US Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration Joint Patrols! Beijing Rarely Silent? [Zhi Ding Lecture Hall Enlightenment Forum Yu Maochun] EP267

This article examines the historical and current strategic significance of joint patrols by the United States Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration in the Taiwan Strait. By reviewing the US‑Taiwan maritime defense dynamics from the 1950s to the present, the piece analyzes the crucial role of regular maritime patrols in countering Beijing’s gray‑zone coercion and maintaining stability in the Indo‑Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait.

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Welcome to the Enlightenment Forum of Zhi Ding Lecture Hall, I am Yu Maochun. This year’s most important security development in East Asia is not the appearance of aircraft carriers, not missile tests, and not another Chinese military exercise around Taiwan; the real key is two white‑hulled coast guard vessels. The United States publicly confirmed for the first time that the US Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration have conducted joint patrols in the Taiwan Strait and released photos and details of the operation. To many, this may seem like a small‑scale maritime law‑enforcement task, but it is far from simple; it is the first clear step in the United States restoring regular patrols in the Taiwan Strait. In the past, US vessels continuously patrolled the strait, helping maintain nearly two decades of peace, but after the patrols stopped, Beijing began to expand its maritime coercion. The Taiwan Strait is not an ordinary waterway; it is one of the world’s most important international sea lanes, linking Northeast Asia with the South China Sea and carrying a significant share of global trade. Whether the Taiwan Strait can continue to function as an international waterway or gradually become a sea route controlled by China will directly affect the strategic balance of the entire Indo‑Pacific region.

The core fact is that the United States previously maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait by having its ships regularly and openly patrol the area. When this routine patrol stopped, instability in the strait rose. In the roughly twenty years after the Korean War broke out in 1950, a key element of US policy toward Taiwan was the Taiwan Patrol Force of the US Seventh Fleet. At that time, US destroyers and other major combat ships continuously patrolled the Taiwan Strait as a routine mission. These warships were not only meant to deter war between Beijing and Taipei, but also to demonstrate in practice that the Taiwan Strait remained open to international navigation and could not be unilaterally controlled by any side. The facts also show that this policy was effective; even though crises erupted in the Taiwan Strait in 1954‑1955 and again from 1958 to the early 1960s, Beijing never succeeded in establishing jurisdiction over the strait, and the continued US patrols reduced Beijing’s claims to mere rhetoric.

But by June 1969, everything began to change. The Nixon administration, seeking to improve relations with Beijing and create conditions for the United States to extricate itself from the Vietnam War, ordered the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet’s permanent Taiwan Strait patrol force. While Washington was seeking to improve ties with Beijing, it also wanted to give Beijing a bit of diplomatic face. Subsequently, the United States made a series of policy decisions, including lifting the strategic embargo on China in June 1971 and formally establishing diplomatic relations with China in 1979. These policies further altered the United States’ strategic direction. In the Cold‑War context of the time, the decision to end routine patrols may have had short‑term tactical benefits, but from a long‑term strategic perspective it became the starting point for the United States’ gradual withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait and its long‑term retreat from a dominant maritime role. Beijing took advantage of the reduced U.S. patrols to incrementally expand its influence in the Taiwan Strait. Today, the Chinese Communist Party repeatedly claims that China has jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait, denies that the strait is entirely international waters, and the China Coast Guard continuously takes actions that harass merchant vessels, intimidate fishermen, tail Taiwanese ships, conduct maritime blockade drills, and attempt to enforce its own unilateral interpretation of maritime law. These actions are not traditional naval operations but tools of gray‑zone coercion, intended to change the status quo step by step without firing a shot.

Precisely because of this, the recent joint U.S.–Taiwan Coast Guard patrol is especially significant. Coast Guard operations differ from naval exercises; many of China’s gray‑zone activities occur in the realm of coast guard law‑enforcement. From maritime law‑enforcement, search and rescue, fisheries protection, anti‑smuggling, humanitarian assistance to maritime domain awareness, Beijing tries to turn its political claims into actual control. Therefore, the United States conducting a joint patrol with Taiwan’s Coast Guard directly counters Beijing’s gray‑zone strategy in the area where it is most active, not through verbal statements but by having U.S. vessels physically present. More importantly, after demonstrating resolve through this joint patrol, the CCP was almost silent, with no noticeable angry protests. History and geopolitics repeatedly show that as long as the United States clearly displays strategic will and capability, the CCP regime must alter its behavior, because the only country with sufficient power and influence to deter China’s expansionist ambitions is the United States—provided the United States is willing to act.

Equally important, this U.S.–Taiwan joint patrol publicly acknowledges the Taiwan Coast Guard as a legitimate maritime law‑enforcement agency. This may seem merely symbolic, but in international politics, when a symbol is accompanied by actual vessel deployments, it carries real weight. This operation shows that the United States does not accept Beijing’s view that the waters surrounding Taiwan are domestic Chinese waters, nor does it accept Chinese agencies’ jurisdiction over those waters. By acting rather than merely stating, the United States confirms that Taiwan lawfully governs its own waters, which remain part of the international commons. The strategic significance of this patrol extends far beyond Taiwan. China’s maritime coercion is rising, threatening Japan in the East China Sea, the Philippines in the South China Sea, and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. These are no longer isolated disputes; Japanese leaders have noted that Taiwan’s security directly affects Japan’s own security, and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro has reached the same conclusion, stating that if China attacks Taiwan, the Philippines cannot remain neutral because geography makes it impossible to stay out of the conflict. The first island chain is gradually forming an interconnected strategic zone, and any turmoil in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably ripple into the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

Therefore, the United States should not treat this U.S.-Taiwan joint maritime patrol as a one‑off action or a symbolic statement, but should institutionalize such patrols as the foundation of a long‑term maritime strategy. This is not to provoke Beijing nor to return to the Cold War, but to restore the normal patrols that once occurred in the Taiwan Strait. The most effective deterrence is often not the most spectacular one. If the United States can have the Navy and the Coast Guard cooperate and, together with allies, maintain continuous operations in the Taiwan Strait, it can clearly demonstrate that the strait remains an international waterway open to lawful navigation. Doing so will make it harder for Beijing to advance gray‑zone coercion and will give allies greater confidence to uphold international maritime law while reducing the likelihood that China’s incremental pressure will gradually turn coercive control into the new normal. History has shown that sustained maritime patrols preserve peace better than occasional displays of force. In the past, routine patrols by the Seventh Fleet prevented strategic ambiguity from sliding into strategic surrender. Today’s U.S.-Taiwan joint maritime patrol points in the same direction, but employs methods better suited to the challenges of the twenty‑first century. The logic is clear: peace in the Taiwan Strait cannot rely solely on communiqués or diplomatic rhetoric; it also requires ships to be physically present at sea, operating regularly, openly, and lawfully. The United States was able to maintain stability in Asia not by withdrawing from disputed waters, but by staying there continuously.