himself, as well as Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin, and others. As a result, before this term ended, only two of these seven remained, while Zhang Shengmin was promoted this time to a member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. This is not an ordinary promotion. Usually, it is elected by the Central Committee after the party congress held once every five years, right? You still need a procedure. But Xi Jinping? He ignores these procedures, and Zhang Shengmin is in charge of military discipline—meaning the person who reports on him, making secret accusations. Can such a person win battles? He will only force people to fight; he will only supervise the troops. Why was your posture incorrect when attacking Taiwan? Why did you get seasick when crossing the sea to attack Taiwan? May I ask if Mbappé (slip of the tongue) is

Is Mbappé a kind of reactionist or something along those lines?

Having been promoted to Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission last year and entering the Political Bureau this year, everyone needs to understand: even a large number of senior military generals with reporting backgrounds have instead obtained higher political positions. This at least reflects that within the current Chinese Communist Party military structure, disciplinary supervision remains the absolute top priority. But an army is not just an ordinary small company. Besides political discipline, what else does it need? Combat capability, professional judgment, and troop coordination are extremely important. The army, navy, air force, and the Marine Corps must coordinate well, along with drones, logistics, and everything else that needs to be properly coordinated. Whether an army can effectively execute missions does not depend on how loyal these top officials are or how much they love Xi Jinping. Especially when the original lineup of the Central Military Commission has changed drastically, how the other positions will establish mutual trust—we couldn't tell this time—and whether they dare to be trusted, these things take time to be verified.

What shocked us was not even the military part. Next, someone compiled a historical statistical chart from 1977 to 2026, which is very stunning; it lists the number of attendees at each CCP Central Committee plenary session. We won't talk about the others, let's just take the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022 during Xi Jinping's tenure. Originally, a total of 376 members, including Central Committee members and alternate members, were supposed to attend, right? As it turned out, the number of members attending this year's Fifth Plenary Session and so on added up to 279. There is a shortage of nearly 97 people in between, which means that compared to the scale of people elected for this term and those who actually attended, it has already decreased by a full 1/4 or so. The attendance rate is 74.2%. This is not hard to understand, right? If a large company's board of directors had 15 people at a meeting last year, and this year there are only 8-9 people left, and they are not being replaced, and if they are to be replaced, they skip the ranking order and find the one at the very end to fill the vacancy. Then may I ask, what happened to this company? Would you still dare to buy its stock? Will its stock have huge volatility?

So let's look back at this Fifth Plenary Session. They only filled 10 vacancies in total, including Lu Dongliang and Liu Jie. After we checked the original list, we found that there were 5 people who were originally ranked higher and should have been the ones to fill the vacancies, but they were not filled. Do you understand what I mean? I am in fourth place. The top three are gone, so I, the fourth place, should be the one to fill the vacancy, followed by the fifth, then the sixth, right? But you skipped backward and started filling from the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth places. What is everyone thinking? It's over. Am I going to be investigated? What do others think of me? What does the 20th person think of me? What do other low-to-mid-level officials outside think of me? I dare not have contact with Bajiong. He is finished. His political career is dead. Should I continue to hang out with him? Maybe he will be investigated. Maybe he will disappear next month. Cut off all relations with him immediately. It was cut off immediately. This is very scary. The people who were not filled this time are Fu Wenhua, Cong Liang, Jilin, as well as Zhu Wenxiang, Zhu Hexin, and so on. Among them, Fu Wenhua and Zhu Wenxiang have military backgrounds, while Zhu Hexin has a background in the financial system. This inevitably reminds us of Huang Qifan, who fell from power a few weeks ago.

