How to Escape the Latin American Trap? Argentina's Risk Index Surpasses 700 Points, Milei's Chainsaw Cuts Deficits While Poverty Rate Jumps Back to 32.3%, Taiwan's Land Reform Turned Landlords into Shareholders, South Korea Tied Subsidies to Export Discipline, Latin America Swings Back and Forth in the Inchworm Effect, While the CCP Lacks All Four and Has Welded the Door Shut!
This episode delves into the Latin American trap and the challenges facing the Milei government's reforms in Argentina. It analyzes the successful experiences of land reform in Taiwan and export discipline in South Korea, while contrasting them with China's deficiencies in land property rights, judicial credibility, industrial subsidies, and policy stability, pointing out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the greatest obstacle to China's economic and social development.
Video link:
Full text:
Observe things as they are, refuse fragmented cognition. We continue from where we left off. Just last Friday, Argentina's country risk index surged to 703 points, the highest level since 2026. This index is compiled by JPMorgan; what does it mean? It means how much more interest the Argentine government has to pay to borrow US dollars compared to the US government itself. 703 basis points means paying 7.03% more interest. On July 10th, this index was only 402 points, the lowest level since 2018. But three months later, it has risen by nearly 70%. Let's go back another month to September 24th, when the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina announced that in the first half of this year, Argentina's poverty rate jumped back from 28.2% in the second half of last year to 32.3%. Milei has been wielding this chainsaw for nearly three years; well, there is a fiscal surplus, and inflation has been suppressed, but the bond market and the poor have turned against him.
So, is this an inevitable stage, or is it caused by policy failure? Well, today, we will continue to look into this in depth. I think everyone should pay close attention to Argentina, because if the CCP were to collapse, the antidote for the Chinese economy might very well lie in the reforms currently being undertaken in Argentina. Not only that, but today we also need to look at another key point: how long does it take for a country's commitment to be believed and accepted by the market? In the last episode, we calculated the transaction efficiency K, and the conclusion was that transaction efficiency is the result of institutional operations. In this episode, besides looking at Argentina, we will also look at how East Asia pushed this K over the threshold, and how Latin America has repeatedly jumped back and forth at this threshold. Also, where is Milei's chainsaw stuck right now? Let's first look at the first East Asian sample country, which is Taiwan. In the early 1950s, Taiwan's per capita income was also around 100-plus US dollars. Many of the so-called good days for Taiwanese farmers at that time meant putting a little rice in sweet potatoes; in Taiwan, they should be called big sweet potatoes, anyway, it was something like that. The staple food was sweet potatoes mixed with a little rice. But the starting point for Taiwan's later economic take-off was not in the factories, but where? It was in the countryside.
After Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Taiwan, having learned a hard lesson from his defeat, he began to redirect resources toward the countryside. What did they do at the time? In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's government first capped land rent at 37.5 percent of the harvest. Then, in 1951, the government began selling public land—which had been taken over from the Japanese—to tenant farmers on an installment basis. However, this was still minor tinkering. It wasn't until 1953 that they really meant business with a campaign called the Land-to-the-Tiller program. The process went like this: landlords were allowed to keep a portion of their paddy fields, roughly 2.9 hectares, while any leased land exceeding this limit was forcibly expropriated by the government. What for? To be resold to the tenant farmers who actually tilled the land. The land price was calculated at 2.5 times the annual harvest, and the tenants didn't have to pay the sum immediately; it was set up as a ten-year installment plan, paid off within a decade. When all was calculated, the annual payment was even less than the original rent, and the land finally belonged to them.
The most crucial question was: what did the government use to pay the landlords for this land? Printing money directly was certainly out of the question. Whether back on the mainland or in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek's financial reforms were so far off the mark that Chiang's reputation for financial banditry—let's put it this way, to find a comparable counterpart—was on par with that fucking idiot Emperor You Xi nowadays. From the exchange of Central Reserve Bank notes in 1945 to the Gold Yuan reform in 1948, and right after Taiwan experienced hyperinflation up to 1949, when the New Taiwan Dollar was issued in June 1949, 40,000 old notes could only be exchanged for a single New Taiwan Dollar. Those Old Taiwan Dollars had only started circulating in May 1946, and within three years they had reached such a miserable state, with note denominations printed up to nearly one million. Therefore, the credibility of Chiang Kai-shek's government in financial matters was practically negative at the time; the common people would immediately take to the streets the moment they heard about any reform, yes, it had reached that point. Moreover, the populace simply refused to accept that currency anymore.
