The CCP Collapse Index is 71.26! One-Quarter of Central Committee Members Missing After the Fifth Plenary Session, Fake Strict Governance Leads to Collective Lying Flat! Huafa Group Faces 744.4 Billion Debt Default with No One Daring to Sign a Bailout! Shanghai Composite Index Hanging Below 3600 While 4600 Stocks Die! Teachers Block Doors Demanding Unpaid Wages, Huang Qifan Arrested After Speaking on Real Estate! The Zombie Month of Emperor You Xi!
This episode releases the CCP Collapse Index for October, which has risen to 71.26. Key content includes the fact that more than a quarter of the Central Committee members are missing since the Fifth Plenary Session, and the announcement of comprehensive strict party governance has led officials to collectively play dead and lie flat. Former Chongqing Mayor Huang Qifan has been taken away for investigation, the Zhuhai Huafa Group is mired in a 744.4 billion debt crisis and faces default, multiple stocks in the stock market have plummeted while the index is propped up by major banks, and teachers, state-owned enterprise employees, and construction workers across the country have blocked doors to demand unpaid wages. Additionally, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake occurred in Nagqu, Tibet, and China and the EU reached an understanding regarding hybrid vehicles and rare earth exports.
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Observe things like stone, refuse fragmented cognition. Today is the release day for our collapse index. The CCP Collapse Index for October has been calculated for everyone; the new value is 71.26, an increase of 0.28 from September's 70.98, which is the largest single-month increase since May of this year. Let's first look at the series of events over these past few months: in July, the door was welded shut; in August, the air inside was cut off; in September, that grandson Xi Jinping locked the door and went out visiting. And October? In October, this fucking idiot came back from visiting and discovered, hey, this body has already started to become zombified. Then he did one thing: he rounded up the Central Committee members who had been nearly crippled by part-time jobs, held a four-day meeting, and lectured a group of broken, decrepit old party hacks on strict party governance. Hey, I think October is still quite interesting. As per the usual rules, let's put the scoring structure here first: politics and military added 0.1, macroeconomics added 0.09, social perception added 0.06 this time, and external environment diplomacy added 0.03, totaling 0.28.
This month, politics and the military are the protagonists, because the two mines on the economic side this month—Huafa and the stock market—both have their fuses pulled from the political side. So today, we will talk in reverse; we will talk about politics first. From October 26th to 29th, the Fifth Plenary Session was held for four days. The communique stated that 162 Central Committee members and 117 alternate Central Committee members attended, totaling 279. When this team was elected at the 20th National Congress, there were 205 Central Committee members plus 171 alternate members, totaling 376. In other words, just four years later, 97 parts of this body are gone, more than a quarter lost. Last year's Fourth Plenary Session had 315 attendees; within one year, another 36 are gone. Anyway, the communique didn't say where these 36 went. But the communique did mention another thing: the plenary session expelled 33 people from the party. Hey, it's not just 24 Central Committee members plus 9 alternate members; among them, 16 are generals and 7 are executives from the military-industrial system.
Expelling fourteen during last year's Fourth Plenary Session was already a record, but this time they more than doubled it. Well, once you expel them, you have to replace them, right? According to the CCP Constitution, you must replace them, right? But out of the alternate members, only ten were promoted to fill the vacancies. Five people who should have been promoted based on their vote counts were skipped over. Among them are Lieutenant Generals like Fu Wenhua and Zhu Wenxiang. As for the Central Military Commission right now, it's still a pair of good-for-nothings—that fucking idiot Xi Jinping combined with Zhang Chengmin. At this plenary session, not a single full member of the Central Committee was appointed to fill a vacancy. The Politburo currently has three open positions, but only one was filled—ah, still Zhang Chengmin. He is the only person in the entire plenary session who moved up, so everyone can chew on that. The only thing that has grown in this cookie over the past year or so is the discipline inspection system. So what on earth did they do over these four days? Actually, it was just one thing: they passed a resolution on several major issues called the "Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Persistently Promoting Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party." I should go to Deyang Club to perform this cross-talk. Ah, this meeting set a date—what date? Ah, the date for the 21st National Congress.