Next year, the 21st National Congress will elect a new leadership, the people of the CCP Central Committee, including the decision on how to deal with Taiwan. If there is a large-scale reshuffle of the old personnel, we have not seen any signs or arrangements for the new personnel this time. Who will do what? It doesn't look like it at the moment. Could it be that the 'Gym Owner' (Guanzhang) is going to be the President? And this time, the story of Hu Chunhua has many more episodes in his appearance. Someone zoomed in on the screenshot and saw that among everyone, only Hu Chunhua had an extra little red book on his desk. Moreover, on October 22, Beijing held this so-called 90th Anniversary of the Victory of the Long March, and Hu Chunhua did not attend. As a result, many overseas people began to guess that something happened to Hu Chunhua, whether he was being investigated or something. As it turned out, he appeared in the closing footage on October 29. But when we look closely, we find that the little red book on Hu Chunhua's desk is called the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. Some people say this is 'waving the red flag to oppose the red flag,' learning from those like Liu Shaoqi, those who were once criticized and denounced during the Cultural Revolution. At that time, when they were criticized by the masses and Mao Zedong, they took out the CCP Constitution and said, 'May I ask, which article of the Constitution did I violate? Point it out.' No one cared about him, and they criticized him anyway. Who was the one who recently took out this Constitution and used the red flag to emphasize the red flag? It was Qin Gang. Where is he now? He has disappeared. Of course, does this mean that Hu Chunhua is publicly singing a different tune from Xi Jinping? CCTV actually edited the footage and included it. But then the reversal came again. This Constitution of the Communist Party itself incorporates 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.' So, whether Hu Chunhua wants to oppose or not is unknown; it varies from person to person. It depends on what Xi Jinping thinks in his own heart. 'You are paying respect to me, right? You are annoying me, right?' This depends entirely on what he thinks, and why Hu Chunhua dared to do this action that others dared not do.

Let's look at the communique of the Fifth Plenary Session. First, it is to continue strengthening the centralized and unified leadership of the CCP Central Committee. The second point of contradiction arises: improving the quality of intra-party democracy and regulating the power of leadership teams and top leaders. On one hand, it says the Central Committee must be more centralized; on the other hand, it says you must supervise me, and I will improve the democratic decision-making procedures within the Party. Simply put, it is bullshit. I want to continue holding power, and you must supervise me, and supervise me to continue holding power, supervise me to help me 'let a hundred flowers bloom,' and if I have any shortcomings, I can listen to your criticisms, but whether you will disappear or not is another matter. This morning, the CCP held a press conference where Hu Heping, Deputy Head of the Publicity Department, specifically explained and whitewashed this so-called democratic centralism. But conversely, the communique also emphasized Xi Jinping's ideology on Party building. So, judging from these current political documents, Xi Jinping's core positioning is clear. And what was specifically emphasized this time? Selecting loyal and capable officials and preventing officials from being inactive. The military has serious corruption issues. If your boss tells you the company needs to innovate and you can make your own decisions, but when you do, the boss gets upset and asks why you didn't ask for permission first, then you ask for permission for everything in the future, and he complains that you are not being proactive. When serious mistakes occur, sometimes it is not your fault, but the fault of the overall environment or other clients, right? Of course, you bear some responsibility, but it is not entirely your fault. The boss thinks it is your fault and then cuts your pay or demotes you. So, let me ask you, if you encounter these bad things in the future, would you dare to report them? You certainly wouldn't, because reporting them would lead to severe consequences. So you cover it up, keep covering it up until the moment it explodes. You're going to die anyway, right? So you might as well live one more day. How can such a company lead its employees, and how can it make this country develop? This is the problem that highly centralized organizations will face.

Now, the CCP not only has to deal with these issues of official discipline, corruption, and work efficiency, but also the issue of his succession. Let's turn the clock back to 2007, the 17th National Congress of the CCP. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang entered the Politburo Standing Committee. At that time, the outside world could already distinguish who the future top leader would be, right? By 2012, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai also entered the Politburo. These two were very young at the time and were observed by many in political circles as the new generation of successors. And what happened? Sun Zhengcai fell from power in 2017, and Hu Chunhua withdrew from the Politburo in 2022. Some have even compiled a list showing the total annihilation of the Youth League faction. A few days ago, a Vice Premier of the CCP passed away, and Xi Jinping will be 74 next year. We still cannot tell from this Fifth Plenary Session who will succeed him. If you can't tell who is succeeding him, then he must be the one continuing. But can his health hold up? We have already discussed these clichés, so I won't repeat them. If a successor is designated too early, people within the Party will start placing bets, trying to curry favor with these people, which leads to a new round of corruption. Xi Jinping doesn't want that, right? But if you keep delaying the designation of a future handover time, many uncertain problems will arise. Will you leave at any time? If you leave at any time, will you face warlordism or factionalism within the Party, where everyone wants revenge? You, Wang Huning, are really damned, and then they kill your whole family. Is that possible? Do these people dare to let Xi Jinping relinquish power? They don't.

