Xi Jinping rushes to visit the US while ailing! Will he step down voluntarily at the Fifth Plenary Session in exchange for Trump abandoning Taiwan? The Beijing political situation breaks down, China comprehensively North-Koreanizes, Chinese people hurry to apply for passports to leave the country, Li Qiang and Cai Qi rule jointly

This video discusses the background and strategic maneuvers surrounding the upcoming summit between Xi Jinping and Trump in Washington, analyzing the contest between the U.S. and China on issues such as arms sales to Taiwan, rare earth exports, and the G20 summit. At the same time, the video explores Sanae Takaichi's visit to the U.S., the political purge involving Zhang Youxia being stripped of his military rank, and China's domestic policy tightening and emulation of an economic model moving toward a "North Koreanization."

Video Link:

Full Text:

These past few days have been exceptionally fascinating. While we were still watching the local mayoral and county magistrate elections, the political maneuvering among China, Japan, and the United States on the international stage was far from complicated, and one of those maneuvering tracks has major military and diplomatic implications for Taiwan. You definitely need to figure this episode out. Xi Jinping these past few days—he is flying to the White House in Washington tomorrow, right? Before falling ill, he set a condition: if you, Trump, dare to carry out arms sales or related assistance to Taiwan before I arrive or during the midterm period, then I, Big Boss Xi, am not coming. I won't show up to campaign for your midterms, and I won't give you any face. Trump said, 'Alright, okay, I will even personally go to the airport to pick you up, choosing our Air Force base, and I'll even dispatch B-2 bombers that bombed Iran to escort your special plane, Xi Jinping, so you can see what our B-2 bombers look like.' So, this dinner banquet and political game is extremely interesting. This is the second meeting of the Trump-Xi summit this year, and it will determine whether the direction of the Chinese Communist Party's next five years will head toward North Koreanization. Today, I want to talk first about another trip: Xi Jinping's first overseas trip of 2026. Where did he go? Not Washington, and not Moscow, but Pyongyang, North Korea, which I just mentioned. He said something very interesting there, saying that high-rise buildings are springing up one after another. What on earth did Xi Jinping learn in Pyongyang? On the other side of the sea, in Japan, Sanae Takaichi actually ran off to New York the day before the Trump-Xi summit to meet with Trump. What kind of relationship is she going to discuss with Taiwan regarding this? That is why I said today's episode features some extremely fascinating political maneuvering.

Tomorrow Xi Jinping, along with Peng Liyuan, will arrive in Washington with the NTR person the director had fantasies about. On the 24th, U.S. time, the White House will officially welcome them, including an honor guard and closed-door talks. The state dinner in the evening is also of paramount importance; no matter how much pain Xi Jinping is in or how physically uncomfortable he feels, he won't miss it the way he did in India last week, right? After having tea and touring the U.S. National Archives on the 25th, Xi Jinping will immediately return to Beijing. This is also Xi Jinping's return visit to the United States after a lapse of 11 years. Now, this state dinner has already been hyped up beforehand. Where is the hype? In the business and tech circles—Jensen Huang wants to go, Elon Musk wants to go, and the boss of OpenAI also wants to go. However, the Chinese side made a demand: for the banquet seating at the White House, half of it must be reserved for Chinese tech giants or political and business figures. Well, I want to ask, can Jack Ma go? Everyone, you go to someone else's house as a guest, yet you demand that half of the host's dining table be allocated to you? The U.S. side strongly opposed this, and the guest list, right up to the moment of departure, has surprisingly not been finalized yet. Now, one of the things Xi Jinping wants to talk about is Taiwan. Japan's Kyodo News Agency, citing numerous inside sources, reported that if Washington approves any new arms sales to Taiwan around the time of the Trump-Xi summit, or any form of assistance, Beijing intends to cancel this summit. If you sell weapons to Taiwan, I won't come. Then how much is this arms deal worth? The U.S. already passed a batch of $11.1 billion in arms sales to us last December, and the second batch is $14.0 billion, which is roughly over 450 billion NT dollars. To this day, it is still being stalled, waiting for Trump's signature. Congress has already passed it, but how did Trump himself describe this arms sale? He said that this is a negotiating chip with China. In addition, the New York Times reported another matter: officials of the Trump administration have asked Taiwan's officials or legislators to reduce their visits to Washington think tanks, and not to let Taiwan become a stumbling block for him in handling U.S.-China relations. This is what the New York Times said. Of course, whether this New York Times report is credible is a matter of opinion.