Consequently, the payment given by the government to the landlords for the land was structured as follows: 70 percent consisted of physical land bonds, with designated sources of repayment. This was similar to the practice in Britain at the time; how were they repaid? The bonds weren't marked with a monetary amount, but rather with a specific weight in kilograms of paddy rice and sweet potatoes. The government also paid this off over ten years. This setup had a distinct advantage: even if the currency depreciated further, the food the landlords received would not shrink in value. How was the remaining 30 percent paid? It was paid through shares in four state-owned enterprises: Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Pulp and Paper, Taiwan Agriculture and Forestry, and Taiwan Industrial and Mining. The effect of this move was that these four state-owned enterprises were privatized in the process. This objectively transformed the rent-collecting landlords overnight into industrial shareholders. For instance, Lin Po-shou of the Banqiao Lin family became the very first chairman of Taiwan Cement after its privatization, and Koo Chen-fu of the Lukang Koo family started from scratch at the bottom and later rose to become chairman as well. However, there was a real cost to this, and many small landlords took a heavy hit because the compensation was paid based on the par value of the shares rather than the market price. As soon as these four stocks went public, their market prices immediately plummeted by about 30 percent. Small landlords who urgently needed cash came to sell, so the amount they actually received ended up being less than half of the compensation value.
Yet happiness, you see, is relative. Look at the fate of the landlords on the other side of the strait; they were relatively fortunate. The peasants who finally got their land suddenly surged with enthusiasm for farming, and the manifestation of this was that Taiwan earned its first batch of foreign exchange through the export of rice and sugar. Accumulated capital and manpower from the rural areas then began to flow toward small factories in the cities. Taiwan did not follow the path taken by South Korea, which fed loans heavily into a few massive conglomerates like Samsung today. On the contrary, what grew out of Taiwan was 550,000 family-owned small and medium-sized enterprises. At the time, family businesses in Taiwan reached such an extent that from the boss to the boss's wife, the boss's siblings, and the boss's wife's siblings, everyone chipped in together to run a enterprise as a cohesive unit—such cooperative family businesses were ubiquitous in Taiwan back then. The Taiwanese people of that era were fiercely aggressive; they would grab a suitcase and run all over the world chasing orders. Whatever the customer wanted had to be modified and delivered within three days. Then, in December 1966, Kaohsiung opened the world's very first export processing zone, drawing in companies like Philips and the US semiconductor firm General Instruments. That was how technology found its way in.
By 1973, a major international event took place: the oil crisis. Chiang Kai-shek realized at the time that the contribution of the traditional economic model to Taiwan's economic development had basically reached its limit. He pivoted to issuing government bonds and launching the Ten Major Construction Projects. Later on, this led to the establishment of the Hsinchu Science Park and TSMC. The price paid must also be made clear: during the martial law period, workers were not allowed to organize independent unions, nor were they allowed to strike. However, it was precisely land reform combined with 550,000 small and medium-sized enterprises that propped up a large middle class, and it was this middle class that later pushed Taiwan onto the path of democratization. However, the Chinese Communist Party did the exact opposite. In 1950, they killed a round of landlords first, and then during the collectivization movement from 1953 to 1956, they took back all the land that had just been distributed to the farmers. Then they used a very ruthless trick—what trick was it? They used the unified purchase and supply policy to keep grain prices suppressed for decades. As a result, all the wealth from the countryside was drained into state-owned factories in the cities. To this day, farmers only have the contract rights to their land, and residential homesteads are still not allowed to be traded. You see, Taiwan turned landlords into industrial shareholders, while the Chinese Communist Party turned farmers into state tenant farmers. Both were called land reforms, but the flow of capital was completely opposite.
