Seizing Power Requires 92% Certainty Before Anyone Dares Move; Joining Forces to Dismantle the Factory-Guard System Needs Only 30%! Cai Qi, Zhou Hong and Xu First in the Firing Line, Pick Someone Like Ding Xuexiang Who Brings No Faction, Whoever Pays the Army Is Whom the Army Follows, Once Eight Provinces Keep Their Money Central Allocations Become Worthless, Three Years of Widespread Unpaid Wages at the Grassroots! Implosion Is a Law, Not a Speculation

This episode deduces the logic of power transition within the CCP in the event of Xi Jinping's sudden death. The analysis suggests that due to a lack of military power and regional control, the bureaucratic system would fall into a weak cabinet state. The security and intelligence apparatus (the 'factory and guard' system) would be the first to face purges, ultimately leading to local governments withholding fiscal revenue and large-scale wage arrears at the grassroots level, making the internal collapse of the CCP an inevitable law.

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Observe things as they are, and reject fragmented cognition. Last week, the Wall Street Journal published a very strange rest schedule regarding Xi Jinping's visit to the United States. This report has been cited too many times, so we won't elaborate on it. Now, let's conduct a more ruthless deduction: suppose this fucking idiot Xi Jinping actually croaks, what will happen to China's political situation? Historically, the logic of power transition has several states. The first is when dictatorial power is weak, but the bureaucratic system is strong, or there is a powerful minister who is even more powerful than the fucking dictator. The second is a military power form, where the bureaucratic system and dictatorial power form a check and balance, meaning the two sides of power are relatively balanced. The third is when dictatorial power is highly concentrated, but the power of the bureaucratic system is extremely weak, and there is no fixed successor. These power relationships actually continue to influence the state of power transition. The current CCP transition clearly belongs to the third type, where the bureaucratic system is basically all.

Born from secretarial backgrounds, they are in a weak state. Those little dwarves in the Politburo, their positions were basically all promoted by this fucking idiot Xi Jinping, and most of them are from secretarial backgrounds. They have no troops in their hands, no territory managed for years, and even less their own purse. If such people encounter this fucking idiot Xi Jinping suddenly disappearing, then in their minds, they will definitely calculate an account first to weigh whether to fight for the throne. Let's put this account out and calculate it publicly. If these little dwarves stay in their current positions without moving, the benefits they can get every year are recorded as R. If they act first and succeed, they can get an extra portion, recorded as delta R. If they act and fail and are liquidated, what is lost? The position plus family assets plus personal freedom, this loss is recorded as L. There is another item: whoever sticks their head out first will be targeted by everyone first, and this cost is recorded as C. Finally, there is the chance of winning, recorded as Q. If you lie still, you can steadily get a benefit R. If you act first, the benefit you get if you win is r plus delta r, and if you lose, you lose l. Regardless of winning or losing, you have to pay this c first. Comparing the two sides, you can calculate a threshold, which is that the chance of winning q must be higher than (r + l + c) divided by (r + delta r + l). Only and only in this situation is it worth it to act first.

First of all, let's look at the losses of being liquidated. Let's calculate it based on a tenfold increase in the benefits of staying in office. This is actually not an exaggeration; if you fail, you're left with nothing, which is definitely more than tenfold. Therefore, this is a very, very conservative assumption. But if someone makes the first move and succeeds, they can get at most two shares of the benefits. The cost of standing out can be considered the risk: the numerator is 1 plus 10 plus 1, which equals 12; while the denominator is 1 plus 2 plus 10, which equals 13. 12 divided by 13 is 92%. What does this mean? It means you need to have more than a 92% certainty of success before making the first move to make it worthwhile. You might ask, for someone who has neither troops nor territory, where on earth can you find this 92% certainty?

It cannot be found. Therefore, everyone at the table calculates and arrives at the same answer, which is to stay put for now. Although the numbers of tenfold and two shares are assumptions we made rather than measured figures, the direction is definitely right, and the conclusion is bound to be: the greater the loss, the higher the threshold. Staying put is not the end of the story either; the decision-making mechanism among this group of people will most likely become an equal-weight cabinet of a collective. What is an equal-weight cabinet? It means that meetings require everyone to nod in agreement, and if even a single person shakes their head, the matter cannot go through. From this moment on, the CCP enters a state of de facto semi-paralysis. But with everyone staying put, is this situation stable? Definitely not stable, because there is one position at the table that is different from all the others, and that position is the discipline inspection in Xi Jinping's hands, namely the Changwei (secret police/intelligence agencies) system. What are the organizational characteristics of the CCP now? Well, I have summarized three characteristics: strong Changwei, weak administration; strong deterrence, weak consensus; strong power, weak capability. Well, the above three points are the basic features of the current CCP bureaucratic system.

