The political rival Xi Jinping fears most is gradually emerging!

This episode is hosted by Hu Liren and mainly analyzes the recent political speculation triggered by Hu Chunha's absence and re-appearance, discussing the resistance and hollowed-out crisis Xi Jinping is facing within the party and the military. The host points out that as military generals refuse to take sides, political elders and the hidden influence of red noble families unite, coupled with the expansion of anti-Xi public sentiment brought about by the collapse of the real estate and livelihood economy, Xi Jinping's rule is facing a serious crisis, and the probability of his team disintegrating is extremely high.

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I just did an episode with everyone about this incident involving Hu Chunha, and it has to be said that this incident is very real. It happened at such an important occasion, where all senior officials of the Communist Party appeared, except for Hu Chunha, and that day he should have been seated on the rostrum. Everyone remembers, that day the rostrum had several rows, and he was supposed to sit in the back row with the people from the CPPCC, but he did not appear. That day Xi Jinping walked into the venue, and later everyone was guessing that something happened to Hu Chunha. For such an important occasion, even if you were really sick, they would drag your hospital bed there. What kind of time is it right now? And then, shortly after, he suddenly appeared. So it is entirely possible, and the probability is very high, that after he was detained, someone bailed him out. Who bailed him out? Just think about who could bail Hu Chunha out? That force must be powerful, meaning, as I have said before, a group of people inside the Communist Party, their ability is very strong, they are a check and balance against Xi Jinping, they are Xi Jinping's political opponents, they are the ones who lifted Xi Jinping up, and they can also bring Xi Jinping down.

Now, although Xi Jinping appears to hold absolute power, because he later moved against people in the military and touched so many, many within the military have now broken away from the CCP Central Commission, effectively separating from the CCP Central Commission in reality. Today, the CCP Central Commission has essentially become hollowed out—hollowed out with no one left. Some people in Beijing are even speculating internally about who Xi Jinping wants to promote, and many are refusing. Many are refusing, drawing a clear line between themselves and Xi Jinping's team and clique. For example, the recent promotion of Zhang Shengming happened because he is Xi's cousin. But if Xi wants to promote others, promoting people who are too young won't work because they lack seniority and influence. If you try to promote those with some seniority, these people have often already taken a side and drawn a clear line against Xi Jinping. In other words, everyone believes that following Xi means everyone is taking a side, and following him will ultimately cost them their lives, so why risk going to prison? They would rather just refuse. In other words, what lies behind these refusals? Anyone who refuses often ends up becoming Xi Jinping's opponent; they have already become Xi's opponents. Therefore, the hardest thing for Xi Jinping to handle is the military. That is why recently, you see many people talking about Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, often discussing political elders. These political elders—yes, they are indeed political elders now—this is not baseless; each of them still has their own resources. However, these people are often already controlled by the CCP and controlled by Xi Jinping. Although they are controlled, they still retain a certain level of influence, which may not be overwhelming, but when these people all gather together, that strength becomes formidable. That strength becomes formidable because, after all, they were former supreme commanders, just like Xi Jinping is the supreme commander now. You could say he is familiar with people in the military, but under his current circumstances, people are naturally keeping their distance from him.

In Deng Xiaoping's era, you see, many people were close to Deng and had been through life-and-death situations with him before, which is why Deng Xiaoping was able to firmly control the CCP and the situation at that time—even after the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, when he killed so many students, there were still many people supporting him. So I think under the current circumstances of the CCP, I want to analyze which factions might band together to oppose Xi. These factions are often those who have been divided, purged, dismantled, or arrested by Xi Jinping, and some whose assets were plundered—such as the Jiang faction, the Deng faction, and now the Deng faction, Jiang faction, and Hu Jintao's faction. Everyone already knows about Hu Jintao being dragged out of the venue that day; they have already become adversaries. Now Hu Jintao's son is still serving as a deputy minister at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but I think that is actually just a facade. Xi Jinping keeps his son in that position to make people feel that he still has some grace toward Hu Jintao, that he still has benevolence toward Hu Jintao, and that ties are not completely cut. But this recent incident involving Hu Chunhua should have made that abundantly clear.

I think the person who most wants to protect Hu Chunhua and the Communist Youth League faction should be Hu Jintao. Although Hu Jintao is quite old now—you can tell just by looking at how he walks and the slowness of his physical movements—his mind is still quite clear. That day at the venue, when looking at the document, he saw something was wrong at a glance and immediately raised an objection. I think he is likely very clear-headed, and he should have understood Xi Jinping's situation by then. Under such circumstances, will he connect with other people, linking up with older figures from the Jiang faction such as Zeng Qinghong and other veterans? The family assets of these veterans have already been mostly seized by Xi Jinping, so deep down in their hearts, they must be extremely resentful and deeply distressed. Once these people are gathered together, they are very likely to form an extremely massive force. This force is currently connecting with people in the military, and if they link up, the single largest force right now is the military.