Meanwhile, foreign media analysts point out that Xi Jinping still holds two trump cards in his hand: one is the restriction on rare earth exports over the 5 to 10-year period that we also mentioned last year, and the other is skipping the G20 summit in Miami in December. If you continue to give things to Taiwan, I will choke you on rare earths, I will continue to cause chaos for you, and you Republicans won't need to run for office anymore; I'll let the Democrats come up to play with me, right? And you know what? A researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations in the U.S. also said something: Xi Jinping is shrewdly using every opportunity to meet Trump to chip away, bit by bit, at U.S. support for Taiwan. Another researcher at Brookings also stated: What is Beijing's goal? To drag out the arms sales for as long as possible. Even though he knows they will pass, delaying it one day at a time is better, because if the speed at which Beijing accumulates its advantages surpasses the speed at which Taiwan builds up its new military, then the balance will continuously tip toward Beijing, and the winning odds will tilt toward Beijing, right? So do you understand what Xi Jinping is doing? Xi Jinping doesn't want the U.S. to abandon Taiwan right now; what he wants is time. He also knows that the U.S. will not abandon Taiwan, but delaying it a day at a time, or a month at a time, is what he aims for. Just yesterday, Zhang Youxia was officially expelled from the military ranks, and it was explicitly stated that these people would be sent to a military tribunal for trial. Interestingly, at the beginning of this year, the verdict given to Zhang Youxia by Xi Jinping and the CCP Central Committee—that is, the news regarding the filing of this investigation—was what? That he severely violated Xi Jinping's personal wishes and will. Now it has turned into him severely violating the Party's something-something-something. So this is very obvious: Xi Jinping doesn't want everyone to know specifically what policies and directions of Xi Jinping that Zhang Youxia opposed. It's inconvenient to say, so they blurred this condition another layer by saying that he violated the entire Party of our CCP, not just me alone. Do you see this shift clearly? So this problem definitely lies somewhere! At the same time, the finalized date for the Fifth Plenary Session was also released, and the established theme is strict governance over the Party.

As we mentioned yesterday, Sanae Takaichi could not sit still at this moment. From the 21st to the 24th, she visited the United States. During her visit, she was also scheduled to meet with Trump at the UN General Assembly in New York, beating Xi Jinping by one day. What is Sanae Takaichi afraid of? Japan is worried that the U.S. might accept some of the Chinese side's claims regarding Taiwan, the East China Sea, Japanese waters, and even the South China Sea, on the condition that China expands its imports of U.S. goods. The greatest risk in facing the CCP's future military pressure will be in the hands of the Japanese people. Trump also has the midterm elections in November, so he is in a hurry for a report card, and the quickest report card is China signing a pile of orders. Even if China does not end up buying them, voters will see these orders and vote for the Republican Party. Of course, whether Trump will fulfill his promises and whether Xi Jinping will fulfill his promises is something we can see with our own eyes. And will Xi Jinping also use this opportunity to see if he can continue to deceive Trump and fleece something else? After all, when Trump was president the first time, Xi Jinping had already deceived him. Trump will certainly not be deceived again this time, but he has also learned that superficial style of Xi Jinping, right? Trump and Xi Jinping both need to appease their own citizens, but their private operations are still mutually antagonistic. This is a historical trend that will absolutely not change. Now, where is the most critical point they need to discuss? We, the U.S. and China, need to draw a clear line. In which areas and tracks are we rivals, or even in a hostile relationship? But under what premises can we still cooperate in certain fields? After all, the U.S. is still an elected government, right? Not everyone is like the Little Pinks, who have no votes and feel that everything should follow the government. Of course, coming back to the point, regarding Japan, this is not the first time Sanae Takaichi has done this. Do you remember in May of this year, before and after that Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing, Sanae Takaichi had a phone call with Trump, and after the meeting, Trump also returned the call to Sanae Takaichi on Air Force One. So there is another thing that Japan is also relatively worried about, because Trump has said he wants to meet with Kim Jong-un again, and Japan is also worried that the U.S. might do so for the sake of a short-term agreement or the election.

