Beidaihe Secret Talks Leaked! Zeng and Wen Jointly Veto, Xi Jinping Shockingly Exposes “Shell Hostage”? 【Jiang Feng Vision 20260723 Episode 443】

The video focuses on the high‑level personnel and military power arrangements that emerged during the Beidaihe period, claiming that Zeng Qinghong and Wen Jiabao had disagreements over Xi Jinping’s stay and the scope of the purge, while Hu Jintao pushed for Hu Chunhua’s return to the Politburo. The content also discusses the military command arrangements after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were detained, as well as signs that officials in Guangdong, Jiangsu, Henan and other regions were aligning with the new power center, and speculates that Hu Chunhua participated in the purge of Xi’s old system.

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Welcome back to Jiang Feng Vision. Hello friends, this year’s Beidaihe air no longer carries the salty smell of the sea but the rust of Qincheng Prison. What’s being contested at the table is not whether the current General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, should step down, but rather the chronic suffocation of Beidaihe caused by retired Vice‑President Zeng Qinghong and former Premier Wen Jiabao.

First, note that the details below about the Beidaihe negotiations and personnel arrangements mainly come from multiple overseas sources, as well as our long‑term tracking and cross‑linking of personnel, military and local actions over the past year.

According to the negotiation framework leaked abroad, Zeng Qinghong’s side insists that Xi can step down, but only in a manner like Mao Zedong’s—seven parts merit, three parts fault. Executives such as Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong could also be handed over, but the entire conservative faction and the “red family” should not be dragged into criminal purges.

Wen Jiabao, however, believes that the death of Li Keqiang and the whereabouts of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli must be settled in the criminal ledger. Both sides are deadlocked, and no one dares to define the cases of Zhang and Liu.

While Zeng Qinghong and Wen Jiabao were locked in an intractable fight, the fourth‑generation General Secretary Hu Jintao quietly played his most lethal card: the purge line can be torn slowly, but Hu Chunhua must first sit in the Politburo.

This is the deep‑seated blood feud that Hu Jintao suffered when he was publicly removed from the venue at the 20th Party Congress. Xi brutally tore up the agreement at the last moment, Li Keqiang was forced to step down, Wang Yang retired, and Hu Chunhua didn’t even retain a Politburo seat. At the closing session, Hu Jintao tried to see the list, only to be dragged out of the hall in front of the whole world.

So today Hu Jintao returns to the source of power, aiming to smash the succession track that Xi forcibly bent back to its original direction.

Hu Jintao also knows very well that Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong are fighting fiercely over how Xi should be dealt with and how far the criminal accounting should go. At this moment, hard‑talking about who will be the top leader would only cause both sides to immediately unite against it.

Therefore, Hu Jintao’s first move is to get Hu Chunhua back into the Politburo, returning him to the track of the sixth‑generation successors. By the 21st Party Congress, if Zeng Qinghong wants to promote the conservative Ding Xuexiang, he will no longer be able to suppress Hu Chunhua.

Facing Hu Chunhua’s return to the Politburo, Zeng Qinghong finds no reason to veto. Because Hu Chunhua is not Wang Yang; Wang might push for a separation of party and state, whereas Hu Chunhua will not disturb the foundations of the red family and the financial cliques.

For Wen Jiabao, Hu Chunhua lacks a massive interest group, has complete local experience, and strong execution ability. To push officials’ asset declarations and investigate the lingering doubts from the Li Keqiang case, he is at least a person willing to take the hot‑potato.

Getting Hu Chunhua this ticket is equivalent to placing a heavy counter‑weight against Ding Xuexiang on the 21st Congress board in advance. The most important thing now is to get the chair first.

And to make senior local officials understand the wind direction, on the eve of the Beidaihe meeting, the political arena displayed two completely different signals.

One method is to settle old scores. The former head of the former State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, Cai, who retired ten years ago, was suddenly investigated after a trip to North Korea, a strike against the behind‑the‑scenes Jia Qinglin. Whoever dares to die protecting Xi Jinping, his henchmen will be uprooted.

Another method is safe landing. State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission director Zhang Yuzhuo handed over the money bag and became president of the Academy of Engineering. As long as one voluntarily hands over power, dignity and safety can be preserved. One grab, one release, and the political elite instantly understand.

But the biggest concern for senior local officials is: what if tomorrow Xi Jinping re‑mobilizes the army, what then? So before truly handing over their fortunes and lives to CCP elders, they must first confirm one thing: does Xi Jinping still have the ability to mobilize the army to overturn the situation?

The answer lies in Baoding and Xishan. On January 20, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were arrested, and the first vice‑chairman of the Central Military Commission and the chief of staff both fell in one night.

By normal logic, this should have been an ideal chance for Xi to take advantage of the chaos to place his own people in charge of the troops. But before he could rejoice, he found himself trapped in a death‑trap that had been set long ago.