Let's continue. Land reform only funneled landlords' money into factories, but whether factories could grow depended on what? It depended on state policies. Here is an inescapable question: after World War II, East Asia and Latin America both liked to play the Keynesian card—state intervention policies. Basically, the playbook was not much different from what the Chinese Communist Party uses today: handing out subsidies and setting tariffs. But why did East Asia foster a manufacturing sector that swept the globe, while Latin America bred a bunch of low-efficiency monopolies accompanied by hyperinflation? In 1993, the World Bank published a book called The East Asian Miracle. The purpose of this book was to attribute East Asia's success to marketization. Researchers Alice Amsden in South Korea and Robert Wade in Taiwan directly overturned this claim. These two people reached completely different conclusions. What were their conclusions? East Asia was precisely where the government intentionally prevented prices from following the market. How did they do it? First, they lowered interest rates to lend to manufacturers, then blocked foreign goods outside the door, and then used subsidies to push these manufacturers into heavy industries—industries with very high barriers to entry, like shipbuilding and aerospace. Because late-developing countries do not need to invent; they need to bring technology in from the outside and then improve it. This cannot grow relying solely on market prices.
However, East Asia's subsidies came with conditions. For example, in South Korea, the regulations were very interesting. How did South Korea regulate it? You had to sell things abroad within a time limit, and then exchange the real export figures for the next round of loans and foreign currency quotas. Park Chung-hee, the South Korean president at the time, personally chaired the monthly Export Promotion Meeting starting in 1965. Failing to meet the targets had miserable consequences. As long as you failed to meet this target, your loan was cut off immediately. Foreign buyers did not care about your political connections; if your stuff was no good, they simply wouldn't buy it. Even if domestic officials wanted to fake these figures, they couldn't. This was called export discipline. On the other hand, Latin America did not carry out land reform first. At that time, land oligarchs and industrial magnates held the government in their own hands, resulting in a situation where subsidies were distributed and tariffs were set, but you were not required to export. What kind of dynamic did this create? Your protected enterprise could sell at high prices in the domestic market and make monopoly profits, so why the fuck would you go abroad to compete with foreigners? Therefore, the businesses in South America banded together to fight for industry privileges, and subsidies completely turned into assets for splitting the spoils.
From the 1990s to the 2000s, what China actually got right was this exact step: processing trade, export tax rebates, and joining the WTO in 2001. During this period, export figures were a hard metric. However, after 2012, the whole flavor changed. Ever since that fucking Xi Jinping came to power, subsidies have been distributed more and more, but export discipline is gone. Why say discipline is gone? The most typical evidence of Latin Americanization is that fucking big chip fund. This thing was established in 2014, and by 2022, the entire big chip fund was swept up in one go, raided from top to bottom. This is what subsidies without an external yardstick grow into—the same end as Latin American subsidy-splitting. This is determined by the game structure: as long as monopoly is the business and subsidies are allocated to this monopoly, you can rest assured that a large-scale spoils-sharing scene will definitely play out there. Moreover, because Chinese people are relatively smart in these aspects, the tricks they play can only be more numerous than those in South America. This is the law.
Why can't Latin American governments control subsidies? Well, this brings us to Qin Hui. Who is Qin Hui? He is a professor in the Department of History at Tsinghua University. His main research focus is on peasants and land issues, and he has specifically compared how systems transitioned in China, Latin America, and South Africa. He has a concept called the "inchworm effect." Why use the term "inchworm"? An inchworm is the larva of a moth; when it moves—well, in the Northeast dialect, it's like "gu yong gu yong" (wriggling) forward—it moves by arching its back and then straightening out. It looks like two completely opposite movements, but both the arching and the straightening are moving forward. Applied to politics, what does it describe? It describes expanding power when swinging to the left and shirking responsibility when swinging to the right. It looks like it's swinging back and forth, but in reality, every move is heading in the same direction. Qin Hui says the most typical example of Latin American decline is not that poor countries are getting poorer; the truly shocking thing about Latin America is that rich countries can also become poor. At the beginning of the 20th century, Argentina's per capita income ranked among the top in the world, and it was a developed country at the time. Later, it slid all the way down. This isn't the fault of globalization; it's because their fucking system was rotten and ruined it.
So how does the inchworm effect work? Let's go through it step by step. In countries with constitutional accountability, the power and responsibility of both the left and right wings are balanced. For example, a government under right-wing advocacy manages less and collects fewer taxes, but at the same time, you have to accept that you get fewer welfare benefits. The left-wing advocates for more welfare, but at the same time, they let the government collect more taxes and manage more things. However, the government must be monitored by the parliament; whether you swing left or right, power and responsibility move together. But in a system without accountability, this situation changes. It becomes: when you swing to the left, those in power expand their authority in the name of public interest, not only collecting more taxes but also controlling more people, while the common people still don't get the best welfare. Then, when swinging to the right, the government sheds responsibilities like pensions, healthcare, and education in the name of market efficiency, but their own power and privileges are not reduced at all. It turns into a situation where, whether you swing left or right, the common people are the ones who get screwed, and the benefits always fall to those in power.
