张颖婕：困局无解，体制无救——北大副教授直言：中国体制无解，改革迫在眉睫

在美国留学工作十年后，我又回到了熟悉的北京。12年前，我在清华本科毕业后踏上留美读博之路。如今，我回到隔壁北大任教已经四年多了。十几年，弹指一挥间。十几年，竟还都是习天下的共产党新时代。最深刻的感受，概括下来，无非八个字：困局无解、体制无救。于是提笔，把这些年以来心中积攒的肺腑真言和的学理思考整理成文，与大家分享。

中国国家统计局公布的中国2024年GDP增长是5%。看到这个数字，很多人都笑了。宏观层面，当局公布的经济指标，是肯定要保的，不知道统计局的康义局长当时压力会有多大。但关键的问题是背后经济发展的结构是否健康，百姓们看到这个数字后的微观反应（包括信心与预期等等），这些才是大问题。中微观层面，各行各业大有百业凋敝、信心暗淡的趋势，无论是老百姓还是市场主体都对未来前景忧心忡忡。做生意做不成、钱放在村镇银行还取不出来，纷纷想往外逃。我身边的同事，拿到海外永居绿卡的不在少数，很多人都是工作在国内、孩子和资产在国外。就比如，北大一位退休校领导是我们院的教授，退休后常年呆在国外和孩子在一起，偶尔回来跟我们吐槽一下。院长则更不用说，找到机会就往国外跑。

从小在国内长大，后来又到海外读书工作，因为家庭原因回国…我当然希望自己的国家能富裕起来。只是，岁月历尽，近些年看到的情况不是越来越好，反而是越来越糟。美国有个学者叫余茂春，最著名的一句话就是要把中共当局和中国人民分开，还是很有道理。中共当局最擅长的就是画大饼，为了自身的合法性。更可笑的是，不但画饼，还不断“翻烙饼”，朝令夕改的情况数不胜数，正式文件说废就废，毫无信用可言，老百姓自然没有信心。

例如，前些年一直画的大饼，是中国式现代化。说的目标里，有一条最实在的，就是2035年达到中等发达国家水平。据国内同事测算，想达到这个目标，至少每年要保证5%的GDP增长。但保5何其之难！2024年的5，又有多少水分！年终岁末靠预期型集中出口把数字拉上去，泱泱大国竟然要靠进出口来拉动1/3的经济增长，这是极不正常的事情。更不论这5%背后的经济结构，实在称不上“高质量”。中共自己制定的政策目标，时常被人看作笑话。

但其实，但凡学过一点经济学的都知道，以中国人民的勤劳和智慧，体制机制选对了，达到人均至少两三万美元的GDP，不是什么难事。八十年代一改革开放，否定阶级斗争，全方位解放社会生产力。历经三十多年高速发展，到了十八大之后，增速一路从10%到今天的维持5%都困难，原因有很多重。学者们都在讨论的房地产经济模式、经济自然规律、国际形势等等，都是真的道理。但根本上，还是经济基础与上层建筑之间产生了矛盾。上层建筑不改革，改革开放释放的发展红利也就快到头了。前任领导人看这个问题看得很清楚，温家宝的原话是，没有政治体制改革的成功，经济体制改革不可能进行到底。

政治体制再不改革，将亲手掐死很多原本有益的发展机会！很多人都知道的例子，李克强当年任上，“放任”了微信、共享单车的初期生长，才有了今时今日的平台经济、共享经济的代表性企业。当然，克强总理和这个时代的政治环境格格不入。当今中国的很多事情，是体制机制的黑色幽默，就是，它会亲手扼杀掉一些对自身发展有利有益的事情。小到最微观的每个人，被很多反人性的制度约束着。大到宏观政策，根本不为主要矛盾服务，而是拧巴着。整个体制如此，经济社会发展必然遇到瓶颈。

政治体制再不改革，当前和之后一段时间的困局就将无解！2021年夏天，河南那场大暴雨，官方说法是一共造成小几百人的死亡失踪。事实上，当我们站在郑州京广路的隧道，看到路面上漂浮具具尸体时，就知道实际的死亡人数绝对被夸小了十倍不止！这一两年，社会戾气愈来愈重，砍人伤人暴力事件频发。中共当局的一个最大笑话，就是言行完全相反。比如，党章里写的“实事求是、求真务实”，与很多当局的言行完全相悖，老百姓直言，“我们已经看过太多生动的例子，我们现在不好骗了！”

政治体制再不改革，无论如何唱响光明论都是无救的体制！有时候被人问，你们北大的学者能否说几句公道话，让上面的人听到。但事实上，知识分子什么都做不了。除了一些小修小补的技术性细节，不敢说真话，只能配合着唱响所谓的光明论。高校、科研院所、企业的体制机制也上行下效，浮躁功利、根本没有长期主义。虽然说上上下下创新的土壤已经基本没有，但诺大的国家，还是时不时冒出黑诸如神话悟空、Deepseek等零星的高质量创新。只是这种星星之火，在这种体制下，大概率无法燎原。

说这么多，也没有什么解决方案。“问题在经济，根子在政治”。如果非提方案，大抵是和绝大多数中国老百姓、市场主体、甚至体制内大部分人所期待的一样，那就是政治体制改革，政治体制改革，政治体制改革！重要的话说三遍！

2025年4月 写于燕园

作者张颖婕是北大光华管理学院营销系副教授

The System Is Hopeless Without Political Reform: Voices from Inside China’s Academia

After Ten Years in the U.S., I Returned to Beijing, Only to See a System Beyond Repair Written in April 2025 at Yanyuan (Peking University) By Zhang Yingjie, Associate Professor of Marketing, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

After studying and working in the United States for ten years, I have returned to the familiar city of Beijing. Twelve years ago, after completing my undergraduate studies at Tsinghua University, I embarked on the journey of pursuing a Ph.D. in the U.S. Now, I’ve been teaching at neighboring Peking University for over four years. A dozen years—gone in the blink of an eye. And yet, all these years have unfolded under the same “New Era” of Xi Jinping’s Communist China.

