Xi Jinping Losing Power and Stepping Down Next Year! Personally Ending the 'Top Leader' Status, Abolishing the 'Iron Hat King' Immunity for CCP Elders? Beijing Split and Coup Imminent, Exclusive Signals from the Fifth Plenary Session

The video discusses the 17,000-word document released by the 20th CCP Central Committee Fifth Plenary Session, analyzing its contents regarding the prohibition of arbitrary rule, the ban on top leaders demanding personal authority, and the mention of untouchable elites ("iron-cap princes"). It refutes the interpretation by some netizens that Xi Jinping has been stripped of power or faces a coup and removal, pointing out that the document was personally drafted by Xi Jinping, who repeatedly emphasized supporting his core status. This reflects the CCP's intention to further tighten control over local officials and emerging tech enterprises, while warning Taiwan not to lower its guard due to misjudgments of internal CCP struggles.

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Over the past few days, another heavy-hitting news story has come out: did Xi Jinping personally put an end to his official writings, and is Taiwan saved? Is China heading toward a new reform, opening-up, and economic takeoff? This is how many people have interpreted it, but is that really the case, or is this just another version of Zhongnanhai bed-under-the-bed gossip? Xi Jinping has reportedly been overthrown in a coup 730 times a year—twice a day. Today's show is very fascinating. On the exact same day mandatory social security contributions were enforced—November 1st—the CCP state media Xinhua News Agency suddenly released a major document over 17,000 words long. Surprisingly, it demands that CCP members not engage in arbitrary rule, not practice patriarchal hierarchy, not replace collective decision-making with individual opinions, and there is even a striking sentence stating that it is prohibited to demand the maintenance of a top leader's personal authority at every level. This is huge! Doesn't the implication here, given that the CCP's top leader is Xi Jinping, mean that Xi Jinping's power has been stripped away?

However, based on my own understanding, including the drafting process personally announced by Xi Jinping and after reading all of these documents, I found something even more absurd. What some netizens interpreted—or rather took out of context—as an anti-Xi manifesto actually had Xi Jinping himself serving as the head of the drafting group! Furthermore, not only does the document fail to abolish Xi Jinping's power, but it also explicitly requires the entire party to continue upholding his core status. So is Xi Jinping opposing Xi Jinping, or are people intentionally misinterpreting the CCP's political documents backward to spin a narrative of fighting Xi? Although the phrasing like the "2442"—referring to the "two upholds"—does not appear this time, this document demanding restraints on top leaders contains 18 instances of statements upholding Xi Jinping as the core and helmsman. So what does this seemingly contradictory document mean, which on one hand says not to uphold the top leader, but on the other hand mentions upholding Xi Jinping over a dozen times?

Let's first look at how this matter happened. From October 26 to 29, the CCP held the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, which is the fifth meeting. The most important decision this time was the persistent promotion of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party. It required Party committee secretaries at all levels and provincial secretaries to respect different opinions, avoid arbitrary decision-making by a single person, and not alter collective decisions without authorization. Which collective does this collective refer to? The central leadership in Beijing. Furthermore, lower-level cadres cannot be required to uphold their personal dignity. The document also stipulates that when major divergences arise on significant issues, decisions must not be forced. If you were to cover up the words "the CCP," at first glance you might think it was some democratic country promoting a system of separation of powers, right? The problem, however, is that these very words were drafted and written by Xi Jinping himself. Consequently, some people began to deduce whether Xi Jinping had suffered a counterattack or purge from within the Party. At first glance, it seems as though Xi Jinping has compromised. But how could Xi Jinping possibly limit his own power? Therefore, there must definitely be conditions attached to an exchange; Xi Jinping must have accepted a compromise, right? Perhaps it was exchanged for you stepping down safely next year—meaning that after you step down, we won't go after you, nor will we go after the six members of the Standing Committee, right? But the core of the problem lies right here. I want to ask: who currently possesses more power than Zhang Youxia and others, someone capable of staging a coup or holding the command of the gun to force Xi Jinping's hand? Even Zhang Youxia has fallen; who has ever surpassed him or could stand shoulder to shoulder with him? Although the CCP has always propagated that the Party commands the gun, the reality is quite the opposite. In their later years, even without the titles of state president or party chairman, Mao Zedong and Deng小平 did not relinquish power over the Central Military Commission. Therefore, the Communist Party—or rather, this place called China—has always operated on the gun commanding the Party, the gun commanding the state.

