Hu Jintao holds the line on the Military Commission Chairman position, Hu Chunhua submits three pledges in four days! Ma Xingrui goes to court to exonerate Zhang Youxia, have the old military leaders finally relented? Xi Jinping's cronies cut off Peng Liyuan's retreat, has the Xinjiang black ledger become a tightening headband? [Jiang Feng Vision 20261106 Episode 533]

This episode provides a detailed analysis of the latest trends in the power struggle among the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Using the indictment of Ma Xingrui as a breakthrough, the civil officials and the military have made three moves in four days: the dual expulsion of top aide Guo Yonghang, the military's adjustment of personnel appearing in public, and the CPPCC's revocation of the membership of former People's Armed Police commander Wang Ning. The program explores the conditions Hu Chunhua faces to take over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the liquidation plans of the old military leaders and the Wen-Hu faction regarding the Zhang Youxia case and the Xi Jinping clique, as well as the role of the Xinjiang "black ledger" as a tight-fitting curse.

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Hello friends, welcome to Jiang Feng Vision. On November 5th, Ma Xingrui was formally indicted, and the court in Yichang, Hubei is waiting for him. The man Xi Jinping personally promoted to the 20th Politburo has become the first member of the 20th Politburo to be brought to court. The indictment lists his official titles in four segments: aerospace technology, Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee, Governor of Guangdong, and Politburo member, but there is only one charge: bribery. However, there are two things that are not mentioned in the indictment at all: one is the line that Xi Jinping has been harping on for more than half a year—that Zhang Youxia, in collusion with Ma Xingrui, embezzled hundreds of billions in military funds within the military-industrial system; the other is the three and a half years Ma Xingrui spent as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang. If we look at these four days: on November 2nd, Ma Xingrui's top aide in Guangdong, Guo Yonghang, was expelled from the Party and public office; on the 3rd, Zhang Shengmin replaced Dong Jun at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse to meet with the Russian Defense Minister; on the 4th, the CPPCC removed the qualifications of Xi Jinping's former People's Armed Police commander, General Wang Ning; and on the 5th, Ma Xingrui was indicted. These four days were a performance for the old military leaders. At the Fifth Plenary Session a week ago, the old military leaders were furious. Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan spoke very sternly. Before the Fifth Plenary Session, you reformist civil officials promised to clear the names of Zhang Youxia and his brothers. As a result, after the plenary session, Xi Jinping kept his dignity, but Zhang Youxia is still carrying the blame and cannot even save his own people. How can we trust you? Why should we hand over the chair of the Central Military Commission to Hu Chunhua? Hu Chunhua's path to the CMC chairmanship is stuck. Right now, the parties at the table each have their own demands: Wen Jiabao wants to liquidate the Xi Jinping clique; Zeng Qinghong wants to let bygones be bygones; Xi Jinping himself only seeks a dignified exit; the old military leaders want to first rehabilitate Zhang and Liu, and then let Hu Chunhua take over. Hu Jintao's bottom line is that Hu Chunhua must take office and must directly become the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. We mentioned in the November 2nd episode that on October 27th, the old military leaders laid their conditions on the table: Hu Chunhua can become the CMC Chairman, but he must first submit a letter of allegiance—rehabilitate Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Li Qiaoming, and liquidate the Xi Jinping clique. These four days represent the letter of allegiance submitted by Hu Chunhua's liquidation team. The two things missing from the indictment are all coded messages for the old military leaders. The aerospace and military industry sectors were investigated thoroughly, but it completely avoids the military. This is using Ying Yong's hand to tell the military that Zhang Youxia is innocent and that we will help you tear off the dirty hat Xi Jinping put on you. Including the Governor of Guangdong in the indictment, coupled with the dual expulsion of Guo Yonghang, points the blade from Guangdong toward Xi Jinping's wife. Not a single word is written about Xinjiang, because once Xinjiang is written, it will lead to the investigation of Xi Jinping himself. The top military order for Wen Jiabao and Hu Chunhua right now is not to send Xi Jinping to Qincheng Prison immediately, but to first accumulate enough trust from the old military leaders and push Hu Chunhua to the position of CMC Chairman. Once Hu Chunhua truly holds the gun in his hand, then they will open the drawer and audit Xi Jinping's Xinjiang ledger. Wen Jiabao's decision-making and coordination agency, and the liquidation team led by Hu Chunhua, must get the nod from the old military leaders. The first thing is to remove the corruption hat that Xi Jinping put on Zhang Youxia. The first hurdle is Ma Xingrui. When Xi Jinping discussed Zhang Youxia's case internally, he always linked the two people together.

