Under Xi Jinping’s Dictatorial Rule, the CCP’s Major Military Theater Commands Are Increasingly Likely to Declare Independence!

This episode was hosted by Huli, analyzing the current situation where the five major military theaters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (such as the Northern and Western Theater Commands) and the Central Military Commission are gradually developing fractures and opposition under Xi Jinping's authoritarian rule and ongoing party purges. The episode points out that military generals in the major theater commands refuse to travel to Beijing, effectively forming de facto independent theater commands and a state of warlord fragmentation. It also discusses the dissatisfaction within the military and political circles toward Xi Jinping, the inside story of the Zhang Youxia case, and the crisis of internal division and rapid collapse facing the CCP regime.

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Xi Jinping recently published an article in the Qiushi magazine, which was mainly targeted at people in political circles, while he has basically purged all those people in the military. Have you all noticed that the people he currently arrests in the military are often not involved with the major theater commands? Currently, the CCP has five major theater commands—the Northeast, Southeast, Northwest, Central, and other major theater commands—and Xi Jinping has hardly touched the military generals in any of them. Those he has targeted are all people and officials from the Central Military Commission, such as Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Li Shangfu, and others whom everyone has heard of. In other words, looking back, Xi Jinping still dares not touch the major theater commands to this day.

I once mentioned something: based on my understanding, Xi Jinping currently has absolutely no ability to control the Northern Theater Command and the Western Theater Command. Now for about half a year to nearly a year, Xi Jinping has not left Beijing. Except for once going to North Korea, coming to the United States, going to India, and going to Central Asia, have you all noticed that he hasn't been to any other place in China? He has been holed up in Beijing all this time, having gone to a very desolate place in Dezhou, Shandong in the first half of this year. He was in Guangzhou around October and November 1st of last year, and after coming back from there, he hasn't been anywhere else. For nearly a year—about ten months—he has not dared to go to other parts of China for fear of changes.

During this time, Beijing has strengthened its defenses, and now whenever there is any unusual military movement in other theater commands, Xi Jinping gets extremely nervous. In nearly a year, the Central Military Commission has not convened a meeting in Beijing for senior generals from the major theater commands, which means he is no longer able to summon them. The people and generals in the theater commands now refuse to travel to Beijing, because once they go to Beijing, there is a high possibility they might be arrested. Therefore, no one is traveling to Beijing now, and everyone remains in this state of strategic equilibrium. In other words, theoretically speaking, the Northern Theater Command and the Western Theater Command have now almost formed independent theater commands, meaning they no longer have much to do with the Central Military Commission. They still cooperate on some routine military administrative matters, but in military affairs, no one is cooperating anymore: you mind your business, and I mind mine. To this day, they have not announced their separation from the Central Military Commission, but this does not mean it will not happen in the future.

News has emerged that there are now significant rifts between the Eastern Theater Command, the Southern Theater Command, and Xi Jinping, with many generals holding major disagreements. These generals do not fear Xi Jinping; their relationships are intricate and complex. Once you offend one person, you might be offending a whole group. Furthermore, these individuals are dissatisfied with the old generals who were arrested by the Central Military Commission in recent years. However, up to this point, there has been no public falling out with Xi Jinping; everyone is acting in their own interest, and Xi Jinping has not taken any other significant measures against them. This is the current strategic balance between them. As Xi Jinping's crackdown in various administrative and political sectors intensifies, rumors from Beijing suggest that it is highly likely that one of the major theater commands may soon announce its secession from the central government, effectively breaking with Xi Jinping directly.

Everyone is now fearful of Xi Jinping's suppression; this is true for the Chinese public, and it is equally true for political figures across the country. For example, in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan, the Party Secretary of Chongqing was moved against the day before yesterday, and the former mayor of Chengdu was moved against yesterday; these people had already retired but were ultimately taken down. Under these circumstances, many within the CCP have family members, brothers, and sisters in both the military and political spheres. If one theater command were to declare independence, it is highly likely that other major theater commands would follow suit, leaving Xi Jinping as a commander with no troops. Zhang Youxia has not visited any theater commands during this period; since taking office, he has almost exclusively stayed in Beijing. It is understandable that Xi Jinping does not visit the theater commands as he must remain in Beijing to oversee the situation, but the fact that Zhang Youxia has not visited other places is very suspicious, and the outside world is speculating about it.