Now we come to the most crucial point of this episode: the North Koreanization of China is unstoppable. From June 8 to June 9, 2026, Xi Jinping paid a state visit to North Korea, which was his first overseas trip of the year. Who went the next month? His strategist and veteran of three administrations, Wang Huning, also went to Pyongyang. Before Xi Jinping and Wang Huning went, Foreign Minister Wang Yi took a trip there in April. Pushing back even further, where did Kim Jong Un go in September 2025? He went to Beijing. Within this single year, there were travels back and forth. But what are outsiders speculating about? Outsiders are guessing about the game between the three parties: China, Russia, and North Korea. Because although the three of them are close buddies like a close-knit family, they also harbor grudges against each other and engage in maneuvering. In fact, we can look at another layer: what did Xi Jinping want to do in Pyongyang? When Xi Jinping went to Pyongyang, he visited a place called the Central Cadre School of the Workers' Party of Korea, which is a place that trains loyal cadres who love the party. Then Xi Jinping said that buildings are springing up one after another. What do these things symbolize? Beyond the cultivation of loyalty to the party, Pyongyang itself has undergone tremendous changes in recent years. Of course, what did the North Korean official narrative say? They said that North Korea wants to learn from China. Kim Jong Un said he hopes to strengthen experience exchanges through such cooperation to help the North Korean people walk the path of modernization together with the Chinese people. Kim Jong Un has also repeatedly stated his desire to learn from the CCP's experience in party building. Alright, that is what officials say—learning all these things, right? But let's actually look at who is learning from whom. First, let's talk about how Pyongyang has changed in recent years. Perhaps we in Taiwan don't know much about it, but in recent years, North Korea's economy has grown by 3% every year since 2024, and is even approaching 4%. This is the fastest pace in the past eight years, and for three consecutive years, its growth has surpassed that of South Korea. In Pyongyang alone, how many newly built housing units and buildings were added in a year? Over 10,000 units! What kind of concept is that? It's more than the newly built buildings in Los Angeles and Chicago combined in the same year. Moreover, mobile phones have increased by over 50 new models, and new energy vehicles—the so-called electric cars—can be seen everywhere running on the streets. Can you believe this is the North Korea in your impression? These past three years have possibly been the best economic era in North Korea since Kim Jong Un took office. Of course, we won't go into detail here about how North Korea's economy suddenly managed to evade international sanctions, because doing so would blur the focus; we can open a livestream to discuss it in detail when there's an opportunity. Over the past five years in North Korea, core prices have risen by 4 to 5 times, and some goods have even risen more than 10 times. Of course, this might also be what Xi Jinping wants, because after all, China is currently experiencing deflation, right? Furthermore, for people living outside Pyongyang, life is so destitute that they can barely hang on. Some analysts have pointed out that if inflation is deducted, North Korea's actual economic growth in recent years might actually be negative. What is it relying on to prop itself up? Building houses. So on the one hand, they are learning from China, but as we mentioned earlier, what is Xi Jinping learning from North Korea? Starting September 1, all foreign nationals, including those within China's borders, will be taxed 20% on dividends and other incomes, restoring the 20% tax, along with retroactive tax inspections and miscellaneous taxes, right? Then there are the new entry and exit regulations on September 15, right? And the newly revised amendments to the National Mobilization Law on October 1, allowing public security to conduct expanded inspections of anyone's communication software at any time. On November 15, it was even rumored that within Beijing, and even within a 180-kilometer radius, no drones or their components are allowed, and they aren't even allowed to be kept at home. Furthermore, if a girlfriend comes to stay over when renting a place, or if out-of-town friends or even foreign friends visit, there is nationwide reporting—police stations across the country must be notified. Although foreigners staying at a friend's house needing to report to the public security police station has been practiced for years, it is now being pushed toward a normalized routine online, right? What is the maximum penalty for failing to report? 20,000 RMB. Even full-time and contractual hospital employees have to register their passports. So, are money, people, and data heading toward North Koreanization? Next, what was the main theme of the Fifth Plenary Session? Strict governance of the party. So tell me, are these the actions of a country that wants to do business with the rest of the world? Are these the actions of a country preparing to close its borders and learn from North Korea, right? Therefore, while officials say North Korea is learning from China, in my view, both sides are learning from each other, and both sides are showing a progressive integration akin to families across the strait. You might as well just unify already, and stop daydreaming about Taiwan. So in my view, Xi Jinping doesn't want to learn North Korea's economic growth, but rather wants to learn how to survive under international containment while still

