Xi Jinping Forced to Hand Over Power! Less Than a Year to Live? Confidants Cai Qi and Li Qiang Stage a Joint Coup? Hu Chunhua's Whole Family Vanishes? The Fifth Plenum Decides the Fate of the Two Sides of the Strait — Will Taiwan Still Fight Next Year?
The video discusses the high-level political dynamics in Zhongnanhai on the eve of the CCP Fifth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping's health status, and the succession crisis. It analyzes Hu Chunhua's absence from the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Long March, the downfall of multiple senior officials, and the political predicament of loyalists such as Cai Qi and Li Qiang. It also compares the late-stage Stalinist fear of power with the lagging response under the totalitarian regime. At the same time, it touches upon local financial pressures, big data-driven social security collection, and the potential impact on Taiwan in the face of China's changing political landscape.
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Tomorrow is very crucial because it determines how the overall policies for mainland China and Taiwan will be implemented and whether their fate will change—that is the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session. Don't simply think this is merely China's internal affair. Of course, by the time some people watch this video, the meeting may have already begun. However, what makes the outside world most curious about the entire Zhongnanhai is not how to save China's economy. The 73-year-old Xi Jinping has been exposed by White House media outlets; his health is indeed much worse than before, and whether he can continue to hold power, how long he can hold it, and whom the CCP Central Committee is actually preparing to let succeed him remain questions.
Yet unexpected things happened. On October 22, the CCP held the commemoration meeting for the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Long March. Xi Jinping attended, along with all seven members of the Standing Committee and officials at or above the provincial and ministerial levels. However, it was pre-recorded, not broadcast live. Xi Jinping walked briskly, unlike last month in India and the United States, where he walked with a limp, had to wait for Trump several times, and needed a human cane—Peng Liyuan—by his side to walk, right? This is one of the key activities of the CCP's highest leadership, and it should have been an occasion for Xi Jinping to demonstrate to the outside world that the CCP Central Committee is united and stable, right? Moreover, it was meant to emphasize that the Fifth Plenary Session is an absolute outpost for strict party governance. Here is the key point: in the official CCP footage, there was a very strange phenomenon. Hu Chunhua, once regarded as Xi Jinping's successor, failed to appear in his expected position, and even Ying Yong, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, was questioned as to why he did not appear at the conference.
What makes people's hair stand on end is that the political backgrounds of these two individuals are completely different. Hu Chunhua was designated by the Communist Youth League faction, Hu Jintao, and others as the successor after Xi Jinping, while Ying Yong was an official transferred by the CCP Central Committee to Hubei to serve as the provincial party secretary during the Wuhan epidemic in 2020. Now, with less than a day left before the Fifth Plenary Session, the simultaneous absence of two key figures with different political backgrounds—is it a coincidence, or has something unknown to the outside world really happened among the top CCP leadership? Especially as the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session approaches, the number of fallen officials has risen sharply, right? Since last year, Xi Jinping seemed to intentionally allow Hu Chunhua to return to the political stage. Many anti-Xi rebels then said, "Look, Hu Chunhua has taken power, hasn't he? The Youth League faction is going to win again, right? They are going to unite with Zhang Youxia to stage a coup against him and rescue Bo Xilai." As a result, now they are all dead. But what is the actual situation? Let us see whether Hu Chunhua appears at the Fifth Plenary Session. If he does not appear, then it is truly over, and Xi Jinping has entered Stalin's era of madness.
After the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, Hu Chunhua's political destiny underwent a major change. At 59, he was still considered a "young man"?? That's right, under an official system where people can live to 150, he was very young, and theoretically he still had room to develop further within the CCP Central Committee, right? But he was kicked out of the (core) political arena by Xi Jinping. Therefore, many people began to guess about that scene—when Hu Jintao flipped through that list which didn't have Hu Chunhua's name on it before being escorted out, were they arguing about this point? Later, Hu Chunhua was transferred to serve as Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). However, at the Long March commemoration meeting on October 22, judging by the ranking order, Hu Chunhua should have appeared before people like Wang Yong, but he failed to show up. With the Fifth Plenary Session approaching, at such a sensitive moment, the former crown prince Hu Chunhua simply did not appear. Various speculations immediately emerged online, with some believing he might be under investigation, and some media even claiming that even Hu Chunhua's family members had gone missing. Currently, the publicly confirmed news is that Hu Chunhua apparently did not take any leave that day, nor was he transferred overseas or presiding over any other important meetings in other provinces.