The most profound feeling I’ve had can be summed up in eight Chinese characters: the deadlock is unsolvable, the system is beyond salvation. So I’ve picked up my pen, hoping to share the heartfelt truths and theoretical reflections I’ve accumulated over these years.

The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported a 5% GDP growth for 2024. When people saw this figure, many simply laughed. At the macro level, economic indicators released by the authorities are bound to be “protected” (i.e., manipulated). One can only imagine the pressure on Kang Yi, the head of the Bureau of Statistics. But the real issue lies in whether the underlying economic structure is healthy and how the public reacts to such figures—their confidence and expectations. Those are the critical questions.

At the micro level, across sectors and industries, there is a widespread sense of stagnation and fading confidence. From ordinary people to market entities, there is deep anxiety about the future. Businesses can’t survive. Some people can’t even withdraw their deposits from local banks. Many are desperate to escape. Among my colleagues, quite a few already hold permanent residency in foreign countries. Many work in China while their children and assets are abroad.

For example, a retired school administrator at Peking University, now a professor in our department, spends most of their time overseas with family. They only occasionally return and share their frustrations with us. As for our dean, it goes without saying—he seizes every opportunity to go abroad.

Having grown up in China and later studied and worked overseas, and now returning for family reasons—I, of course, wish for my country to become prosperous. But after all these years, what I see is not improvement, but deterioration.

A U.S.-based scholar, Miles Yu (Yu Maochun), once famously said that one must distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people—a statement I find deeply reasonable. The CCP excels at making empty promises to justify its own legitimacy. Even more ridiculous is that it not only makes empty promises but also keeps flipping them. Policies change overnight. Official documents can be scrapped at will. There is no credibility, and naturally, the public has no confidence.

Take for example the grand promise of "Chinese-style modernization" that has been promoted in recent years. Among its stated goals, the most tangible one is for China to reach the level of a “moderately developed country” by 2035. According to domestic academic estimates, to achieve that, China needs to maintain at least 5% annual GDP growth. But hitting 5% is now extremely difficult! How much of that 5% in 2024 is even real? At the end of the year, the government ramped up exports to artificially inflate the numbers. That a major power must rely on foreign trade to drive a third of its economic growth is, frankly, abnormal. And never mind the quality of that 5%—its structure can hardly be called “high quality.” Even the CCP’s own policy goals have become a public joke.

But anyone with even a basic understanding of economics knows that with the intelligence and diligence of the Chinese people, if the system were well designed, reaching a per capita GDP of $20,000 to $30,000 would not be difficult.

In the 1980s, reforms negated the class struggle narrative and unleashed society’s productive forces. After over 30 years of rapid development, growth started slowing sharply after the 18th National Congress. From 10% to struggling to maintain 5% today—the reasons are manifold. Scholars often cite the real estate model, economic cycles, and international pressures—all of which are valid.

But at the root of it lies the conflict between the economic base and the political superstructure. Without reforming the superstructure, the dividends of reform and opening-up will soon be exhausted.

The former premier, Wen Jiabao, saw this issue clearly. He once said: “Without the success of political reform, it is impossible to fully implement economic reform.”

If the political system is not reformed, many valuable opportunities for development will be strangled to death by its own hand.

Everyone knows the example: during Li Keqiang’s tenure, his relatively “hands-off” approach allowed WeChat and the bike-sharing industry to flourish in their early stages. That gave rise to China’s platform and sharing economies. But Premier Li was always out of sync with the political climate of the time.

Today, many of China’s issues are examples of “black humor” institutional dysfunctions—the system often ends up killing off things that are beneficial to its own growth.

At the micro level, individuals are bound by anti-human regulations. At the macro level, policy direction often ignores the real principal contradictions in society and twists itself into contradictions. Under such a system, economic and social development will inevitably hit bottlenecks.

If political reform does not happen, the current deadlock will remain unsolvable.

Take the example of the massive floods in Henan during the summer of 2021. The official death toll was reported in the low hundreds. But when we stood at the Jingguang Road tunnel in Zhengzhou and saw the floating bodies, we knew the actual number was at least ten times higher.

In the past year or two, social hostility has intensified. Violent stabbings and assaults happen more frequently.

One of the CCP’s greatest ironies is how often its words and deeds contradict each other.

For instance, the Party Charter claims to promote “seeking truth from facts and pragmatic governance,” yet countless government actions are the opposite. Ordinary citizens often say: “We’ve seen too many vivid examples. We’re not that easy to fool anymore.”

Without political reform, no amount of “bright future” rhetoric can save this system.

People often ask: can scholars at Peking University speak some truth to power? The reality is: intellectuals can do nothing. Apart from some minor technical tinkering, we dare not speak the truth. All we can do is go along with the state-sponsored “bright future” narrative.

The institutional structures of universities, research institutes, and enterprises mimic the political hierarchy. They are short-sighted, utilitarian, and lack any long-term vision.

Even though the soil for innovation is essentially gone, a nation of this size still occasionally gives rise to exceptional achievements like Black Myth: Wukong or DeepSeek. But in this system, such sparks of brilliance will almost certainly not be allowed to spread into a wider flame.

I’ve said so much, and yet there is no real solution.

“The problems lie in the economy, but the root is in politics.”

If I were to offer any solution, it would likely be the same as what most Chinese people, businesses, and even many within the system silently hope for:

Political reform, political reform, political reform.

Say it three times—because it’s that important.