Under this condition, the position of the head of the Changwei becomes even more hated. Let's look at the Soviet Union in 1953. On March 15, 1953, didn't Stalin slam his fist down and kick the bucket? Beria, who controlled the secret police, started moving and fighting for power that very day. What did he do? He merged the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense entirely into his own hands, putting the police, labor camps, and Kremlin guards all under Beria himself. Here comes the fun part: over the next few months, the most progressive person in the entire leadership was actually this head of the secret police. Why is he said to be progressive? Because on March 27 of that same year, Beria promoted a general amnesty, releasing about 1.2 million prisoners. Supposedly, this was loosening the ropes for everyone, right? What was the result? On June 26, during a meeting of the Presidium—the Presidium being the Politburo of the CPSU at the time—Marshal Zhukov and a few officers pushed the door right in, arrested Beria on the spot, and then subsequently he was executed by firing squad on December 23. From the moment Stalin breathed his last to the moment Beria was arrested was a total of only 113 days. Why did Beria have to die first? Because everyone else at the table didn't care what Beria wanted to do, but only what Beria was capable of doing. Beria had everyone's compromising material tightly in his grip; he could certainly pat his chest and say, "Hey, I won't use these materials." But who could guarantee that his words would count? There was simply no way, because there was no court, no higher authority, and no one who could guarantee it. So for the others, as long as this person still held the compromising materials and the guards, staying put themselves would not be safe.

There is also another account here, let's calculate it again. Suppose this bunch of losers continues to stay put, and then let the probability of being dealt with in the future by a dictatorial successor be denoted as pi, and let the probability that this group of losers unites to take this person down—well, this success probability—be denoted as rho. If you join the alliance and succeed, you get to keep 2, and if you fail, you lose 1. If you continue to stay put and are not dealt with, you keep r, but if you are dealt with, you likewise lose 1. Comparing both sides, the formula simplifies down in the end to just one line: rho plus pi is greater than 1. Under this circumstance, you should join. For example, if these people feel that the probability of being dealt with reaches 70%, then as long as the alliance achieves a winning probability of over 30%, you should go for it. 70% plus 30% exceeds 1, right? Do it! Just ponder these two numbers. Earlier, seizing power by yourself required a 92% certainty of success; now, uniting to take this person down only requires 30%. How did the threshold drop? Just because one thing changed: staying put is no longer safe either.

This number of 70% is likewise for demonstration purposes, but the rationale is also very solid, which is: the more compromising materials being held, the more people who are willing to unite. The late Ming dynasty played this out once too. On September 30, 1627, the Tianqi Emperor, Zhu Youxiao, passed away. Wei Zhongxian at the time controlled the entire Eastern Depot. The four Grand Secretaries in the cabinet all relied on Wei Zhongxian's political influence. After ascending the throne, Chongzhen first stabilized for two months, and then allowed low-ranking officials to submit memorials—meaning submitting memorials to impeach Wei Zhongxian. Not a single one of the four Grand Secretaries spoke up for Wei Zhongxian. In December, Wei Zhongxian was driven out of Beijing, and halfway there, he hanged himself. Total time: two and a half months.

Speaking of today, the people in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who handle arrests and those who manage files are not the same person; there are several different lines of authority. Discipline inspection is one line, political and legal affairs is another, the police (Public Security) is one, state security (MSS) is one, and there is another line that manages the Central Guard. My judgment is that this last line will definitely be the first one to be moved against. Why? Because if Xi Jinping were to suddenly drop dead, these guards would be the first to know. The personal safety of others is also in the hands of this line, and phone calls and documents must also pass through this line. So, this is an information hub; it is something on everyone's ledger, so the faction corresponding to this line is the highest. Hey, I am talking about the position, not the person. Whoever sits in that position is the target. How will they move? I judge that it won't be like the Soviet Union in 1953, where they rushed in to make arrests. The reason is not that the Chinese military doesn't want to, but what? It is because the CCP's military today, after round after round of purges, has few people left. Therefore, the safest method is: after Xi Jinping dies, as long as there is no collective signed order, no one will lead troops through the door. A more likely approach is to hold a meeting, issue a collective resolution, split the three powers of the guard, document circulation, and special case handling among three people, and then stop the cases currently being handled in batches, using this primarily to trade for the support of the bureaucratic system.