Although quite a few people within the military system are indeed dissatisfied with Xi Jinping due to events involving Zhang Youxia and the Rocket Force, and while Xi Jinping doesn't quite trust military personnel—at least the majority of them—why is it that this time only Zhang Shengmin was promoted to the Politburo, while the positions for more than thirty key military officers across various theater commands remain vacant? And though military-affiliated personnel are dissatisfied with Xi Jinping, why do they not dare to actually launch a rebellion? You must understand that most people, especially Communist Party members, support whoever is winning, regardless of any lingering dissatisfaction in their hearts, right? First of all, we need to understand who the "top leader" in this CCP document actually refers to. Does it refer to Xi Jinping? Within the Communist Party organization, "top leader" is actually a very common title. A provincial Party secretary is the top leader in the province; a municipal Party secretary is the top leader in the city; a county Party secretary is the top leader in the county. From a national perspective, provincial governors and city mayors are also top leaders. For instance, as you all know, companies have Party branches, and the top leader there politically is not necessarily the boss. Even schools in China have Party committee secretaries, and hospitals have hospital secretaries. Simply put, throughout the entire Communist Party organization, there are "top leaders" of that region everywhere. Looking further into this article, we discover what the CCP emphasizes: superiors interviewing the top leaders of lower levels, and the lower-level top leaders having to personally report to the Party Central Committee on how they supervise the top leaders further below them—such as how the provincial top leader supervises the municipal top leader. Therefore, everyone, the crux of this system is actually not to let the people of the entire country supervise Xi Jinping together, but rather to allow the entire organization of the Communist Party, from top to bottom and across all levels of cadre leadership, to manage things more strictly, closely revolving around the core values of Xi Jinping and the Party Central Committee. You must read this article clearly and thoroughly; do not take things out of context and read just one piece concluding that Xi Jinping is facing a coup and about to fall from power.

Think about it: if a certain provincial Party secretary has operated locally for over a dozen or twenty years, even if he retires, passing the torch to his descendants, with all important cadres having been promoted by him—where local enterprises, banks, factions, and finance are also promoted by him, where the public security system must listen to him, and where other officials seeking promotion must look to the face of that provincial godfather behind the scenes, a local emperor, right? Xi Jinping has always felt that China's poor economy is partly caused by your corruption and malfeasance. To put it another way, for Xi Jinping, the most troublesome thing is not that lower-level officials lack power, but that their power might become so great that they do not need to listen to the Party Central Committee, forming their own network of connections and potentially competing in the future for the leadership lineup of the state presidency. From what examples can you see this? The downfall of Huang Qifan makes this evident. Xi Jinping is purging all the old connection systems under the former top leaders; a great many provincial governors and provincial Party secretaries who were top leaders have fallen this year, right? If you don't believe it, let's look directly at the most fascinating contradiction in this document. The front part says that top leaders cannot demand the maintenance of personal authority, but what does the second part of the same document write? It demands that all Party members resolutely uphold Xi Jinping's core leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the entire Party, remaining consistent with the Party Central Committee centered on Xi Jinping ideologically, politically, and in action. The local provincial Party secretary cannot demand that his subordinates uphold his own rights and interests, but the entire Party—including that provincial Party secretary—must fully support the supreme core position of Xi Jinping. I am not making this up randomly; these two statements are written in the exact same document. Some people saw the former sentence and excitedly claimed that Xi Jinping's power had been revoked, only for you to flip further ahead and find that Xi Jinping's core status was mentioned yet another 18 times.

