Not waiting for Xi Jinping to step down, Hu Chunhua enters the Military Commission first! Wen Jiabao rewrites the agenda for the Fifth Plenary Session: Personnel first, settling accounts later; 5 personnel orders in 48 hours [Jiang Feng Vision 20260914 Episode 487]

This video analyzes the intensive personnel changes on the eve of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee, pointing out that retired Premier Wen Jiabao is currently directing the conference arrangements and personnel layout. The video details recent key personnel adjustments in provinces and cities such as Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Henan, and discusses the game between the military and top leaders surrounding the incidents of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. The author believes that Wen Jiabao has adopted a strategy of "putting people in their positions first and settling accounts later," planning to elevate Hu Chunbao to the positions of member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Fifth Plenary Session, taking over the role in advance as a successor, thereby bypassing the political deadlock over whether to force Xi Jinping to step down immediately.

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Let's put the conclusion upfront right at the beginning: Hu Chunbao will step up first at the Fifth Plenary Session in October, getting both the Political Bureau Standing Committee and the Central Military Commission Vice Chairmanship simultaneously, regardless of whether old Xi steps down in October or not. Remember this sentence first, and then let's look at what has happened in the past two days.

Within the 48 hours from September 11 to 12, the top leaders of two provincial capitals were replaced, the mayoral candidate for a sub-provincial city was determined, the head of the organization department of a provincial party committee was replaced, and a vice governor was subjected to the "dual expulsion" (expelled from both the Party and public office). Out of five orders, two bore the signature of approval by the CCP Central Committee. With one month left before the Fifth Plenary Session in October, personnel appointments in the CCP are never issued casually. One month before the plenary session, appointments are continuously made to critical positions over two consecutive days, which begs the question: who is this CCP Central Committee written on the signature right now? The nominal top leader has been in New Delhi attending the BRICS summit these past two days, yet the orders from Beijing continue to be issued as usual.

Tracing one step further back, that unsettled account of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli has had zero results from the Beidaihe talks in August all the way to today. The reformists demand liquidation, and liquidation requires holding accountable those who took action in January; the conservatives want a soft landing, and a soft landing requires letting those two lives be swept under the rug. The message released from the military is that if lives are lost, someone must pay with their lives. Caught in a three-way standoff over this October meeting, even the agenda cannot be finalized. Wen Jiabao's solution is not to untie this knot, but to reshuffle the game and get people into position first; once people are in their positions, accounts can be settled later. The plenary session dominance gained by the conservatives at the cost of two lives was originally intended to set the October agenda on how to settle accounts, but Wen Jiabao rejected that, changing the agenda to how personnel should be arranged. Those five orders issued over the past two days are his initial move in arranging personnel. Therefore, three things will be discussed today: how Wen Jiabao bypassed that deadlock to send Hu Chunbao up, why the positions sent are not just for the Standing Committee but also the Military Commission, and why he is not touching the General Secretary's chair this time.

Let's lay out the five orders from the past two days and examine them one by one to see where they land. On September 12, Hu Lijie assumed office as a member of the Standing Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Head of the Provincial Organization Department. This female official was born in 1971 and is a native of Dashiqiao, Liaoning. In December 2021, Hu Lijie entered the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, left Liaoning in 2024 to serve as the Head of the Organization Department in Shanxi, and two and a half years later was transferred to Jiangsu to take over the position of the Organization Department head who had been taken away by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection just 12 days prior. On September 12, Li Qiang served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Dalian Municipal Party Committee. This Li Qiang is a local official from Liaoning, sharing the same name but being a different person from the one in the State Council, replacing Xiong Maoping. Also on September 12, the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee decided that Ma Shanshan would serve as Deputy Secretary of the Shenyang Municipal Party Committee and Party Leadership Group Secretary of the Municipal Government, as well as the next Mayor of Shenyang; at 47 years of age and originally from Tianjin, she became Party Secretary of Fuxin less than a year ago, and this single jump directly makes her a vice-ministerial level official. On September 11, the Henan Provincial Party Committee decided that Wang Song would serve as Secretary of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee; a native of Anfuhai, Jiangxi, a Tsinghua Ph.D., and former Deputy Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, he transitioned from Head of the Propaganda Department of the Henan Provincial Party Committee to top leader of the provincial capital. On September 11, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Lei Siwei, former member of the Standing Committee of the Gansu Provincial Party Committee and Vice Governor, was expelled from the Party and public office, becoming the first provincial-ministerial official to be placed under investigation after the Two Sessions this year.