After the incident involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in January, Xi Jinping changed the false charges against them three times. First it was undermining the Chairman Responsibility System of the Central Military Commission, then it was collusion with foreign forces, and finally it settled on conspiring with Ma Xingrui's military-industrial complex to embezzle hundreds of billions of yuan in military funds. Xi Jinping and Cai Qi unified their narrative and locked onto this single point. Zeng Qinghong asked Li Xi, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission, about this, but neither of them could give a clear answer, nor had they received any prior notice from the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Li Xi was handling Ma Xingrui's case at the time, yet he had no idea how Zhang Youxia could be linked to Ma Xingrui. Xi Jinping detained Zhang Youxia on this exact pretext, claiming that his involvement in the Ma Xingrui case required incommunicado detention and investigation. Zhang Youxia's own case was handed over to military procuratorial organs, but it has yet to go to trial. For now, the only case that can be tried first and explained clearly to the public is Ma Xingrui's. On April 1, Hu Chunhua took charge as the head of the temporary liquidation group of Xi Jinping's faction. On April 3, Ma Xingrui's downfall was officially announced, and his case fell into the hands of the liquidation group from that day on. Ma Xingrui's money originated from land in Shenzhen and his younger brother's business. Around May, Hu Donghai, the former chairman of CITIC Real Estate, was taken away. Following this lead, investigators reached Ma Xingrui's younger brother Ma Xingquan, Qianhai businessman Ma Shaofu, and Wang Zhanjiang, a real estate developer who moved south from Jilin. Operating under the state-owned enterprise banner of CITIC Real Estate, Wang Zhanjiang gorged himself on urban renewal projects in Shenzhen. Three days after acquiring an urban renewal project in May 2017, he resold it to Evergrande. Evergrande forked over more than 16 billion yuan. The official dual-expulsion announcement on July 14 stated very clearly that he engaged in extensive family corruption, accepting huge amounts of property personally or in collusion with relatives and specially designated persons. The relative who took the money alongside him was specified. On November 5, the Supreme People's Procuratorate designated the Yichang Procuratorate in Hubei to initiate public prosecution at the Yichang Intermediate People's Court. The indictment listed his official titles across four stages: Deputy General Manager and General Manager of Aerospace Science and Technology, Party Secretary of Shenzhen, Governor of Guangdong, and member of the Political Bureau. There was only one charge: accepting bribes. From his downfall in April to the public prosecution in November, there was no mention of military funds. Xi Jinping claimed there was a direct link between Zhang Youxia and Ma Xingrui, but this link ceased to exist once it reached the courtroom. The money trail stopped at Ma Xingquan, Ma Shaofu, Wang Zhanjiang, and Evergrande. According to insider accounts within the mainland, Ma Xingrui's case also implicated the boss's wife, as well as Xi Jinping's younger brother and elder sister's couple—none of whom appeared in the indictment. This was the deliberate boundary drawn in the indictment. As for clearing Zhang Youxia's name, Xi Jinping temporarily withheld it to keep his options open. According to regulations, major cases involving provincial or ministerial officials must be tried in a different jurisdiction, and any province can be designated. Yet the Supreme People's Procuratorate specifically pointed to Hubei. The person who signed this designation was Supreme People's Procuratorate Procurator-General Ying Yong, who was brought up all the way from Zhejiang by Xi Jinping. In February 2020, at the height of the epidemic in Wuhan, Xi Jinping sent him to serve as the Hubei party secretary to take the fall. He knows Hubei's public security, procuratorate, and judiciary inside and out. Xi Jinping's own procurator-general personally severed the very thread Xi Jinping used to pin down Zhang Youxia, and even sent Xi Jinping's cash cow back to Hubei for trial. Zhang Youxia has not yet been politically rehabilitated, but the first hurdle of the corruption charge has already been cleared. In truth, veteran military leaders long ago had a clear grasp of whether Zhang Youxia was corrupt or not. According to rumors within the mainland, during the US-China negotiations in Switzerland last May, the US side presented the Chinese delegation with a list of overseas assets belonging to the families of CCP officials, totaling 20 trillion US dollars. The only five people whose names did not appear on the list were Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua, Zhang Youxia, and Liu Yuan. Among these five uncorrupt officials, Li Keqiang is already gone, and according to mainland reports, Zhang Youxia's life or death remains unknown to this day. When all is said and throwing rhetoric aside, the rehabilitation demanded by the veteran military leaders boils down to this: you used corruption charges to purge an incorruptible man, and that false charge must be lifted before the entire party and the entire military. Slamming this indictment onto the desk of the August 1 Building is Hu Chunhua's liquidation group delivering their very first statement of allegiance to the veteran military leaders.

