Taiwan should strive for international recognition from multiple sides. If one country recognizes it, it will lead to recognition by many others [Zhiding Lecture Hall: Robert Tsao, Miles Yu] EP196 (Part 2)

In this episode, guests Miles Yu and Robert Tsao discuss how Taiwan can curb the military threats from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by striving for international recognition to create a domino effect. Miles Yu analyzes the strategic significance of international recognition for Taiwan, refutes the view held by some Washington think tanks that the domino theory is outdated, emphasizes the importance of deterrence strategy and responding with strength, and points out that Taiwanese society and public opinion should maintain a clear and objective understanding of U.S. policy.

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In reality, what the CCP fears most is any country in the international community recognizing Taiwan as an independent and sovereign state. As long as one country stands up, it is like the Emperor's New Clothes; it forms a force, known in English as a Cascade Effect, or a domino effect. The pieces the CCP is playing are not just Taiwan; the surrounding countries like Japan and South Korea are also pieces. The key lies in which country is the first domino—whether it is Taiwan, India, or the Philippines. Once one domino falls, everyone else falls. You do not necessarily have to wait for a war to break out to strive for international recognition. The CCP's intimidation of other countries in the world, and its unreasonable claims and actions, are actually what it fears most. The reason the CCP is obsessed with Taiwan is, to a large extent, one of its weaknesses. For example, when the CCP dealt with Lithuania, a Baltic state, it was unreasonable and furious, imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on it. If one day countries like Lithuania feel that the CCP is unreasonable and say, "We will maintain our diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China, but at the same time, we will also recognize Taiwan," then that is exactly what it fears most. If this step is taken, and before a war breaks out, if there is a country with the courage to recognize Taiwan—recognizing both Taiwan and the CCP—then this will form a trend. I think in such a situation, it is not just a small country; in fact, many countries will realize this. Therefore, this is what the CCP fears most.

So, of course, recognizing Taiwan after a war breaks out is a good strategy, and it is not necessarily that novel. There is an important American think tank called the Reagan Institute that conducted a poll a year or two ago. It surveyed many Americans on whether the U.S. government should recognize Taiwan as a sovereign and independent country if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were to invade Taiwan by force, and 76% of respondents said yes. American democratic society is very open, so it has this basis of public opinion. If the CCP invades Taiwan, it would violate the U.S. commitment to oppose any party using force to resolve or change the status quo. Of course, the U.S. has many policy options, including recognizing Taiwan; this is all possible. Therefore, the U.S.'s most fundamental goal is to prevent war. As for this issue, the CCP's use of military intimidation against its neighbors—not just Taiwan, but surrounding countries as well—is a problem. I don't think this issue is that complicated; one doesn't necessarily have to wait until a war breaks out to make such political demands. If Taiwan were to say, 'If you, the CCP, use force against me, many countries might recognize me as an independent state,' would promoting such an effort have some deterrent effect on the CCP's use of force against Taiwan? It is not true that it would have absolutely no deterrent effect. How to explain this? The CCP has a blind spot in its Taiwan policy; it believes that Taiwan is the key to the U.S.-China issue and that whatever the U.S. says, Taiwan follows. In reality, what you are talking about is not a question of whether the U.S. recognizes it or not, but rather that there are over 200 countries in the world, and many of them do not necessarily listen entirely to the U.S. Even America's staunchest friends vote differently from the U.S. on some major international issues, such as the Middle East. So what is the CCP's blind spot? Because it is overly committed to using U.S.-China relations to solve the Taiwan issue, in fact, as Taiwan's diplomatic space expands, it is more possible for it to develop relations in many areas with democratic countries outside of the U.S. So, as I just said, Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country—a reality that no one can deny; it is just a matter of whether there is the courage to recognize it. Moreover, once one country recognizes it, it creates a trend because this involves many issues, and everyone shares a common feeling. Therefore, I think the CCP is also afraid of this. So, if you shift your diplomatic focus, or move it slightly to other countries—that is, allies of the U.S. other than the U.S. itself—the effect should actually be quite good. Therefore, I think this has a certain deterrent effect on the CCP.