So, assuming the anti-Xi faction really succeeded in forcing him out, did they forget to delete these 18 most important points? The reason is quite simple. Imagine if Zhu Yuanzhang told you today, 'You meritorious officials are all very capable, but from now on, you are not allowed to protect the top leader,' and he doesn't even clarify what he means by 'top leader'—would you really believe him? I used to be able to criticize Zhu Yuanzhang; would you dare to criticize him? Mao Zedong also once said that people should be allowed to speak out freely and criticize him. But what happened? A bunch of over 500,000 or 300,000 naive people actually criticized Mao. And what was the outcome? A new wave of political purges; they were all labeled as extreme rightists, all removed from their posts, and subjected to mass slaughter. Therefore, never believe someone in power when they tell you, 'I want to hear your opinions.' Of course, if you have no power, it might be fine, but if you have any potential for development or are competing with him or his faction for supreme power, you must never tell him the truth. Because as soon as you do, he knows you are a thorn in his side, that you will compete with him in the future, and he will seize upon this point to eliminate you before you gain any influence. Democratic countries are the same, it's just that they don't have political struggles as severe as dictatorships that lead to people's deaths. Of course, from the CCP's own logic, they would tell you that protecting the core status of Xi Jinping and protecting the personal authority of local top leaders are two different things, because the CCP defines the former as protecting the central leadership, while the latter is seen as local officials building personal power bases. This is not a conflict. You must follow collective leadership, which refers to Xi Jinping, because Xi Jinping alone is already equivalent to the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee; he also represents the decisions of the collective leadership. So, do you understand? Xi Jinping is smuggling in concepts.

Here is even more explosive news: in the same document, he encourages party members to speak the truth and not suppress dissenting opinions, while on the other hand, he demands that they not 'recklessly discuss' the central leadership. Isn't this the same case of Mao Zedong that I mentioned earlier? This is not the same system as in Taiwan, where you can openly oppose the president and criticize the ruling party, or even replace unpopular representatives or officials through elections and recalls. There is another crucial piece of evidence: on November 1st, Xinhua News Agency not only published this decision but also released a document personally signed by Xi Jinping. In it, Xi personally explained that since January of this year, the CCP Central Committee had established a drafting group for the Fifth Plenary Session, with Xi himself as the head, and Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and Li Xi as deputy heads. These people are all members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Wang Huning needs no introduction, right? The chief strategist for united front work against Taiwan, the architect of the CCP's high-level political ideology, a veteran of three administrations. Cai Qi is Xi Jinping's personal chief eunuch. So, it's no problem for him to pack the team with his own loyalists, right? I know that anti-CCP Chinese people really hope that Xi Jinping will fall soon and that China will get better. But here is the reality: if Xi Jinping falls, China might indeed get better temporarily, but it will still be under Communist Party rule. It will never become as good as a democratic country, including in terms of social welfare systems. In reality, Xi Jinping has not lost his grip on power. Of course, your judgment is not entirely unreasonable, because the CCP operates in a black box; until Pandora's box is opened, everyone's inferences are reasonable. But I believe most Taiwanese hope that Xi Jinping will continue in office until the CCP collapses with him. Otherwise, if he is replaced by a new leader who is moderate like Hu or Wen but equally cunning inside, that would be terrifying for Taiwan and the world. Because the CCP organization itself is a malignant tumor. If they use a warm and moderate facade to paralyze Taiwan, Europe, and the US, it will be very difficult for us in Taiwan and for Western officials to expose them, because the public is forgetful. They see a new leader who is very moderate like Hu Jintao, and it seems like there's no need for military conflict across the strait, right? But in reality, they are engaging in implicit united front work. How can we expose that? It's impossible. But Xi Jinping's 'wolf warrior' diplomatic style and his 'wolf warrior' infiltration of Taiwan make it easier to pierce his lies to Taiwan and the world, because he is doing it openly. If he were doing it secretly, it would be hard for us to expose.