This exposes a very fatal weakness of the CCP: in the absence of Xi Jinping clearly arranging a successor, any successor or anyone regarded as a potential successor, including the former crown prince, will be seen as a potential competitive threat. And there is another even more noteworthy detail this time, which we just briefly mentioned: Supreme People's Procuratorate Procurator-General Ying Yong was absent. In 2016, during the 80th anniversary commemoration of the Long March, the official state media Xinhua News Agency explicitly introduced the attending personnel when introducing those present, but this year it only introduced the President of the Supreme People's Court, omitting the Procurator-General. Then, the most crucial part—you could also understand this as the "bed-ear-listening" version making a comeback—the "Zhongnanhai positioning studies" that have been very popular these days suddenly exploded. Some netizens put together the footage of the reception for the 77th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on September 30, the National Health Conference on October 13, and the Long March commemoration meeting mentioned today to look at them all at once. When Xi Jinping walked at the very front, the distance between Li Qiang and Zhao Leji seemed a bit different from before, appearing to have widened slightly. Especially on October 13 at the health conference, Li Qiang walked relatively closer to Xi Jinping, while Zhao Leji and Wang Huangning intentionally kept a certain distance.
Some commentators felt that perhaps Xi Jinping was preparing to hand over more power to Li Qiang. Look at Li Qiang, smiling from ear to ear! Don't think that this is truly so-called "bed-ear listening"; because the biggest feature of CCP politics is a lack of transparency, and positioning studies, clapping studies, and banquet culture are indeed very important aspects worth observing in the CCP. Previously, Li Keqiang (a slip of the tongue) actually dared to stand on equal footing with Xi Jinping, openly sing a different tune, and even when Xi Jinping waved to greet people, Li Qiang, as the number two figure, actually waved along with him. As a result, the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee were clapping—the number three and number four figures were clapping, and Li Keqiang should have been clapping along too; he shouldn't have been waving. Consequently, at the next meeting, he clapped together with the number three and number four figures; he didn't dare to wave anymore. So this is what I mean: the CCP pays great attention to these details. As for what kind of end Li Keqiang met later, I don't need to spell it out, right? Did Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, and others intentionally keep their distance to highlight Li Qiang's status as the number two figure? Is such a possibility there? Perhaps. But taking a step back, is there a reverse possibility that Zhao Leji and Wang Huning were trying to kill Li Qiang with kindness—using such details so that when Xi Jinping watches the playback, or when others talk to Xi Jinping, they would say, "He is intentionally trying to replace you, he wants to learn from Li Keqiang,"—forcing Xi Jinping to suspect Li Qiang, while Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, and others intentionally created this phenomenon where everyone honors Li Qiang the same way they honor you, making Xi Jinping suspicious or prone to purging him? That's hard to say. After all, he is Xi Jinping; he is a hybrid of Stalin and Chongzhen.