In March 2015, Ma Xingrui went to Shenzhen as the party secretary. Two months later, Guo Yonghang became the secretary-general of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee. A secretary knows far more than what he has signed off on: who met with whom, how many times a certain matter was urged, who didn't usually come by but suddenly showed up for a project—these things are not in the documents, they are in his head. His stubborn resistance was waiting for someone to save his life, waiting for Ma Xingrui to overturn his case, and even more so waiting for the woman behind Ma Xingrui to make a move. According to reports inside the Great Firewall, Ma Xingrui and his wife Rong Li acted as financial planners for the boss's wife's family. Rong Li was the boss's wife's best friend, and the couple called the boss's wife 'Big Sister.' The boss's wife privately had a circle of wives' friends, which included Ma Xingrui's wife. The big money Ma Xingrui looted in Guangdong and Xinjiang was not saved for himself. Guo Yonghang's stubbornness was a gamble that Xi Jinping and the boss's wife could protect Ma Xingrui before the Fifth Plenary Session. As soon as the Fifth Plenary Session dispersed, on November 2, Guo Yonghang was subjected to the 'double shuai' and transferred to the judicial authorities. Three days later, Ma Xingrui was prosecuted. Those who had originally urged Guo Yonghang to hold out—what could they now use to guarantee his safety? Once Guo Yonghang was transferred, Ma Xingrui's case could not be overturned; and if Ma Xingrui's case could not be overturned, the boss's wife could not possibly extricate herself. Guo Yonghang had the Ma family's account books in his hands, and Caixin had traced the path of the Ma family's money. Ma Xingrui's younger brother, Ma Xingqiu, along with real estate developer Wang Zhanjiang's Huasheng system, used CITIC Real Estate's brand to take a cut of Shenzhen's urban redevelopment. The Huasheng system also invested 5 billion into Evergrande Real Estate. Among the list of financiers for the Huasheng system was the Zhuhai state-owned assets managed by Guo Yonghang during his tenure. In June 2021, when Evergrande could no longer hold on, those 5 billion of the Huasheng system were taken over by Vanke's Boshang system. According to reports inside the Great Firewall, behind Vanke is the family of Xi Jinping. The hole poked by Ma Xingrui was filled by Vanke, which belongs to Xi Jinping's family. There is another narrative inside the Great Firewall: Xu Jiayin was merely Ma Xingrui's white glove. Out of Evergrande's 2-trillion-yuan hole, the big money flowed to the side of Ma Xingrui's boss's wife. There was an even bigger secret channel for the Ma family's money, which went through the China Development Bank. According to reports inside the Great Firewall, in 2019, Ma Xingrui recommended Ouyang Weimin to the boss's wife to become the president of the China Development Bank, specifically to issue loans for projects designated by Ma Xingrui. When the real estate market collapsed, the China Development Bank's bad debts reached hundreds of billions. In 2023, Ouyang Weimin stepped down early; it was still Ma Xingrui who used his relationship with the boss's wife to firmly protect him. On July 14 of this year, Ma Xingrui was subjected to the 'double shuai,' and five days later on July 19, Ouyang Weimin was taken down. This was what killed Guo Yonghang. On the local side, how projects were approved, how land was allocated, and from which state-owned asset platform the money came were handled by Guo Yonghang. On the bank side, how loans were issued and how bad debts were suppressed were handled by Ouyang Weimin. When these two sets of account books were placed on the same table and cross-checked, they matched perfectly. People caught in the middle only knew their own section and did not know how much the other side had confessed. Today he would say it was handled according to the rules, and tomorrow an approval slip would pop up in the other side's account books. Lining up the daggers along this path: in April, the boss's wife's top general Ma Xingrui; in July, the China Development Bank president Ouyang Weimin, recommended by Ma Xingrui for the boss's wife; on August 20, Yang Xinsheng, the party secretary of Yuncheng County in Shandong—the shared hometown of the boss's wife and Ma Xingrui—was taken down; on November 2, Ma Xingrui's top secretary Guo Yonghang; and on November 5, Ma Xingrui himself was paraded into the Yichang court. Why was there no mention of the boss's wife in that indictment? According to reports inside the Great Firewall, Ma Xingrui had already confessed to the fact of transferring massive benefits to the family of the boss's wife, and members of the boss's wife's family had already been detained by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Logically, the boss's wife herself should have been dealt with in the same case; it was Hu Jintao who, out of concern for intra-party unity, showed leniency and temporarily left her untouched. Why were the old military leaders staring at this particular line? According to reports inside the Great Firewall, after the 20th National Congress, the boss's wife took a seat on the Central Military Commission's cadre evaluation committee, holding the promotions of generals in her hands. She also sent her top secretary, Zhong Shaojun, to the August 1 Building as a military supervisor to force Zhang Youxia to surrender power. Half of the suppressed anger in the military was directed at Xi Jinping, and the other half at her. Taking down a Guo Yonghang only meant that one person had been dealt with. Tracing upward along the accounts handled by Guo Yonghang was the only way to answer the real question the old military leaders wanted to ask: could the woman at the top still protect herself? The old military leaders inspected the goods by demanding real swords and real guns. The cold winter behind the red walls has already crashed down.