Liu Yuan and Wang Yang immediately activated a top‑secret four‑cabin isolation plan.

The first line: Liu Yuan fled Beijing overnight, heading straight for Baoding. He knows that if all personnel contacts and command authority remain in the August 1st Building in Beijing, Xi can seal off the agencies and capture the entire army in one swoop.

Baoding guards the heavy troops south of Beijing and the route into the capital. When Liu Yuan reaches Baoding, it is equivalent to pulling the troops out of Beijing’s power quagmire and telling the entire army that Zhang Youxia can be arrested, but the guns must never be handed back to Xi alone.

The second line: Wang Yang took classified documents to Kunming. Many do not understand why Wang went to Kunming. He did not take the troops, but the party‑affairs files, central liaison channels, and all textual bases for the elder‑group’s political arrangements.

The army having guns alone is insufficient. Without legal party authorization, any unit that refuses Xi’s orders will be labeled a military coup and called to suppress the entire army. Therefore Wang must bring this set of legitimate party procedures to Kunming for safe keeping. As long as the documents are in Kunming, Xi can never forge a decision of the Party Central Committee.

The third line: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao firmly hold Beijing. Hu Jintao stays in Beijing, using his former status as General Secretary and former CMC chairman to press the political narrative. With him in place, if the army does not obey Xi’s personal orders, it is not a rebellion by commanders but a collective correction of personal authoritarianism by senior party elders.

Wen Jiabao remains in Beijing to tightly control the State Council and the discipline‑inspection system, preventing Xi from taking advantage of the chaos to launch surprise arrests or reverse‑cleaning of already‑reassigned local officials.

The fourth line: Xishan covertly cuts tactical communications. The August 1st Building is an office building, but Xishan controls the army’s strategic communications and emergency command. Xi stamping a document in his office is useless; if Xishan does not route the frequency to the war zone, his order remains an empty piece of paper.

This bullet‑proof design hinges on: Xi controls the August 1st Building, but he does not have Baoding’s troops; he seized the official seal, but lacks the Kunming‑stored document authorization; he forces orders, but Xishan does not disseminate them; he wants to label it a coup, yet Beijing still has Hu and Wen firmly holding the political line.

Even if he controls Zhongnanhai, he could never simultaneously take away these four things.

What makes Xi even more desperate is that after Zhang Youxia fell, the two newly promoted generals—one in charge of combat operations, the other of disciplinary inspection—are not Xi’s people.

Even the PLA Daily has, since July 11, completely omitted the seven characters “Chairman of the Central Military Commission” from its pages.

Soon after, the newspaper unusually blasted the army’s own scandals: night‑time training conducted just for show, firing signal flares that exposed targets; grassroots units daring not to make decisions, only escalating through layers; a bureau using eight toner cartridges a month for formalism.

On the surface it criticizes the grassroots, but in reality it interrogates the entire army: over the past ten years the chairman personally commanded, what has the army become?

The army has not publicly announced abolishing the CMC chairman, Xi can still attend meetings, attend promotion ceremonies, sign documents, but whether orders can be issued and whether war‑zone units obey is no longer up to him.

The army no longer follows a single‑line command from Zhongnanhai; local high‑ranking officials’ first reaction is not to shout slogans of loyalty, but to look for an exit.

Especially after Ma Xingrui was transferred for prosecution and his confidant, Guangzhou Party Secretary Guo Yonghang, was taken down in a sweep, local cadres saw a bloody fact: Xi’s protective umbrella has completely failed.

He once guarded the South of China, secured the West, oversaw major projects, and now the entire line is being cleared.

Even more striking, the central authorities immediately sent an outsider with no Guangdong roots, Hu Fan, to parachute in and take over the Guangdong Provincial Organization Department.

The organization minister is the gatekeeper of the political arena; personnel files, assessment materials, who stays, who is moved, who can be nominated as a representative to the 21st Party Congress—all are in his hands.

When Hu Fan sat down, all cadres previously promoted by Ma Xingrui and Huang Kunming felt a chill. Once the materials are submitted, the new leadership will tick the boxes; poor performance means one’s name will be erased from the next list.

Guangdong’s blood‑soaked storm made political elites in other provinces instantly understand the direction of the wind.

Jiangsu Provincial Party Secretary Xin Changxing boldly went to Taizhou for research on July 8. Taizhou is the ancestral home of Hu Jintao’s family, and Jiangsu’s propaganda amplified the itinerary, making the entire political arena understand: Jiangsu left a door open, ready to accept new power arrangements at any time.

Henan Provincial Party Secretary Liu Ning’s actions were even more direct than Xin Changxing’s. From July 6 to 8, Liu Ning personally led a Henan party and government delegation to Xinjiang, publicly under the pretext of targeted assistance to Xinjiang and industrial cooperation.