This 21st National Congress is to be held in the second half of 2027. However, regarding economic matters, not a single word was mentioned. And as for personnel succession, not a single word was mentioned either. This is what I call zombie talk. In September, what I talked about was idling—ah, orders were sent down, but there was no sound. In October, it took another step forward; it wasn't that there was no echo, but rather that every single organ in the system calculated a clear account, which was that moving is worse than not moving. Let me break down this calculation for everyone. What does strict governance of the party mean when it lands on specific individuals? It means lifelong accountability. The signature you put down today—if something goes wrong ten years from now, they will still come looking for you. So for an official, a bank president, or a state-owned enterprise chairman, what good can they possibly do by using the pen in their hand to sign something? It's nothing more than extending the life of the previous mess by half a year. What's the point? Under this kind of game theory, whoever takes action is a fucking idiot. This is the root cause why the current CCP system is bound to ossify. In fact, to see whether a system is ossified, you just look at two things. The first is what? It's the reaction speed after an incident occurs. What does a fast reaction speed indicate?
It indicates that grassroots governments are reacting autonomously. This is just like—like being poked with something; ah, it's just that your body naturally recoils, which is the most direct reaction of the body, and this process doesn't even require thinking. But ever since that airplane hit the Supreme Leader back in June, coupled with all of the CCP's disaster responses, look at how sluggish it is. Sluggish, right? The second observation window for ossification is seeing whether it's a one-size-fits-all approach. Everyone remember, as long as a system adopts a one-size-fits-all approach, that system is an organization with zero administrative capacity, ah, plus an empty brain. Look at what the CCP's reaction was after hitting the Supreme Leader? Within the entire scope of Beijing, you couldn't even have drones—not that they weren't allowed to fly, but you couldn't have them at all. What is the accompanying measure after a one-size-fits-all approach? It's speech control, because they lack the ability to handle problems. And speech control is essentially one-size-fits-all as well. Conversely, what if he doesn't sign this signature? Ah, not a single hair will be lost; they just push this report upward, ah, "Leader, please handle it," and you shift the blame upward while having zero trouble yourself.
Therefore, the decision on strict party governance itself is the root cause of this ossified disease. What kind of situation does this lead to? It means whoever picks up the pen to sign is planting a landmine for themselves. Thus, the optimal solution for the entire system is for everyone to collectively play dead and lie flat. On the military side, it's simply a model of playing dead. Sixteen generals were expelled this year, and in the PLA Daily, it's the same as usual: ah, there are editorials, but statements of loyalty from the officers and soldiers of the theater commands and military branches are still missing. And not making a statement is precisely the safest thing to do. The model on the local side is Huafa this month. Ah, we'll talk about that in a moment. There is also a line of small print in the communique: Alternate Member of the Central Committee Li Yunze was stripped of his party posts. He has been the head of the National Financial Regulatory Administration, which oversees the nation's banking and insurance industries since 2023. The person in charge of risks was dealt with first, and this happened in the very same week as the Zhuhai Huafa incident. So this month's score for politics and the military increased by 0.1, and then comes the recurring segment. Ah, the Political Star of October—who is awarded the Political Star? It has to be Huang Qifan. He is already fucking 74 years old, and a full ten years have passed since his retirement in 2016, but on the 10th of last month, he was taken away, and even his only son went down with him.
Well, there is a very black humor-infused thing here. What is it? On the day he was detained, what was he actually doing? He was just giving a lecture on real estate at a real estate opening event in Zhongshan, Guangdong. Word on the internet is what? That right after pointing the country's direction on stage, and running off to the Shenzhen airport afterward, he was pinned down right there on the spot. Immediately following that was a series of people directly vanishing into thin air. I've already drafted the award acceptance speech, so let me take out my little notebook and read it to you all. Let me read this award acceptance speech to you with deep emotion and vivid expression. Mayor Huang, you are the busiest person in the Chinese Communist Party system after retirement. Over the past decade, wearing the titles of Vice Chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges and Distinguished Professor at Fudan University, you lectured all over China, rattling off economic statistics just like that, even more fluently than the spokesperson for the National Bureau of Statistics. You are the chief architect of the Chongqing model; the very first page of the textbook on local governments using land as collateral to set up financing platforms—covering items like the Eight Major Entities, Yu Fu, and land debentures—was written by you. This month, Zhuhai Huafa used its RMB 744.4 billion in assets to write a graduation thesis defense for this textbook of yours, and right on the day of that defense, the author of the textbook went inside.