Argentina has been swinging like this for decades. From the Menem government in the 1990s, which sold off state-owned enterprises and pegged the peso to the US dollar one-to-one—that was a swing to the right—but the necessary responsibilities were never fulfilled. By 2001, when Argentina defaulted on its debt, the one-to-one peg was effectively dead. Then in 2008, the Cristina government nationalized private pensions, and nearly $30 billion went into the government's pockets just like that; this was an expansion of power by swinging to the left. But the pension problems of the common people were not solved at all. This is why every time the rules are changed, they have to be changed again. And the government's word counts for even less each time. Furthermore, Qin Hui used the term "inchworm" originally to describe China. Why did he talk about China first? Because the CCP stopped welfare housing distribution in 1998 and pushed housing into the market. The CCP shed the promise of housing distribution; this is shirking responsibility. But urban land can only be sold by the government; that is how land finance came to be. This is expanding power. At the same time, the CCP pushed healthcare and education into the market—it's the same pattern. On top of that, workers are not allowed to organize independent unions, and there is basically no welfare. China used this to trade for super-low-cost exports, which is what the CCP calls the "low human rights advantage." The CCP even wants to export this advantage. For example, Shougang Hierro Peru, the largest Chinese-funded mining enterprise in Latin America, is a company in Peru. In Peru, because they forcibly suppressed strikes and even fucking fired union members, they have been clashing with local labor laws for many years. Not to mention the BYD incident in Brazil last year, which everyone knows about. However, we have to admit that capital is willing to run to these places with low human rights and low welfare. But what are the consequences after they run there? This way, democratic welfare states in Europe, America, and Latin America will lose both jobs and tax bases at the same time. When your economy is growing rapidly, it's not a big deal, but when the Kondratiev wave hits a depression cycle, unemployed people need welfare, but the tax base is shrinking. That's how deficits and populism rise together.
It grew out of it, so how did the extreme right come about? In fact, most of them come about this way. If we apply this ratchet effect to urbanization, it is exclusionary urbanization. Qin Hui compared it to South Africa during the apartheid era. At that time, the South African white government, under the guise of preventing the emergence of slums, only allowed young, able-bodied single black men to enter white cities to work, and designated a fixed area for these black men to live in. However, the burden of supporting these black men's wives, children, elderly care, and medical treatment was entirely dumped back on their rural hometowns. What does this look like in particular? It looks especially like those very, very pitiful left-behind children in China's rural areas. Around Christmas every year, there would be a South African version of the migrant worker homecoming tide. In China, the total number of migrant workers nationwide is around 300 million, with 1.8 million working away from home. The structure is the same: people work in the cities, but their household registration (hukou), children's schooling, and elderly care and medical treatment are tied to their fucking hometowns. Then the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the fucking nerve, specifically uses the slums of Latin America and India as an excuse, claiming that cities cannot relax the household registration system. However, the industrialization of Taiwan and South Korea directly proves that the hukou control enforced by the CCP is pure bullshit. At that time, whether in Taiwan or South Korea, any peasant entering the city could buy a house, obtain local residency, and move their whole family into the city. Therefore, the root cause of Latin America's ills is the land oligarchy and the ratchet effect, not peasants entering the city. We won't discuss the political reasons for household registration control too much. The situation it creates is that it takes away all the demographic dividend of young local laborers, while completely suppressing the costs of social support for the elderly and the young. In other words, the CCP only wants the dividends, but fucking refuses the costs; the costs are left for everyone else to digest yourselves. This is the mindset of the CCP. With these tools of analysis, let's look back at Milei. When Milei came to power in December 2023, what was the condition of Argentina he took over? The inflation rate for that month was 25.5%, the full-year inflation for 2023 was 211.4%, and in April 2024, the year-on-year inflation surged to nearly 300%. In the past 123 years, Argentina had run fiscal deficits for 113 of those years. Where did Argentina's inflation come from? To put it bluntly, it was created by the monetization of fiscal deficits. At that time, whenever the Argentine treasury ran out of money, it would demand money from the central bank, and the central bank would print more pesos and give them back to the Ministry of Finance. As a result, more and more pesos were printed, and prices rose more and more fiercely. On the very day Milei took office, his first executive order was to cut the number of ministries from 18 to 9, and the effect was very good. Throughout 2024, the federal government's actual primary expenditure was directly cut by 27%, with the deepest cuts hitting pensions and social security programs, which accounted for 30% of the total deficit. Next came public works, followed by energy and transportation subsidies, and transfer payments to various provinces. Since the Ministry of Finance is no longer short of money, it doesn't need to ask the central bank for it, and the central bank doesn't need to print more money either. As a result, Argentina's primary fiscal surplus in 2024 accounted for 0.8% of GDP. It can be said that for many years, the Argentine government had forgotten what a fiscal surplus even looked like. By this year, the primary fiscal surplus remained at 0.4%, and monthly inflation plummeted all the way from 25.5% down to 1.9% in September of this year—dropping from a monthly inflation rate of nearly 30% down to around 2%. This can be considered fucking awesome.
