Fire in Xi Jinping's Backyard: Did Huang Qifan Implicate Xi Yuanping and Qi Qiaoqiao? Li Qiang Takes Office Early, Leaving No Chance for Hu Chunhua? CCP's 18 Secret Orders on Stability Maintenance Exposed! Xiaomi's Brakes Malfunction Too! (Old Beijing Teahouse / Episode 1775 / 2026 / 10/16)

This episode mainly discusses several recent hot topics in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officialdom and society. First, it analyzes the Huang Qifan case and rumors involving high-level relatives such as Xi Yuanping and Qi Qiaoqiao, while discussing Li Qiang taking office in a high-profile manner and the power struggle ahead of the Fifth Plenary Session; next, it exposes the eighteen secret stability maintenance (weiwen) documents issued by the Office of the Leading Group for Political Security and Social Stability Work of the CCP Central Committee along with the "4-15 mechanism"; finally, it reviews social and business events such as the quality controversy over the brake pedal of Huawei's Zunjie car and the brake booster failure of Xiaomi's car.

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As the saying goes, the CCP officialdom is getting livelier and livelier. The X account [Sinking Power] reposted a Xinhua News Agency report: Li Qiang delivered a video speech at the opening ceremony of the new Yalu River Bridge between China and North Korea. Below was a large photo of Li Qiang, with the North Korean Kim family village flag on one side and the West Korean Xi family village flag on the other. Li Qiang wore an honest and simple smile, standing right there in the middle, giving off completely the vibe of a miniature state chairman Xi Jinping. [Sinking Power] left a sigh, "The road to North Korea is getting smoother and smoother." Throwing out these words hits two birds with one stone: on one hand, the opening of the Yalu River Bridge indeed makes the road to North Korea smoother; on the other hand, this pomp surrounding Li Qiang's exclusive official announcement continually solidifies that he is Xi Jinping's undisputed successor, and he has already begun taking office and testing the waters in advance. So, will Li Qiang, who takes over as general secretary of the party and state chairman, march bravely toward Pyongyang under the command of Xi Jinping, who retains the title of chairman of the Central Military Commission? This prospect is simply terrifyingly wonderful. Netizens browsed through the webpage of the CCTV big pants building and said, "The entire Xinwen Lianbao is all about him, a stark contrast to Li Keqiang." Below that, besides "Li Qiang delivered a video speech at the opening ceremony of the new Yalu River Bridge," there was also Li Qiang meeting the President of Botswana, and Li Qiang taking a photo with the President of Botswana. Just look at this: under the premise that Li Qiang has been repeatedly sidelined, demoted, and heavily suppressed by Xi Jinping for quite a few years, he has unexpectedly become the darling and focus figure of the disaster television station. Even if the onlookers didn't drop their jaws, they would still be stunned—what is going on, has the political climate changed? Li Qiang secretly rejoiced while expressing that his authority had suddenly risen, and being illuminated by the 2000-degree spotlight made him feel a bit light-headed.

Well, a smile keeps you young, so new tea friends quickly click [Subscribe] and the little bell. Welcome to join the tea house's joyful journey, look at the world from a different angle with the brothers, and make your mood better. Note that subscription is free, and pressing the subscribe button brings a steady stream of laughter. Now, back to the story. As Huang Qifan was officially announced to have been taken down, and rumors swarmed that Standing Committee-level high officials Han Zheng and Li Zhanshu's children were in trouble, and Wang Huning and Li Xi were interviewed, Li Qiang's high-profile promotion felt a bit too abrupt. Anyway, when things are abnormal, there must be demons. Today, Liu Zhuo will try to sort out a certain possibility of this for you. Everyone on Earth knows that with Huang Qifan's downfall, the storm eye is in Zhongnanhai. Before Huang Qifan, it was hard to imagine the downfall of a municipality's mayor dragging in four members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee: Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, Li Xi, and Han Zheng. Such a situation could literally seat a table for mahjong. However, what deserves high-lighting and the shout of "attention, attention" is that Xi Jinping's biological younger brother, Xi Yuanping, unexpectedly appeared on the involved list. Even more noteworthy is that his biological sister, Qi Qiaoqiao, is also in it. This matter is huge. This is a major case involving financial capital, officials' families, and the top-tier power network of the CCP, where pulling a single hair moves the whole body. If handled