Li Keqiang's Wife and Daughter Take the Case to the Fifth Plenary Session! Hu Chunhua Moves to File a Case, Xi Jinping Will Be a Defendant Upon Returning from Overseas; Zeng Qinghong Demands Xi Step Down Gracefully, Unable Even to Sit at the Table [Jiangfeng Perspective 20260918 Episode 491]
The video focuses on rumors surrounding Cheng Hong and her daughter's demand for an investigation into the cause of Li Keqiang's death. It chronologically outlines their process of seeking intervention from party elders starting in late 2025, to proposing an investigation motion to Hu Chunhua in 2026, and analyzes the potential stances of Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, Liu Yuan, Hu Chunhua, Zeng Qinghong, and the military around the time of the Fifth Plenary Session. The content also covers Li Keqiang's death, the sentencing of Gu Wanming, central decision-making coordination bodies, rumors related to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, and predictions for political personnel arrangements from 2026 to 2028.
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Today, let's start with one person: Li Keqiang's wife, Cheng Hong. While others are discussing how Xi Jinping might step down, she only asks one thing: how exactly did my husband die? The accounts recorded by overseas leaks over this past year can be divided into four steps.
Step one: In December 2025, she and her daughter sought to meet with Hu Jintao and his wife. Wen Jiabao stepped in to block them, telling her to wait for the right time. She put forward three points: Li Keqiang had no family history of heart disease and swam regularly, often for over half an hour at a time; he had just undergone a comprehensive physical examination before his business trip to Shanghai; and neither his wife nor daughter was by his side when he passed away. She said she was not seeking revenge, only the truth, just like in the case of Liu Shaoqi.
Step two: In January 2026, Hu Jintao's intention was to close the case and wait until after Xi Jinping passes away to discuss it. Her reply was that if the investigation is not reopened, the mother and daughter would go to the petition center to petition publicly, unless they were placed under house arrest just like Xi Jinping did to others. Wang Yang, Liu Yuan, and Hu Chunhua stood on her side.
Step three: In April 2026, Hu Chunhua was seconded from the CPPCC to the group led by Wen Jiabao, becoming the head of the liquidation team. Wang Yang and Liu Yuan conveyed her original words: do not let a single one of them off the hook.
Step four: In September 2026, the leaks were the most direct: Zeng Qinghong did not agree to the liquidation, but could not refuse the legitimate demands of the family. Launching an investigation into the Li Keqiang case is the beginning of the liquidation. From last winter to this autumn, not a single step was taken by the elders themselves; it was this widow pushing Zhongnanhai forward.
What can the Fifth Plenary Session in October achieve? The leaks say that Hu Chunhua will propose a motion in his capacity as a member of the Central Committee, requesting that the plenary session authorize the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to conduct a comprehensive review of the Li Keqiang case. On Zeng Qinghong's side, they are discussing something else. The path he is paving for Xi Jinping is to resign due to illness, handing over all three positions in exchange for immunity for past actions. However, the agenda for what the plenary session discusses is set by the Secretariat of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. The Secretariat now listens to Wen Jiabao. Can Wen Jiabao nod to include Zeng Qinghong's immunity proposal on the agenda? If he doesn't, the more than 200 members of the Central Committee will have nothing to discuss.
Therefore, whether to step down or grant immunity, according to Wen Jiabao's considerations, it is highly likely to be shelved for now. Wen Jiabao has many things on the table, such as personnel, the Central Military Commission, and party rectification, but the one weighing the most is how Li Keqiang died. Whether Xi Jinping steps down or not has nothing to do with this case. Zhou Yongkang stepped down in 2012, but was still prosecuted in 2014.
Some also say that in this situation, the conservatives might simply make him disappear, sealing the accounts in his coffin. That calculation is too optimistic. The year Liu Shaoqi was confirmed to have been persecuted to death, Mao Zedong had already been dead for four years, yet the case was still investigated. However, when it reached Mao Zedong, it was just a statement that he bore primary responsibility; no one convicts the dead. If Xi Jinping passes away, the defendant's seat will be occupied by Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, while he himself will have a grand state funeral, untainted by any criminal charges.
So, thinking one step further, once this case is fully reviewed, if he is still alive when it reaches him, he must be convicted. He knows clearly in his heart that he cannot walk out of this case alive. This is not a curse on anyone; it is his most probable outcome.
