张颖婕：困局无解，体制无救——北大副教授直言：中国体制无解，改革迫在眉睫

The System Is Hopeless Without Political Reform: Voices from Inside China’s Academia

After Ten Years in the U.S., I Returned to Beijing, Only to See a System Beyond Repair Written in April 2025 at Yanyuan (Peking University) By Zhang Yingjie, Associate Professor of Marketing, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

After studying and working in the United States for ten years, I have returned to the familiar city of Beijing. Twelve years ago, after completing my undergraduate studies at Tsinghua University, I embarked on the journey of pursuing a Ph.D. in the U.S. Now, I’ve been teaching at neighboring Peking University for over four years. A dozen years—gone in the blink of an eye. And yet, all these years have unfolded under the same “New Era” of Xi Jinping’s Communist China.

The most profound feeling I’ve had can be summed up in eight Chinese characters: the deadlock is unsolvable, the system is beyond salvation. So I’ve picked up my pen, hoping to share the heartfelt truths and theoretical reflections I’ve accumulated over these years.

The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported a 5% GDP growth for 2024. When people saw this figure, many simply laughed. At the macro level, economic indicators released by the authorities are bound to be “protected” (i.e., manipulated). One can only imagine the pressure on Kang Yi, the head of the Bureau of Statistics. But the real issue lies in whether the underlying economic structure is healthy and how the public reacts to such figures—their confidence and expectations. Those are the critical questions.

At the micro level, across sectors and industries, there is a widespread sense of stagnation and fading confidence. From ordinary people to market entities, there is deep anxiety about the future. Businesses can’t survive. Some people can’t even withdraw their deposits from local banks. Many are desperate to escape. Among my colleagues, quite a few already hold permanent residency in foreign countries. Many work in China while their children and assets are abroad.

For example, a retired school administrator at Peking University, now a professor in our department, spends most of their time overseas with family. They only occasionally return and share their frustrations with us. As for our dean, it goes without saying—he seizes every opportunity to go abroad.

Having grown up in China and later studied and worked overseas, and now returning for family reasons—I, of course, wish for my country to become prosperous. But after all these years, what I see is not improvement, but deterioration.

A U.S.-based scholar, Miles Yu (Yu Maochun), once famously said that one must distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people—a statement I find deeply reasonable. The CCP excels at making empty promises to justify its own legitimacy. Even more ridiculous is that it not only makes empty promises but also keeps flipping them. Policies change overnight. Official documents can be scrapped at will. There is no credibility, and naturally, the public has no confidence.

Take for example the grand promise of "Chinese-style modernization" that has been promoted in recent years. Among its stated goals, the most tangible one is for China to reach the level of a “moderately developed country” by 2035. According to domestic academic estimates, to achieve that, China needs to maintain at least 5% annual GDP growth. But hitting 5% is now extremely difficult! How much of that 5% in 2024 is even real? At the end of the year, the government ramped up exports to artificially inflate the numbers. That a major power must rely on foreign trade to drive a third of its economic growth is, frankly, abnormal. And never mind the quality of that 5%—its structure can hardly be called “high quality.” Even the CCP’s own policy goals have become a public joke.

But anyone with even a basic understanding of economics knows that with the intelligence and diligence of the Chinese people, if the system were well designed, reaching a per capita GDP of $20,000 to $30,000 would not be difficult.

In the 1980s, reforms negated the class struggle narrative and unleashed society’s productive forces. After over 30 years of rapid development, growth started slowing sharply after the 18th National Congress. From 10% to struggling to maintain 5% today—the reasons are manifold. Scholars often cite the real estate model, economic cycles, and international pressures—all of which are valid.

But at the root of it lies the conflict between the economic base and the political superstructure. Without reforming the superstructure, the dividends of reform and opening-up will soon be exhausted.

The former premier, Wen Jiabao, saw this issue clearly. He once said: “Without the success of political reform, it is impossible to fully implement economic reform.”

If the political system is not reformed, many valuable opportunities for development will be strangled to death by its own hand.

Everyone knows the example: during Li Keqiang’s tenure, his relatively “hands-off” approach allowed WeChat and the bike-sharing industry to flourish in their early stages. That gave rise to China’s platform and sharing economies. But Premier Li was always out of sync with the political climate of the time.

Today, many of China’s issues are examples of “black humor” institutional dysfunctions—the system often ends up killing off things that are beneficial to its own growth.

At the micro level, individuals are bound by anti-human regulations. At the macro level, policy direction often ignores the real principal contradictions in society and twists itself into contradictions. Under such a system, economic and social development will inevitably hit bottlenecks.

If political reform does not happen, the current deadlock will remain unsolvable.

Take the example of the massive floods in Henan during the summer of 2021. The official death toll was reported in the low hundreds. But when we stood at the Jingguang Road tunnel in Zhengzhou and saw the floating bodies, we knew the actual number was at least ten times higher.

In the past year or two, social hostility has intensified. Violent stabbings and assaults happen more frequently.

One of the CCP’s greatest ironies is how often its words and deeds contradict each other.

For instance, the Party Charter claims to promote “seeking truth from facts and pragmatic governance,” yet countless government actions are the opposite. Ordinary citizens often say: “We’ve seen too many vivid examples. We’re not that easy to fool anymore.”

Without political reform, no amount of “bright future” rhetoric can save this system.

People often ask: can scholars at Peking University speak some truth to power? The reality is: intellectuals can do nothing. Apart from some minor technical tinkering, we dare not speak the truth. All we can do is go along with the state-sponsored “bright future” narrative.

The institutional structures of universities, research institutes, and enterprises mimic the political hierarchy. They are short-sighted, utilitarian, and lack any long-term vision.

Even though the soil for innovation is essentially gone, a nation of this size still occasionally gives rise to exceptional achievements like Black Myth: Wukong or DeepSeek. But in this system, such sparks of brilliance will almost certainly not be allowed to spread into a wider flame.

I’ve said so much, and yet there is no real solution.

“The problems lie in the economy, but the root is in politics.”

If I were to offer any solution, it would likely be the same as what most Chinese people, businesses, and even many within the system silently hope for:

Political reform, political reform, political reform.

Say it three times—because it’s that important.