poorly, both Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan might go down together. A mere Huang Qifan is going to stir up Zhongnanhai, or rather the two pools of spring water in the entire financial system, keeping so many high-ranking officials and nobles awake at night. This result completely exceeds the brain computing power of Xi, because according to the whistleblower Yin Ke, to handle the "Huang Qifan case," Xi Jinping has mobilized extremely rare personnel deployment. What are they? The Chongqing Municipal Government, the National Development and Reform Commission, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Chongqing Bank, Southwest Securities, and multiple state-owned enterprises drew backbone personnel to form 17 special investigation groups, fully entering major core departments. It was quite a serious and bloody affair, and the results were remarkable. After Huang Qifan and his son Huang Ranfei were taken away, in just a few days, Huang Qifan confessed a list of interests with extremely wide connections. On this list, Xi Yuanping and Qi Qiaoqiao were prominently featured, not to mention Huang Qifan's only legitimate son, Huang Ranfei. Upon investigation, this "favored son of heaven" who graduated from the Fudan University Department of Finance was the "chief business partner" of Wang Huning's children, Li Zhanshu's daughter Li Qianxin, and Han Zheng's daughter Han Xue. To put it bluntly, he was a "dedicated money-laundering tool" used by the children of high-ranking power elites to cash out state assets by exploiting paternal power. Huang Ranfei had long been operating supply chain finance, industrial capital, and enterprise IPO businesses in Shenzhen and the Greater Bay Area. Some viewpoints speculate that when Huang Ranfei was conducting capital operations in Shenzhen on behalf of certain interest groups, he had deep interest intertwinings with affiliated companies or agents of Xi Yuanping, Qi Qiaoqiao, and others, commonly known as "white gloves."

Here comes the question: why would Xi Jinping take heavy action to deal with an outdated politician who had interests intertwined with both his biological younger brother and biological sister? Even if Xi Jinping were petty and unhappy about Huang Qifan being all cozy and smooth with his arch-rival Bo Xilai, he wouldn't go as far as ignoring the consequences and sacrificing his family's interests to vent a personal grudge. To complete this chain, one needs to pay attention to the timing of the incident: the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session, which is the high-incidence period of power struggles at the very top of the party, and also the best time for various factions to launch intensive moves and stab from the dark. If the Huang Qifan case really burns towards Xi Yuanping, it cannot be ruled out that other factions within the party, especially elder forces like Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan, forced Xi to face the corruption evidence of the Xi family, thereby forcing Xi Jinping that since he had the courage to "break the term limit," please also break the rule that "the law does not apply to the family members of the current supreme leader." Baozi was cornered by the elders. Understanding this background, Xi Jinping suddenly pushed henchman Li Qiang to the forefront, also pushing Ding Xuexiang out to form a cabinet structure of General Secretary and State President Li Qiang, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, and Premier Ding Xuexiang, which provides a smooth explanation. The anti-Xi forces, elder faction, and Youth League faction took advantage of the topic around the Fifth Plenary Session, intentionally using Huang Qifan to drag out Xi Jinping's immediate family members, forcing Xi Jinping to make concessions and return certain important powers to Youth League crown prince candidates like Hu Chunhua and others. To avoid this situation, Xi Jinping bit the bullet and decentralized power in advance, lifting the most obedient and submissive Li Qiang to the position, occupying the chair to block the noise of occupying the latrine without doing anything, thus turning passivity into initiative and taking a step back to stabilize the basic circle of power. As for Ding Xuexiang, according to Yin Ke, Ding Xuexiang 100% defected to Xi Jinping. In October 2017, he severed all substantive ties and interest deliveries with Jiang Zemin's family, and was scolded by Jiang Mianheng as an ungrateful white-eyed wolf, so Xi is still satisfied and trusts him. As for Wang Huning, Li Xi, and Han Zheng, they all belong to the type of opportunists who run wherever the wind blows hardest, and Old Xi feels no psychological pressure to sacrifice them. Let's have an emergency poll, tea friends: do you think Li Qiang will successfully ascend to the top this time? Candidate answers: 1. Yes, 2. No, 3. Don't know / Observing. Quickly type the numbers in the comment section.