Five positions in 48 hours, every single one of which is the position of someone who will raise their hand or manage those who raise their hand at that meeting in October. So who is issuing this batch of orders? The official press release states it was approved by the CCP Central Committee, while the nominal top leader of this Central Committee flew to New Delhi on September 12 and spoke at the BRICS summit on the morning of the 13th. With the person in New Delhi, the orders from Beijing are still being issued. The hand issuing the orders is not in New Delhi. According to accounts from overseas whistleblowers, the Secretariat of the General Office of the Central Committee—the bureau responsible for drafting documents and arranging meeting agendas—is now directly under Wen Jiabao's dispatch, and the conference arrangements and agenda for that meeting in October are being sorted out by this bureau. On the side of the Organization Department, after Shi Taifeng took over supreme authority over organization, official promotions were no longer dependent on old Xi.

The CCP's three major tools of power: the police (knives), the military (guns), and propaganda (pens). Count them up: the police (Political and Legal Affairs Commission) is acquired; propaganda (General Office) is acquired; the purse strings (Financial Work Commission) are acquired; personnel (Organization Department) is acquired. What about the military? The military is not lacking. According to overseas whistleblowers, Zhang Shengmin presides over the daily operations of the Military Commission, controls the troops stationed in Beijing, and even includes the Central Security Bureau; Liu Yuan acts for the daily operations of the Chairman of the Military Commission. Military power has long landed elsewhere and is no longer in old Xi's hands. However, an account is weighing down on the military power, and this account is that deadlock. The account came about as follows: on January 20, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli ran into trouble at the Central Party School; on Saturday, January 24, the Ministry of Defense rapidly and officially announced that the two had been placed under investigation; on Sunday, January 25, the front page of the PLA Daily convicted them with the crime of severely trampling on the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The interpretation from overseas whistleblowers is that the Ministry of Defense belongs to the civilian system of the State Council, and Dong Jun is one of old Xi's men who has never entered the Military Commission; that was the only channel through which old Xi's faction could issue announcements, where the persecuting side convicted the victim side. By comparison, when Zhang Youxia took down Miao Hua and Wei Fenghe in the past, it was only after the Military Commission for Discipline Inspection had investigated them for over half a year that official announcements were made. On August 28, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress removed Zhang Youxia from the post of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Liu Zhenli from the post of member of the Central Military Commission.

. According to the leaks, this incident was led by the conservatives, and it was very difficult for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to stop it. In the words of the whistleblower himself, the explanation should be demanded from Zhao Leji. The conservatives bought the leadership of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee with two heads.

So why can't this account be settled? Because of three paths and three vetoes. The first path is the rehabilitation of Zhang and Liu; doing so would mean holding accountable those who took action in January and sending old Xi to Qincheng Prison. Wen Jiabao's side cannot accept leaving this unliquidated, but the conservatives cannot make up their minds. From the Beidaihe meeting in August until today, there has been no final conclusion among the party elders. The second path is not to rehabilitate them, but to give money if people are dead. Zeng Qinghong's proposal was to follow the precedents of Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, providing financial compensation to the families. Hu and Wen determined on January 24 that the two people were no longer alive, and Zeng Qinghong only understood this when asking for people at the Beidaihe meeting in August. However, the military does not accept this plan; Li Zuocheng's remark was that as long as they are alive, things are negotiable, but if they are dead, someone must pay with their life. The third path is for old Xi to step down with dignity, retiring due to health under the Hua Guofeng model. The old military leaders do not accept this; if old Xi steps down with dignity, Zhang and Liu will never be vindicated. Therefore, the cost of retiring due to health is the entire military. Three paths, three vetoes—this is a deadlock. Not a single step of the ledger has moved, but there is one piece of physical evidence: on August 29, the front page of the PLA Daily published the news of the closing of the National People's Congress, and the names Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli each appeared five times; thereafter, until September 13, across fifteen issues of the military newspaper, these two names did not appear even once. This means that matter does not belong to the military to handle, and the military does not recognize it either. With the ledger hanging, the military is staring at one thing: who will sit in that Central Military Commission chair after October. This is the price set by the military.

