Beijing Will Go Bankrupt Before Attacking Taiwan! China's 915 Accelerated Collapse, Wholesale Seizure of Chinese People's Property? The Whole Nation Enters Wartime Economy, Xi Jinping Heads Toward Chongzhen's Doomed End, How to Survive in Desperation?

The video categorizes China's fiscal pressure into six levels: taxation, asset sales, borrowing, law enforcement fines, requisition in the name of national security, and the rationing system, arguing that China is moving from the fourth level to the fifth. Citing data such as land grant revenue, government bond issuance, and local budget self-sufficiency rates, the content discusses local finance and law enforcement behavior, drawing historical comparisons with Ming dynasty mining taxes, Zhang Juzheng, and the Chongzhen Emperor to analyze the fiscal system, economic environment, and the ruling style of Xi Jinping.

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Recently, many people have been discussing whether China has entered a phase where people with technology and relative wealth are strictly prohibited from leaving the country, and whether the amendment to the National Defense Mobilization Act has passed, allowing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to requisition private property in the name of national defense and security. It sounds like a step toward North Koreanization and an impending war.

Now, a wartime economy is a form of long-term preparation for war, but you cannot say it is an immediate preparation. Because a wartime economy is the ultimate form of means for a government to take money from the people, and it follows an orderly sequence from light to heavy, comprising roughly six levels. The fourth level—or rather, level 4.5.

What is the first level? It is the most normal national taxation, with legal basis, tax rates, filing periods, and public disclosure of how much tax you need to pay when buying a product, along with channels for relief. You can disagree, you can appeal, you can file an administrative lawsuit, and you will know in advance exactly how much money you need to pay.

Where is the second level? Selling assets, selling state-owned land, selling land grant rights, and even selling controlling stakes in state-owned enterprises. Of course, this uses the percentage ratio and your national development prospects as a comparative standard. China used this method of selling land for over twenty years, and this was the most heartwarming one because it didn't require great governance capacity; it only required you to have vast territories and land.

What is the third level after that? Issuing national bonds, local government bonds, letting local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) borrow, letting banks take them over, letting the central bank play along, playing the left hand against the right. And the process of cashing out in the middle turns into your own GDP growth. What is the biggest characteristic of this level? It simply passes the problem on to future children to solve, while our generation enjoys the benefits.

Now we are at the fourth level: fines. What do you do when normal tax revenue is not enough? You pick on people through law enforcement, investigate them, fine them, detain them, freeze their assets, cut their wages, or owe them back pay, because you might engage in demanding unpaid wages maliciously. Once you maliciously demand unpaid wages, you are even less likely to get your money. From this level onward, you no longer know how much money you actually have to pay.

Then comes the fifth level: requisition in the name of national security. Naturally, the laws are written very nicely and state that you will be compensated. But you must know that the current financial situation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is extremely terrifying; it simply has no money, which is why it has to requisition and use your belongings. China will collapse not because of a financial crisis, but because of its fiscal revenue crisis. And these are not taxes, but direct confiscation, and you cannot question the reasons. The moment you question it, all the little pinks and patriotic wolf warriors are shouting about attacking Taiwan—won't you donate your family's cattle?

What is the sixth and final layer? A rationing system. For example, forcing wealthy individuals to subscribe to government bonds, and the state allocating labor. Money is no longer important at this moment because the free market is gone; the state directly allocates how much you can eat and what work you do. This layer is called a wartime economy, or perhaps a famine economy. China has been down this road before, but reaching this point essentially means North Koreanization. The CCP was also North Koreanized back then, right? Before Deng Xiaoping took over, and during the period when Zhu Rongji took over, it was still a painful transition.

So, at which layer is the People's Republic of China currently? Physically, it is at the fourth layer and is moving toward the fifth. The laws for the fifth layer have already been laid out for you. So, may I ask, how long will it take to officially move toward the fifth layer and start implementation? A month, half a year, or a year toward the sixth? Therefore, China is entering a wartime economy; it is on the way. It is currently at 4.5 and is preparing to jump to five.

Let's start from the layer where China stayed the longest, which is the real estate boom. Land became valuable, right? Developers would acquire land, local governments could generate revenue from land sales, and both parties would even bring in a bank. The three parties could collude in corruption and continue to inflate local housing prices. It didn't matter anyway, because the local government had money to build all sorts of things. Urban expansion, rising land prices, subway stations being built, highways being built—everything kept rising, continuing to borrow from the future.