Such an economic growth model can exist, but it ignores one thing: North Korea's economy is also propped up by the Russia-Ukraine war, or even by dispatching overseas laborers and trading in exchange for US dollars and Chinese yuan by aligning with China. Therefore, if China gradually enters a state of North Koreanization, I must ask: who will act as the China to this North Korea? Furthermore, isn't this exactly what Xi Jinping desires most? In the North Korean elections this March, the voter turnout was as high as 99.99%, and the approval vote reached 99.93%. As for those 0.07% who voted against, I don't know who they were—perhaps just a facade put on for the West to see, or maybe they genuinely opposed, and I have no idea what has happened to those people now. Therefore, perhaps due to his past psychological shadows—back when he ran for election in Fujian Province and ranked near the very bottom, right? And when he entered the first Politburo Standing Committee, he was also ranked last, wasn't he?—Xi Jinping truly carries deep childhood trauma in his heart. Now, he wants a 100% unanimous vote, doesn't he? So, North Korea has proven one thing to Xi Jinping: a country can be cut off from the entire world, the prices of goods for its people can multiply by five, yet its capital can still continue its great rejuvenation; food can be scarce, but what North Korea has taught Xi Jinping is never how to give the people a better life, but rather how to make the regime endure through history while forcing the people to endure a terrible life.

And what was that dinner in Washington all about? In June, Xi Jinping went to Pyongyang to see how a sanctioned country survives; in September, Xi Jinping went to Washington to set conditions: you are not allowed to sell weapons and you are not allowed to give Taiwan more commitments. These two trips are actually part of the same chessboard. What were they trading for? Time. Until that day comes, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) truly falls out with the United States, what Xi Jinping wants is a China that can survive just fine without relying on the entire Western, European, and American worlds—just like Pyongyang. So everyone, tomorrow night's state dinner at the White House will discuss many things: rare earths, tariffs, chips, geopolitics, AI, Iran, North Korea, and even Taiwan. But to be fair, Washington has never to this day announced that it would unilaterally change the so-called One China policy, nor has it changed the Taiwan Relations Act. The U.S. side has repeatedly assured Taiwan that its policy has not changed; last year's 11.1 billion did indeed pass, and what got stuck was the new additional part. And even taking a step back—ten million steps back—if Trump really wanted to sell out Taiwan, the U.S. separation of powers system would not allow Trump to do such a thing. Therefore, everyone actually doesn't need to worry too much. The most important thing is still to look at Taiwan ourselves. In fact, the internal chaos within Taiwan is a hundred times more serious than whether Trump will sell us out. The most crucial factor is still ourselves, right? But the Chinese people, actually you still have a trump card. How so? Most North Koreans have never seen the outside world, but you have. The people who have seen the prosperous and dazzling outside world can mostly never go back; it is easy to go from luxury to frugality, but with one precondition: whether Xi Jinping can truly succeed in persuading or making the majority of the ruling Zhao family members—those 500 families—agree with Xi Jinping's step toward North Koreanization. And what is the promise in exchange? Although the Chinese people will become increasingly poorer, and although there is no guarantee that you Zhao family members can be as rich as you were during the Hu-Wen era, what I can guarantee is that your power will be greater than ever before, you will be able to boss ordinary people around even more, more ordinary people in China will have to grovel before you just to survive, and you can play with more young women. Such a promise is quite possible. Today's video ends here.

If you like it, remember to subscribe to me.

If you don't like it, make sure to block me.

I am Bajiong, see you next time. Bye.