[US Trending] Xi's “Succession Countdown” Has Begun | Four Years On, Beijing Still Has “Bridge Watchers”? | Big Data Finds You to Pay Social Insurance: Buy Rice First, or Pay Up First? | 18 Stability-Maintenance Measures for the Central Plenum? | If You Can't Get It, Belittle It? China's “Nobel Prize Complex”
This episode discusses the current situation where bridge guards are still stationed at the overpass on the East Third Ring Road in Beijing, and reports on the mockery by netizens triggered by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security's "big data talent search" to urge social security payments, as well as the controversy in Guangdong over raising the social security base and demanding retroactive payments. At the same time, it reviews the official Chinese attitude of contradiction toward the Nobel Prize, and the issues of BYD's Hefei factory restricting employee dining and providing meager work meals. Following that, it focuses on the analysis by foreign media regarding discussions on Xi's "countdown to succession" and the risks of power transition, exposes the 18 stability maintenance measures prepared by the CCP for the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, and inventories the absurd phenomenon of the pension gap between farmers and those inside the system, along with netizen commentary.
Video link:
Full text:
Bringing you the voices from outside the Great Firewall. Hello viewers, welcome to today's America. On October 13, 2022, the brave Peng Lifa hung four banners in Beijing, protesting the General Secretary and his zero-COVID lockdowns, and was subsequently arrested by the CCP. His slogans—"We want food, not PCR tests; we want freedom, not lockdowns; we want respect, not lies; we want votes, not a ruler; we want to be citizens, not slaves"—appeared again a month later during the White Paper Movement. At the time, netizens called Peng Lifa the general secretary's most feared person. Four years later, on October 12, netizens filmed that bridge guards were still stationed at the overpass on the East Third Ring Road in Beijing. A Twitter user said: Saluting Mr. Peng Lifa for his righteous act. This is a true democratic fighter! Daring to defy universal condemnation. Opening the prelude to the White Paper Movement, ending pandemic lockdowns, his contribution is immeasurable! The number one democratic figure of our time!
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced a "big data search" to find uninsured individuals and mobilize them to enroll in social security. Afterward, it drew collective mockery from netizens inside the firewall. On October 13, netizens flooded the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security with direct messages. The content of the direct messages included: "I heard you are looking for me. The boss who didn't pay my social security over a decade ago, I can take you to find him." "I don't have money to pay for social security. Can you have the bank lend me two or three hundred thousand, and I'll pay it all at once? As for repayment, I'll slowly pay the bank back once I receive my pension. You go pave the way for me, and won't we have everything?" The netizen below posted a video showing that their rice jar was hitting rock bottom and asked: "Should I buy rice first? Or pay social security first?" Netizens used the government's mobilization for social security to demand a job from the authorities.
The following blogger points out that while big data can precisely track people who haven't paid social insurance, it seems to fail to show the same efficiency when it comes to issues like missing persons or telecommunication fraud. When people are out of work and unable to afford social insurance, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chooses to kick them when they're down. The Guangdong government adjusted the lower limit of the pension insurance contribution base this year, raising it from the original 4,775 to 5,521. Even more absurdly, the local government also demanded that the difference for the months from January to September be retroactively paid. Netizens complained: "The rent went up in October, and now they want me to make up the difference for the previous 9 months?"
The CCP has always had a sour grapes attitude toward the Nobel Prize. In October 2025, after no Chinese individuals won the Nobel Prize in Natural Sciences, the Beijing Daily published a commentary titled "Winning Foreign Awards Is Not an Indicator to Define China's Level of Development," and criticized outsiders for using the number of Nobel Prizes to measure China's innovation capability. However, the CCP also seems very eager to brush against the Nobel Prize. On October 8, Huanqiu.com released a video on Bilibili reviewing the "Chinese affinity" of multiple Nobel laureates, putting "Nobel prize call answered by a Chinese student" at the top of the title. It also reported that this student "personally handed his advisor's mobile phone number to the Nobel Committee." Netizens roasted: "Personally handing the advisor's mobile phone number to the Nobel Committee can also be counted as a Chinese element?"