Why is it that after Xi Jinping has been in power for so many years, the outside world remains so sensitive to such details? Because under a system where personal power is extremely centralized, everyone's status must be understood through the prism of the supreme leader. If you are relatively close to Xi Jinping today, some people will think you are trusted with important responsibilities; if you are relatively far from him tomorrow, some people will suspect you have lost power and are about to fall from grace. Just think about it: Xi Jinping took over as CCP General Secretary in 2012, and also became commander-in-chief of the armed forces, right? In 2018, he abolished the constitutional term limits for the presidency, allowing for indefinite consecutive terms. In 2022, he began his third term as General Secretary. In less than a few months from now, it will be 2027, and he is preparing for his fourth term at the 21st National Congress. If you were Xi Jinping, facing a very contradictory problem right now, would you or would you not arrange a successor in advance, make it public, and announce it to the world? Assuming you designate Li Qiang as your successor today, what would other top CCP officials do? Since Xi Jinping will die or retire in a few years, I need to start forming cliques for my own selfish interests and curry favor with Li Qiang. This is also what ancient emperors feared most—things that happen before the crown prince ascends the throne, right? Will the personnel arrangements for local officials in the future gradually lean toward Li Qiang as well? Will those corrupt practices of official back-scratching and backdoor deals that Xi Jinping dislikes emerge once again? Once a successor begins to form their own political network, would Xi Jinping worry that his own power might be challenged ahead of time?
However, if he never arranges a successor, problems arise too, because everyone in the Politburo will never know if they have a chance to climb higher. If you perform too poorly, the supreme leader thinks you are incompetent; if you perform too well, will he suspect you are too ambitious and eliminate you first, blocking all your paths? He also has to guard against the possibility that the next Xi Jinping might also act like an obedient subordinate to climb to the top. Of course, there might be some people in Taiwan's political circles like that too, which I won't elaborate on here. If an official in the Chinese Communist State hopes to get promoted, they must prove their political loyalty—advancing and retreating as instructed. But what kind of loyalty counts as loyalty in Xi Jinping's eyes? Applauding for Xi Jinping today, applauding for Xi Jinping tomorrow, and continuing to applaud for him the day after tomorrow—does this somehow prove that I harbor no other disloyal intentions? This is also why I believe Xi Jinping's recent public statements are more worthy of study than the movements of officials.
At this meeting, Xi Jinping spent the entire time praising Mao Zedong, while the slogans in the audience were all about Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—it was entirely like that, right? Moreover, Xi Jinping's remarks were extremely heavy, emphasizing loyalty, purges, and a stern atmosphere. Remember the memorial service for Jiang Zemin a few months ago? He also spent the entire time talking about Jiang Zemin, but it was all to elevate himself. And where is another key point of observation? On October 16, Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee's party journal, published an article by Xi Jinping. The content compiled Xi Jinping's remarks at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in January of this year, which specifically pointed out once again: some cadres talk to me about loyalty on the surface, but act otherwise behind my back; some form cliques for selfish interests, build factions, and set up small circles; and some officials even sway with the wind, going wherever the profits are, and are ready to abandon ship at any moment. Hey everyone, these are words Xi Jinping spoke back in January of this year! And at that time, Zhang Youxia was under investigation. Now it is specifically pointed out again—what is the purpose of this? Therefore, I think what is even more worthy of study are the words "abandon ship." Why does Xi Jinping still need to issue another warning? Does this imply that the CCP Central Committee is worried that someone might look loyal politically, but is actually persecuting Xi Jinping and preparing to unseat him? Could someone have been plotting a coup over the past few years, only to have it discovered? Or are some people truly cooperating with the US CIA after watching recruitment videos released by the agency? We don't know for sure, but Xi Jinping definitely has a guilty conscience.