As early as the end of 2019, you stated that China's annual real estate construction volume would plummet from 1.7 billion square meters to 1 billion square meters, and that at least two-thirds of real estate enterprises would die off. All of these predictions came true. The only thing you failed to calculate was yourself. You were giving a lecture on what to do about real estate at a real estate opening ceremony, and the very day you finished giving it, you vanished. This could be considered the Chinese Communist Party's fastest policy response regarding real estate this year. The Chongqing Municipal Party Committee held a meeting on October 14 stating the need to purge noxious influences and tackle the Pao Ge culture and clique culture. My assessment is that this noxious influence is none other than you, who kept publicly lecturing on the economy even after retirement. This month, the Chinese Communist Party rounded up the very last person inside the system who was still publicly lecturing on the economy. Then, at the Fifth Plenary Session, not a single word was spoken about the economy. This is what you call consistency between words and actions. Mayor Huang, you finally went to your ultimate destination, that nursing home known as Qincheng Prison. Congratulations, congratulations. Alright, politics aside, let's talk about the economy. The main course for the October economy is still Zhuhai Huafa. I talked about this matter with everyone on my show a couple of days ago. Let me briefly retell this matter from beginning to end in chronological order.
Huafa Group is Zhuhai's largest state-owned enterprise, with the Zhuhai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission holding a 93.5% stake. Its total book assets stand at RMB 744.4 billion, and interest-bearing liabilities have reached over RMB 520 billion. Such a massive AAA-rated entity recorded a consolidated net loss of RMB 16.9 billion last year, and in the first half of this year, revenue continued to drop by 28%, losing another over RMB 5 billion. In September, Huafa submitted applications to at least three Chinese banks. What were they applying for? They wanted to extend the overall maturity of all existing loans while also demanding that the banks lower interest rates. By late October, not a single one of the three banks had relented, and furthermore, on October 20, Huafa issued a tranche of ultra-short-term notes with an interest rate of only 2.07%, which is practically the same as government bonds. And just last Monday, Huafa's offshore bonds were hammered: the dim sum bond maturing in December with a face value of RMB 1.4 billion and a 4.5% coupon rate plummeted 9% in a single day down to RMB 89. Meanwhile, the one maturing in 2029 plummeted by 12%. On October 28, insiders confirmed that two of Huafa's maturing trust products had not been honored on schedule. On October 29, Huafa honored part of the investors for one of the products, while for the other there was completely no movement at all.
This led to the dim sum bond maturing next year plunging 38% this week, dropping to 60% of its face value. Pay attention: domestically, you can still issue new bonds at a cabbage price of 2.07%, but overseas, old bonds are being dumped at a 60% discount. Look at how the exact same company played out two different prices. Why is this? Because before this dim sum bond was hammered, domestic banks were still thinking about—well, closing their eyes and pretending to be blind. But the real-money-and-guts overseas market had long since seen through the fact that it was going to burst and run for the hills. So why didn't the Zhuhai government bail them out? That ledger and the ledger of the Fifth Plenary Session are actually the same ledger. Let's look at the money first: Zhuhai's total land sales revenue last year was only RMB 3.27 billion, a direct plunge of 64%. The municipal-level land sales revenue was left with merely RMB 1.014 billion, a staggering plunge of 81.5%. Yet last year, Huafa's financial expenses alone—to put it bluntly, paying interest—hit RMB 6.7 billion. See that? Zhuhai's total citywide land sales revenue isn't even enough to pay half a year of Huafa's interest. Now let's look at the system: back in the day, to bypass regulatory oversight and acquire land across the country, Huafa engaged in RMB 100 billion worth of bulk trading, which is why Huafa had long since removed itself from the list of urban investment platforms.
Sigh, what have they transformed into? They've become so-called commercial state-owned enterprises. But now, their cleverness has backfired. With the CCP's Document No. 35 and Document No. 134, all those debt-resolution lists—special refinancing, emergency liquidity from the central bank, and unified bank loan extensions and interest rate cuts—have absolutely nothing to do with them. Moreover, Guangdong had long been bragging, claiming what? Claiming that the entire province had zero hidden debt. So, what was Guangdong's method? How could there possibly be no hidden debt? Fuck, everyone look, as long as a lackey of that fucking idiot Xi Jinping has served as an official somewhere, you can't see the real situation at all. What was Guangdong's game? It was stuffing hundreds of billions in trade flows into urban investment platforms and then declaring, 'Hey, look, this is a trading company.' This is exactly what the auditors said when Anren defaulted back in the day. How did they put it? The auditor described Anren's accounts by saying, 'Look, this thing has a duck's bill and fits the definition of a duck, so it is a duck.' Because it has trade flows, it's a commercial enterprise. And how was Zhuhai's budget report written last year?