The National People's Congress (NPC) website released news on September 14 that NPC Vice Chairperson Tie Ning led a team to Gansu for legislative research on the protection of historical and cultural heritage. From September 8 to 11, the research team traveled from Tianshui to Jiayuguan, a full four days. Only two vice chairpersons of the provincial People's Congress appeared on behalf of the province; the Provincial Party Secretary Hu Changsheng was absent, and Acting Governor Kong Shaoxun was also absent. A vice-national-level official visited the province for four days, yet the top leadership collectively failed to appear.
Li Keqiang's final public appearance in his life took place at the Mogao Caves in Gansu Province. On the afternoon of August 30, 2023, Li Keqiang, who had been retired for half a year and had no public activities during that time, appeared in Dunhuang. The highest-ranking official accompanying him was the Party Secretary of the Dunhuang Academy. Ordinary people spontaneously gathered around him, shouting, "Hello, Premier." That was the last footage of him left in this world.
Two months later, on October 27, 2023, the official announcement stated he had passed away in Shanghai, providing only the five words: "sudden heart attack." At the farewell ceremony, Cheng Hong was seen with tears streaming down her face; that face was seen by all of China. In Dingyuan, Anhui, and Zhengzhou, Henan, streets were piled high with flowers, delivered bouquet by bouquet by food delivery riders.
As soon as Tie Ning went to Gansu, the local top officials hid. This was interpreted as someone at the top preparing to settle the account for Li Keqiang, and the high-ranking provincial officials dared not accompany her. What Cheng Hong wants is the truth about her husband's cause of death. But as a scholar, what can she use to fight a state machine? The three things she holds—family history, swimming, and medical records—are all common sense. Common sense tears a moral gap in the public consciousness, and that is enough.
Because the first person who tried to demand an account for her had already used his life to test how hard this machine is. That person was Gu Wanming, former head of the Xinhua News Agency's Guangdong branch. On October 30, 2023, just three days after Li Keqiang's death was announced, he issued an open letter as a veteran Party member, proposing five demands: suspend cremation, establish an investigation team, hold those responsible accountable, perform an autopsy, and hold a funeral according to protocol. As a result, he was quickly criminally detained. In November 2024, the Shanghai Minhang Court sentenced him to one year for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble"; in December, Xinhua News Agency revoked his retirement benefits. A retired bureau chief demanding an account for the Premier was met with a one-year prison sentence.
Can arresting one Gu Wanming seal the mouths of officials or the heart of a widow? It cannot. In July 2025, an open letter from Li Keqiang's wife and daughter circulated outside the Great Firewall. By the end of 2025, the mother and daughter went directly to Wang Yang and Wen Jiabao, seeking to meet with Hu Jintao and his wife. In January 2026, she took her plea to the entrance of the petition center; in April 2026, her words were delivered verbatim by Wang Yang and Liu Yuan to the liquidation team leader, Hu Chunhua.
The path she is taking has gone from others shouting for her to her own petitions, from pleading within the Party to forcing her way to the doorstep of the system. The person holding the line for her throughout this is Wang Yang. In December 2025, Wang Yang privately assured the mother and daughter that he would definitely secure justice for Li Keqiang and provide them with an explanation. His reasoning was extremely blunt: if one day he himself were to die under mysterious circumstances, Li Keqiang would certainly have secured justice for him and provided an explanation to Wang Yang's wife and daughter.
Does a former Chairman of the CPPCC, a national-level official, stake his political credibility, his family, and his life on the case of a dead man out of selflessness? No. If they can make Li Keqiang die suddenly in a heavily guarded state guesthouse today, they can make Wang Yang or Liu Yuan suffer a sudden heart attack in their own studies tomorrow. Wang Yang is protecting Cheng Hong at the risk of his life to protect the few remaining survivors of the elder faction, so that when they close their eyes to sleep in the future, they don't have to guard against the guards and health doctors serving them tea and medicine.
Liu Yuan is even more ruthless than Wang Yang. He is the son of Liu Shaoqi. His family waited eleven years for that 1980 rehabilitation resolution, but his mother, Wang Guangmei, made her meaning very clear back then: rehabilitation is one thing, but who caused the death is another. The Party gave the former, but never gave the latter. So this time, Liu Yuan will not be satisfied with a piece of paper; he wants the person behind that decision. No matter which level this case reaches, Wang Yang's attitude is only four words: "until death do us part." Liu Yuan and Hu Chunhua are the same.