Now you see it clearly: the conservatives traded two heads for the leadership of the Fifth Plenary Session because they wanted to set the agenda for October as how to settle the accounts. But how to settle the accounts? All three paths are completely blocked. If the agenda is set on the ledger, the October meeting cannot be held. Wen Jiabao's solution comes from this. Wen Jiabao did not solve that knot; he changed the game. The three things he chose—the Standing Committee chair vacated by Cai Qi, the empty grid in the Political Bureau that has been vacant for three years, and the addition of another vice chairman of the Central Military Commission—are all fill-in-the-blanks. Filling in the blanks does not require old Xi to move first, nor does it require the conservatives to nod first and say liquidation. Filling in the blanks is not reopening old ledgers, and no one can block you by claiming you are reopening old ledgers. The agenda set by the conservatives is how to settle the accounts; Wen Jiabao changed it to how to arrange the people. Put the people up first, and settle the accounts later. If the order is reversed, the accounts can never be settled.

And the arrangement of people has already begun. Last week, according to the rules of the CCP, the secretarial team follows the master; only when the master takes a step up does the team follow through the door. Where was the anomaly this time? The order was reversed; the chief steward went to work first, while the master didn't budge. Last week, a man named Jin Shanwen took office. You most likely have not heard this name, so let me lay out his background first. Overseas independent media say that Jin Shanwen has long worked on the front line of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, was the close personal chief secretary of former top CCP leader Wang Zhaoguo, and later served Li Jianguo, while Li Jianguo back then was Li Ruihuan's political secretary. In other words, this person's entire lineage—Wang Zhaoguo, Li Jianguo, Li Ruihuan, and further up connected to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Now he has assumed a key post in the Central and State Organs Working Commission. During that lecture on September 7, in front of one hundred and twenty central organ branch secretaries, he lectured that loyalty to the party is not loyalty to an individual; this was a sounding of wind. And the overseas leak characterized this appointment very bluntly: this is the chief steward arranged by Wen Jiabao for Hu Chunhua, which bluntly speaking is the future director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. The chief steward arrived at his post last week, while Hu Chunhua himself is still sitting in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). On September 8, CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning led a team to investigate the Buddhist College of China, and Hu Chunhua was among the accompanying list. At the CPPCC bi-weekly consultation symposium a few days ago, people also noticed his attendance, sitting with his head down leafing through case files.

Then we must ask, the seven chairs of the Political Bureau Standing Committee are fully occupied—who is vacating one? This matter has not been answered by any leak. Below is our own judgment. Li Qiang, Premier of the State Council; overseas leaks say he is a fence-sitter who has already leaned toward the conservatives. A person busy changing camps to save his own seat will not step down at this time. Wang Huning, CPPCC Chairman; leaks say he turned the CPPCC into a stronghold of the reformists, playing both sides—such a person is the last to get off the boat, not the first. Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; he still has a play to act, today I'll only state the conclusion: he is not stepping down. Li Xi, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); he was originally a conservative faction figure, and just look at whom the CCDI has arrested over the past half year to know—he cannot step down. Ding Xuexiang, Executive Vice Premier of the State Council; old Xi's man, he is going to step down, but a sentence in the leak states very clearly that the handling of Ding Xuexiang and others still takes time, and he is second in line. The remaining chair belongs to Cai Qi. Why is it him? Five reasons: first, this director of the General Office can no longer control the Central Security Bureau; the power to command the Security Bureau was stripped away long ago; second, his entire family is under strict surveillance, guarded precisely against anyone running away early; third, at the beginning of the year, someone on behalf of superiors challenged him, asking him to write a comprehensive and profound written self-criticism to be submitted for review by all members of the Political Bureau; fourth, during the bargaining process between the reformists and conservatives, the superiors repeatedly dropped hints making Cai Qi fully responsible; fifth, and most fatally, the General Office under his feet has been hollowed out—Kong Shaoxun was transferred, Meng Xiangfeng leaned over, and the secretarial bureau is in Wen Jiabao's hands. Cai Qi's seat is Director of the General Office plus First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The General Office no longer obeys him, his successor as chief steward has arrived in position last week, everything that should be dismantled has been dismantled, and all that's left is to move the chair away.