What is even more coincidental is that on October 23, Xi Jinping also presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, reviewing the inspection report of the 7th Central Committee. He once again emphasized the anti-corruption struggle and the continued strict observance of discipline. The main content of the Fifth Plenary Session, which will be held on October 26, is to promote how to govern the Party strictly. A leader who has been in power for nearly 15 years, by the end of 2026, is still emphasizing strict Party governance on a large scale. If these officials were all promoted layer by layer after Xi Jinping took power, why is this problem still occurring now? "Do not suspect those you employ, and do not employ those you suspect." Xi Jinping has been in power for so many years, spending so much time purging corruption in the military, and now he is also rectifying various economic levels. Even people at the level of Zhang Youxia can get into trouble, so why would anyone else feel safe? Even the "tumbler" Huang Qifan has fallen. Where is the point that is even more worth pondering? In July, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee Ma Xingrui was also dual-investigated. Here is the key point: Xia Linmao, a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Committee and Vice Mayor, was also investigated. This Xia Linmao is no simple character. Who is he? He is a former subordinate of Cai Qi during Cai's tenure as Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee. Cai Qi is also considered by the outside world to be Xi Jinping's "Chief of Staff" or "Head Eunuch." During the second Trump-Xi meeting at the White House, he was actually blocked outside the White House lounge. This means that Xi Jinping really does not trust even Cai Qi. To what extent has his health deteriorated that he does not want Cai Qi to know the full picture? So, when his former subordinate was suddenly investigated, the outside world began to wonder: are the original team and network of Cai Qi being rectified? Is Cai Qi finished?
Suppose a Beijing official sees Xia Linmao suddenly being taken in for investigation today. What will you be thinking about when you go to work tomorrow? It must be: "They need to arrange new people, I am going to move up, I am going to take over, they will definitely promote me." Or: "I'm finished. Is there anything on my phone that I didn't think that way, but he thinks I thought that way? Delete it quickly." These purges can indeed rectify corruption in the short term, but if officials do not understand the boundaries of this discipline and the standards that change at any time, they will instead become afraid to act or do nothing, afraid to bear the consequences and responsibilities of their own judgments, and even afraid to report the real bad news to the top. Because if you report it, you get sacked; if you don't report it, you hide it as long as you can. "I still have a chance to survive." The fact that Xi Jinping can continue to rectify the overall situation in China means that he is still firmly in power. Here is the exaggerated part: on October 19, the Chinese state security department published a very interesting article. What was it called? "Vow to defend the Party Central Committee to the death." Hey, what happened? You are actually publishing this from the Ministry of State Security? Have you been flipped by the CIA? Has someone staged a coup against you? You aren't even addressing Taiwan independence forces here. Those who don't know might think that you are really fighting inside Beijing, with shots fired and Dongfeng missiles exploding everywhere, even though Beijing citizens are completely unaware.
There is a very interesting paragraph in this article. It describes those responsible for protecting the central leaders during the Long March era, that is, the group around Mao Zedong, as the "Red Imperial Guards." Ancient emperors were also particularly worried and afraid of who controlled the Imperial Guards, and whether the person who controlled the Imperial Guards would suddenly stage a coup against them. I also hope that all of you Party members will be as loyal as the personal guards. And when it comes to the handover at the 21st National Congress, if it is not me, will you be loyal to the people I arrange? Xi Jinping's physical condition is similar to that of the former Soviet leader Stalin, his competitive relationship is like the late Soviet period, and the state structure is like the end of the Ming Dynasty. Soviet leader Stalin, who passed away in 1953, was 74 years old when he died. Xi Jinping is 73 this year. Looking back with hindsight, Stalin was indeed terminally ill in his later years, but he did not admit it at the time. He had many small maneuvers to avoid it. Although some footage and photos could show that he was indeed in poor health, he refused to admit it. Now that the historical data has been reviewed, it is true that in those years everyone suspected, he was indeed terminally ill. But Stalin at that time, holding the highest power in the Soviet Union, still maintained a high degree of wariness and suspicion toward those around him, including his personal guards and confidants. He could sack anyone at any time. To what extent did Stalin's political terror develop? According to later historical materials, when Stalin suddenly fell ill, the people around him delayed medical assistance because they were afraid of taking responsibility. Of course, it is also possible that people like Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and Li Qiang wanted to see him take his last breath before calling a doctor. Why? Because they were afraid that if Stalin were saved, he would kill them all: "Why did you save me late? Why didn't you discover it the first time? Did you have bad intentions?" Kill them, behead them. So, let the Emperor have a smooth journey.