It was written in black and white that there was no new hidden debt. If the fiscal authorities were to spend money to save Huafa now, it would be equivalent to admitting one thing: that the 'zero-COVID' policy back then was a lie. Within the CCP, this is a very serious political error. Who do you think can take the blame for this mess? Finally, let's look at the people: the group that drove Huafa from 100 billion to 700 billion—former Municipal Party Secretary Guo Yonghang, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Director Li Wenji, Huafa Chairman Li Guangning, and Vice President Zhang Hong—have all been rounded up one after another and taken away. So, the accounts now sitting in front of the current Zhuhai officials and bank presidents couldn't be clearer. If you sign off on a loan extension for them today, you simply won't be able to save them. Six months from now, Huafa will default regardless. If this group of people were to sign off now, what kind of situation would it create? The bad debts left by their predecessors would become the scapegoat for your own unauthorized loan extensions and concealment of non-performing loans, so just wait to be held accountable for life. Conversely, if you don't sign and let Huafa die right now? Well, the bad debts can all be blamed on the 'dead tigers' like Guo Yonghang and Li Guangning, leaving you clean and without any responsibility. Look, isn't this exactly what the 'strict party governance' from the Fifth Plenary Session looks like when implemented at the local level? The 1.4 billion 'dim sum bond' of Huafa due in December is the next hurdle; that's a future issue, let's see what happens next week.
Looking at the stock market, the week Huafa ran into trouble, the A-shares also collapsed. Let's clear up the accounts for October first. The Shanghai Composite Index fell all the way from 3,842 points at the end of September to 3,599 points on October 30th, a drop of 243 points in a month, falling below 3,600 points for the first time this year. The ChiNext index was even worse, simply too miserable to look at, plunging 23% in a single month, setting the largest monthly decline in over a decade. The CSI 300 fell for twelve consecutive weeks; the entire October market was a collapse that couldn't be stopped step by step. Which day was the most chaotic? It was October 15th, when 2.25 trillion in market value evaporated in a single day, and over 5,000 stocks collectively slumped. By the 22nd, the 3,700-point mark was lost, and another 5,000 stocks fell. Seeing that the market was about to crash, on the 26th—the same day Huafa's short-term bonds were smashed—those fucking idiots in the CCP finally got desperate.
What did they do directly? They changed the compilation rules of the Shanghai Composite Index, creating a bizarre rule where the weight of a single stock is capped at 15%, and they even moved up the time for removing risk stocks. It's obvious what this is: they want to rely on changing the exam paper to forcibly stabilize the index. The absurdity of the last two days of last month was off the charts. On one side, the ChiNext index plummeted by more than 4%, while on the other side, ICBC and CCB actually hit record highs on the same day. By the close on the 30th, more than 4,600 stocks were down, and nine of the fifteen major indices were at their lowest point of the day. Do you understand this market now? Is it possible that retail investors caused ICBC and CCB to hit new highs? It's highly likely that large funds like Huijin were pulling up bank weights to drag the index, and the Shanghai Composite Index was left hanging around 3,600 points. This leads to a very funny situation: the index is moving, but the 4,600 stocks underneath are dead. What does this feel like? It's like a person who has lost the ability to take care of themselves being dragged along by a rope. This is the zombie version of the stock market.
The A-shares market actually started falling back in July; the ChiNext index has dropped more than 40% from its July high. Trading volume on September 29 hit a 14-month low, and then October saw a volume-backed decline, which is a sign of retail investors cutting losses and exiting. Regarding the data, I will go through it quickly: on October 19, the National Bureau of Statistics released the third-quarter GDP, which grew by 4.5%, with the first three quarters at 4.6%. However, my assessment remains unchanged: the real growth rate is at most around 1%. The old principle still applies: wherever the CCP is trying to paint a rosy picture, that is exactly where we should scrape away the facade. What is the CCP bragging about? They claim that September exports, denominated in US dollars, rose by 30.3%, reaching $447.2 billion for the month, which is a record high, with a trade surplus of $133.5 billion. Exports can be said to be the only leg still standing in the CCP's economy, but as we discussed a couple of days ago, the extent of the moisture—the fake trade—within those figures is significant, so I won't repeat it. Let's look further.
