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Huh? Xi Jinping is highly respected? Yu Maochun discusses the strange phenomenon of Xi Jinping 【Zhi Ding Lecture Hall Enlightenment Forum Yu Maochun】 EP243

1# · OP Author:余茂春 Published:2026-04-29 08:14 Replies:0 Views:57 Permalink:fanzei.net/d_7pw7z2

Yu Maochun discussed the gap between Xi Jinping’s domestic and international reputation and power on the program, pointing out that the outside claim that Xi Jinping is highly respected is more like a fictional legend. By analyzing the Winnie the Pooh incident, the Xiong’an New Area’s unfinished projects, the dynamic zero‑COVID policy and the White Paper Movement, economic slowdown, and internal purges, Yu Maochun argues that Xi Jinping’s rule relies on coercion rather than approval, and his power does not equate to genuine respect.

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Western commentators often portray Xi Jinping as a powerful and widely respected strategist, but this is more legend than fact. In the eyes of the Chinese people, Xi may be the most resented leader since Mao Zedong; even the disappearance of Winnie the Pooh online shows that Xi’s power comes from coercion, not genuine popular approval.

Welcome to the Enlightenment Forum of Zhi Ding Lecture Hall, I am Yu Maochun. When a legend becomes fact, print the legend. This is a classic line from the Western classic film "Twin Tigers Slaying the Dragon," a memorable quote but not a life lesson. Yet, whenever Xi Jinping is discussed, many Western commentators seem to do exactly that. We are told that Xi is widely respected at home, a strong and visionary strategist who not only holds power but also earns admiration. This is a concise and reassuring narrative, but a closer look reveals it is more legend than fact. Indeed, Xi has concentrated power in his own hands, but saying he has earned respect is questionable.

Another apt analogy comes from the political satire film "Govern by Doing Nothing," featuring Qian Si Gardner. In the film he is actually a simple‑minded person mistakenly taken for a deep thinker; his vague and stale remarks are interpreted by the elite as profound wisdom. This illusion persists because people expect depth and thus perceive depth. The comparison is not perfect, but it highlights a key point: the claim that Xi is highly respected is repeatedly asserted yet rarely substantiated. Within China, criticism of Xi must be indirect, whereas outside China the reality can be stated more bluntly. Xi may be the most privately resented and disliked Chinese leader since Mao Zedong; among China’s massive netizen slang, people often mock him obliquely, portraying him as a clown obsessed with vanity and power.

The "Winnie the Pooh" incident aptly illustrates this phenomenon: Chinese netizens use this cartoon character as satire, indirectly mocking Xi Jinping, and the state apparatus systematically deletes related content. This reaction explains everything: a system truly confident in its leader would not need to censor a cartoon character; if a system feels compelled to do so, it reveals another layer of sensitivity and insecurity. Despite pervasive censorship, satire persists, hidden in wordplay, metaphor, and fleeting online comments that appear and disappear at a speed almost matching that of the censors.

When we examine Xi Jinping's record, this undercurrent becomes clearer. Take the Xiong'an New Area, one of Xi's signature projects—a model city built on a swamp outside Beijing. Promoted as a future metropolis costing hundreds of billions of dollars, years later it remains empty, unable to attract residents and lacking genuine economic vitality. Once packaged as a visionary plan, it now resembles a state‑driven vanity project, derided in China as a "ghost city" that symbolizes Xi's vanity and absurdity rather than practical development. The huge gap between ideal and reality has turned it into a quiet yet sharp national joke, repeatedly referenced in millions of online posts and subtle, mocking banter.

Next is the dynamic zero‑COVID policy, perhaps the most far‑reaching and self‑destructive decision of Xi's tenure. Driven by a rigid insistence on absolute party control, the policy imposed massive lockdowns, disrupted daily life, and incurred heavy economic costs. Entire cities were sealed off, supply chains broke, public anger surged, and ultimately the backlash evolved into the White Paper Movement. This rare nationwide protest saw citizens holding blank sheets of paper to symbolize censored speech. Though brief, the movement was significant as a direct expression of public fury that forced a sudden and chaotic policy reversal. In popular discourse, this episode exposed Xi's villainous nature and his fragility, showing that he only displayed policy‑adjusting incompetence when pressure became unbearable.

Xi's broader governance style has also produced equally stark economic consequences. China's once‑vibrant growth model has visibly slowed under tightening ideological control. The real‑estate sector, long the backbone of the economy, has now collapsed, with many large developers falling due to debt. Local government financing is strained, youth unemployment has risen to alarming levels, and official data has become increasingly opaque. Meanwhile, consumer confidence has plummeted, capital is fleeing at a staggering rate, and the exodus of skilled talent is accelerating as more people seek opportunities abroad. These are not the hallmarks of a leader who inspires confidence or respect; rather, they reflect uncertainty and shattered fantasies.

Even within the political system, Xi's reliance on purges further highlights the issue. The anti‑corruption campaign and internal purges have removed hundreds of thousands of officials; although framed as disciplinary rectification, these Stalinist‑style cleansings foster fear rather than loyalty. A leader who must constantly eliminate rivals does not demonstrate a stable, confident authority.

Overall, these phenomena tell a consistent story: grand plans fail to materialize, policy drives are over‑exerted, and collapse follows. Under tighter control, economic vitality erodes, and political stability rests on coercion rather than popular legitimacy. This does not deny that Xi wields power—his position is indeed solid, and his concentration of authority is unprecedented in decades. However, power and respect are not the same; power can be imposed, but respect must be earned. This explains why the claim that Xi is widely respected now sounds less like observation and more like a psychological projection. It reflects an assumption that centralization equals competence and longevity equals legitimacy, whereas the underlying reality is far more complex and far less dignified.

Like the legend in a western film, or the illusion surrounding Quincy Gardner in "Wu Wei Er Zhi," this narrative persists because it is convenient; it simplifies a complex and unsettling fact. A leader can wield massive power yet be widely resented, can occupy a dominant position yet lack security, can demand obedience yet fail to earn admiration and respect. Before repeating this legend again, it may be worth asking a simple question: what we see, is it genuine respect or merely forced imitation? History will ultimately answer such questions, and when the answer emerges, it rarely sides with the legend.

Key events timeline · Selected related nodes
2022-11
China Erupts in White Paper Movement Against Zero-COVID Policy
Dissatisfied with the long-term, strict dynamic zero-COVID lockdown policies, people across China launched rare nationwide protests. Demonstrators held up blank sheets of paper to symbolize censorship, eventually forcing the authorities to make a sudden and chaotic reversal of their pandemic control policies.
Related topics Xi Jinping Miles Yu
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