When the health of a ruler deteriorates, their paranoia and distrust of those around them reach extreme levels. They are faced with a crucial problem: what method can be used to determine who is truly loyal? You purge a batch of officials and replace them with new ones, only to find a few years later that these newly promoted minor officials are forming cliques. Do they harbor disloyalty toward you? Even if they don't, the ruler will imagine they do, and once he starts imagining it, you fall from grace. The most terrifying part is that in front of all officials, everyone only dares to report what the top leader wants to hear, making it increasingly difficult for the top leader to know the truth. For instance, when Stalin suddenly fell ill in March 1953, his death was not confirmed until March 5. This was due to various delays in medical treatment; his guards actually waited nearly a full day before daring to check on him, because without the leader's command, no one dared to knock on his door arbitrarily. How much fear and power calculation lay behind these delayed medical treatments still leaves room for debate, but a very persuasive explanation is this: the people around Stalin had already grown accustomed to waiting for his orders on everything. Today, Xi Jinping particularly emphasizes the "Two Whatevers," and when he himself lacks the capacity to decide during a crisis, his subordinates dare not take any rash actions without hearing a directive—leading to his demise. This is the most ironic aspect of a totalitarian state: a leader initially hopes everyone will obey him, but when he truly needs those around him to take initiative, these people lose normal, rational judgment out of fear of making mistakes.
Of course, I believe Xi Jinping and Stalin share an alarming question: if a political system relies excessively on the authority and personal prestige of its top leader without a credible power transition mechanism, the leader's age, physical condition, psychological state, and sense of political security may all affect the stability of the nation. Speaking of this, let us shift our perspective from Zhongnanhai back to ordinary Chinese citizens. Because Xi Jinping has recently been continuously emphasizing anti-corruption, while local government financial pressures in China are excessive and public livelihoods are heavily indebted—matters I need not elaborate on—these issues have not disappeared as a result. On October 10, CCP Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Li Zhong publicly stated that big data would be used to find those Little Pinks who failed to pay social security. This remark sparked strong backlash on the Chinese internet. Many people are worried: why is the social security fund insufficient now? Why do I have to pay more, why do I have to pay retroactively for past periods, and why are there even fines of one to three times the amount? We will not dwell on this economic problem here, as it has already been covered in previous episodes. Does the CCP Central Committee know that public reaction is massive and fierce? Yes, they know. But the person who made these remarks, Li Zhong, was promoted by Xi Jinping on October 22 to serve as the Standing Committee Member and Head of the Organization Department of the Liaoning Provincial Committee. Xi Jinping must feel immensely gratified—his big data AI can finally track down every single Chinese person. Even if missing children cannot be found, it doesn't matter, as long as the money is found.
There is also an even more absurd piece of news: on October 22, the Beijing Municipal Tax Service publicly disclosed on its website tax notices served to 21 natural persons. Therefore, I must emphasize once again: to all you Little Pinks, the ones frantically harvesting you are not us in Taiwan, nor the United States, but Zhongnanhai. Striking at Zhongnanhai is definitely faster and more effective than striking at Taiwan. The economic pressure in China's localities is likely already far more complex than what Beijing's propaganda portrays. In July this year, we also reported that the Changchun Municipal Government in Jilin Province publicly stated that our economy is facing unprecedented difficulties and challenges. As a result, this statement was removed just a few days later. Fast forward to the present month of October, and Xi Jinping has no intention of letting Changchun off the hook. On October 21, numerous Changchun officials suspected of corruption and bribery were placed under investigation. Among those officials is one whose name is Zuguo (Motherland). Zuguo is truly in trouble; Zuguo is finished! Little Pinks, hurry up and save Zuguo! If you were an official in Changchun today, facing a poor local economy where you know where the problem lies yet cannot solve it—because this is a structural problem, a problem of the central government, while the central government still demands that you continue to remit fiscal revenues upward—what can you do? If you actually report the problem upward to the central government, you might be questioned, accused of it being a personal problem of your local government. If you report only the good news and conceal the bad, you might be deemed disloyal to the Party and accused of lying due to someone else's political struggle or the central government's policies. Thus, no decision is safe. What is a decision that everyone ends up making? It is how to extend or delay the risk of being pursued by Xi Jinping for debts. The practice of layering on extra burdens level by level is something I believe Chinese friends all experienced during the pandemic, and it needs no further elaboration, right?