Yesterday I talked about the nine new Beijing measures, which looked like a state of extreme nervousness and paranoia—so much for the "four self-confidences," right? Well, something that demonstrates those "four self-confidences" even more has arrived. On October 12, the overseas "Explosive Point Weekly" exclusively exposed a classified document titled "Notice on Doing a Good Job in Maintaining Security and Stability During the 20th Central Committee's Fifth Plenary Session." Which department issued it? The Office of the Leading Group for Maintaining Political Security and Social Stability of the CCP Central Committee. This office sent it to every nerve ending of the public security, procuratorate, judiciary, and state security systems across all provinces and cities nationwide. The document lists a total of 18 specific stability maintenance and security measures, each targeting a specific group of people. Let's put it this way: the scope of prevention and the extreme nature of the methods in these 18 regulations have reached the point of seeing enemies everywhere; it can be called the culmination of the Party's comprehensive control over society. It first stipulates a nearly draconian "daily reporting mechanism," requiring all localities and departments across the country to report the day's situation to the central authorities by 6:00 PM every day, explicitly demanding that they "report the situation if there is one, and report peace if there is none." Think about it: if a grassroots official must report to their superiors every day that "it is very safe here," then when they encounter mass petitions or emergencies, their first reaction will absolutely not be to solve the problem, but to cover it up at all costs. So, who exactly is on this list of people the CCP considers potential "national security threats"? Breaking it down carefully, it becomes clear: the potential threats are "you, me, and him"—us, the leeks. The first category being guarded against are "people with interest-based grievances." Article 10 of the document explicitly points out that preventing the "gathering of interest-based groups" should be the "top priority." Who exactly are they guarding against? Those who have suffered investment losses, such as those who bought unfinished homes or failed wealth management products; veterans who cannot get their money; and the so-called "three vehicles and two workers," which refers to ride-hailing drivers, truck drivers, taxi drivers, delivery workers, and food delivery riders. These are all the most vulnerable groups. The document also specifically emphasizes keeping a close eye on any signs of them "forming unions" or "inciting strikes." Listen to that—this is truly bullying the grassroots people for not knowing the Party's history of how it rose to power. If you open the history books, you will see that in the early days of the Party, the CCP made organizing and leading the labor movement and establishing industrial unions its core fundamental task. The Party was founded in July 1921, and in August of that same year, it established the China Labor Secretariat, the general organ for openly leading the labor movement. From January 1922 to February 1923, the CCP led and launched the first climax of the Chinese labor movement. In these 13 months, more than 100 strikes of various sizes broke out across the country, with over 300,000 workers participating. That was back then. Look at how the Communist Party did nothing but "endanger national security" and "subvert state power" when it was in the opposition, but once it became a one-party dictatorship, it immediately changed its face: strikes are not allowed, and unions must be led by the Party. Furthermore, has everyone noticed that the people the Party guards against first are the most grassroots, the hardest-working, and the ones hit hardest by the economic downturn? The CCP, which claims to "serve the people wholeheartedly," does not go to solve the commission issues of ride-hailing platforms or the lack of social security for delivery workers; instead, it treats the grassroots people as class enemies to be guarded against with all its might. Sigh, come to think of it, the Party also knows that when the cattle and horses of the whole society cannot even eat their fill or pay their mortgages, demanding unpaid wages and defending rights can turn into a spark that "subverts state power" at any minute, triggering a prairie fire. The second category being guarded against are "people with organizational capabilities." Articles 4 and 5 of the document require keeping a close eye on labor groups, women's groups, and young students, strictly preventing any "large-scale gatherings of non-official organizations," while strengthening control over underground Catholic churches and Christian house churches. The Communist Party rose to power by organizing student movements and labor movements, so it knows the power of organization better than anyone. What you believe in is not very important, and how poor you are is even less important; what is most important is that you remain a scattered pile of sand, with everyone being an enemy to everyone else. The third category being guarded against are "people who can bring problems into Beijing." It requires strict control over people petitioning in Beijing through cross-regional police cooperation on highways, railways, and civil aviation, leveraging the capital's "moat"—that is, the role of Hebei and Tianjin surrounding Beijing—to resolutely block all unstable factors outside the capital. Well, that's great; now the black-clad dogs who intercept petitioners can "kill people and set fires" with a clear conscience. The fourth category being guarded against is also very broad: "people who can disseminate information." It requires strict control over foreign journalists and personnel of foreign embassies and consulates in China to prevent them from "spying and collecting intelligence." In particular, because "preventing the people's mouths is more dangerous than preventing a river," it requires 7x24 monitoring on the internet, and for netizens who spread so-called harmful information, it demands "rapid location and identification" based on the "4-15 mechanism." Some people may not know that the Celestial Empire has a "4-15 mechanism" used for online public opinion control. The "15" here refers to 15 minutes, meaning that within 15 minutes after a "public opinion event" or information that might "affect the stability of the political situation" appears, the system must complete data collection, preliminary verification, hierarchical assessment, and report directly to superiors or relevant departments.