Now, regarding the possibility of moving against Xi Jinping, the likelihood of political figures doing so is extremely low because they lack real power and control over the military. A coup requires an army—at least thousands or tens of thousands of troops—which the political sector does not have. This possibility only exists for the major military regions and theater commands, which might have the capability to mobilize troops to head north or enter Beijing directly to control the situation. From the perspective of the domestic public, including those in political and military circles, the inner capacity to challenge Xi Jinping is fully present. Xi Jinping has completely lost popular support; a single call would be met with widespread response, but currently, no one is taking the lead to challenge his dictatorship. The personnel of the Central Guard Bureau have no ability to militarily challenge the major theater commands. The combat capability of the theater commands is extremely strong, possessing heavy weapons, armored vehicles, tanks, and aircraft, whereas the Central Guard Bureau is not equipped with these; they are only equipped with light weapons and can only perform defensive tasks, lacking true combat power. The real combat power lies with the major theater commands. Among the navy, army, and air force, while the navy may not necessarily participate, the combat capabilities of the air force and the army are very strong. The forces are completely mismatched; the Central Guard Bureau has only tens of thousands of personnel, while a theater command could mobilize one hundred thousand troops. Under these circumstances, Xi Jinping is also very worried.

Therefore, he has consistently used anti-corruption as a pretext to arrest officials, but those in the military know very well that when this fire spreads, it will eventually reach them. In the ten-plus years since Xi Jinping took office, nearly two hundred generals have been taken down. There is another fuse: how he decides to sentence Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, especially Zhang Youxia. Zhang Youxia has now been pushed to the forefront and has entered the military court of the Central Military Commission. The crime for which Zhang Youxia was last announced is actually a capital offense; there is no possibility of survival, at the very least it is a suspended death sentence, for challenging the system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission assuming overall responsibility. Xi Jinping has made it very clear that Zhang Youxia is challenging his authority. Of course, other corruption charges and the buying and selling of offices are supplementary; his primary crime is challenging the Central Military Commission and undermining the system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission assuming overall responsibility.

Now it depends on whether any of the major theater commands might suddenly announce the independence of a certain unit and break away from the Central Military Commission, which would lead to a state of warlordism. That is why I have always said that if the Communist Party falls in the future, this country will inevitably split; only through division will this country be safe. If you talk about further independence or unification, the challenge Xi Jinping is facing now—ah! You say that Xi Jinping now wants to unify Taiwan, it sounds like a joke, because he cannot even handle the people within his current territorial scope, and they have already developed huge rifts. Look at how he cannot solve the Xinjiang issue or the Tibet issue; it is all through a posture of forceful suppression.

A couple of days ago, I was chatting with an official from Xinjiang. He is an official in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and a second-generation military dependent whose parents were Sichuanese drafted into Xinjiang in the 1950s, having previously served as soldiers in Sichuan. Later, they participated in the Sino-Indian conflict of that era and subsequently stayed behind in the Corps. This friend of mine was born after the 1960s and has just retired. He tells me now that these people in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps are extremely dissatisfied with Xi Jinping. Privately, people are communicating with each other, and these retired individuals entirely support Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up, as they are also its beneficiaries. However, ever since Xi Jinping came to power, they have seen the entire country undergo a total, destructive collapse of the economy, finance, and public morale, and now even the Party spirit has collapsed, leaving everyone distrustful of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Administratively, the relationship between the Corps and the central authorities still involves subordination and compliance, but in reality, they have already detached from each other. The possibility that Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission could mobilize troops to suppress ordinary people is almost nonexistent. Of course, the possibility of stability maintenance remains, but if the entire theater of operations falls into chaos, the entire Xinjiang Military District might declare independence in the future, or the various military branches of the entire Western Theater Command might declare independence—this possibility is very high. These people already detest Xi Jinping to the core, along with his Fujian faction and Zhejiang faction, and they utterly look down on his current cabinet, including Li Qiang, Chen Wenqing, and Cai Qi.