But we still don't know what the situation in 2027 will be like, and this is precisely what Taiwan really needs to observe. This does not mean that Beijing has announced it will definitely launch a war against us in 2027. Its military capability and the decision to do so can be completely different. You may lack the capability but still choose to fight, or you may have the capability but choose not to fight; these are not contradictory. But because many people think of the CCP as a normal country—'I can't take Taiwan now, so I won't fight'—is it really like that? Don't forget, it is a dictatorship, it is Xi Jinping. Of course, before Xi Jinping finishes rectifying the military, our risk is at its lowest, but after he finishes rectifying it, our risk will definitely be much greater than it is now, even much greater than in 2022. The CCP is currently in a stage of reorganizing its military. Once it is purged and ready, the problem arises: can we in Taiwan keep up? Will our Legislative Yuan continue to block our various military and defense efforts? Will there be more 'skepticism of the US'? Will there be hype about defeatism, and will the 'One Country, Two Systems' proposal be like the one from the 'Guanzhang'?

However, we in Taiwan do need to observe how Beijing will handle these military and political issues moving forward. First, what will the personnel arrangements of the CCP Central Committee be? What combat and command backgrounds do the new leadership team have, and what is their vision? Furthermore, will there be substantive changes in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) maritime exercises, military deployments, and logistics? Especially, will the activities of large-scale coast guard vessels and warships within the First Island Chain become more frequent, normalized, and highly proficient? If you were Xi Jinping, how would you make a decision regarding Taiwan? How would you take Taiwan? If I were Xi Jinping, as we transition from 2027 to 2028, or when securing a supreme leader term while facing numerous internal party issues regarding re-election, where would I launch an attack? The Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongsha campaigns—I would definitely not attack Taiwan proper and Penghu, because attacking Taiwan proper and Penghu is simply too difficult and the US and Japan would intervene. However, Kinmen and Matsu inherently belong to Fujian Province, and the Republic of China has extremely poor emergency response capabilities to support and retake them. Judging by Japan's relinquishment of sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu and the US defense perimeter, it likely does not include Kinmen and Matsu. After rapidly occupying the Kinmen and Matsu areas, the CCP Central Committee would then have a bunch of self-media, people willing to surrender and bootlick the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and CCTV conduct massive reporting, edit short videos, and universally distribute a lot of cash as rebates to the residents of the Kinmen area. At the same time, they would announce the construction of a bunch of skyscrapers in Kinmen just like those in Xiamen. Anyway, this money is taken from the social security, pensions, and loans of the Chinese people, so it doesn't matter, it really doesn't matter. Once Taiwan is officially taken back, I can fill in the gaps later anyway. At this point, I ask you, would this action cause many Taiwanese citizens who are indifferent to politics to waver? What would they think? It would definitely not be like the Green camp saying 'I will defend Taiwan to the death'—that's impossible. Human nature being what it is, those who usually don't care, seeing these superficial things, would think that getting money and having a bunch of skyscrapers built isn't bad either, right? And furthermore, it avoids war. I ask you, at this point, would Taiwan's domestic morale and public sentiment still exist? And how would the opposition party hype this up? At this moment, they would only need to make a feint, surrounding Taiwan with fake actions, and wouldn't a bunch of surrenderists emerge to lead the surrender, or even influence the next election? Would some pro-CCP civic organizations even be established to act as proxy governments to negotiate with the CCP? Of course, this is all my fantasy, and I hope it never happens. That's the end of the video today.

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Unification doesn't seem that bad after all.