Why would the bureaucracy be willing to trade? Let's look at the data. Cadres managed by the CCP Central Committee have also suffered in recent years. 58 were investigated in 2024, 65 in 2025, and as of last month this year, it has already exceeded 50. It is highly probable that a record will be broken this year. Furthermore, just look at the number of cases filed by the Discipline Inspection Commission: from 700,000 to 800,000 the year before last, to 900,000 last year, it will definitely exceed one million this year. In the current CCP bureaucratic system, a sword hangs over everyone's head. Whoever can make this sword stop, the bureaucratic system will most likely recognize that person. This area is currently managed by Cai Qi and Zhou Hongxu. As soon as the situation changes for Xi Jinping, they will definitely be the first to fall. If the cabinet has a consensus on the matter of the secret police, it is only after this most dangerous position is dismantled that the process of selecting a person begins.

So who to choose? Choose the most capable one? On the contrary, let me analyze it for everyone. Does it make sense? After a new CCP leader takes office and stabilizes, what is the first thing they must do? It must be to replace people, that is, to replace disobedient old people with their own people. Coupled with the fact that the meat in the pot is getting less every year—from January to August this year, national land sale revenue fell by another 28.6%, which I have mentioned before. Anyone who proposes reform at this time is, to put it bluntly, adding meat to their own bowl from someone else's. Therefore, at that time, what the CCP Central Committee fears most is a master who has his own ideas, has means, and brings his own people. There are historical references for this as well. In 74 BC, Emperor Zhao of Han died, and he had no son. As a result, the General Huo Guang first installed Prince Liu He of Changyi. After Liu He entered Chang'an, he brought more than 200 of his own former subordinates. As soon as he sat down, he began to appoint his own people to official positions. As a result, he only lasted 27 days before Huo Guang deposed Liu He entirely, and those 200 people were all executed. The next person Huo Guang replaced him with was Liu Bingyi, who later became Emperor Xuan of Han. This person grew up among the common people and had no "own people" around him. Just savor Huo Guang's selection criteria: he didn't look at whether this person was stupid or whether his ability was strong; he looked at whether this person brought his own people. Under such circumstances, the weak cabinet group would instantly combine into a role like Huo Guang.

1908 in the late Qing Dynasty followed the same path. On November 15, 1908, Cixi died. The successor, Puyi, was only two years and nine months old, and the Regent Zaifeng was only 25 years old and had never led troops for a day. What the powerful figures at that time really did was behind the scenes. On January 2, 1909, they dismissed Yuan Shikai, who held the Beiyang New Army, and sent him back to his hometown. This is what a weak cabinet combined to achieve. Then Zaifeng's 24-year-old brother Zai Xun managed the navy, and his 22-year-old brother Zai Tao managed the Military Advisory Council. What is the Military Advisory Council equivalent to? It is more like the current General Staff Department. You can understand it this way. What exactly are these powerful figures aiming for? They are aiming for a court that does not have the ability to take back their privileges. The subsequent events have already been told in the Great Qing series; it was in October 1911 that things directly went wrong. The court could only invite people back according to Yuan Shikai's asking price.

