Xi Jinping Has Entered the Dark Governance Era! How Many Chances Does Publicly Challenging the Entire CCP System Have? “Real China”

In this episode of "Real China," host Hu Liren analyzed the current state of Xi Jinping entering a "dark governance era." He pointed out that at the CCP's 105th anniversary celebration, Xi heavily relied on the Central Guard Bureau and the Beijing Garrison troops to ensure his own safety, showing his distrust of internal systems. Hu Liren believes Xi's rule has evolved into "dark governance," and any dissent will be severely suppressed. The program also mentioned that many CCP veterans, red second-generation and military second-generation members have become estranged from Xi, yet Xi continues to win over the military through rewards and divide-and-conquer tactics, attempting to consolidate the "Xi family dynasty" rule. The host predicts that July and August will be critical periods when Xi faces major challenges, and the verdict of the Zhang Xiaoxia case may become a significant turning point.

Video link:

Full text:

Hi, everyone! The first live broadcast starts today. These past two days, I’ve seen many people online commenting on the Chinese Communist Party’s 105th anniversary celebration, with various performances and activities, right? As you can see, these are very real scenes online; the videos and images released by the CCP show the venue filled with many young guards from the Central Guard Bureau. These guards belong to the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, the group overseen by Cai Qi. These armed forces are the closest to Xi Jinping in Zhongnanhai and are actually controlled personally by Xi Jinping.

In Beijing, the whole system has about 50,000 personnel, known as the garrison troops, i.e., the Beijing garrison. This garrison is now controlled by the CCP and has become a system that falls under the Central Guard Bureau’s jurisdiction, though the units have different designations. Xi Jinping now relies on this to protect his own safety, his family’s safety, and the safety of his entire team.

Look, a country has reached this point, right? This time, the venue held about three thousand people. In the two rows of the corridor and the surrounding area, you can see Central Guard Bureau personnel. Roughly fifty on one side, a hundred on the other, four rows in total, about two hundred people. That two hundred does not even count the many other Central Guard Bureau members seated throughout the venue. These people are not in uniform; they are placed among the officials. I recognized about three people in the venue—three acquaintances—inside this CCP venue.

One of them told me that the venue had strict security checks, and everyone inside were staff from various ministries, i.e., CCP officials, and not everyone could enter; they had to be screened. Those screened are considered the safest people by Xi Jinping, posing no threat to him. Yet Xi still needs so many guards from the Central Guard Bureau to protect him. He has already survived multiple assassination attempts. Not long ago, I mentioned that he had said this. So now Xi’s security is extremely strict, completely different from the Mao, Deng, Jiang, or Hu eras. Xi is now constantly anxious.

What you see, we don’t need to over‑analyze; just look at the facts. Has the Communist Party ever had such a situation at its meetings before? No. When did this start? The first time was with the constitutional amendment. That amendment session was filled with Central Guard Bureau personnel because Xi feared rebellion or slogans being shouted. Once, during a discussion on the Taiwan issue, someone suddenly stood up and spoke out. The video spread online quickly, and the person was immediately seized and disappeared.

Last year I also mentioned an incident at Zhongnanhai where a forty‑something official suddenly went mad, demanding Xi step down and calling for the overthrow of the dictator. Everyone in that area heard it. The person was caught on the spot and taken away. These people act without regard for their own safety, already mentally broken. Under Xi’s control, China has become a dark country where you are not allowed any independent thought. If you voice a different opinion, even a slight one, you will be immediately arrested. Within the Party, it is extremely strict, so everyone is very careful, fearing that their thoughts, actions, or words might not align with the Party line.

In such a situation, you may sometimes unintentionally show some dissatisfaction with Xi and with the current CCP. If these words are discovered, you will be removed immediately, possibly even made to disappear. This is the present reality.

Look at the situation now. This time there is still a bit left at the venue, a bit left. All the old senior cadres, all the senior cadres—I’m talking about the Hu‑Wen era. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s era isn’t far off, just about ten‑plus years. These seniors, the older ones, are only in their seventies, eighties, or nineties, and some are perfectly healthy, right? You see, this time Wen Jiabao didn’t even attend the event. Why didn’t he attend? Everyone has turned Xi Jinping into a target of opposition. First, some of the older people don’t want to. If you call Xi down, they don’t want to go. Some have already turned against Xi. Now the entire CCP bureaucratic system, these senior cadres, are all turning against the CCP and against Xi. The whole CCP under Xi is now being challenged. It has become a situation where Xi uses force, dark governance. Dark governance isn’t only about current CCP officials, but also about those old officials, retired officials. As long as you have a different mindset, he will immediately grab you. Now, what about those seniors? Many have already left Beijing, gone to a place to recuperate. Those recuperation places are often in areas not controlled by Xi, right? These people now don’t know their own future fate. They don’t know what will happen to them. But Xi might one day launch a massive purge and eliminate them. Now we are watching how the red‑second‑generation and military‑second‑generation confront Xi. I think the earlier the action, the better. If these red‑second‑generation and military‑second‑generation keep going like this, Xi may continuously dismantle these forces. After all, he is still the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the President, the Party Chairman, and still has some influence. Within the CCP, many people act purely on self‑interest, following whoever offers them benefits. They have no principle, no sense of right and wrong. Xi’s current opponents, although they only control the Central Military Commission or the Beijing garrison units, are being constantly divided by Xi, who also has counter‑measures. So internal CCP conflicts are becoming more intense and increasingly public. These contradictions have become public. You can imagine that by the 105th anniversary, those senior cadres should already have appeared. According to the CCP’s usual practice, major anniversaries—five‑year, ten‑year, fifteen‑year, twenty‑year—are big events, at least major events. In such circumstances, these senior cadres should all appear on stage.

