Trump, Xi Jinping: The Strategic Reality Behind the Grand Spectacle — The More US-China Relations Change, the More They Stay in Place [Zhiding Lecture Hall Enlightenment Forum Miles Yu] EP276
This article explores the grim strategic reality behind the grand diplomatic courtesy during Xi Jinping's visit to Washington between the US and China. Miles Yu analyzes the deeper symbolic significance of the military display in the welcoming ceremony, the state dinner music, and the archival documents, outlines the clashes between the two sides on the Taiwan issue and specific economic and trade figures, and points out the Trump administration's soft-and-hard approach and its Asia-Pacific strategic layout of strengthening the US-Japan alliance.
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Welcome to the Enlightenment Forum of Zhiding Lecture Hall, I am Miles Yu. During Xi Jinping's visit to Washington, he was greeted with grand state courtesies, complimentary words from President Trump, and various talks about "strategic stability." However, beneath these diplomatic pageants, a grim strategic reality remains unchanged: China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains a formidable strategic competitor to the United States, because the two sides' fundamental visions of the world order are fundamentally incompatible. To this day, the CCP still refers to American power as "hegemonism," believing that the United States is destined to hinder China's rise and Beijing's pursuit of establishing a China-centric international order. Quite clearly, just a few weeks before visiting the US, Xi Jinping himself was still using this rhetoric. At the same time, the United States continues to strengthen its alliance system in the Western Pacific, rapidly enhancing its military deterrence capabilities and economic security measures, a considerable part of which is precisely designed to check China's growing global power expansion. For example, just a few days before Xi Jinping's special plane arrived at Joint Base Andrews, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Huawei as a criminal organization, a case that has just opened trial in New York. Therefore, the grand welcome given by Trump to Xi Jinping must never be misread as a strategic show of weakness by the United States toward China.
On September 23, Xi Jinping arrived at Joint Base Andrews. As the U.S. national anthem played, two B-1B strategic bombers roared overhead. The next day at the White House, a B-2 "Spirit" stealth strategic bomber, accompanied by four F-22 "Raptor" fighter jets, flew over the White House. The B-2 is the exact same type of bomber used by the U.S. in strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Nearly 480 U.S. military officers and soldiers participated in the entire welcoming ceremony. This is certainly a diplomatic courtesy, but it is at the same time a diplomatic courtesy set against the backdrop of showcasing U.S. military, economic, and technological strength.
The cultural symbolism during the summit was equally intriguing. The White House state dinner featured music from Les Misérables, including "Do You Hear the People Sing?"—a song that served as a street anthem for the 2019-2020 pro-freedom movement in Hong Kong against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The dinner also included "The Moon Represents My Heart," made famous by Teresa Teng. Teng was never merely a pop singer; her songs were once denounced by the CCP as "spiritual pollution," yet they traveled from Taiwan across the airwaves into mainland China. During the Cold War, her voice represented a different Chinese world, one not ruled by the Beijing Communists. She refused to perform in China under CCP rule and publicly supported the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement. At a White House state dinner hosting the top leader of the CCP, it is hard to imagine a musical arrangement with more historical irony. Even "Jasmine Flower," played during the state visit, is not a "red song"; it is a Chinese folk tune passed down for centuries, with a history far predating the CCP regime. Puccini even incorporated the famous melody of "Jasmine Flower" into his opera Turandot. The implication here is significant: China is far older and far greater than the CCP.
This symbolism continued during a visit to the U.S. National Archives. Trump took the leader of a Leninist party to view the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. These documents represent limited government, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty—founding principles fundamentally different from the Leninist political tradition. There was also the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, a historical document that Beijing would prefer the world to remember differently. Under the treaty, Japan renounced "all right, title and claim" to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, but the treaty did not transfer sovereignty over Taiwan to China. Beijing has long refused to recognize the legitimacy of this treaty. Regardless of one's view on Taiwan's ultimate legal status, the existence of the Treaty of San Francisco proves at least one thing: the CCP's insistence that "China's sovereignty over Taiwan is a long-established, undisputed historical fact in the international community" is not so simple, because that is not the case.
The Taiwan issue itself presented another notable contrast. Xi Jinping demanded that Trump go beyond the long-standing U.S. policy of "not supporting Taiwan independence" and explicitly declare "opposition to Taiwan independence." However, Trump refused to make any public concessions on either point. The language used by both sides also formed a sharp contrast. Xi Jinping spoke in familiar, abstract slogans and CCP jargon: peaceful coexistence and the "win-win cooperation" repeated year after year. Washington, meanwhile, spoke increasingly in terms of numbers, deadlines, and concrete implementation measures. The trade truce was extended to January 10, 2027; China would purchase at least $17 billion in U.S. agricultural products annually and resume imports of U.S. beef and poultry. In 2027 and 2028, China would purchase 10 million metric tons of U.S. coal each year. Both sides would apply specific tariff arrangements to $30 billion worth of goods each, and there must be concrete, verifiable deliveries for rare earths and critical minerals. But Washington must keep one thing in mind: a promise is not performance. Several previous commitments made by Beijing remain unfulfilled, including purchases of Boeing aircraft and U.S. agricultural products. Therefore, this Washington summit did not produce any grand strategic deal. The two leaders basically just agreed to keep talking.
However, this summit carried another important message, one intended for Japan. While U.S.-China relations occupied the center of the diplomatic stage, Trump also deliberately strengthened the U.S.-Japan treaty alliance. Just one day before meeting Xi Jinping, Trump held a highly public meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at the United Nations. The two sides discussed China, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, military deterrence, the Quad, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. As soon as Xi Jinping departed for home, Takaichi received a detailed briefing on the U.S.-China summit directly from the man she called "dear Donald." Xi Jinping could not have failed to understand this strategic picture. What China received was a grand, presidential-level spectacle; what Japan received was the status of America's most important Indo-Pacific ally and a strategic role as the cornerstone of U.S. power and influence in Asia.
Strategic stability requires strategic patience as well as strategy. Trump has spent his life rolling in a world of tough bargaining, from New York real estate to casinos and the entertainment industry; he knows very well that a smiling face and strength are never contradictory. What the United States needs now is exactly the use of both carrots and sticks. Trump can play the role of the 'good cop' in diplomacy, maintaining direct communication between top leaders and providing corresponding rewards when China makes measurable and verifiable actual performance. However, his administration also includes cabinet officials like Marco Rubio, Scott Bessent, and Pete Hegseth, who can play a tougher role when Beijing refuses to fulfill its commitments. China certainly has chips, especially in rare earths and critical minerals, but dependence is never one-way, and the dependence between the two sides is asymmetric. Economically, China remains highly dependent on the U.S. consumer market, advanced technology, financial power, and an international system composed of global economic networks and allies, in which the United States still holds immense influence to this day. The chips Washington holds are far beyond what those habitually pessimistic people can imagine. The only question is: is the United States willing to use these chips?
Therefore, the message conveyed by this summit is not that the United States is starting to go soft on China, nor is it about any 'U.S.-China friendship.' What it demonstrates is a more subtle and potentially more effective strategy: smiling at Xi Jinping, taking him to see the U.S. Constitution, letting him listen to Teresa Teng, and also letting him listen to Puccini, having B-1B and B-2 strategic bombers fly over his head, demanding that Beijing provide dates, quantities, and performance results, and then, keeping the big stick within reach.