If you study Xi Jinping now, the things happening within the military, these incidents, there is no way to explain them, absolutely no way to explain them. I believe that his influence within the military, his power within the military, has already completely collapsed. He may have sent people to various theater commands, but the people in these theater commands have very likely already rejected them; it's as if he no longer has any presence in these theater commands. Look at how Xi Jinping arrested the commander of the Northern Theater Command and also arrested the commander of the Western Theater Command. You think that by arresting these people, by arresting these people, you want the military, you must have the military troops, but what kind of entity is the military? What is the military of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? The CCP's military is completely independent; it is entirely separate from the political system. People in political circles have to look at the faces of those in the local military districts, the faces of these military sub-district personnel, the faces of these generals, because once a major event occurs, they need support from the military. You cannot control it. If the military turns against you, then you are finished; your regime will be completely finished.

Therefore, many Chinese people are now pinning their hopes on the old guard of the CCP military, these personnel, and their second-generation military descendants, hoping they can truly check Xi Jinping and whether they can take action as soon as possible to strike down Xi's power. Striking down Xi's power is what everyone is hoping for. Of course, this hope is good, but to actually take action, it may still take some time. That is one thing. Secondly, a lot of work may still need to be done, specifically work on public opinion. So some people are saying, Xi Jinping, the worse you make this country, the greater the chance of your downfall, and the greater your risk, because these are all things Xi Jinping is doing to weave his public opinion, the foundation of anti-Xi public opinion. The common people are hating Xi Jinping, including those Little Pinks. Once the Little Pinks run out of food at home, that's it. Then these Little Pinks will start cursing Xi Jinping, and then Xi's doomsday will have arrived.

So, in doing anything—I used to work in management—in doing anything, you need a time node to start. Just like when we have a project to launch, when we want to start a certain project, we will conduct a complete assessment, a comprehensive assessment, to evaluate at which point this project should be launched. Its funding, its technology, its market, its research and development, its capital—in every aspect, we must conduct a re-evaluation, a complete assessment, and then determine the project. It's just like doing internet business in the past; when the internet was at its peak, it was easy to get money, but once you encountered risks, you were finished. It's just like trading stocks, just like buying a house. If you are investing in real estate, for example, the 2008 financial crisis in the United States hit, and it released all these financial problems. Two companies suddenly collapsed. Well, in this situation, it enters a complete trough period. After reaching the trough, later on, houses worth hundreds of thousands became houses bought for tens of thousands.

I had a friend, probably after 2008, who went to Shanghai. At the time, I asked, I said, what are you doing? He said I am buying houses. I said you are buying houses? He said yes, he said I have bought dozens of sets now, bought probably dozens of sets, really dozens of houses, dozens of houses. I don't know if he is watching my program, I don't know, a very close friend. Originally in that Charlton, because he had cash on hand at the time, the houses he bought were all bankruptcy foreclosures. You ask, how much was a bankruptcy foreclosure? A few tens of thousands per unit. So his strength at the time was to buy dozens, buying twenty or thirty was completely more than enough; he could probably buy them for a million. After buying them, I said what are you doing? He said I am calling this renovation company to renovate. He said during this period I am specifically doing the procurement myself. I think now, look at these houses, look at the houses he bought, the median price has already reached hundreds of thousands. So I think he was buying at auctions at the time, all of these, he said the houses I got were all from the bank, the houses I took were hundreds of thousands, dozens of houses, dozens of houses, if I remember correctly, dozens of houses. So for anything, it requires one thing: if you want to succeed in this matter, it requires a time node, it requires a foundation. Once this foundation is reached, the time node is right, then the success of this matter is highly likely. For this kind of thing, you only have success and no failure; once you fail, you are finished.

I have been thinking that the time is about right, and Xi Jinping's countdown is almost up. I always have a feeling that during this Fifth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping seemed a bit low-profile. I don't know if anyone else has this feeling. Look at this communiqué, go read that communiqué—the number of times Xi Jinping's name appears has dropped significantly. In the past, it was all about Xi Jinping giving a few speeches, Xi Jinping Thought, giving a few speeches, Xi Jinping leading the direction of the world, giving a few speeches, Xi Jinping this and that. Now, after interpreting and looking at this communiqué, my impression is that Xi Jinping's name—for example, if his name appeared two hundred times previously, now it might only be a hundred times, or even less than a hundred times. Therefore, under these circumstances, I think he must be under pressure.

When you run things to this extent in this world, and reform and opening-up has been going on for decades, trying to be a dictator in China is actually extremely difficult. It should be said that it is like playing with fire and burning oneself; it is extremely hard, not that easy at all. You want to arrest so many generals, you want to arrest so many officials—just think about how many people you are offending, how many families are watching. Besides, the relationships among these military figures are intricate and complex. Think about how someone can be young, in their 50s, and directly promoted to general; some get promoted to general around the age of 50, and some in their mid-50s. Just think, these people actually rose like rockets, right? Think about it simply: to rise like a rocket to such a position, do you think their family or social connections, or their clan, might have very strong ties within the military? These ties might reach all the way to the heavens, possibly reaching all the way to the heavens. Therefore, I feel that Xi Jinping has reached a turning point where, if things continue, the other side is very likely to show their hand and have a showdown.