However, what was the side effect? The poverty rate also went through a major micro-oscillation. At the very beginning of the reforms in 2025, the poverty rate once spiked to 52.9%. With the fall in inflation, it dropped back to 38.1% in the second half of 2024. In the first half of last year, the poverty rate fell directly to 31.6%, and by the second half of last year, it dropped to 28.2%. Meanwhile, Argentina's trade surplus reached $18.9 billion in 2024, setting a historical record, and capital controls were lifted in April of last year. A series of reforms can be considered very effective. Argentina's full-year GDP grew by 4.4% last year, and relying on the midterm elections in Argentina last October, Milei's La Libertad Avanza directly won 4.84% of the vote. The U.S. Department of Treasury also provided a $20 billion currency swap line and helped banks scrape together another $20 billion for Argentina. Some people might think, hey, isn't this pretty good? Why did the poverty rate rebound? The problem lies in this year. In the first half of this year, the poverty rate jumped back from 28.2% to 32.3%, and nearly 2 million people fell back below the poverty line within this half-year. Why? Looking at the data, the per capita income of Argentine households rose by 11.5% in the first half of this year, but the basket of basic consumer goods corresponding to the poverty line only rose by 11.6%. That is to say, the income growth was slower than the growth of that basket of goods by 0.8 percentage points. Therefore, families close to the line fell below it one by one. Moreover, the decline in inflation also got stuck. Once monthly inflation was suppressed to around 2%, it could not be driven down any further. For the first nine months of this year, it hovered between 1.7% and 3.4%. The economy is now also heading downwards; in the second quarter of this year, Argentina's GDP fell by 0.6% quarter-on-quarter. What is this? This is the marginal wall of the reform dividends from monetary discipline. Therefore, the next step must be to deepen reforms because those frictional costs we mentioned in the previous episode—such as property registration and chaotic taxes, these Argentine versions of the Brazilian cost—Milei's chainsaw hasn't touched them yet, so transaction efficiency K won't budge. If K doesn't budge, an economy after deficit tightening is left with only one thing: contraction. If no new division of labor grows to catch those who fall, this V-shaped recovery is very likely to hook back. Therefore, Argentina's real major test will be next year. Although this matter hasn't happened yet, the ledger is actually already on the table. The Argentine government announced a financing plan this July, stating that the number of US dollars needed by the Ministry of Finance next year is $24.9 billion. However, just to repay bondholders, $4.378 billion must be repaid on January 9 next year, and another $5.385 billion on July 9. Where will these US dollars come from? The plan is to first use the surplus accumulated in 2026 to cover it, then have the Ministry of Finance use paper money to buy US dollars from the central bank, and plus issuing bonds in the domestic market, with the rest relying on loans from international institutions and selling state-owned enterprises. But pay attention, everyone: the column for issuing bonds in the international market is written as zero. Why is it zero? Because the international market still doesn't believe it. On July 9 of this year, didn't Argentina fail to issue bonds internationally? Argentina also emptied its own national treasury and reserves to cope with $4.3 billion, just for what? To show the international market that I will never default. But the country's risk index still rose from 402 points to 703 points. What was the market saying? Although your finances are in surplus, where will you get so many US dollars to repay in 2027? And what else are they worried about? That Argentina will hold general elections next October, and whether these rules can still hold after the elections? Hey, brothers have no confidence in their hearts. This is the same logic as Britain after the Glorious Revolution in the previous episode. What is credit? It is repaid year by year, not changed by a piece of government decree.