How exactly are enterprises being squeezed? In September, the PPI rose by 5% year-on-year, hitting a new high since June 2022. By late October, Brent crude oil surged to $115 per barrel, yet the CPI only rose by 0.9%. What does this indicate? It means that upstream input costs are still skyrocketing, but downstream, the ordinary people simply have no money to pick up the tab. The high costs are stuck in the middle, effectively cutting off the profit margins of enterprises. Once enterprises have no profits, the manufacturing sector naturally shrinks. The manufacturing PMI for October fell to 49.3, returning to the contraction zone. For medium-sized enterprises, it was 48.4, and for small enterprises, it was only 47.5, meaning the smaller the enterprise, the faster it collapses. Let's look at investment and real estate; this is a complete freefall. Fixed-asset investment from January to September fell by 7.2%, and real estate development investment plummeted by 20.6%. In September alone, both new home sales and floor area sold fell by over 20%, and funds available to real estate enterprises dropped by over 21.6%, with domestic bank loans to them being slashed by 33.1%.
What does this mean? It means that not only are ordinary people not buying homes, but even banks are desperately pulling loans from real estate developers and running away. This has directly led to the complete lying-flat of financial data. New RMB loans in September were 210 billion less than the same period last year, and household loans saw near-zero growth. In the first nine months, cumulative net household loans decreased by 1.03 trillion. This is the first time since statistics began that in the first three quarters, the public as a whole has been in a state of net loan repayment. What does this show? It shows that the Chinese public has completely lost all illusions about the future; they would rather tighten their belts and repay loans early than take on any leverage. Alright, the private sector has stalled, so what about fiscal revenue? Fiscal revenue is also bleeding out. Public budget revenue for September turned negative, falling by 0.1%, and the securities stamp duty—which relies on harvesting leeks from the stock market—also turned negative in September. Now, the stamp duty ATM has also stopped working. Land sale revenue for the first nine months was only 1.6 trillion, still plummeting by 28%. Local governments are now completely unable to make ends meet. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance had to pull out a 550 billion local government debt settlement quota on October 9, allowing local governments to issue debt in the fourth quarter to keep themselves alive.
What is a settlement quota? To put it bluntly, it is digging into old accounts. We usually call this "scraping the bottom of the pot." In reality, for the past decade or so, the central government has set a debt ceiling for each province every year. Some provinces didn't reach that limit back then, or they paid off some old debt later. At this point, a "historical remaining quota" appears on the books, which is what they call a settlement quota—it is literally scraping the bottom of the pot. As for the 15.5% increase in industrial profits from January to September, it was purely supported by the doubling of profits in the electronics industry. Meanwhile, foreign investment profits only rose by 0.5%, which shows that foreign capital is still fucking leaving, and private enterprises are still struggling to survive. When we string all these data points together, the core truth is one thing: ordinary people would rather borrow new debt than consume, private enterprises are crushed by costs and dare not borrow money, and local governments cannot sell land and can only rely on the two fake legs of debt issuance and exports to barely hold on. That is why the economic growth figure added 0.09.
Now, let's talk about something a bit more relatable—the social experience on the ground. The main theme of October can be summed up in two very simple words: unpaid wages. Moreover, the issue of unpaid wages crossed a line this month. Who used to be the ones facing unpaid wages? Construction workers or private enterprise employees. On the night of October 26, teachers at a public school in Zunhua City, Tangshan, Hebei, collectively went to block the gates of the municipal education bureau. It was for no other reason than that their salaries had been chronically delayed. At the scene, a large number of police (Public Security) were there maintaining stability. Then on October 20, employees of China Unicom in Changsha, wearing red vests, did nothing else but block the gates to demand their money. On that exact same day, workers at Nanhua Paper Industry in Tianyang, Guangxi, also chanted slogans at the factory gates demanding compensation. Next, on October 21, at the China Construction Second Engineering Bureau's Huangdao project in Qingdao, this project was actually a bit strange. How much did they owe? Only 600,000 yuan, but for this mere 600,000 yuan, many people had already climbed to the top floor to demand their unpaid wages. On the same day, nine construction workers in Shantou also climbed onto a rooftop.