Arranged just before the Beidaihe meeting, the person Liu Ning was set to meet happened to be Chen Xiaojiang, who succeeded Ma Xingrui and took the position of Xinjiang Party Secretary, so this trip was about more than just project talks.

Liu Ning, a Tsinghua graduate recommended by Chen Xi, finds himself in a situation where a fellow named Chen is under investigation. No one knows whether the next investigation dossier will, following the Tsinghua cadre network, land on his own head.

A senior official like Liu Ning must, before the Fifth Plenum and the next round of personnel reshuffling, first figure out who has the final say and who controls the hat on the provincial party secretary’s head.

According to long‑term assessments outside the Great Firewall, Chen Xiaojiang is a cadre line trusted by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Liu Ning’s overt discussion of Xinjiang assistance and industry is actually a personal visit to recognize a new dock, using Chen Xiaojiang to reconnect with the Hu‑Wen system.

Anyone in the political arena can see that Henan is also starting to keep a back‑door.

These provincial party secretaries will not publicly endorse any particular successor for now, because no one knows what final outcome Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong will reach. Hu Chunhua could return to the Politburo, Ding Xuexiang is still in the inner circle, and other candidates could also be put on the table.

What local cadres need to do now is ensure that, regardless of which elder‑led collective ultimately pushes forward a successor, they will not be excluded from the next power structure for being too tightly bound to Xi Jinping.

Therefore, what senior officials truly hand over consists of three things: the materials of old projects, the personnel authority over local leadership teams, and the nomination rights for the 21st Party Congress delegates.

When these items are transferred to the new central decision‑making body, it amounts to acknowledging that, from then on, who changes locally, how accounts are audited, and who can enter the next list will no longer be decided solely by Xi.

This is the common logic behind Guangdong changing its organization minister, Jiangsu’s trip to Taizhou, and Henan’s trip to Xinjiang: localities have begun to move away from Xi’s single‑track command and align with the elder‑led collective central decision‑making.

They are still watching whether Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong can negotiate a settlement boundary, whether Hu Chunhua can first return to the Politburo, and whether the elders can truly control the next round of cadre listings.

Hu Chunhua’s re‑entry into the Politburo is not a brand‑new card suddenly pulled out by Hu Jintao from a drawer. That card has been in play since this spring.

After Wen Jiabao appeared publicly at the end of March, Beijing’s first task was to determine who would be responsible for clearing the personnel projects and security system that Xi left over the past decade.

By early April, according to ordinary sources inside the wall, Hu Chunhua was placed as the head of a temporary Xi‑group liquidation task force.

The position was not publicly announced, Xinhua would not issue a notice, but insiders did not need to wait for news. As soon as the working group began reviewing old projects, as soon as the organization department re‑examined cadre files, and as soon as localities received notices to submit supplemental materials and explanations, provincial party secretaries and ministers immediately sensed a shift in the wind.

Hu Chunhua’s reduced public appearances after April should be viewed in this context. He is operating within a non‑public mechanism, sifting through local materials, cadre lists, and the project ties left by Xi’s old system.

The liquidation group must accomplish at least three tasks. First, redraw the personnel network that Xi built over the years through secretaries, old allies, and local forces. Identify who was promoted by Cai Qi, who is linked to Wang Xiaohong’s public security line, who entered key posts through Chen Xi’s organization system, and register each layer anew.

Second, re‑account the major local projects and fiscal relationships. Separate projects that were normal decisions from those forced through to demonstrate loyalty to Xi, and disentangle local cadres who used political tasks to channel benefits.

Third, prepare materials for the 21st Party Congress cadre adjustments. Determine who can stay, who must be moved, and who must undergo review. This list cannot wait until a few days before the Congress; it must be compiled months in advance, province by province, department by department.

Thus, what local senior officials truly fear in these months is the liquidation mechanism chaired by Hu Chunhua.

This also explains why Xin Changxing went to Taizhou, why Liu Ning went to Xinjiang to meet Chen Xiaojiang, and why Guangdong installed an organization minister without local roots.

But a new problem arises. Although Hu Chunhua heads the liquidation, he is still only the Vice‑Chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference. He can lead the special task force under elder authorization, but he does not hold an official Politburo position.

Therefore, Hu Jintao must fill that gap for Hu Chunhua. Hu Chunhua’s return to the Politburo is not just revenge; it also turns the actual work he has been doing since April into an official central role.

Speculative leaks suggest that dealing with Xi may not involve an immediate on‑the‑spot arrest like the Gang of Four, but rather a prolonged political suffocation that is longer than a simple arrest.

His position will temporarily remain, he will still attend meetings, but he will no longer be able to assign cadres, move troops, or have local senior officials obey him.

When the 21st National Congress is finally held, the most awkward scene might be: Xi Jinping is still sitting on the podium, but the more than two thousand delegates below, the new Central Committee, and the new Politburo are no longer a team he can arrange alone. Thank you for watching, see you next episode.