So, what kind of person do the people at that table want? We can deduce this by following the order of fear. The thing they fear most is being arrested, so this person cannot have led troops, nor can they have managed discipline inspection or political and legal affairs. Just not being able to arrest people isn't enough. If this person has a power base cultivated over many years, and slowly replaces people with their own, they will still face the result of being purged. So, this person cannot have a power base. Even if both of these conditions are met, this person might still dig up old accounts, saying that past events were all done by you. So, what is the safest option? It is that for every major event in the past, this person has signed their name. Hey, once they start digging up old accounts, it will first land on their own head. Hua Guofeng in 1976 was exactly this kind of loser; he could only rely on what? He could only rely on that bullshit 'Two Whatevers' to maintain his position. Furthermore, it is best if this person doesn't even mention reform upon taking office, only continuity. Mediocre ability, keeping a low profile, and at the core, one thing: they cannot have their own faction, a bit like the feeling of Hu Jintao. Now, the only one left who meets the above conditions is Ding Xuexiang. But just choosing a weak one isn't safe enough, because people can change. Emperor Xuan of Han honestly waited until 68 BC when Huo Guang died, right? Two years later, he wiped out the entire Huo clan. So, I estimate another rule must be added, which is to split the three titles of General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Hey, that is, decentralization. Half of this rule is already in place. How is the constitution of the CCP written? It says that if the position of President is vacant, the Vice President succeeds. And the current Vice President, Han Zheng, is not a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. There is no automatic succession path for the Chairman of the Military Commission, and the only remaining publicly serving Vice Chairman of the Military Commission is that fucking idiot Zhang Youxia; he is nothing, having come from a political work background. There is a precedent for this kind of splitting. In 1953, when Stalin kicked the bucket, who was at the top? Malenkov. He took two positions as soon as he came up, but the time he enjoyed it was very short; nine days later, he was forced to hand one over. Someone selected this way can't arrest anyone, and can't replace anyone. Conversely, this person is the same; they can't command a single province.

Speaking of this, some friends will definitely ask, what about the military? Historically, at times like this, the final decision-maker is the one with the guns. In 1953, arresting Beria relied on Zhukov; in 1976, arresting the Gang of Four relied on Ye Jianying. Is there such a person today? No. How did the five people on the current CCP Central Military Commission disappear? I have told you all before; basically, the Central Military Commission has been thoroughly purged by the CCP, and the remaining Zhang Shengmin is useless. Since 2017, Zhang Shengmin has been in charge of military discipline inspection, which is still the work of the Eastern Depot (secret police); it is not the work of leading troops, so he does not have this capability. Isn't the current rule of the CCP military called the 'Chairman Responsibility System' or some bullshit? Doesn't this mean that all major matters are decided by the Chairman of the Military Commission alone? What is this system for? It is a way to prevent coups, with the intention of cutting off all horizontal connections between generals and concentrating command power in the hands of one person. If done this way, the cost for the military to stage a coup is very high. But if you want to be a referee, what do you need? You need someone whom all branches of the military respect, you need generals who can trust each other, and you need someone who can legitimately issue orders. These three things have been wiped out by the same Chairman Responsibility System. So what will the military do? It mainly depends on money. Look, the 2026 defense budget is 1.94 trillion, of which 98.5% is paid by the central government. Last year, defense spending accounted for 41.5% of the central government's expenditure, which means the military is the biggest recipient of central fiscal funds. As long as the central government can pay on time, the most cost-effective approach for the military is to recognize whoever can pay the military expenses, and then do nothing else. Some people worry that the military will become private armies of various provinces, but I think that the path of the late Qing Dynasty is not feasible for China. What was the situation in 1911? It was that the New Armies of each province were funded by the provinces themselves. Today's military spending is still paid by the central government itself.

If another scenario where things truly go wrong unfolds, it is that once military spending falls short, they will pick up the old trade of the Jiang Zemin era—namely, garrison troops turning around to do business with local entities. The CCP has a precedent for this, and they are extremely skilled at it. Before 1998, the military was allowed to engage in commerce on a large scale, primarily to supplement military expenditures. It was not officially halted until 1999. Just how rampant was it back then? Older Guangzhou residents all know of a company called Shunfa. In the early 1990s, there was a massive VCD pirated disc market in Panyu, Guangzhou, and these goods were basically all smuggled. Let me tell you, I am not exaggerating at all: how did they collect money? They never checked quantities, because the largest banknote back then was 10 yuan, so they just weighed it out on a scale; as long as the scale was accurate, the goods were handed right over to you. That was how things were sold back then, and those discs were basically all smuggled. What was the military's role? They provided cover by bidding under false pretenses. The transportation and unloading of the goods from the Shunfa Group were entirely outsourced to the Guangzhou Military Region. If any inspectors came up to check, they would just get beaten up on the spot—specifically, the military beating up these local civil servants. If you ask older Guangzhou residents, basically everyone knows about this. So when it comes to this kind of work, the CCP's military is not unfamiliar with it at all. Furthermore, Lai Changxing's Yuanhua case at the time also had the shadow of the military involved. Therefore, nobody needs to doubt that the CCP military has its eyes on military funding.