Moreover, I found an even more important historical comparison. The sentence in this document that has received the most attention is that 'top leaders must not engage in one-man rule or patriarchal systems.' Many people take this as the first anti-Xi signal appearing in 2026, but it is not the first time. Let's turn the clock back to 2016, exactly 10 years ago. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee passed a resolution that one must not engage in one-man rule or patriarchal systems, and one is not allowed to use personal authority to replace the decisions of the party organization. So, have you noticed? These words were written 10 years ago. But what happened around 2016? Did Xi Jinping step down? Quite the opposite. In 2016, the CCP officially established Xi Jinping's core status. Then, in 2018, the National People's Congress of China shocked the world by amending the constitution to remove the provision that the President and Vice President could not serve more than two consecutive terms. That is why he can now move from his third term to a fourth, right? So, 10 years ago, the CCP already demanded no one-man rule, yet Xi Jinping's power did not shrink; instead, it expanded further. Now, in 2026, similar language appears again—how does that suddenly mean Xi Jinping is about to step down?

Another term in this document that deserves more attention is iron-cap prince, which states that neither iron-cap princes nor imperial edicts of pardon are allowed to exist. Many people look at this and wonder: Does this mean that no matter how high an official Xi Jinping is, he cannot be exempt from accountability? That the ruler who breaks the law is punished the same as a commoner—is that really the case? One of the iron-cap princes most familiar and widely known to everyone should be the Mongol prince Sengge Rinchen, right? He was one of the main commanders who resisted the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Anglo-French Allied Forces in the late Qing Dynasty. Let me first explain that iron-cap princes were originally special prince peerages in the Qing Dynasty that could be inherited. There were only 12 such families, and the peerages of all other princes were reduced generation by generation. Your father was a prince, so your next generation became a duke, a marquess, an earl, and so on. This was to prevent what happened in the Ming Dynasty, where from Zhu Yuanzhang to Chongzhen over those 200-plus years, there were hundreds of thousands of prince families and related organizations. These princes and their descendants were not allowed to expand their power, meaning they did not work, yet by simply having children they could receive subsidies from the center in the Forbidden City. These subsidies came from the people's taxes, so this was also one of the sources of the Ming Dynasty's fiscal collapse, though not the all of it. What does an imperial edict of pardon mean? In plain terms, it is a death-get-out-of-jail-free card. Transposed into modern political language, it means that you people cannot rely on your high status or being founding fathers and meritorious officials of the state to have things like an imperial edict of pardon or an iron-cap designation. Even if you have both of these, you will still face my punishment and investigation. Is this the first time this phrase has appeared? No, as early as 2015, Xi Jinping twice addressed the matter of iron-cap princes. What happened around that year? Former Central Military Commission Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and others—people with power on par with Zhang Youxia—were brought down by Xi Jinping. Who else were these remarks incidentally directed at? Retired cadres. Do not think that because you have retired and become veterans you can continue to form cliques and let your factional personnel and protégés take shortcuts. Especially look at around this year's Fifth Plenary Session, where the CCP successively confirmed disciplinary actions against a large number of high-ranking officials, including mid-level officials, some of whom involved important generals in the Central Military Commission system. When Xi Jinping first came to power, he gradually adjusted his political system precisely through the anti-corruption campaign. Now, having governed for so many years, the Party Central Committee continues to emphasize official corruption, two-faced persons, factional clique-forming, and even bans the establishment of private fiefdoms in localities. Doesn't this mean that the CCP's so-called rectification achievements have not made these problems disappear? If all corrupt officials and these political strongholds had already been completely purged, why would you still emphasize the exact same problems in the twilight of your third term?