Xi Jinping still has a point in this: he continuously divides the military. You see, there was a news item in the past two days where Xi praised many troops and soldiers, listing a long string of names, all from various units. After the units reported them, he now tries to win the hearts of the people and the military, to bring these troops into his fold. He himself has no such presence in the troops. Look, let me show you, you’ll understand. There is a report from the Central Military Commission praising the entire army. Yesterday, the Central Military Commission issued a notice commending outstanding Communist Party members, grassroots Party organizations, and outstanding Party workers across the army. He now wants to buy off these people, buy off the grassroots. He uses these commendations as a political bargaining chip, which he can continuously use to elevate you. Look at the honor roll; the names are all there. The first name is from Xinjiang, apparently a Xinjiang person. Central Military Commission Training Management Department’s Anuer, Staff Department’s Zhong Lei, Eastern Theater Command Joint Staff Department’s Zhong Lei—many names, a long list, all on this. He rewarded many people; those rewarded are exactly the ones Xi is constantly buying off. Once you get a reward, you can go to Beijing. After arriving in Beijing, there’s another commendation, and then he keeps giving you power, giving you benefits, and disperses these people to various units across the country. That’s what’s happening now. Xi is also doing this, secretly inserting these people into various units. But once you get close to Xi and his circle, you’re often isolated within the troops. Now everyone is saying, I think from now until August, many incidents may erupt inside the military. The most pressing issue now is the suffering of the Chinese people. I keep saying the greatest hardship is for the ordinary citizens. Since Xi started this, everything is about Xi. Look at these articles; they’re all about Xi. He controls the entire media, flooding it daily with dozens of news pieces, none of which are about national construction or economic development—none at all. All are about the General Secretary bragging. Xi now governs by bragging, by dark governance. He relies on this, and everyone knows it. So the emergence of a dictator—these so‑called elders, the political veterans—what are they now? It’s retribution. They hold up the Party’s plaque, thinking that as long as the economy improves, the country will be fine. They don’t understand, they lack political awareness and vigilance. They are intoxicated by the past decades of booming economic growth. They never imagined their old age would be trapped like this, not even knowing their own fate. These elders don’t know their fate. The ones truly protecting them are the second‑generation military and revolutionary families. Xi will eventually eliminate them. As long as he pursues the Xi family dynasty, these people will be eliminated. Xi has never abandoned the idea of a Xi family dynasty. He keeps promoting Yan’an cave dwellings and other things, which are essentially mind‑altering drugs for the second‑generation military and revolutionary families, for the whole CCP system. What is his ultimate goal? Because Xi has offended so many within the system, he can’t let anyone replace him; only his own people, those with the surname Xi, can secure his future path and his life, since everyone now wants to settle scores with him.

So, the Communist Party has now reached this point. Now, the whole world wants to settle accounts with it. Without Xi Jinping, it is now dark and has no way forward; the more it goes, the narrower the path becomes, and all the friends around have disappeared, all gone. It is already July, and this month is a major event, very likely. Now, within the Party, that is, the Central Committee, many people are spreading rumors that the case of Zhang Youxia will be decided—how will it be decided? Up to now, Zhang Youxia has only issued a notice, and later there has been no information related to Zhang Youxia at all. Zhang Youxia is now a focal point, a focal point. The focus is his life and death, which also represents the life and death of Xi Jinping, representing the survival of the second-generation military and red families. This is the current situation of the CCP, so Zhang Youxia has become a focal figure. Although he was arrested, he became a focus. So in July, we will see many major tremors within the CCP, many internal shocks. Now Xi Jinping controls the media side, actually two parts: one is the media, because all these major media are in Beijing, so they are under his control; the second is the Beijing garrison, fifty thousand troops he controls. He cannot control everything else; many people are rebelling, he cannot even leave Beijing. He went to a place like Shandong once, a nearby place in Dezhou, very close, right? Dezhou is known for its roast chicken, a very close area, about three hours from Shandong to Beijing, roughly three hours, very quick. I am very familiar with that area. So, those of us who pay attention to the CCP’s political situation now watch July and August as a big crisis for Xi, I estimate he will not get through this hurdle; it will be very difficult. The more he boasts, the more we must remember, when you watch CCP news and see Xi Jinping praised every day as great, that is actually his most dangerous time. The most dangerous is when he constantly boasts on the streets like a fool. I am the boss, I am the boss, beating my chest every day. I am the boss, but everyone knows he is not the boss, everyone knows this person is a fool, that he isn’t even wearing underwear, not even shorts, he has reached this point. He does this every day, the emperor’s new clothes, that is the emperor’s. Xi now faces this; his era is this era. He has come to this point, fighting for his own life, and he has put pressure on his entire family, his Zhejiang corps, all the people he brought from Fujian and Zhejiang; these people will all be eliminated, all will be cleared. Even Peng Liyuan’s family is his bargaining chip, his bet. If this chip flips, everything ends, the whole country changes completely. This is what Xi is facing now. Okay, that’s the topic I’ll discuss with you all, that’s all, everyone is paying attention, watching the news every day, seeing what’s happening now. The CCP can be described like this: up to now, big events could happen anywhere at any time. The more he boasts, the more he thinks he is great and safe, at this point it is easy for a major incident to occur. Thank you all for watching, see you in the next program.

The host is Hu Liren, program "Real China". Common speech recognition errors have been corrected: "狐狸人"→Hu Liren; "名人、民营"→democracy activists; "川布"→Trump; "博命"→fight for life; "连法轮功、念法轮功"→practice Falun Gong; "出神、错神、出城"→scum; "活在器官"→organ harvesting; "金专、精装国家"→BRICS; "异性接班人"→different-surname successor; "国务员"→State Council; "行" in the context of "Western, Chinese awake or not"→awake.