Now, if the military keeps its eyes on military funding, and military funding keeps its eyes on the central government's purse, then whose purse does the central government keep its eyes on? Primarily eight provinces. From January to August of this year, the central government's general public budget revenue was 7.01 trillion, and in these eight months, the central level itself only spent 2.82 trillion, accounting for about 40%, while the rest was allocated to local governments. Looking at the local governments, the money collected by localities themselves was 8.65 trillion, while what they spent was 15.33 trillion, leaving a gap of a full 6.68 trillion. How is this shortfall completely filled? It relies entirely on central government allocations and the issuance of debt. This year alone, the budget for transfer payments reached 10.42 trillion. And whose money is it that the central government pays out? According to public calculations, there are only eight provinces where what they hand over to the central government exceeds what they take back from it: Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, along with Shandong, Fujian, and Tianjin. Guangdong alone contributed over 1 trillion in fiscal revenue to the central government last year, while the transfer payments it took back amounted to 26.61 billion. To put it bluntly, whether the central government can disburse money depends on whether these eight provinces hand it over. And whether the other twenty-odd provinces can disburse money depends on whether the central government allocates funds. The most direct method for the central government to keep a province in line is to reshuffle personnel, but replacing a provincial party secretary when dealing with a faction where no one can be outmaneuvered requires something: it requires everyone to nod in agreement. Because every time someone is replaced, the balance of power on the table changes, there is always someone who will definitely shake their head, making a personnel change impossible. After that, provincial party secretaries become very difficult to rotate. When someone acts as an official in one locality for too long, they become integrated with the local bureaucracy. If personnel cannot be changed, then people must be arrested. However, as we mentioned earlier, making arrests relies on someone at the very top signing off, and right now, no one is willing to sign this document. So what remains is only the issue of money—specifically concrete issues like whether or not to allocate funds.

This tactic is effective for the twenty-odd provinces that survive on allocations, but for the eight paying provinces, the central government has to beg the localities. Although the CCP's debt is currently very high, it at least still possesses state power and the banking system, meaning overall debt can be dragged out as much as possible. But the cash needed to pay monthly salaries cannot be dragged out, and where does this portion of cash come from? It comes from taxes. I predict what kind of situation will emerge: value-added tax and enterprise income tax are split between the central government and the localities. The provincial governments can collect less of these split taxes from local enterprises, and in turn use fees that localities can monopolize entirely—such as state-owned enterprise profits and various fees on land—to claw the money back. This trick is actually not fresh either; from 1980 to 1993, the CCP engaged in something called

The money for diplomacy is the same, let's take pensions for example. What does the CCP demand? It demands that provinces with pension surpluses transfer this adjustment fund to the central government, but there are plenty of provinces that just drag their feet and refuse to transfer it. Once these few steps are completed, there is finally some cash in the local coffers. So, who will this money be paid to first? It must be paid to the local police, procuratorate, and courts first, and as long as it is linked to central government settlement, they will definitely delay it as long as they can. You see, there is a compliant excuse for every move, so what tricks does the central government have left at this point? There is only one trick left, which is to have the central bank buy government bonds, that is, to use money printing to cover it. Let's look at the accounts here; the local level has long been borrowing new debt to pay off old debt. From January to August this year, 85.5% of the principal of local government debt that matured was paid off by issuing new debt. If we calculate the cash flow for the current period, most of them are already substantially bankrupt. We have also talked about the credit issue, but the central government's own books have not reached this point yet. At the end of last year, the balance of government bonds at the central level was 41.2 trillion, equivalent to 29.4% of GDP. The ten-year government bond yield on September 30 was 1.68%, which means that the current central government is not having a hard time borrowing money. So it's not that the CCP has no money to bail out, the problem is whether a central government that no one listens to has the ability to provide this bailout? If it really relies on printing money to bail out, the nominal appropriations are preserved, but the money itself becomes worthless. Moreover, the RMB exchange rate project is what that fucking Emperor You Xi wants, not necessarily what they want. If the money is worthless, or if the money simply cannot be allocated, who will be the first to not receive it? Here we have to look at the order of payment at the county level. The rule of county finance is that personnel with official establishment are paid first, while personnel outside the establishment and various subsidies are ranked behind. Most auxiliary police and grid workers are outside the establishment. There are now 4 million grids divided across China, with 4.5 million grid workers, and this tail of the team has now begun to break. What was the result of the CCP's own audit last year? 37 counties have already begun to default on this part of the money on a large scale, involving about 550,000 people, totaling 1.68 billion. We also talked about this in the county-level episode, so don't think the CCP's stability maintenance is so awesome; it is a system that pushes the buck, and the effect is not very good.