On November 2, the civil officials first cut off the clues of the boss's wife. The next day, the military returned the favor. On November 3, Russian Defense Minister Belousov visited. Defense Minister Dong Jun had been missing for a month and a half, and it was Zhang Shengmin who appeared at the Diaoyutai. Why him specifically? The Fifth Plenary Session added Zhang Shengmin to the Politburo. Adding a Politburo member between two party congresses is the first time in 32 years since Huang Ju in 1994. Adding him is to ensure he has a say in two places. The first place is at the meeting. According to domestic sources, Wen Jiabao's decision-making and coordination body attended the plenary session. Although they had no voting rights, Wen Jiabao could speak and interrupt at any time. After the Fourth Plenary Session last year, Xi Jinping withdrew from the coordination body, and Zhang Youxia nominated Liu Yuan, a military representative, to fill the vacancy. However, Wen Jiabao is not familiar with military affairs. Liu Yuan can attend Politburo meetings, but there must be someone from the military in the Politburo to coordinate. The second place is on the stage. At the banquet of the Xiangshan Forum in September, Zhang Shengmin sat at the table without saying a word, so they had to ask Han Zheng to step in. We talked about this in September. By November 3, the person meeting foreign defense ministers on behalf of the military was already this Politburo member. The military's public face had been replaced by someone from the old military leaders' side. However, not a single Central Military Commission (CMC) member was added at the Fifth Plenary Session. Zhang Shuguang, the Secretary of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission who was promoted to general in July this year; Wang Gang, the Air Force Commander; Han Shengyan, the Central Theater Command Commander who was promoted to general last December; and Yang Zhibin, the Eastern Theater Command Commander, were all suppressed. Some bloggers say that before Hu Chunhua takes over as Chairman of the CMC, this group of young and strong officers must not be allowed to enter the CMC, lest they get involved in forcing Xi Jinping to abdicate. If they become CMC members before Hu Chunhua, their seniority would be higher than the new boss, and they might feel that they helped win the country, so how could Hu Chunhua suppress them? Therefore, those who rush to the front to do dirty work and take the blame can only be Zhang Shengmin, who will reach the age limit next year, plus old military leaders who have long retired, such as Chi Haotian, Cao Gangchuan, Fan Changlong, Li Zuocheng, Liu Yuan, and Wang Guanzhong. When Hu Chunhua sits in the chair of the CMC Chairman, he will personally sign the order to promote these newcomers into the CMC. The military's return favor is waiting for Hu Chunhua's next move. The next day, November 4, the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee closed. Former Armed Police Commander Wang Ning was stripped of his committee member status. He came from the 31st Army and received the Armed Police flag from Xi Jinping's hands. All three consecutive Armed Police commanders have fallen, which we covered in the previous episode. Today, we only look at a new layer: the knife in the hands of the CPPCC has changed owners. This is the third time this year that the CPPCC has removed a general. The method of removal is the same: the military does not announce a word, the person disappears from the meeting, and the title is stripped directly after a vote by the Standing Committee. The first time was before the Two Sessions in early March, when former Army Commander Han Weiguo, former Political Commissar Liu Lei, and former Strategic Support Force Commander Gao Jin were removed. They cut off the old commander and old political commissar of the Army. The second time was at the end of August, when General Zhao Zongqi was removed. He was the commander of the Jinan Military Region promoted by Hu Jintao's order, and the first commander of the Western Theater Command. In 1984, he fought in Laoshan. Zhang Youxia was the commander of the 119th Regiment, and Zhao Zongqi was the commander of the 118th Regiment. These two times, Xi Jinping and the conservatives used the knife of the CPPCC to cut off the factions of Hu Jintao and Zhang Youxia. At that time, there was no other way; some people might have had some problems and were caught by others. The third time on November 4, they cut off Wang Ning, the Armed Police Commander who was personally presented with the flag by Xi Jinping. On the surface, all three times were the same, presided over by Wang Huning, with Secretary-General Wang Dongfeng giving