China used this model for over 20 years, from the Jiang Zemin era all the way to the Hu Jintao era, and has already borrowed away China's future. But why did this perpetual motion machine suddenly fail? And why was the third layer so effective? Because it was the only one of these six layers where the government didn't need to learn how to collect taxes; it was truly mindless. As long as you were corrupt and greedy enough, you could do it. You didn't need ability; you only needed inventory, and you were fine.

Where did your ability come from? Chinese workers' wages were not allowed to rise, so that American daddy would give me orders. For the past two or three decades, local governments in China have never been forced to establish a truly sustainable tax revenue source other than land, because they didn't need to; they collected it mindlessly. Now, they have to find other ways.

We can see the latest announcement from the CCP Ministry of Finance: from January to July 2026, land transfer fees across China plummeted by 31%. Has the inventory been sold out? Has all the land in China been leased out? No. Strictly speaking, it is overcapacity. And the implication of overcapacity is that no one has the money to buy, and no one dares to rent, so it's not that the land is all leased out, right? So what do you do when land can't be leased or sold? You borrow, so you move to the fourth layer, right?

Back then, relying on American daddy's orders, the "great rejuvenation," and prosperity, Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen came in, while continuing to earn money from Americans, so you went crazy with infrastructure. Why did you do that? Because you thought you could keep earning American money like a perpetual motion machine. As long as American money kept coming in, and the money of the people of the world and Europe kept coming into China, you could keep borrowing from the future. After all, future orders from the US and Europe couldn't run away.

As it turned out, after the pandemic, the real estate market exploded, the financial system was cut off, everyone was "running" (emigrating), and corruption among Chinese officials became increasingly severe. So, do you understand this logic now? Now that this bloodline has been severed, what can they do? Let the Little Pinks reach a climax saying that China's export trade surplus last year broke the record in human history, reaching 1 trillion yuan. But do you know where these are being re-exported to? Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, Russia, and Central Asian countries. If you look closely, you will see it is price-cutting competition. Your prices are even lower than before, and the profit after deducting costs is actually less than what was earned in 2018 and 2019.

The CCP government also stated that in the first quarter of 2026, the scale of government bond issuance exceeded 6.7 trillion, local government debt exceeded 3.1 trillion, and national debt exceeded 3.6 trillion. This doesn't even include urban investment bonds. By our calculation, China is borrowing over 70 billion RMB every day, plus n, to pay salaries, and it is still not enough. Many public sectors in China are now cutting salaries, or are in arrears on performance bonuses, or even year-end bonuses, right? State security is also in arrears in some places, right? The police are too, right?

We can see another terrifying piece of data from the first quarter of this year: in 28 provinces and administrative regions in China, the self-sufficiency rate of the general public budget has all fallen below 100%, meaning they are spending more than they earn. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhejiang—none of them can support themselves on their own. And if you can't even support yourself, how can you pay money to the central government? Calculating from this ratio, it means that for every 100 yuan the local government spends, only 56 yuan is earned by itself, so you are effectively losing money. And this is the first time in the history of the CCP that this has happened.

And this third layer has another meaning, which is the one that moves only as a last resort. So now we are talking about the layer China is currently in. If you open a store in China today, suddenly someone comes to inspect your fire safety, then a few days later they come to inspect your food safety, and before long market regulation comes to check your advertisements, your electronic scales, your random 3C products. Some people even open shops or companies, and the police from another province thousands of kilometers away will suddenly say that you have problems with these things and that they are going to fine you.

You have seen that in the past year or two I have also shared how Guangdong, Fujian, and the three northeastern provinces have been inspected several times. Once this inspection team arrives, they pull down the metal shutters, saying that our little town is resting today and not opening for business, because opening means being harassed by you. From any perspective, if your revenue today is 10,000 yuan, you must be fined by these accounts until your quota is met, and then it is given to the locality so that the local government has the money to pay the chengguan, civil servants, and police.

Another case is that if you have assets overseas, you are accused of tax evasion, your assets are frozen first, then your bank accounts are frozen, and your passport is confiscated. So this is not a matter of cooperating well to escape disaster; you can only close your door and stop doing business first. The Little Pinks will say that fire safety is very important, food safety is very important, and environmental protection is very important. It is important, but if it is so important, why do the Zhao family members have special provisions? If the Zhao family members did not have special provisions, would they put more effort into this place instead of tormenting ordinary people?

So when the finances of local governments in every province in China become increasingly poor, what do law enforcement agencies do? Then you ask, who caused this? Are local governments bad? A question mark is raised, and I will explain it to everyone later.