Inside the CCP, some huge divisions have actually arisen around Xi Jinping as well. An acquaintance of mine belongs to the Fujian faction and was by Xi Jinping's side. Although this person is no longer by his side, they were once within his core team and hold the position of alternate member of the CCP Central Committee. There are over one hundred alternate members of the Central Committee and around two hundred full members, meaning this person is among the roughly three hundred people within the entire CCP group. He told me very tactfully that nowadays everyone is distancing themselves from Xi as much as possible; people do not view Xi favorably, and in the event that Xi falls from power, these individuals would all face political reckoning. Many people are now trying their best to politically isolate themselves from Xi Jinping. In the beginning, these individuals were relatively supportive of Xi, from the constitutional amendment in 2018 until 2020. In the future, I will let everyone know this person's name at an appropriate time. This person used to be like a younger brother to me, and is now a ministerial-level official.

Everyone is sitting on the sidelines watching the tigers fight, waiting for the ultimate outcome of the CCP. I anticipate that a major event will occur within the CCP in these few months. The more intensive Xi Jinping's actions are within the Party, and the more severe his Party purge and cleansing campaigns, the stronger the backlash will be. Once the backlash reaches the military theaters, it is very likely that people within the troops will easily act on impulse, and once they act on impulse, the situation will become irrecoverable. It is very likely to trigger a widespread response where if the various theater commands declare independence, Xi Jinping will wish he had dug a hole to bury himself in; all his blueprints over the past decade will completely go up in smoke. The day these theater command personnel turn against him will be when his doomsday truly arrives, and it will arrive rapidly—perhaps within a few days he will completely collapse, just like Mao Zedong back in the day. Mao Zedong died in September, and in October the Gang of Four was instantly taken down. In CCP politics, those engaged in politics have their heads tied to their waistbands; today it is either you die or I survive.

This is the current state of Xi Jinping, which makes him extremely dangerous. Right now, he can only tell everyone that he controls the personnel of the Central Security Bureau and those in the outer circles. Since Xi Jinping returned to Beijing from Guangzhou on November 1 of last year, he has not visited any other place except for a single trip to Dezhou—which is Peng Liyuan's base—and once to Beidaihe for a meeting. At that time, a military unit came to Beidaihe from the Northern Theater Command, very close from Shenyang, and Xi Jinping had to flee back overnight. Beidaihe experienced a firefight at that time; it is possible Beidaihe was conducting arrests, and a small-scale firefight broke out between military units, causing Xi Jinping's motorcade to flee back to Beijing overnight. Therefore, people should not be fooled by Xi Jinping wearing thick clothes when he goes out; in reality, he is wearing layers of bulletproof gear and is himself extremely terrified. When brawling breaks out between people, you never know who will die, as humans are very fragile. The inside of the CCP is exactly the same; he is currently showing off his might because he controls the media, and what the outside world learns is only the news controlled by the CCP media, but deep inside the CCP it is a life-or-death struggle for everyone, and no one knows what is coming. We can only analyze the fragments from the information that leaks out—information leaked by people from Beijing, the military, and political circles—and draw our conclusions.

However, everyone now agrees that Xi Jinping will definitely not be able to continue in the next term. The Fifth Plenary Session, this 20th Central Committee's Fifth Plenary Session, is very likely to have major incidents. Many high-ranking military officials and theater command leaders will likely refuse to attend, feigning illness. Xi Jinping also knows he cannot handle these people. If you tell the Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee to come for a visit, he will fly over immediately, but if you ask these generals from the Western Theater Command to come to Beijing, Xi Jinping cannot control them. In their own regions, they are like they are at home, like warlords; their subordinates are all their cronies, all people they promoted. The military is completely different from the political sphere. The Zhang Youxia incident should have been announced long ago; he was arrested last December and it was announced in January. Just a while ago, they started talking about convicting Zhang Youxia, but in fact, there was nothing. Zhang Youxia went on a hunger strike in Langfang at that time, and was later locked up in a place north of Beijing, essentially to let him 'recuperate.' It was initially thought that Zhang Youxia might be spared, but then his case was suddenly announced, with the handling of the Zhang Youxia incident being released the night before Xi Jinping came to the United States, though it was not formally characterized.