On October 9, the official propaganda channel of the China Association for Science and Technology published an article emphasizing that the Nobel Prize "is worthy of respect, but not a universal yardstick," and cannot comprehensively measure a country's scientific and technological strength. Netizens joked: "The World Cup is worthy of respect, but it is not a universal yardstick for measuring Chinese football."
Last week, the braking pedal of a Huawei 800 snapping sparked skepticism about "grudge products"—meaning that when front-line grassroots employees' compensation is squeezed to the limit, the quality of products and services is likely to drop sharply. Next, let's look at how domestic car companies treat their employees. On October 14, in order to prevent employees from dining outside the factory, the Hefei BYD Phase IV factory allegedly closed relevant entrances and exits, forcing employees to dine in the factory cafeteria. Netizens complained: "It's the exact same routine as forcing people to eat in the elementary school cafeteria back in the day." Since BYD doesn't let employees go out to eat, what is the quality of the food in BYD's cafeteria like? This employee displayed BYD's so-called "15-yuan meal standard" work meal: two vegetarian dishes, plus a piece of bone with very little meat. The employee complained: "After eating it, I have even less strength."
Next, we enter the foreign media looking at China segment. Australian sinologist Geremie Bar once made a remark: "Dictators all face an inescapable dilemma." That is, once they seize power, the countdown to losing it also begins. The physical problems shown by General Secretary Xi during the Trump-Xi summit have made the outside world realize that Xi's own countdown has also begun.
A senior British journalist and China expert with over 35 years of experience reporting on Asia, who also participated in winning the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, recently wrote an article titled, "General Secretary Xi's 'Countdown to Death' Will Become a Global Political Spectacle." The article states: In his later years, Mao Zedong suffered from prolonged illnesses, and his mental and political judgments became increasingly extreme, ultimately pushing China to the brink of civil war. Deng Xiaoping's departure was relatively peaceful, but in the ten years before his death, China also experienced violent political turmoil, including the 1989 Tiananmen protests. And now, the "countdown to death" surrounding General Secretary Xi has also begun.
Of course, the biggest difference between today and the past is that China has become one of the centers of global politics and economy. As General Secretary Xi gradually ages, the outside world's attention to his health and the transfer of power will become a global political spectacle. It may affect global financial markets, the flow of international investment capital, and even alter the defense strategies of various countries. In other words, China's internal political risks have now become risks for the whole world. At 73 years old this year, his pace has noticeably slowed down. When heading to the United States to hold a summit with Trump, the sight of him being helped by Peng Liyuan down the aircraft stairs made him look somewhat frail. He also requested the White House to prepare a special lounge for him; his meeting time with Trump was also shorter than the outside world expected.