And what about the current random collection of e-commerce taxes, overseas insurance policies, and overseas assets? This is not a conspiracy theory term invented by myself; this is profit-seeking law enforcement mentioned by the CCP Central Committee itself. The 2025 CCP Central Government Work Report has already written about it: when we sent Bao Qingtian down, what did we find? Localities are indiscriminately collecting taxes, indiscriminately issuing fines, and indiscriminately conducting inspections. So our Bao Qingtian, Xi Jinping, is going to save you localities and rescue the ordinary people suffering in the abyss of misery, which is why Xiaowei still thinks Xi Jinping is the great savior today.

If you were just a grassroots civil servant acting recklessly, would it require the State Council to launch a nationwide special campaign across all provinces? After a year of rectification, extending all the way to 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Justice published its own results and found that local violations existed, investigating and rectifying more than 66,000 cases, and even recovering 30.7 billion in economic losses for enterprises. Are local misdeeds entirely the fault of the localities?

Because of Zhu Rongji's tax-sharing reform, most of the fiscal revenue belongs to the central government, and while local land cannot be leased out, it leads them to have to supplement taxes to the central government when trying to support themselves. What else can be done? So this system turns everyone into such a state, and then makes everyone harm others, while the people at the bottom are always the scapegoats.

As for tax makeup, there is also something overseas called "long-range fishing." As long as you are Chinese, or even if you used to be Chinese, as long as you have family or hostages inside the Great Firewall, you always have to cooperate with them—whether it is telling lies, minor criticisms for major help, or slandering people who share your ideals and hope for China to become better.

So what has it turned into now? Because I have no money, I need to support a bloated civil service, and the central government still wants to fleece me, so I can only strive to continue fleecing the ordinary people. I say you are illegal, you are in violation of regulations, and you evade taxes because you evaded taxes. After all, didn't you do this during the Hu-Wen era? But the problem is that the Hu-Wen era allowed it, leaving a gray area. Is it illegal? Of course, it is defined however Xi Jinping wants. But for a country's industrial and commercial environment, this is an extremely tragic phenomenon, and it will strangle innovation.

How do we know when a government and a regime can no longer stay at this layer and is about to move down to the next layer? The criterion for judgment is very clear: when the CCP already knows that doing so will harm the economy, and yet still orders it to be done, that is the criterion for judgment. This is not to say that localities, a few civil servants, or a few village officials are particularly bad, but rather that the fiscal structure of the CCP is forcing even officials with a conscience to make such atrocious choices that destroy the economy, with no other way out.

Unless you can now announce democratization and let American orders return, what other way do you have? You have no way. Therefore, through all the above reasoning and analysis, when do you think the CCP will reach the final layer of a wartime economy? If that day arrives, how long will it be until its demise? And when will the CCP fall? I don't know, but I know this situation is accelerating.

Many people compare China to the mid-Ming or even late-Ming dynasty. One difference is that today's China possesses things that the Ming Empire back then did not have, which of course are also Western structures. What else? Central banks, state-owned banks, national debt, local debt—how these monetary policies are controlled did not exist before the Ming Dynasty. If the Ming dynasty treasury had no silver, then there really was no silver, and moreover, they encountered deflation at one moment and sudden inflation at another.

And now in China, it possesses these Western financial architectures, plus the fact that it is a totalitarian state, so it can play however it wants. Moreover, it has a massive base of 1.4 billion people, meaning the speed at which it bursts is very slow, but once this balloon pops, the damage will be even more severe than in a small country.

Now that problems have emerged in China's local governments, Beijing can extend debt maturities, swap debt, or even turn it into national debt, allowing the Little Pinks to extend their lives for 30 years, during which they will have to be beasts of burden to pay off the debt for 30 years. But the problem is, if things are pushed further down the road, China's current birth rate has already plummeted to the low fertility rates of high-development countries even before entering that status. So what will happen to the children of future China? How many people's debts will a single person have to repay?

So if we compare this to the events from the mid-Ming to the late Ming, more than 400 years ago, the Wanli Emperor of the Ming dynasty dispatched eunuchs to various regions to monitor mines and act as tax envoys to collect mineral taxes, bypassing the Ministry of Revenue, local finances, local government offices, and even the central authorities managing money, to exact commercial taxes, shop taxes, and various miscellaneous levies. Historical records written at the time are very clear: from senior cabinet ministers down to local officials, all opposed this mining tax.

You might ask whether this mining tax should be collected. It could be collected, but the emperor used terrible methods and terrible forms. This led to an even heavier tax burden handed up from the localities to the center, severely damaged public morale, and made many people even more afraid to develop industry and commerce. The Ming dynasty did not encourage commerce, which was, of course, a legacy caused by the system established by Zhu Yuanzhang.

