Henan Biyang Siphon Enforcement: The Fiscal Revenue Generation Technique of County-level Governments

A new version of cross-provincial law enforcement has emerged in Biyang County, Zhumadian City, Henan Province.

In the past, so-called "distant water fishing" involved local law enforcement officers traveling to other regions to apprehend individuals, seize property, and freeze accounts, which at least involved them personally going out to sea. Biyang's approach is more convenient: goods from other regions are driven to the Biyang highway exit, where law enforcement officers, upon receiving a so-called tip-off, seize them on the spot. This is followed by administrative procedures such as inspection, claim, auction, destruction, and remittance to the national treasury. Power does not leave the county, and property enters the county. The technical skill involved is not low, but the way it is done is quite unsightly.

Public reports indicate that the incident can be traced back to the latter half of 2025. In January 2026, Biyang County Market Supervision Administration's public information included 18 "Notices of Claim for Detained Goods," involving 21 trucks from 10 provinces and cities, with dates ranging from July 31, 2025, to January 19, 2026. The seized goods included frozen products such as pig trotters and chicken feet, with owners from Guangxi, Chongqing, Hunan, Guangdong, and other regions.

The most typical case occurred on October 29, 2025. A truck carrying 7.8 tons of frozen pig trotters departed from Nanning, Guangxi, with Foshan, Guangdong, as its destination. The normal route would be to travel east to a neighboring province, a journey of about 500 kilometers, according to reports. Instead, the truck traveled north, detouring to Biyang, Henan, and was subsequently seized by the Biyang County Market Supervision Department. The Lianhe Zaobao reported that the value of this batch of goods was about 200,000 yuan. Similar routes were repeatedly observed later, with southern goods collectively heading north, as if being sucked into a county-level administrative black hole.

The reasons for seizure are also typically Chinese: the drivers were suspected of operating with uninspected and unquarantined frozen by-products. Even with quarantine certificates and transaction contracts, the owners might not be able to retrieve their goods. Previous reports mentioned that some goods were destroyed due to failed inspections, while others were auctioned off at low prices as "ownerless goods" without the owners' knowledge. Law enforcement officers from the Biyang County Market Supervision Bureau once told the media that goods that passed inspection could be auctioned for cash and remitted to the national treasury, while those that failed would be subjected to high-temperature processing. This statement reveals the entire logic: once goods enter the administrative machine, they are no longer the property of the owner but become resources that local authorities can redefine.

On June 15, the Biyang County Joint Investigation Team announced that an investigation team composed of the County Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision, the County Public Security Bureau, and other departments had been formed to investigate and verify the relevant situation. Wang Lei, former party secretary and director of the Biyang County Market Supervision Administration, and Zhang Xing, captain of the third squadron of the comprehensive administrative law enforcement brigade of the County Market Supervision Administration, have been taken into custody and are undergoing investigation. The work of dealing with other lawbreakers and seized goods is progressing simultaneously. The announcement is, of course, written in a very upright manner, mentioning strict and swift action, thorough investigation, and no shielding. This is the standard performance of local governance in China: before an incident explodes, all procedures are legal and compliant; after it explodes, a few individuals immediately become the black sheep.

The most valuable aspect of the Biyang case is that it demonstrates the absurd underlying logic of the "nationally unified large market." Xi Jinping repeatedly talks about a unified national market, and official documents discuss unified systems, unified supervision, and unified enforcement standards, even explicitly requiring that cross-regional enforcement not be carried out illegally, that administrative and criminal means not be used to interfere with economic disputes, and that law enforcement and judicial activities not be profit-driven. Biyang's practice is more direct: since the whole country is a unified market, all goods in the country can naturally be absorbed by this county; since enforcement is unified, Biyang County can also wield its power over goods from Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, and Chongqing; and since local governments need to develop, officials who can convert external property and financial resources into local income are, according to the CCP's performance logic, simply thrifty officials.

Separatist factions overseas should feel ashamed. For years, separatists have called for independence, drawing maps after maps, but have gained no territory in reality. Biyang does not shout slogans, issue declarations, or engage in theoretical construction; it has directly become an independent kingdom through law enforcement. Goods from Guangxi, destinations in Guangdong, owners in Hunan, businesses in Chongqing – as soon as the wheels touch Biyang's border, property rights enter Biyang's version of the legal world. Local separatism does not require warlords or independent referendums; a market supervision bureau equipped with highway exits, tip-off leads, seizure notices, and auction procedures is sufficient.

This is also the reality of governance under the CCP's fiscal predicament. Land finance has collapsed, local debt is mounting, tax sources are shrinking, and grassroots finances need to support officials, stability maintenance, and various political tasks. Beijing can continue to talk about a law-based business environment, but local governments can only find money themselves. Fines, seizures, freezes, auctions, cross-regional enforcement, and selective enforcement have all become part of the fiscal toolbox. Those who can generate revenue can keep the machinery running; those who can siphon blood from other regions can alleviate local pressure. In this system, a good government is not one that protects property rights but one that can monetize power.

Biyang's siphon-like enforcement is not a deviation from the CCP system; it is precisely the grassroots answer of this system. The central government wants unification, local governments want money, cadres want performance, and departments want power, ultimately leading to market entities being trampled on. The higher the cost for cargo owners to seek redress across provinces, the more stable the local law enforcement's gains; the more complex the procedures, the easier it is for property to be reprocessed; the longer the chain of responsibility, the easier it is to cut off a few terminal cadres to resolve the issue.

The detention of Wang Lei and Zhang Xing only indicates that Biyang's actions were too conspicuous this time. What truly needs to be questioned is why these 21 trucks could enter the same county in a similar manner for six consecutive months, whether there was a fixed cooperation between the so-called informants and law enforcement agencies, how the funds from the auction and disposal of goods flowed, how the cargo owners' losses will be compensated, and what roles the relevant platforms, drivers, and intermediaries played. Without clarifying these issues, the so-called investigation is merely installing a temporary light in a county-level black hole; once the light is turned off, the next batch of goods will continue to be sucked in.