However, the CCP is fundamentally an aggressive country. As I just said, it not only has such ambitions toward Taiwan but also toward India, Japan, and Vietnam. Basically, for many of the countries on its land borders, it has not only open territorial claims but also undisclosed ones, especially regarding territorial waters, where it is very rigid. It claims that the South China Sea is its sovereign territory, the nine-dash line. So, this is also very barbaric and unreasonable. Therefore, once the CCP pushes many countries around the world to the limit, as long as one country stands up, it will be like the Emperor's New Clothes, forming a force, which in English is called a Cascade Effect.

There is a person in the United States named Ryan Hass (柯瑞恩), and he recently seemed to say that Taiwan currently does not understand the United States, claiming that Taiwan is still talking about the domino theory. For instance, when Minister Chiu Chui-cheng of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council recently went to Washington to give a speech mentioning this domino effect, Ryan Hass said that this is outdated, that people shouldn't talk about the domino effect because Americans don't like to hear it, and that Taiwan should instead say things that Americans like to hear. What is your view on this? Ryan is a good friend, but Ryan is also very outdated on many issues, especially the Taiwan issue. He said that Minister Chiu doesn't understand the United States, but I think Ryan doesn't understand the United States. Why? Because the think tank where Ryan works is the Brookings Institution, which is left-leaning in the U.S. and affiliated with the Democratic Party. What Minister Chiu said is entirely correct. Why? Because institutions like Brookings cannot truly understand some of the basic governance and international policies of the Trump administration. The domino effect mentioned by Minister Chiu is a fact and is not outdated. Why? As I just mentioned, what is a domino? A domino is a game with many pieces inside, many tiles inside. The chess pieces the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays with do not just consist of Taiwan alone; neighboring countries like Japan, South Korea, and others are all pieces. Look at how tense the CCP's relations are with India, and with the Philippines. If a war breaks out in the Asia-Pacific region, it won't just be between China and Taiwan, but could easily be between China and India or China and the Philippines—that shouldn't be surprising at all, because that is how it is. The question then is, which country is the first domino in the row? Is it Taiwan, India, or the Philippines? With a row of dominos, once the first tile falls, everyone falls—that is the principle of the domino effect. This is not some Arabian Nights fantasy. Therefore, what Ryan says is very outdated; he doesn't understand the domino effect, because the CCP faces a very large group of countries, many pieces, and once one falls, everyone will feel their security threatened. So look at this: the threat from China against Taiwan actually makes countries like the Philippines, Japan, and India feel very nervous because they all face this issue; after the CCP fires the first shot, there will certainly be a second, third, and fourth shot aimed at them. Hence, the domino theory is not outdated at all, but rather something very realistic. This is something that not only the Brookings Institution fails to recognize, but in fact, many other neighboring countries have recognized. Japan says that a contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan, and India is the same. So if you look at the relationship between India and Taiwan, there are many similarities and a certain amount of interaction. Needless to say, regarding the Philippines—look at some of the countries most actively opposing the CCP's aggression against Taiwan, though they may not say it explicitly, these countries face the same threat from the CCP, such as the Philippines providing the U.S. with the right to use military facilities, and some U.S. counter-measure weapons being deployed in the Philippines; and Japan goes without saying. Overall, this means that once one tile falls, the rest will fall underneath. This is, of course, the most obvious truth. Therefore, I don't think there is anything wrong with what Minister Chiu said; in fact, what he said is completely correct.

Sometimes in Taiwan, people like to take what Americans or self-proclaimed think tanks say and blow it out of proportion, as if it were of great importance. Mr. Cao, I am the head of China studies at a major American think tank. I know that American think tanks are dazzling and diverse, but you have to identify where their basic policy leanings lie, especially their partisan affiliations. So, don't keep going to people who aren't in power to discuss an issue. Furthermore, while I certainly respect my colleagues, the point is that the vast majority of people in Washington think tanks who deal with China issues basically look at these problems from the perspective of foreign policy—that is, foreign policy and foreign relations. In the United States, the word I dislike most is 'relations'—diplomatic relations, foreign policy. Because policy lacks a long-term strategic vision; policy is very temporary, and a president can change it at any time, so policy is not very important. Doctrine is important, principles are important, and declarations are all important. Then there is this 'relations' aspect. What are these relations? They are like marital relations or state relations, where everyone talks about peace, not causing trouble, and just living a stable life. This is not a very healthy relationship between nations. If one side is specifically looking to provoke and specifically looking to go to war, then you don't necessarily need to keep emphasizing relations; you need to emphasize countermeasures. Therefore, in his first term and this current term, Mr. Trump's main strategic focus has not been on emphasizing relations, but on emphasizing deterrence. He uses America's powerful economic, military, and political strength to prevent those who destroy peace from starting wars and provoking unstable situations. So, this is the crux of the problem. I feel that what Washington lacks most are people who understand the underlying principles of American strategy; everyone comes from a background of foreign relations. I don't think this is necessarily a bad thing, but it always feels like they fail to see the essence of the matter. In Taiwan, when you look at any commentary, you can tell which side it leans toward based on which newspaper or organization it comes from. However, when it comes to these comments published about the United States, Taiwan might not be able to clearly distinguish whether they have truly hit the point or if they are just subjective opinions. Taiwan's judgment in this regard is also relatively poor.