The next one to take action is Hu Chunhua. Hu Chunhua is by no means a "puppet emperor" pushed up by the elders. Leaks from outside the Great Firewall in January this year stated that Hu Chunhua several times declined Hu Jintao's arrangements for him to take over. His terms were simple and ruthless: he could take over, but only on the condition that the Xi group be thoroughly liquidated; otherwise, being General Secretary would just make him the next Hu Yaobang or Zhao Zhaoyang. He used Li Keqiang as a shield, saying he could not face Li Keqiang's family. If Hu Jintao could persuade the family to give up their pursuit, he could take a step back. But Hu Jintao and his wife have no face to face Cheng Hong, nor can they bring themselves to persuade her to give up.
Wang Yang is 71 this year and believes he cannot pass the test of Li Keqiang's wife and daughter. He does not want to be General Secretary; he is at the age, and he has no faction of his own within the Party. Now, he is silently paving the way for Hu Chunhua. Hu Chunhua is the second disciple under Hu Jintao, harder and colder than his senior disciple Li Keqiang, and more like the Hu Jintao who wore a steel helmet and imposed martial law in Lhasa in 1989.
Why can't this blood debt be erased within the Party? Because the elders talk about Party spirit, unity, and a smooth transition. That phrase in Beidaihe about "no settling of accounts after the autumn" is just talk among the old men on the surface. Cheng Hong was not in Beidaihe. If she really takes her case to the entrance of the petition bureau, this case will no longer be within the Party, no one will be able to contain it, and the fig leaf of the entire regime will be torn off on the spot. Therefore, Wen Jiabao must give her a piece of paper within the Party system—that paper from the Fifth Plenary Session.
Wen Jiabao has been retired for fourteen years. He is not a member of the Standing Committee, not even a member of the Central Committee. As an elderly man with white hair living in retirement, by what right does he set the agenda for the Fifth Plenary Session in October? Hu Jintao's intention is to seal the case until after Xi Jinping's death. Hu Chunhua refuses to take over, and liquidation is the condition for his succession. This situation leaves Wen Jiabao with only one path: since the case cannot be avoided, he must be the one to arrange it. Who gets a seat at the table and who does not is decided by him first.
At the end of June 2025, the Politburo reviewed and passed the "Regulations on the Work of the CCP Central Committee's Decision-making and Consultative Bodies." Leaks from outside the Great Firewall suggest that there are seven people in this body: Wen Jiabao as the team leader, with Li Ruihuan, Zeng Qinghong, Wang Yang, Xi Jinping, Zhao Leji, and Li Qiang, each having one vote. After the Fourth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping will withdraw, Zhang Youxia will make nominations, and Liu Yuan will fill the vacancy.
Look at Wen Jiabao's background. When it comes to military force, he cannot compare to the generals; but when it comes to how to dismantle and reassemble the party's machinery, no one in the entire party understands it better than him. He served as the Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee under three General Secretaries: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin. The General Office is the nerve center of the party. How official documents circulate, who manages the seals, how meeting schedules are arranged, which cases can be brought to the table, and which names should be crossed out—he has mastered this entire institutional code.
Now, the Secretariat of the General Office, which drafts the documents for the Fifth Plenary Session and sets the meeting agenda, is under his command. That is why Hu Chunhua's motion can make it to the table, while Zeng Qinghong's proposal for "letting bygones be bygones" cannot. Shi Taifeng is in charge of personnel appointments at the Organization Department, Liu Jinguo holds the party law at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Cai Zhaohui, who just joined the Political and Legal Affairs Commission as a full-time director, is an old subordinate brought up by Hu Chunhua during his time in Inner Mongolia. Ning Yong, the Deputy Secretary of the Central Financial Commission, was part of the institution that Wen Jiabao was the first secretary of when it was established in 1998.
This is why he has the authority. He has no bayonets in his hands, but the people who arrange the meetings, the people who manage personnel, the people who investigate others, and the people who manage the money are all on his line. He holds the dealer's hand for the entire machine.
It is true that Hu Jintao had a stroke, but he has been recuperating well, and with his calm personality, he has recovered quite well. He does not handle specific matters; he leaves the running of errands and the accounting to Wen Jiabao, while he watches the situation unfold.
According to the Party Constitution, the plenary session of the Central Committee is convened by the Politburo, and the Politburo decides what to discuss and how to discuss it. But before the Politburo meets, who sets the tone? It is Wen Jiabao's group. During the Fourth Plenary Session, Zhang Youxia proposed on behalf of the military that the group temporarily replace the Politburo Standing Committee to guide the work of the Politburo and the Central Plenary Session until the 21st National Congress.