Therefore, I believe what is truly worth discussing in this document is not whether Xi Jinping is banned from having the final say or whether he is going to fall from power, but rather what kind of predicament the organization of the CCP under Xi Jinping's rule is currently facing. On the one hand, Beijing expects absolute loyalty from all cadres, and no major matters can violate the center. On the other hand, if local officials dare not make any decisions and must wait for instructions from Beijing for everything, the entire government will lose its efficiency, including in foreign wars. A general away from the capital may ignore imperial orders, but does he dare to ignore them? I must wait for personal orders from Xi Jinping. Will Xi Jinping know how to fight a war? A war personally commanded by Xi Jinping will definitely be extremely tragic. But as soon as a war breaks out, regardless of whether the CCP wins or loses, it will mean no small amount of harm to Taiwan. Especially given that China is currently facing economic growth, local finances, enterprise investment, demographic structures, and social governance challenges, the problems that local officials need to handle are extremely complex. If officials only know how to report and ask for instructions without daring to bear responsibility, having more orders from the center does not mean local performance will be any better. This is probably why, besides emphasizing political loyalty, the document also specifically emphasizes that cadres must improve their capabilities and solve and improve problems. But here lies a huge contradiction: you are not allowed to have your own opinions and must obey the Party Central Committee, yet if you execute the instructions sent down by the Party Central Committee poorly, it blames your personal capability. How on earth can you expect people to get things done this way? So I say Xi Jinping must stay in power for life; he must lead the Communist Party toward destruction. He cannot be replaced. So having said this, let us look back at another claim on the internet, where some people started searching and comparing documents, saying, look, this document mentions Mao Zedong, as well as Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao and their political thought from back then, and only then is Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era written. This arrangement does not mean Xi Jinping has fallen from power; this is the CCP's normal arrangement, which naturally lists first-generation leaders right up to current leaders.

Instead, I noticed a part in this document that is very relevant to Taiwan. In addition to demanding management cadres, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also requires the expansion of party organization systems, specifically mentioning platform enterprises and the tech and internet innovation sectors. It demands the establishment of higher-level management in internet enterprises that can also be mobilized. This means that Beijing not only wants to tighten its grip on local officials, but also further strengthen the Communist Party's influence over the organizational structures of emerging industries, enterprises, and technological development. For Taiwan, this is actually a point much more worthy of attention than whether Xi Jinping was forced to step down by a single remark, because the CCP's strategy toward Taiwan is not executed by Xi Jinping alone; behind him is a whole set of United Front and military cyber warfare units. Of course, someone might ask, do you think Xi Jinping is not facing any challenges at all right now? Has his power already become as stable as Mount Tai? Actually, you cannot put it that way. He will certainly encounter a lot of turbulence on the path toward absolute stability of power, but from what we can see so far, Xi Jinping has resolved them one by one. Especially the large-scale personnel reshuffles at this year's Fifth Plenary Session are indeed worth studying, because in a political system with highly concentrated power, the massive disappearance or purge of officials likely reflects that the top leader is facing some difficulties, and also reflects a serious trust crisis within the system. These two things can be true at the same time, but we cannot, simply because we hope to see Xi Jinping step down, interpret every political document as a sign that Xi Jinping is about to be overthrown in a coup, that he is going to be shot, that Dongfeng missiles are bombing back and forth in Beijing, chasing him all the way from Chaoyang District to Majuqiao Town, and then all the way to Qinhuangdao, with Xi Jinping fleeing overnight to North Korea for help. We cannot do that, right? Of course, next year marks the question of whether Xi Jinping will seek re-election or whether his faction will hand over power and he will become a retired emperor behind the scenes. If his network still holds supreme power, I believe that even though he is currently purging the entire military and may lack the capability to fight by 2027, as long as his faction remains in power, the risk of an attack will definitely be much higher than if other, moderate factions were in power. Moreover, by the time he finishes his purges, will our Legislative Yuan, our national defense and diplomacy, and our capabilities be able to remain unhindered in the meantime, build friendly relations with the US, eliminate skepticism toward the US, and maintain US trust in us? If we cannot keep up, then future risks will only increase year by year. Therefore, we must not lower Taiwan's due vigilance just because we misjudge the CCP's internal struggles and assume that Xi Jinping has already lost military power and that Beijing is about to collapse on its own. That concludes today's video.

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