However, more worthy of attention than Xi Jinping's physical health is a problem within China's political system: who will rule China after Xi? For any authoritarian regime, the transfer of supreme power is one of the most dangerous moments. And the dilemma Xi faces is particularly thorny. If he designates a successor now, hoping that the person will continue to implement his policies and safeguard his political legacy in the future, he may trigger an intense power struggle prematurely. After all, if a successor appears while Xi himself is not yet ready to relinquish power, it creates a conflict. But if he delays designating a successor, he may leave behind a dangerous power vacuum. More troublesome is that no matter whom Xi chooses, he will likely have to select from officials who are relatively unfamiliar to the outside world. This is because the current members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee are already too old to be long-term successors. This leads to a series of questions: Can a successor suddenly promoted to the top level command the obedience of the military? Can they control the entire Chinese Communist Party? Or, will Xi turn around and strike at the successor he handpicked himself? Mao Zedong once designated Liu Shaoqi as his successor, but Liu was later defeated in political struggles, held in solitary confinement, and eventually died under extremely harsh conditions. Deng Xiaoping also replaced two successors before finally settling on Jiang Zemin. In recent years, Xi has continuously purged high-ranking officials around him; even some of his close, once-trusted former subordinates have not escaped the purges. The author believes this is not a good omen for any official who might become Xi's number two. China may now be entering a long period of political uncertainty. An American legal scholar and senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations predicts that China may be experiencing a long political twilight. During this period, the economy remains weak, social discontent continues to rise, and the government relies increasingly on so-called "grid management" to maintain control. But the impact of Xi's succession problem likely goes beyond China's borders. Brown University professor Tyler Jost and a Yale University professor wrote in Foreign Affairs last year that the power transition struggle within the CCP is very likely to affect China's foreign policy, especially the Taiwan issue. Xi has consistently made achieving cross-strait unification a key political goal. If Xi feels more and more strongly that the countdown to his succession is approaching, he may be more willing to take risks on the issue of war. As for how the Xi era will ultimately end, it is unlikely to be as calm as when Deng Xiaoping passed away. When Deng died, the power transition had been basically completed, and a relatively institutionalized mechanism for leadership succession had been established. Therefore, his death did not cause much of a stir in Chinese politics. The end of the Xi era may instead be closer to the situation after Mao Zedong's death. After Mao died, a bloodless coup occurred within the top ranks of the CCP. The People's Liberation Army also intervened in this power struggle; Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and other members of the "Gang of Four" were arrested and later publicly tried. In fact, before Xi took power in 2012, signs of similar political turmoil had already appeared in Chinese politics. At that time, the carefully arranged power transition was impacted by the arrest of Bo Xilai, a key rival of Xi within the Politburo. Rumors even spread wildly on the internet that a military coup had occurred in Beijing, including tanks entering the streets of Beijing and gunshots heard near Zhongnanhai. However, these coup rumors were never confirmed. After taking power, Xi brought China back to an era of highly centralized personal rule. Today, he stands at the pinnacle of power. Next year, Xi is very likely to begin his fourth term. But the more power is concentrated, the harder the succession problem becomes to solve. What must be faced now is precisely the consequence of the political system he built with his own hands. As Deng Xiaoping once warned: basing the fate of a country on the prestige of one or two individuals is very unhealthy and very dangerous. It is fine as long as nothing happens, but once something goes wrong, it becomes uncontrollable. Dear viewers, once the countdown for Xi reaches its end, will China usher in a smooth transfer of power, or a political storm that will affect the whole world? Please leave your comments in the section below.
How many people does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) need to maintain stability just to hold a Central Committee plenary session? Recently, the news outlet "Explosive Weekly," which investigates the inside story of Chinese politics, claimed to have obtained an internal document from the CCP Central Committee, exposing 18 stability maintenance (weiwen) measures prepared by the CCP for the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee on October 26. The authenticity of this document cannot currently be independently verified.
The first stability maintenance measure is to monitor domestic and foreign forces identified as opposing the CCP, collect intelligence, and prevent them from contacting each other or organizing activities. Second, strictly monitor foreign embassy and consulate personnel, foreign journalists, and members of non-governmental organizations, especially their activities when traveling to so-called sensitive areas. Third, prevent anyone from displaying anti-CCP slogans through flash mob protests, electronic screens, banners, or drones. Fourth, focus on workers, women, and young students to prevent large-scale gatherings not approved by the authorities. Fifth, strengthen religious control, especially by preventing underground Catholic churches and Christian house churches from holding unauthorized gatherings. Sixth, monitor political and social instability factors that may arise during the transition of provincial party committees. Seventh, strengthen counter-terrorism, focusing on monitoring personnel, transportation entrances and exits, buildings, dangerous goods, and public places. Strictly enforce Beijing's no-fly zone regulations, with a focus on preventing illegal flights of small aircraft such as drones. Ninth, strictly prevent petitioners from entering Beijing. Require Hebei, Tianjin, and other areas surrounding Beijing to cooperate in screening and intercepting key personnel at highways, railways, airports, and other access routes to Beijing.