In the meetings held by the Politburo this year, the one on June 30, 2025, which established the group, also conveniently dismissed Ma Xingrui as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang. At the regular meeting on November 28, 2025, to review the inspection report, Li Xi took Ma Xingrui away during the meeting. At the regular meetings in late January and late February 2026, the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were not brought to the table; Xi Jinping wanted to retroactively authorize the arrests, but failed. The regular meeting at the end of May 2026 did not even issue a press release, but the replacement of Wang Zhonglin by Guan Zhiou and the appointment of Cai Qi as the President of the Party School to succeed Chen Xi were all decided during those days.
When Politburo members have issues, they first report to the group, and Wang Yang is responsible for receiving them. The seven members of the group each have one vote, and Wen Jiabao, as the leader, holds the power of veto. But to use this veto, he needs the nod from Hu Jintao and the military. Therefore, the Politburo meetings are just a formal procedure for matters already decided by the group. The meetings are held by the Politburo, but the decisions are made by the group.
If the Fifth Plenary Session were to discuss whether to investigate the cause of Li Keqiang's death, at the group level, it would pass four to three: Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, Liu Yuan, and Li Ruihuan against Zeng Qinghong, Zhao Leji, and Li Qiang. Li Ruihuan was brought back by Hu and Wen, so he has no reason to help Zeng Qinghong; even if he does not express a stance, it would be three to three, and Wen Jiabao's veto would be sufficient. Conversely, Zeng Qinghong cannot veto anything.
At the Politburo level, the regular meeting at the end of September is where the procedures are followed. If Li Keqiang's issue is discussed, the press release will state "reviewed the documents to be submitted to the Fifth Plenary Session for deliberation." Hu Chunhua is a member of the Central Committee; he submits his motion as a written opinion, the Secretariat includes it in the agenda, prints it as material, and distributes a copy to each of the more than 200 Central Committee members. Thus, the motion enters the meeting hall.
Regarding Zeng Qinghong's "letting bygones be bygones" proposal, among the seven votes in the group, Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and Liu Yuan would certainly oppose it, and Li Ruihuan would follow Hu and Wen; Zeng Qinghong, Zhao Leji, and Li Qiang would lose four to three. Even if the votes were close, Wen Jiabao holds a veto, and with Hu Jintao and the military nodding, the veto would stand. Therefore, this proposal cannot pass in the group.
However, Wen Jiabao will not go as far as a group vote. A vote to veto would require writing "do not agree to let bygones be bygones" on paper, and the conservatives would use that to say that Wen Jiabao had long ago decided to go after Xi Jinping. Wen Jiabao's method is not to include it in the agenda of the decision-making and consultative body. The proposal remains a piece of paper in Zeng Qinghong's own hands, which is harsher than a veto. A veto leaves a record, but leaving it aside means there is not even a record, nor even the qualification to be discussed.
Are these two elders joining forces to push Hu Chunhua to change China? Do not be self-indulgent. The new entry and exit management regulations, the "seclusion order," is a State Council order signed by Li Qiang. If Xi Jinping wants to lock the country, Li Qiang dare not refuse to sign. Even if the elders have taken over, in order to keep this red boat from sinking, they will still strictly guard against everything internally. Returning to the 1980s is a pipe dream; even the relative relaxation of the ten years under Hu and Wen may not be recoverable today. What they want is merely to avoid sprinting toward the dead end of a "Greater North Korea" and to let the battered people's livelihood and economy catch a breath. This breath is the limit of what they can provide.
Zeng Qinghong has spent his entire life maneuvering within Zhongnanhai, earning the nickname "the old political practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine" within the Party. He is most adept at forming alliances, building bridges, and mediating disputes in the shadows. The prescription he presented to the various factional heavyweights at Beidaihe was extremely clear: arrange a smooth landing for Xi Jinping, have him resign gracefully at the Fifth Plenary Session in October citing poor health, and have him cleanly hand over the three positions of General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In return, the Party would preserve his historical dignity as the core of the fifth generation of leadership, downplay the issues, and let bygones be bygones.