Take Hu Chunhao before. If this matter had happened a few years ago, when he arrested Hu Chunhao, if someone had come to intercede or talk to him, he probably wouldn't have paid them any mind at all, wouldn't have paid them any mind at all, because Hu Chunhao was too important to him, far too important. I have been saying that Xi Jinping has been wiping out the Communist Youth League faction entirely. Look at how even Li Keqiang was targeted, right? Li Keqiang died under unclear circumstances, and everyone, people inside the Communist Party, are very clear about this. This time, look at how that woman was taken down as well. Therefore, members of the Youth League faction are leaving one by one, and all under abnormal circumstances.

Liu Yandong—just think, Liu Yandong is an 80-year-old person. As I have mentioned before regarding people like this within the Communist Party, the veteran cadres and veteran Red Army soldiers of the past used to live into their nineties or hundreds. These people, when they were young, suffered so much without enough to eat or drink; some even had bullet scars on their bodies, having fought their way through, and they still managed to live and hold on until now. Look at Liu Yandong. Their family conditions were relatively good; her family itself was at the vice-ministerial cadre level, and her family life when she was young must have been very good. She was born in the 1940s—yes, 1945. Born in 1945, after the Communist Party came to power, her father... up until 50, starting in 1949, life was good for her until the Cultural Revolution. Her father was later persecuted during the Cultural Revolution for more than ten years, which laid a solid foundation for her physical health. And suddenly like this, at 80 years old, she is gone. Ordinary folks would feel that this is still relatively young. Of course, many young people die nowadays, but these are all abnormal deaths. Therefore, I can be certain that Liu Yandong, she was very mature, just like Li Keqiang. For someone like Liu Yandong, those people in her family—she enjoyed a sub-national-level treatment. Just think, people like her have homes entirely controlled by personnel from the Central Security Bureau, including doctors, her personal doctors, and the household staff, all of whom are dispatched by the Central Security Bureau. These people are actually Xi's people, who can manipulate you at any time, thinking of making you leave tomorrow, and you will leave tomorrow.

I feel we should be able to see it, and will see Xi step down very soon. It won't take much longer. If he drags it out until next year, if he continues to stay in power next year—some media are speculating that he will still ascend to... I feel that possibility is almost zero, almost zero. Because for him to ascend... to continue for another term, just think about how many officials he would have to purge, and these officials genuinely have all kinds of connections. Xi Jinping has already offended all of them, almost all of them, including the people around him. In fact, even the people around him are unwilling to take sides with him, because the deeper you enter that upper echelon, the more fearful you feel, the more fearful you feel.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is just like this. There is a saying that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Everyone understands who has the guns and who has the armed forces, so the CCP is essentially a violent organization. Therefore, those who eventually overthrow it must also be a violent organization. It is impossible for it to undergo a democratic transition; a democratic transition is impossible. That is why I have always criticized those so-called 'democratic transition' advocates. Look, has there been any transition? The CCP cannot turn towards kindness; it can only become more and more like the CCP. Every cent they earn, their corrupt funds, is the hard-earned money of the common people. Only by treating the common people as objects of enslavement can they fill their pockets, and only then can their families live lives of great wealth and luxury. They are all super-rich, all of them super-rich. If you were in the United States, where would you go to earn that kind of money? Look at their assets all over the world; they are massive. So, it has reached the end; it should be the end.

As for the Hu Chunhua incident, it should have had a huge impact on Xi Jinping and his team. If this matter—and I think people in Xi Jinping's team all know about it—if Hu Chunhua were to be taken down, it wouldn't just be a few people who knew; his entire team would certainly know. If Hu Chunhua were to be taken down, Wang Huning would certainly know first, as they are in the CPPCC. If these high-level people within the CCP all know about it, and then suddenly Hu Chunhua appears again and is placed back in a high position, those around him must be thinking, 'You, Xi Jinping, you, Old Xi, you have also loosened your grip.' Think about it, it's like a soft-shelled turtle biting you; you know it won't let go. Unless it feels pain, how could it possibly let go of its bite, right? So, to make it let go, how much force would it take? Therefore, I think that for a dictator, once they reach a certain level—especially when they are about to perish, or are about to disintegrate, or are about to be toppled and overthrown—there will often be huge internal friction. No one is willing to go down with him; who has the guts to go all the way with him? No one. Under these circumstances, the possibility of Xi's team disintegrating is also very high.

Alright, I will leave this topic here for everyone. I hope everyone will pray for the CCP to perish soon. Regardless of one's nature or religious beliefs, or religious groups, we should all pray in our own different ways. I believe, I believe that the suffering of China and the suffering of the Chinese people will finally come to an end when Xi Jinping steps down. Thank you all for watching, and see you in the next program.