"4" refers to 4 hours. Within 4 hours of public opinion erupting, cross-departmental coordination must be implemented to precisely block, delete, or take down rumors and information harmful to the Party. At the same time, relevant units should basically clarify the facts and prepare authoritative statements to achieve "online and offline synchronized" physical handling, becoming the "first definer" of sudden incidents. Now you know why some hot topics are silenced so quickly; it turns out there is a whole set of stability maintenance (weiwen) logic behind it that is precise to the minute. If you ask me, building a makeshift hospital in a few days during the pandemic was really nothing; the "4-15 mechanism" is the true "China speed" with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) characteristics. There is another point that is quite ironic: it requires strict prevention of reactionary slogans being projected onto large public electronic screens in cities, and preventing drones from "flying illegally," etc. This is clearly being scared to death by the "Remove the National Traitor Xi Jinping" banner and the small drone hitting the "China Zun" tower—"there are always unruly people trying to harm me." After reading this notice that guards against this and that, I suddenly understand the phrase "the streets of Beijing are full of old fogies." Because when you control people to death, it naturally leads to young people not coming to Beijing and young people in Beijing leaving. The dual effect of these two results is self-evident: of course, the old fogies will occupy Beijing. Xi the Steamed Bun (Xi Jinping) implies that whether a city has vitality or not is not important, and whether there are old fogies or not is not important; safety is the top priority, and stability overrides everything, old fogies included. But I must timidly ask: if you keep increasing the pressure on a pressure cooker but seal all the steam vents, are you heading for an explosion?

Recently, "Far Ahead" has once again proven with its solid strength that so-called national enterprises are simply enterprises that professionally screw over their own nation, with no exceptions. Over the past few days, the scandal regarding the three consecutive fractures of the brake pedal of the Huawei Maextro has caused an uproar. Unsurprisingly, the problematic vehicles were not recalled; instead, Douchedi's videos and posts denouncing Huawei were taken down or made unplayable first. Look here, it really won't open; this one opens, but this one really won't open. Isn't it surprising, isn't it unexpected? However, given the overwhelming public opinion, the Party's mouthpiece, People’s Daily, began to step in to deflect fire for "Far Ahead," claiming that it was all "the fault of hastily produced cars." Since People’s Daily entered the arena, Huawei also had to cooperate by making a statement. On the afternoon of the same day People’s Daily published its article, Maextro Auto customer service stated that the upgrade plan for the Maextro V800 brake pedal bracket base is expected to be confirmed by the end of October and rolled out starting in November. However, the two core questions—【whether there is a design flaw】 and 【whether problematic vehicles will be recalled】—remained answered with none, none, none. Then, two days later, Huawei finally provided an ultimate statement without pictures or proof. What was it? On October 13, Maextro produced a report issued by a so-called "state-recognized third-party testing institution," rumored to be the "China Automotive Technology and Research Center Testing Center." Strangely, staff at this testing center stated to the media that while the 【report】 was indeed issued by their center, they emphasized one point: it only tested the 【sample vehicle】 provided by the enterprise, was only responsible for the 【sample vehicle】, and could not guarantee the enterprise's subsequent mass-produced products. Furthermore, they could not guarantee whether the report circulating in the outside world had been tampered with. Why did the "China Automotive Technology and Research Center Testing Center" issue such a flurry of disclaimers? It turns out that this report was so outrageous that it repeatedly trampled the IQ of all Chinese people into the dust. Let's see how it trampled it: the report claimed that after increasing the longitudinal force to a strength test of 3000 Newtons, the brake pedal had no cracks and no damage, making it fully qualified. As soon as this report came out, the Douchedi tester involved, "Dongche Dakeji Dongmen," was directly laughed to tears. He pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between static loading and dynamic loading, and the strength index of this submitted sample was