What is the situation further up? Official documents will still be operated as if nothing is wrong; for example, if the higher-ups issue a document, the lower levels will also hold meetings to convey it. But everyone also knows that the maintenance of this highly repressive state depends on what? It also depends on the dependency relationship between local and central finance. If you, the central government, only move your mouth, then in all likelihood, the local government will not implement those things from the central government either. So, talking is fine, but doing it is impossible, because you didn't give me money, and the central government does not have a single individual capable of punishing this passive execution. When the time comes, every official will use regulations to protect themselves, and adding it all up, the entire system will come to a halt. From 1990 to 1991, the Soviet republics did exactly this; they kept the tax money directly in their own hands and then found a bunch of excuses to cope. We can arrange the timeline! If that fucking Xi Jinping dies, what will be done in the first month? It must be blocking the news and arranging the seating order. What to look at then? Look at who is ranked at the front of the funeral committee list. Once the seating order is set, the line in charge of the secret police and guards will become the target. So the next half year will be spent dealing with this line. Beria took 113 days, and Wei Zhongxian took 75 days. After dismantling this egg, the Central Committee plenary session must be held to elect the person who no one can handle. The person elected is likely unable to command the provinces. So from the ninth month to two years after Xi Jinping kicks the bucket, it is the stage where these eight provinces calculate how to keep the money. If the money is kept in the province, then the central government's appropriations will be worthless. In two to three years, the grassroots will begin to default on wages on a large scale. You see, it was only 35 months from the death of Empress Dowager Cixi to the Wuchang Uprising. I use this as a ruler; if the step of the provinces keeping the money happens, there is absolutely no turning back. Because if provincial finance can turn around on its own, the central government has no tools to take back this financial power.

There is another possibility, which is what? It is to select a fucking idiot who looks relatively weak and harmless, but who will slowly grow in power on their own. When Stalin became General Secretary in 1922, his colleagues in the Soviet Communist Party only saw Stalin as someone doing clerical work, a fucking idiot. When this fucking idiot Xi Jinping came to power back then, he was also a candidate acceptable to all sides, but my view is this: to grow in power, you must have meat to distribute; you can only buy a group of new followers if you have meat. But the current situation is that the meat in the pot is decreasing, so this path is much harder to walk than before. Then there is the speed; three years is a fast way to go, while the slow way is like Yugoslavia. On May 4, 1980, Tito passed away, and then eight people took turns serving as chairman, changing every year. The result was that regarding the 20 billion US dollars in foreign debt, no one dared to make a decision, dragging it out for a full eleven years until it fell apart in 1991. Some might still say, what about the common people taking to the streets? Your estimate is not very good. Scholars have counted the dictatorial leaders who were driven from power, and the time span is quite large, from 1946 to 2028. Among the 303 cases where the method of stepping down could be clearly identified, 205 were driven out by their own people, and only 32 were overthrown by the common people, accounting for only 10 percent. But the common people can do one thing, which is to infinitely increase the costs of this system. Don't look at the CCP now, it seems quite cocky, but its finances are actually highly fragile, relying mainly on those eight coastal provinces. So if Xi Jinping croaks, it will most likely create a situation that will accelerate the disintegration of the CCP. At this time, the common people will probably catch their breath, and the situation within the CCP will be that the party leader cannot consolidate power, and those below dare not make political gambles, let alone bet their chips on one person. While the efficiency of the bureaucratic system is already low, another chunk will be lost. When the benefit function and the risk function become increasingly inverted, the organization will implode. This is not a deduction; this is a law. So Xi Jinping, add some vinegar, add some oil, and get ready to croak. Alright, that is all for today's blabbering. If you like my show, hit the bell; if you want to support me, you can join the membership channel. The membership channel has 4G of in-depth programs every month. Welcome to join the group of good people. See you in the next episode.