explanations. But according to domestic sources, the real power of the CPPCC Party Group has long been out of Wang Huning's hands. The people who actually reviewed the list of members one by one were the first-ranked Vice Chairman and Minister of the Organization Department, Shi Taifeng, and the second-ranked Vice Chairman, Hu Chunhua. On April 13, when the CPPCC Party Group held the mobilization meeting for the third round of special inspections, it was Shi Taifeng, Hu Chunhua, and Wang Dongfeng who appeared, leaving Wang Huning aside. Why specifically cut the Armed Police? After Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had trouble in January, the Army stopped listening to Xi Jinping. The only guns Xi Jinping could still use were Wang Xiaohong's police and the Beijing Armed Police. According to domestic sources, in order to seize the military power of the Beijing Garrison, Xi Jinping even transferred Chen Yuan, the Shanghai Armed Police Commander and a direct subordinate of the boss's wife, from Shanghai, wanting him to take over the Garrison, but it did not succeed. Connecting these three days: on November 2, civil officials cut off Ma Xingrui's chief secretary; on November 3, the military changed its facade to Zhang Shengmin; on November 4, the CPPCC, presided over by Hu Chunhua, cut back at Xi Jinping's people. The rules are also laid out on the table: Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan are guarding the door of the August 1st Building for you, and you, Hu Chunhua, must hand over enough of a 'pledge of allegiance' by liquidating the Xi Jinping clique and clearing the names of the old generals.

On November 5, the Supreme People's Procuratorate filed a public prosecution against Ma Xingrui. On the same day, Beijing held two reporting meetings to publicize the Fifth Plenary Session. The first meeting was held at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), where Deputy Secretary Liu Guoguo delivered a speech. The Xinhua News Agency release read from beginning to end that he said we must closely follow the General Secretary, but the eight characters of the Two Establishes and the Two Safeguards were completely missing. On March 27, this Liu Guoguo took away Guo Yonghang, and three days after his dual expulsion and transfer on November 2, he stood on the stage to lecture, without reciting those eight characters even once. The second meeting was held at the Ministry of Public Security, hosted by Wang Xiaohong, with a main venue and branch venues totaling over 10,000 people in a video conference. What he shouted was firm support for the Two Establishes and resolute implementation of the Two Safeguards. Why did Wang Xiaohong insist on clinging to Old Xi's memorial tablet on this very day? The day before, Wang Ning was stripped of his post, and on the same day Ma Xingrui was prosecuted. The military's facade was also replaced by Zhang Shengmin. Old Xi has lost military power, the money bag, and the armed police, leaving only Wang Xiaohong's public security force. He shouted it out to the more than 10,000 public security officers below, but the people below also have eyes. The Supreme People's Procuratorate put a Politburo member on trial, the CPPCC stripped a general of his post, and the CCDI didn't even recite those eight characters. When a public security cadre receives an order from above, the first thing they have to weigh is whether the handling of this matter can withstand future scrutiny. Matters that used to be handled with a single phone call will henceforth require written procedures in the future, and matters that used to be handled first and reported later will henceforth require prior approval. The louder Wang Xiaohong shouts, the more it shows that his position at the bottom is unstable. According to sources within the Wall, Ma Xingrui at most holds the corruption evidence of Old Xi's family and the boss's wife's family, while Wang Xiaohong holds the evidence of murder and silencing. Ma Xingrui can topple the boss's wife, and Wang Xiaohong can topple Old Xi. However, with three moves in four days leading up to this point, the old military heads have still not conceded. The meeting of the Central Military Commission to convey the Fifth Plenary Session has not yet been held as of the day Ma Xingrui was prosecuted, and not a single one of the five vacant seats on the Military Commission has been filled. The redress for Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Li Qiaoming has not yet landed, and with three issues stuck in one place, the Military Commission's board has not yet been rearranged. When all is said and outs, the drama in Zhongnanhai boils down to endurance in the end—who can hold out the longest in one breath.