Speaking of this, I know many friends have a question mark in their hearts, and this question mark is bigger than all the previous questions combined: Why on earth Hu Chunhua? A person who dropped down after the 20th National Congress, whom no one mentioned for three years, sitting in the CPPCC with his head down leafing through case files—why on earth is it him? The following two things are entirely public figures; you can check them on the internet yourself. The first anomaly: dropping into a regular Central Committee member at age fifty-nine. Hu Chunhua was born in April 1963, and when the 20th National Congress was held, he was fifty-nine years old. There is a line in this party that everyone knows called 'seven up, eight down'—at sixty-seven one can stay, at sixty-eight one must retire. Fifty-nine is still eight or nine years away from that line, and what was he previously? An 18th Political Bureau member, a 19th Political Bureau member, serving two consecutive terms as Vice Premier of the State Council, yet he was not reappointed at the 20th National Congress, dropping into a Central Committee member. In March 2023, he went to be Vice Chairman of the CPPCC. A person at this level has only two paths: either remain in office or retire upon reaching age, with no third path, and officials from beginning to end gave not a single word of explanation. The second anomaly: the Political Bureau is missing a person. The 17th Central Political Bureau had twenty-five members, the 18th had twenty-five, the 19th had twenty-five—three consecutive terms were all twenty-five. What about the 20th? Twenty-four, missing one. Officials didn't say who was missing, nor why. And even more fatal is the following sentence: that grid has been empty from October 2022 to today; for over three years it has not been filled even once, and although several plenary sessions were held in the middle to elect alternate members of the Central Committee, they never touched that grid in the Political Bureau. A fifty-unine-year-old vice premier dropping downwards, and a seat left empty for three years with no one filling it—put these two things together and chew on it.

So how do the overseas leaks tell it? The leaks say that back then it wasn't that he wasn't elected; it was that he himself refused to enter that Political Bureau. Hu Chunhua was someone cultivated all the way up as a successor—the Communist Youth League, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, station by station he walked through. Such a person, with his political sensitivity right there, knew very well how the 20th National Congress was engineered. Then what did entering that Political Bureau mean? It meant endorsing that list of names; from that day on, every raise of the hand and every document would bear his name, and if there ever came a day of liquidation in the future, he himself would be on that list. So following this logic downwards, a very piercing sentence comes out: he wouldn't enter even if offered a seat on the Standing Committee. The true value of this layer lies not in what happened on that day back then, but in turning the entire past three years of Hu Chunhua upside down. What did the outside world say about him over these past three years? He lost power, was marginalized, didn't dare to speak out, and was finished. However, if he himself refused to enter back then, then these past three years were not a matter of not daring to speak, but of never having signed his name on the wrong things. Look back at that scene in the CPPCC: for three years, he hasn't uttered a single superfluous word, has not made statements, taken a stand, shown his face, accepted interviews, or published signed articles; when attending meetings, he just sits there and bows his head to leaf through case files. The outside world all says this is a person who lost power and doesn't dare to make a sound, but if you look at it from another angle, a person who hasn't signed his name on any document for three years is today the only person in that room whose hands are clean.

I know that hearing this, two thorns must be pricking you. The first thorn: if he really thought the 20th National Congress was illegal, why did he go on to become Vice Chairman of the CPPCC in March 2023? The crux lies in what a CPPCC Vice Chairman is: it is a sub-state-level post, but it is a sinecure, not a decision-making body. The Political Bureau is a place where you raise your hand, sign your name, and leave your name on resolutions; the CPPCC is a place where you sit and listen. What he avoids is the place for signing, not every single seat. Look at what he does in the CPPCC: bows his head and leafs through case files without saying a word—the exact same set of actions as not entering the Political Bureau back then. The second thorn: did he have a choice? Could a Political Bureau member refuse an arrangement from above? The evidence is not in that day back then, but in what he did over the following three years. He did nothing at all—three years of zero speeches. This in itself is a choice. A person who still wants to climb upward would not do this, and a person who was genuinely crushed and harboring resentment would not do this either. Such a person would send messages, find people, or drop a suggestive remark on some occasion. There is only one kind of person who remains completely silent for three years: planning

waiting for.

The last question, and the focal point for today: since this is a succession, why doesn't he touch the highest chair this time? In both previous successions, the successor entered the inner circle first and then the Central Military Commission. The first time, Hu Jintao entered the inner circle at the 1992 congress, became a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenary Session in September 1999, and took over the highest chair in 2002. The second time, Xi Jinping entered the inner circle at the 2007 congress, became a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Fifth Plenary Session in October 2010, and took over the highest chair in 2012. Sixteen years ago, Xi himself entered the Central Military Commission at a Fifth Plenary Session. According to their rules, a successor does not receive the seal first; they receive the gun first. Now some friends might ask, Hu Chunhua is currently just a regular seat in the main assembly hall, and jumping straight in to sit on the Standing Committee is too big a leap, isn't it? There is a precedent. At the Third Plenary Session in December 1978, Chen Yun was co-opted in one step as a member of the Central Committee, becoming a member of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau Standing Committee. He was reinstated to a regular seat after being pushed down for many years, which is almost identical to Hu Chunhua's current predicament.