This brings us back to the most contradictory aspect of Xi Jinping: he wants all cadres to obey the CCP Central Committee, he wants officials to stop engaging in factional struggles, he wants to purge these corrupt officials who form cliques for personal gain, and he hopes the CCP Central Committee can truly become a utopia under his governance, while constantly emphasizing strict party discipline. Everyone, let's look at 2027, when the CCP will hold its 21st National Congress next year. Xi Jinping will be 74 years old. Whether he will continue to serve as General Secretary is currently unknown to everyone. Because at this time, if someone tries to prepare for succession too early, will they be seen as challenging Xi Jinping? Conversely, if all officials are afraid to discuss succession, when something really happens, who can smoothly take over? Will this power vacuum during the succession period create turmoil across the Taiwan Strait? This is what I mean by the real focus of the Fifth Plenary Session. The death of Stalin in 1953 eventually forced the Soviet leadership to redistribute power. Even though he had been in power for decades, he could not ensure that all political figures would act according to his original wishes after he was gone. So the question arises: has Xi Jinping realized that no matter how strong an individual's authority is, it cannot replace a long-functioning system?
Finally, let's return to Taiwan itself. Some Taiwanese feel that since so many CCP officials have been dismissed, the military has been purged, and Xi Jinping's health is constantly in question, does this mean the CCP is about to collapse? Does it mean that Taiwan is actually becoming safer? I think we should not be too optimistic. If the CCP suddenly collapses and disintegrates in a disorderly manner, rather than a gradual disintegration, it will definitely still be authoritarian, it will definitely still be like Russia. And the sudden, disorderly collapse of 1.4 billion people is not necessarily a good thing for Taiwan. Everyone wants to fight for that one position, and fighting will lead to chaos. To what extent will that chaos reach? Moreover, if internal pressure is truly increasing, the leader may not necessarily relax military and political pressure on Taiwan because of it. For us, what we care about most is whether, given Xi Jinping's age and health this year, he can make rational, non-emotional decisions that are not influenced by his physical condition. Is there anyone who dares to stand up and oppose him? Xi Jinping, I know your legs are hurting, take more medicine, and then let's discuss whether to attack Taiwan or do this or that, instead of, oh, here we go again, Tsai Kang-yung or Shen Po-yang are talking about attacking Taiwan—this can't happen, it can't be like this. A national leader cannot be like this, right? Recently, there is an even more outrageous thing: at the National Defense University of the CCP, students' rooms, electronic products, and even all wardrobes are being searched. If any circumvention of the Great Firewall is discovered, they will be immediately expelled from military service and their student status will be revoked. This shows how much the CCP fears the truth and the world of freedom of speech. However, paper cannot wrap up fire after all. The real problem Xi Jinping has to face is not who is going to betray you. If one day you have to hand over power, can the system you built actually allow others to succeed you? And do these seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee really dare to let you die? Do they really dare to take over? After taking over, will you die? This is also a problem. For example, if Cai Qi or Li Qiang takes over, and you, Xi Jinping, are not dead yet, you are just acting as the retired emperor, then I would rather keep you on life support until you are 150 years old. Because if you are gone, may I ask, can our prestige compare to yours and convince the public? It is the same as in the time of Zhu Yuanzhang. So, if you, Xi Jinping, are gone, OK, then we, the seven members of the Standing Committee, are all war criminals who are relatives, confidants, or family members of those who have been purged. We will be the first ghosts pushed to the guillotine. This is what I think is the Zhongnanhai crisis that deserves everyone's attention at the Fifth Plenary Session. That's all for today's video.
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I am Ba Jiong. See you next time. Bye.
Hu Chunhua
October 13th National Health Conference