Tenth, prevent mass protests. Focus on those who have suffered investment losses, veterans, real estate rights defenders, ride-hailing drivers, taxi drivers, couriers, and food delivery workers. The document also specifically requires preventing workers from organizing strikes, forming unions, or holding mass demonstrations. Eleventh, investigate conflicts involving families, neighbors, and unpaid wages, and strengthen the management of groups such as those with mental disorders, those released from prison, and troubled minors to prevent extreme violent incidents. Twelfth, strengthen joint patrols by the police and the People's Armed Police, focusing on inspections of government agencies, shopping malls, stations, airports, parks, and squares. Thirteenth, strictly control firearms, explosive and flammable materials, dangerous chemicals, and express delivery logistics channels. Fourteenth, conduct special rectification of addictive substances and other items that may cause danger to prevent them from flowing into Beijing. Fifteenth, investigate public safety hazards such as traffic, fire, floods, landslides, and mudslides. Sixteenth, strengthen the security management of detention centers, prisons, and discipline inspection and supervision case-handling venues. Seventeenth, implement 24-hour monitoring of domestic and foreign social media platforms to quickly discover and handle sensitive information, and block or delete political rumors and content deemed harmful by the authorities. Eighteenth, closely monitor livelihood and rights defense topics, and quickly trace the identities of and legally handle those deemed by the authorities to be engaging in malicious hype, inciting gatherings, or spreading harmful information. In addition, the document also requires relevant departments to have staff on duty 24 hours a day and to report the stability maintenance situation to superiors before 6 p.m. every day. Report if there is an incident; report that all is well if there is nothing to report.
These 18 measures, ranging from foreign journalists to house churches, from workers demanding unpaid wages to real estate rights defenders, and from drones to social media circles, have brought almost the entire society under control. The CCP is holding an internal party meeting, yet it is guarding against the common people.
Next, let's look at a few absurd videos. This talented blogger artistically commented on the current state of Chinese society. In the video, a person in a suit is riding on the back of a farmer, and the two are operating farm tools together. A netizen joked: "Thank you, leader, for spurring me on and letting me constantly improve and grow." Another netizen said: "Actually, he is carrying several people." In 2026, the national unified minimum standard for Chinese farmers' pensions is 163 yuan per person per month. So, what about the pensions of the leadership class riding on the backs of farmers?
Below, an aunt within the CCP system proudly announces that her monthly pension is 27,000 yuan, and the money has even grown mold. Netizens lamented: On one side is the "universal insurance" that is being urged and collected by all means, for fear that the water in the pool is not enough; on the other side is the huge pension at the top of the system's dividends, where the "money has grown mold because it cannot be spent."
At the end of the show, we enter the netizen interaction segment. A comment under the topic of using big data to track people down for social insurance said: By the time you’ve paid enough social insurance and it’s time to collect it, they will have already pulled out, and you won’t even be able to find anyone; otherwise, they’ll just change the policy on you and introduce a new rule. How could you ever outsmart them? Don't be foolish. Simon Zhang pointed out: Given the current survival environment behind the Great Firewall, it's not even certain you'll live long enough to collect a pension. With all kinds of pollution, toxic food, medical insurance that only reimburses traditional Chinese medicine, and the 996 work schedule overdrawing your health, this place is worse than hell itself! Another said: The Communist Party is starting to grab money. Before, it only targeted the rich, but now it treats everyone equally, and not a single one can escape. I really wonder how much longer the Chinese people can endure this! Today's US trending topics end here. Thank you all for watching. Audience friends,
If you like our show, please help by liking and subscribing,
and help us spread these voices from outside the Great Firewall further.
In addition, friends who want to further support our channel
can consider joining the membership of US-China Benchmarking. Until next time,
see you there.