Now we come to the most critical step. Their own charter states that the circle of the Political Bureau is elected by the plenary meeting of the assembly hall. Does the assembly hall elected at the congress three years ago dare to scrap the side that wants Xi Jinping to step down? They dare not. Once scrapped, everything elected by this assembly hall is scrapped along with it, the resolutions of all previous plenary sessions are scrapped along with them, and the seats of everyone present are scrapped along with them; they would no longer have a machine to stamp seals. Wen Jiabao's group is a team put together by the elders themselves, and it has not a single word of legal basis; what it fears most are the three words "legitimacy." Therefore, the assembly hall must be kept, and it must be kept clean. The Political Bureau is elected by the assembly hall, so it can certainly change what it elected. Hu Chunhua did not enter the Political Bureau back then, so he carries no stain from the congress three years ago. Now the CCP elders are going to set things right, using the assembly hall elected at that congress to add new people into the Political Bureau elected 3 years ago. Everyone elected in this time has a clean factional background. There are currently seven members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee; after the plenary session, Cai Qi steps down, Hu Chunhua steps up, and the vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission is added to Hu Chunhua.

Then why give the Political Bureau Standing Committee and the vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission together? Because giving either one alone is not enough. Giving only the Central Military Commission is not enough to establish the identity of a successor; it must be realized through the status of a Political Bureau Standing Committee member; giving only the Standing Committee is also not enough, as a successor must be able to speak with the military. You still remember that ledger from just now: rehabilitation, giving money, retiring with dignity—three paths and three vetoes, the ledger is hanging there. And as long as it hangs there, the military will watch who sits in the chair of the Central Military Commission after October. Giving that slot on the Central Military Commission to Hu Chunhua is equivalent to telling the military that the account has not been settled, but the person who will settle the account in the future has already taken a seat at your table. Hu Jintao's original words entrusted to Wen Jiabao for the conservatives were: "Nominating Hu Chunhua is the succession." And in their set of rules, the final seal of the successor's identity is stamped on that slot of the Central Military Commission.

Then why doesn't he touch the highest chair this time? I will give you four reasons all at once. First, to sit in that chair, one must first take down Xi Jinping; whether to make him acknowledge the account or let him retire due to illness has not been settled by the elders to this day. However, positions in the Standing Committee, the Political Bureau, and the vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission all have slots that can be filled without alarming Xi Jinping. Therefore, what needs to be done in October are things that can be done without Xi Jinping stepping down first. Second, precedent. Both successions involved getting the gun first and the seal later, with a gap of two or three years in between; neither was achieved in one step. Third, in the elders' original plan, the General Secretary was already arranged for Wang Yang to act as proxy until the next congress, and whether Xi Jinping steps down or not is not something that the Fifth Plenary Session must decide. Fourth, the time window. Entering the Standing Committee and the Central Military Commission first, taking charge of matters, getting people up there, and having knives, guns, and the conference table in hand are the only ways the accounts of Zhang and Liu can be calculated. From October of this year to the next congress, the 1-year gap in between is left for liquidation. Therefore, the sequence is that in October Hu Chunhua goes up first, a year is spent handling problems, and at the 21st National Congress he is formally elected General Secretary. This is the entire meaning of not waiting for Xi Jinping to step down. It is not that whether he steps down or not doesn't matter; it is that the matter of his stepping down has been moved off the October agenda. If Xi steps down in October, Hu Chunhua still goes up; if Xi does not step down in October, Hu Chunhua goes up all the same.

In this episode today, I started from five personnel orders in forty-eight hours, talked about a ledger of three paths and three vetoes, talked about a seat that has been vacant for three years, and talked about that Fifth Plenary Session sixteen years ago. I wrap up my words into one sentence: that meeting in October is not about discussing whether to liquidate that person, but about pushing Hu Chunhua up and taking over the gun. The assembly hall was arranged by Wen Jiabao, and the seat was cleared for Hu Chunhua.