After the mid-Ming dynasty, commerce suddenly became active again. Wanli's actions once more stifled the commercial development that was preparing to revive. Naturally, amidst various foreign and internal wars, the imperial court ran out of money. Later on, the Minister of Revenue levied many, many wine, ceremony, and grain taxes from the populace, which marked the beginning of the three major taxes of the late Ming dynasty.

Does this not compare to the current People's Republic of China as the fifth layer? Levying taxes on everyone in the name of the military, in the name of national development, and in the name that the nation needs your money. Isn't the mineral tax I just mentioned the fourth layer? In the end, the Ming dynasty did not reach the sixth layer; it perished at the five-and-a-half layer.

So this is precisely the key point I want to make: a wartime economy may not be the cause of destruction. As mentioned earlier, Zhu Rongji's tax-sharing system suddenly made the CCP Central Committee very wealthy while leaving the localities poor. But local poverty could be sustained by leasing land, selling land, and relying on American orders. Now, however, none of these exist.

Indeed, Zhu Rongji's reforms temporarily alleviated China's fiscal crisis, as long as this engine—or even the perpetual motion machine of the World Trade Organization—could continue to operate. This is comparable to a figure from the mid-to-late Ming dynasty: Zhang Juzheng. The Great Ming that Zhang Juzheng took over faced similar issues; the severe problems faced by Zhu Rongji upon taking office involved completely chaotic taxes between the center and the localities, alongside all sorts of messy and unclear levies.

What was ultimately implemented? The Single Whip Law. Of course, this temporarily eased the economy of the Ming dynasty, but later, with Spanish silver and Japanese silver flowing in, the economy experienced deflation again, and there was no modern financial system to sustain its life, right? So in the end, it blew up.

Although the two implemented different systems, their roles in history share very interesting commonalities: they both took over a country experiencing financial trouble, and through extremely aggressive reform mechanisms and tax reform mechanisms, they readjusted the power controlled by the center. Therefore, many people say Zhang Juzheng bought extra time for the Ming dynasty with a few shots of adrenaline, and Zhu Rongji likewise bought extra time for the CCP, but the CCP will likely still face inevitable doom in the future.

Thus, Zhang Juzheng successfully resolved the previous round of crisis without eliminating the political and economic structures that would create the next round of crisis. Zhu Rongji was very similar; the tax-sharing system solved the center's lack of money, but who would sustain local debt expenditures and local debts? He probably did not anticipate the relationship between Xi Jinping, Trump, and the US-China tariff and trade war, which made such a perpetual motion machine impossible to continue.

Many people compare him to the Chongzhen Emperor, but strictly speaking, he has a bit of Wanli's shadow, a bit of the Jiajing Emperor's flavor, but most resembles Chongzhen indeed. Because after Zhang Juzheng died, Wanli—who had been kept completely in check and thus behaved diligently while Zhang was alive—began to fight the civil and military officials and let things slide, causing administrative functions to paralyze completely.

Xi Jinping is not like that. Of course, Xi Jinping was very obedient in his first term, killing and chopping heads with his left hand. Xi Jinping's second term does not resemble the late period of Wanli; instead, it resembles Chongzhen. The late Wanli period was about not wanting to manage anything, but look at what Xi Jinping manages: he wants to manage everything, personally commanding and personally deploying everything, with the sole exception that he will never personally visit disaster-stricken areas when a disaster occurs.

Therefore, everyone says that Chongzhen was a diligent ruler of a fallen state; he was not a lazy emperor. He was extremely diligent, striving hard to make the country strong, but he deeply distrusted officials. The more diligent he was, the more the country accelerated toward ruin; and the more he distrusted officials, the more power concentrated in the hands of the single emperor, making officials increasingly afraid of making mistakes, unwilling to take on responsibilities, and inclined to lie flat.

When power in an entire country becomes increasingly centralized, it may actually be a time when administrative capacity is increasingly declining, because those below dare not make decisions; even when they do, they add layers of excessive enforcement. The central government's intentions were clearly not that strict, yet by the time they reach the local level, they become absurd. So I ask, has this land not changed since ancient times?

Furthermore, with Xi Jinping now, he has killed several generals. Wasn't the Chongzhen Emperor the same? "With the death of Chuanting, the Ming Dynasty fell." So, has the CCP's Sun Chuanting died? And who might that person be?

Therefore, what we need to observe next is not when Xi Jinping will let the CCP perish and then bring about the great rejuvenation of China. We only need to see how much of the people's property the CCP government will sacrifice as the price to maintain its own fiscal capacity; and whether today's Xi Jinping will reach that crossroads.