simply passed by "hugging the limit." Besides, using such rig testing to respond to real emergency braking scenarios at a vehicle speed of 100 kilometers per hour is simply absurd. In the end, this tester helplessly left a remark, "I am speechless, I don't know what to say, just leave it at that." However, netizens are not all brainwashed fans. Look, someone was even sharper and more knowledgeable than the tester, stripping away the underwear of the "3000 Newton test." How did they strip it? This testing institution didn't move a car at all; instead, they removed the pedal parts, placed them on testing equipment, and slowly increased the force until it finally reached 3000 Newtons and held for 5 seconds. Please note this "slowly increasing force"—just how slow was it? The test instructions stated in black and white that the loading speed was 20 millimeters per minute, which is 2 centimeters per minute. What concept is 2 centimeters per minute? A netizen gave a vivid and intuitive reference: a snail makes a shiny appearance carrying its heavy shell, and an ordinary snail can crawl 9 centimeters per minute. At this speed, it means that Huawei's test used to prove the brakes had no problems had a "braking" speed even slower than a snail, only one-fifth of a snail's crawling speed, and it was tested in a static state. What Douchedi tested was a sudden stomp to the floor at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, while the testing institution found by the Maextro V800 used 【slow-pressing of parts】 in a static test to respond to the dynamic fracture during 【full vehicle emergency braking】. Isn't this fooling ghosts? Huawei righteously stated that which part is tested, static or dynamic, doesn't matter; the rise of Party-State manufacturing is destined to be bumpy. Please give the Party-State national industry a chance and witness together the transformation of the Party-State national auto industry from big to strong. To summarize in one sentence: as long as you all remember that we are far ahead, the Party-State national enterprise is finished. Down the line, a bunch of national enterprises expressed their dissent. The Shandong formaldehyde cabbage seller raised a hand: "Do not let a single violation ruin the brand of Chinese vegetables; please give national enterprises some time." Shuanghui, with antibiotics exceeding the limit by 38 times, also shouted: "Do not let a single excessive limit ruin the brand of Chinese meat; please give national enterprises some time." I ask you, are you convinced?

In today's Party-State, it is not just the "far ahead" monopoly that repeatedly charges an IQ tax on brain-dead fans. Xiaomi Auto, a new-force carmaker blessed with overwhelming internet traffic, is also catching up fast when it comes to "brakes failing." Moreover, Xiaomi shows a strong sense of keeping in step: just like Huawei, when dealing with the fatal flaws of its own cars, human lives are pushed aside while "perfunctory evasion" takes center stage. Recently, multiple Xiaomi Auto owners revealed that the vehicle's intelligent brake booster is suspected of having a serious malfunction. The most direct manifestation is that the brake pedal simply cannot be pressed down. Look right here—what frustrates owners the most is the attitude when contacting Xiaomi after-sales service, which is essentially "we just won't tell you." The service team tightly evades two core questions throughout: 1. The cause of the malfunction, and 2. How much out-of-pocket repair costs will be after the warranty expires. Look at that: under Xi Jinping's new quality productive forces ecosystem, as a new energy vehicle owner who has already contributed to overtaking on a bend, you don't even deserve the most basic right to know. Would you say these aren't leeks? As for those owners whose brakes haven't malfunctioned yet, perhaps your next trip could detonate this huge time bomb. However, Xiaomi says: whether an accident happens or not, and when it happens, please don't ask me; those are metaphysical matters. See that? In the Party-State's new energy race track, car owners who support national brands surviving in one piece depend entirely on the solid destiny given by their parents. Trust the national brand and run headfirst into whatever comes next—did you remember that? New tea friends, don't forget to click subscribe and the little bell. Tea friends are also welcome to click the member website recommended by the brothers to use the circumverting the Great Firewall VPN for free and participate in the black ointment lucky draw. The links are in the pinned comment in the text box below the title. Let's go! Multiple episodes a week with heartfelt releases, Spicy News Skewers, be there or be square. See you in the next show.