There were just too many incidents like this in October, so I won't go through them one by one. We just need to look at this chart to see how lively things are. In fact, what we are seeing now is that the money of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can no longer flow to the extremities like hands and feet. Looking now at natural disasters, late in the night on October 20, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake—the largest in the country this year—occurred in Baqin County, Nagqu, Tibet, at an altitude of 4,400 meters on the plateau. And what did the CCP report? Sixteen people dead. How the fuck am I supposed to believe that? Then there was the evacuation of tens of thousands of people affected by the disaster. And guess what the Western Theater Command did? One and a half hours after the earthquake, continuing the CCP's current disaster relief tradition, this huge theater command sent just a single drone to hover around. Hundreds of your houses collapsed directly, tens of thousands of people were freezing in plateau temperatures below zero, and your Western Theater Command just flew a drone to take a photo and call it a day. Isn't this fucking purely fooling ghosts? Remember the ledger from August? Everyone remembers, right? Well, it happened again, and the social experience score increased by 0.06.
Finally, let's talk about the external environment. There weren't many events on this front in October, but one thing must be recorded: from October 8 to 9, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič talked with Wang Wentao in Beijing for two days and then signed a joint statement. What was the content of the statement? They reached a trade understanding with the EU regarding hybrid vehicles. As soon as Šefčovič went back, what did he say? He said that in the next four years, China's exports of hybrid vehicles to Europe might drop by more than half compared to previous expectations, involving millions of cars. The CCP also promised to open a green channel for the approval of rare earth and permanent magnet exports to Europe. On September 18, those fucking idiots at the Ministry of Commerce were still being stubborn, saying things like voluntary export restrictions seriously violated WTO rules and that China resolutely opposed them. But just three weeks later, they fucking obediently signed it. So why did they cave in so quickly? Because domestic demand and real estate have both completely fucking collapsed, and the CCP's economy is left with only the export leg, making it completely unable to bear the cost of losing the European market. They can only slap themselves in the face and use rare earths in exchange for foreign exchange. Let's look ahead.
What we are looking at are really future events—well, events of this very month. What else happened this month? The U.S. Department of Commerce's 50 percent related-party look-through rule was also automatically reinstated on October 9. The most ridiculous part? From October 18 to 19, the APEC meeting opened in Shenzhen, except the CCP turned the ministerial meeting into an online conference, and the CEO summit was also scaled down, turning home-court diplomacy into an online class. Either Xi Jinping's fucking health really can't hold out anymore, or due to zero-COVID overreach, this bastard is also scared and simply cowered back into his shell, not daring to come out. Therefore, the external environment score increased by 0.03. Alright, we have covered the four variables: politics and military increased by 0.1, macroeconomics increased by 0.09, social experience increased by 0.06, and external environment and diplomacy increased by 0.03, totaling 0.28. Therefore, the collapse index for October is locked at 71.26. How should we understand October? Actually, three words are enough: zombification. Let me string this together for you. Right now, the CCP's equipment is also directly decaying in its entire construction; one-fourth of the Central Committee members are gone, and only two people are left in the Military Commission—strictly speaking, it should be one and a half people, since the eunuch counts as half. This is the body losing its cells.
The only output of the Fifth Plenary Session was that fucking very abstract strict governance of the Party, which turned every pen capable of signing into a risk. Consequently, if the banks don't sign, Huafa collapses; if the finance department doesn't sign, teachers take to the streets. The optimal solution for the entire system is to play dead, which is like the organs of a body shutting down one by one. Large capital props up bank stocks to forcibly drag the Shanghai Composite Index at 3600 points, which is the torso being dragged by external forces. What is to watch in November? It's whether that fucking idiot Xi Jinping can still walk out supporting Peng Liyuan at that Shenzhen A-row and meeting! Keep doing your evil deeds, Chinese Communist Party, and I will keep tally for everyone. Alright, that is all for today's broadcast. If you like my show, please click the bell icon below. If you want to support me, you can join the membership channel. The membership channel features four in-depth episodes per month; welcome to join the lives of good people. See you in the next show.