Speaking of what was missing from the indictment—Xinjiang—the indictment kept Ma Xingrui's three and a half years in Xinjiang tightly sealed. Was nothing found in Xinjiang? There are three public records right there. First, Ma Xingrui obtained his position as a member of the 20th Politburo while serving as the party secretary of Xinjiang. In June of this year, his qualification as a delegate to the National People's Congress was also revoked by the Xinjiang People's Congress Standing Committee. Second, during the years Ma Xingrui governed Xinjiang, three tigers fell in succession: Jiao Xiaoping, deputy commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in February 2023; Li Pengxin, deputy secretary of the autonomous region's party committee in December; and Dou Wangui, vice chairman of the autonomous region's CPPCC in March 2024. The CCDI had long since entered Xinjiang. According to accounts from within the Wall, Liu Guoguo had long thoroughly investigated Ma Xingrui's power-and-money transactions in Guangdong and Xinjiang. Third, most importantly, whose hands do the two former secretaries who governed Xinjiang now fall into? The former secretary, Chen Quanguo, left Xinjiang at the end of 2021. Half a year later, in June 2022, he became the deputy leader of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, and the leader was Hu Chunhua. Four months before the 20th National Congress, the former Xinjiang secretary sat in the deputy's seat of Hu Chunhua. At that Politburo meeting on June 30 of last year, while Ma Xingrui was removed as Xinjiang secretary, the person replacing him was Hu Jintao's man, Chen Xiaojiang. The former was Hu Chunhua's deputy, and the successor is Hu Jintao's man. Both ends of this ledger on Xinjiang are tightly gripped by the Hu-Wen faction. The reason the indictment does not write it down is that this Xinjiang ledger is by no means just Ma Xingrui's ledger. Over the past decade, that high-pressure stability-maintenance path in Xinjiang was personally finalized and dictated by Old Xi himself. Both former Xinjiang secretaries, Chen Quanguo and Ma Xingrui, operated entirely in accordance with Old Xi's path. Once the Xinjiang party secretary is written into the indictment, what is tried in the Yichang court will not just be Ma Xingrui, but will directly put Old Xi's own Xinjiang-governing line on trial. Plucking Xinjiang out of the indictment and locking it in a drawer is leaving a final tight-fillet spell for Old Xi. Bluntly put, this drawer is the switch for how Old Xi steps down. According to accounts from within the Wall, during the Fourth Plenary Session last October, all parties had already negotiated that Old Xi would hand over power and step down following the Hua Guofeng model, with the elders letting bygones be bygones while retaining his identity as the fifth-generation leader of the CCP. However, after the incidents involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in January, Wen Jiabao changed his mind and supported Hu Chunhua in carrying out a thorough liquidation. If the drawer remains locked, it follows the Hua Guofeng model; if the drawer is pulled open, it follows the Gang of Four model. As long as Old Xi obediently hands over the chairmanship of the Military Commission and the general secretary post, this drawer stays locked. If Old Xi and Wang Xiaohong dare to counterattack during the transition period, Hu Chunhua can pull open the drawer at any time and additionally prosecute Ma Xingrui for his crimes in Xinjiang. The old military leaders can read this drawer; when will the miscarriages of justice of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Li Qiaoming be redressed? According to accounts from within the Wall, Hu Jintao's instruction is that after the reorganization of the Central Military Commission, it will be studied and decided by the Military Commission. In principle, just as Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai could be rehabilitated, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli can of course also be rehabilitated, but it requires waiting for the reorganization of the Military Commission and waiting for people. Among the recent two batches of generals—one batch last December and another batch this July—are Major General Zhu Chuansheng, who currently presides over the daily work of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission, and Major General Chen Demin, who presides over the Political Work Department. According to accounts from within the Wall, as early as this December, they will be promoted to full generals together. Major generals cannot become members of the Military Commission; without taking this step, the Military Commission cannot be fully staffed. Zhu Chuansheng is Li Zuocheng's man, and Chen Demin is Hu Jintao's air force man. As soon as Zhu Chuansheng and Chen Demin receive their full general ranks, the five vacant seats in the Central Military Commission will have substitute candidates, and the Sixth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee may be convened ahead of schedule. By then, the guns in the hands of the old military leaders will be handed over to Hu Chunhua, and that drawer locking away the master ledger of Xinjiang will also reach the day it is opened. Hu Jintao will put Old Xi's clique on trial; the three moves in four days after the Fifth Plenary Session are merely the opening of the court, and for the true verdict, let us keep our eyes on the August 1st Building this December. Alright, that's all for today's Jiangfeng Horizon.

Thank you friends for watching, and see you next time.