So, what is Milei's core strategy? Milei is betting on Vaca Muerta's shale gas and lithium. Last year, Argentina's energy trade surplus was $7.8 billion, a record high. In the first half of this year alone, it has already reached $5 billion. This year will definitely surpass last year, with oil exports accounting for 70% of total energy exports, and lithium resources accounting for nearly 20% of the world's total. But there is a process here that needs to be clarified: the energy surplus is the dollars earned by the entire country, but where do they mainly end up? They end up in the hands of Argentine oil companies. They are not currently in the Treasury's pocket. If the Treasury wants to get these dollars, the Central Bank must first buy them in the market, accumulate them as reserves, and then the Treasury can exchange pesos with the Central Bank. Therefore, whether the hurdle of 2027 can be cleared depends on whether the Central Bank can accumulate enough of these dollars. So, it's not just about whether the oil fields can produce more oil; we can now combine the accounts of the two periods. Whether a country can jump out of the Latin American trap depends on whether its transaction efficiency can cross that threshold. If the threshold is to be crossed, the wall of property rights must first be torn down, and then the taxes—which have become a mess in places like Brazil—as well as the labor regulations, must be simplified. Taiwan's method was to use land reform in 1953 to convert rural dead capital into industrial equity. Peru and Brazil are still stuck today on those tax calculations of 289 days and 1,501 hours, and simple rules alone are not enough. After the rules are simplified, there must be people who believe that the rules will remain simple. What do people look at to decide whether to believe? They look at whether the police and the courts are fair. In 1974, Hong Kong relied on the ICAC and Section 10 to completely turn around a rotten police force. And the high inequality and wealth gap in Latin America force people back into families and gangs. Furthermore, after social trust is established, when the state issues subsidies, it must tie them to hard indicators like exports that cannot be faked; that is, you need an objective indicator to measure them. At that time, East Asia tied them, but Latin America did not, so Latin America has been swaying back and forth in the 'measuring worm effect' for decades. Finally, all of this must withstand what? It must withstand changes in government. You can't just go back to the old ways because of a war or tight finances. It took the UK a full forty years to make the market believe that the UK would not default on its debts. Milei's chainsaw has only cut the deficit so far; whether the rest of the chain can be cut depends on time and the gradual accumulation of institutions.
Finally, let's talk about the CCP. Actually, we can compare these four points to China one by one. Farmers' land and houses are still unable to be leveraged for money to this day, right? The court ruled on the Peng Yu case, and now people across the country don't dare to help an old lady. Then, the subsidies after 2012 basically became a distribution scene. Your 'Big Funds' from top to bottom, in various industries—for example, private education—can disappear overnight. At least Milei still has a chainsaw; the CCP doesn't even have a chainsaw. Why? Because what Milei is cutting is at least other people's livelihoods, but if the CCP were to cut, it would be their own, or what the CCP considers to be their own. What does the CCP have in its hands now? It's the same set of tactics as Charles I, which we discussed in the last episode: 'retroactive investigation of twenty years' if they can't last until next year, logging, and 'distant-water fishing' (extortion). So, is the Latin American trap a cultural curse? It is not a Latin American trap; it is a trap where the state's word means nothing, and it is also a trap regarding whether the domestic public believes that there is still justice in this society. Right now, we can say with absolute certainty that the CCP not only has all these traps, but has added one more. What is this extra one? In Latin America, you can at least change the government every few years and at least try to see if other paths work. The CCP has now welded shut every door it could for you, so don't hold any illusions. When the CCP said the 'Sino-British Joint Declaration' was just a historical document, when they unilaterally increased social security burdens and engaged in 'distant-water fishing,' the entire country of China, whether it's the internal K or the external K, has been on a downward trajectory. So, it's not that I don't offer constructive suggestions; it's which of these constructive suggestions can the CCP actually fucking achieve? Therefore, the CCP is China's greatest enemy right now. The urgent matter is what? It's for you all to work harder and hurry up and finish yourselves off. Alright, that's all for today's rant. If you like my show, please click the share button and the bell. If you want to support my big brother, join the membership channel. The membership channel has deep-dive programs every season; welcome to join the 'Hardcore Warehouse.' See you in the next episode.