Mr. Cao makes a lot of sense. Because you are a Taiwanese patriot, I just feel there is another point to be made: besides this, I don't think Taiwanese people don't understand; many Taiwanese understand very well, and many Americans understand very well too. The key lies in what the political stance is of the person who studies these issues. In Taiwan, there are many people who do not completely align with the ideas of the U.S. Republican Party, and there are also many whose opinions do not necessarily entirely match those of the U.S. Democratic Party. Therefore, you have to look at what kind of person in Taiwan is saying what, and another very important thing is what academic discipline they come from. Political scientists—excuse me—have different views; historians have different views; economists also have different views. Therefore, you need a comprehensive balance to accurately grasp this pulse. Traditional Chinese medicine likes to check the pulse; the pulse of the U.S. is actually very clear, the key is what you are looking at and how you look at it. If the U.S. has just gone through some physical exercise, running 5 miles, and then you go to check its pulse, its heartbeat is very fast—that's problematic, that's not right. You need to look at its average value, and look at where the most fundamental aspects of this country's policies and operations lie. This, I think, requires everyone to put in a little effort. I have been to Taiwan; recently, because of work, I have been there many times and met many insightful people. Although they also know the United States very well, the key issue is from what perspective they view the United States. I feel that some of them have biases, while others are still very accurate. So Taiwan is a democratic and open society with open speech, and there are all kinds of people. Just as I said once on television in Taiwan before, Taiwan's public opinion is varied and colorful, featuring high-level arguments, bizarre arguments, and fallacies. The key is for everyone to distinguish between them; only in this way can you grasp the pulse. As government officials, I feel that people in Taiwan like Minister Chiu, what they say is actually very correct, but don't get discouraged just because of criticism from some not-so-correct U.S. think tank. In fact, some people from Taiwan who come to the U.S. to speak also talk nonsense. Recently, like Lung Ying-tai, she used to be Taiwan's Minister of Culture, and now every day what she talks about basically means: hey, you need peace, you need peace; she even implies that it doesn't matter even if you kneel on the ground and kowtow—this kind of talk is actually quite dangerous. Peace is of course very right; peace is a goal and an ideological appeal. How to achieve peace? You must emphasize means, you must emphasize deterrence; that is to say, how you can stop those who destroy peace from destroying peace. This kind of talk from Ms. Lung Ying-tai, I feel she doesn't say much of substance, though anyone understands the principles. Mr. Trump also talks about peace; he is a peacemaker, and he even wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize—all of that is true. But he has certain means, and these means are very important. Therefore, people should not be blinded just by the correctness and appeal of this kind of concept; rather, you must specifically talk about what measures can be taken to achieve peace. If you keep talking to the Chinese Communist Party about peace, peace, that is what they love to hear most. Mr. Lai, you say one sentence, and they claim you are destroying peace, and it never ends. So you must recognize the true nature of the aggressor; when you talk about peace with him—Hitler loved talking about peace the most, and before he invaded Poland, he said many things about peace, and this kind of thing shouldn't fool people. Putin is the same; he feels he is a maker of peace, and he feels Ukraine is a troublemaker. So I feel that when talking about these things, one must have a sense of reality. The most important thing is still to find ways to talk more about how to use the most effective methods to stop those who destroy peace from destroying peace.

Very well, today we are very grateful to Dr. Yu for coming to our program to discuss many important issues. Since I have come to the United States this time, we still have plenty of time to meet, and next time we can consult with you anytime on other issues. No need to consult, no need to consult; I have also learned a lot of things from you. So today we will chat up to this point, alright? Thank you everyone.