As for the suspicious case of Li Keqiang's sudden death, it should only reach the executive level—Cai Qi, Chen Xi, and Wang Xiaohong—and absolutely not trace back to the top-level couple. Zeng Qinghong wants the investigation to stop at Cai Qi; if the blame falls on Cai, the next step up is Xi. But Xi was personally promoted by Zeng in 2007; if the case reaches that point, it would be a blow to Zeng's own judgment and his credibility within the Party over the last twenty years.
To solidify this plan, he played three cards on the table. The first was the three-point Beidaihe consensus: transition at the 21st National Congress, restoration of collective leadership, and no settling of scores after the fact. The second was the surprise dismissal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from their military posts by the NPC Standing Committee on August 28, without consulting Wen Jiabao's group, effectively creating a fait accompli that makes it impossible to investigate the case further. The third was to define Xi's legacy as "70% good, 30% bad," to be communicated only internally to those at the vice-national level and above, without entering the official communique. He still holds onto his turf: the NPC belongs to Zhao Leji, and foreign affairs belong to Wang Yi.
Three cards and one piece of turf—Zeng Qinghong's calculations were not exactly imprecise. However, the problem is that in the seven-vote group, he only has three votes, and the veto power lies with Wen Jiabao. His proposal cannot even make it onto the agenda, yet the Li Keqiang case was able to pass in the group and will certainly be investigated; he can no longer block this.
There are two outcomes if the investigation proceeds. First, if Xi is alive and sitting in the General Secretary's chair, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's report will move up layer by layer. If it reaches him, a living person must be convicted. A sitting General Secretary being convicted by his own Party would mean the re-election at the 20th National Congress was illegitimate, all documents from the past four years would need to be recalculated, the military would demand Xi pay for the lives of Zhang and Liu, and Cheng Hong would demand a public exoneration. The Party would have to pay for every single item, and the debt would not be paid off even by the 21st National Congress.
Second, if Xi is gone, the dead are not convicted; this is an old rule of the Party. When the Liu Shaoqi case reached Mao Zedong, it was only labeled as "bearing primary responsibility." The defendants' bench would be replaced by Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, while Xi himself would have a grand state funeral, untainted by any criminal charges. Isn't this second outcome exactly what Zeng Qinghong's Beidaihe proposal wanted? Even if the proposal doesn't reach the table, it can achieve the same effect.
The cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli cannot be overturned at the Fifth Plenary Session in October. Overturning a case requires someone to admit fault, and the NPC's dismissal has already completed the procedure and become a fait accompli. No one at the Fifth Plenary Session will stand up and say that procedure was wrong; Zhao Leji won't, and Zeng Qinghong certainly won't. Therefore, there is only one way to handle the Zhang-Liu case at the Fifth Plenary Session: leave it hanging and don't mention it.
The military is clear on this point. The military will fully support the investigation into the Li Keqiang case because these two cases follow the same line. Li Keqiang died at a state guesthouse in Shanghai in October 2023; whose guards were there, whose special security team was it, and who did the Shanghai armed police take orders from that day? Once the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection investigates, it will be investigating the very personnel under Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong.
When Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had their incident at the Central Party School on January 20, 2026, the guards and special security inside and outside the school were the same group. Once the Li Keqiang case is opened, the people who are handed over will sooner or later talk about what happened on January 20. The Fifth Plenary Session may not mention the Zhang-Liu case, but it will emerge on its own through the opening provided by the Li Keqiang case. That is how the military calculates its debt: investigate the Li Keqiang case to the end.
The military must also ensure one thing: Xi cannot have any accidents. Zeng Qinghong wants him dead, but the military insists he stays alive. This is not because the military cares for him. Only one person can admit who gave the order at the Central Party School on January 20. If this person dies, the Zhang-Liu case will forever be an unsolved mystery; the dead are not convicted, and no one will even write the words "bearing primary responsibility." Therefore, the military and Li Keqiang's wife and daughter have formed a joint force at this moment: Xi must not exit the stage early; he must live, live until he sits in the defendant's chair, live until the day he speaks.
There are two things the military can do. On September 12, during the China-India talks in New Delhi, an extra face appeared next to Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu: Zhou Hongxu, Director of the Central Guard Bureau, sitting in plain clothes. He was handpicked by Zhang Youxia to enter the Red Wall, and he has remained unmoved for the eight months since Zhang Youxia fell. The hands that want Xi dead must first pass through his gate. Sending him there this time is to ensure that Xi does not have any accidents.
The 301 Hospital is a military hospital with the highest standards of medical care, which the military provides as requested. But while the military can guard the gates and the hospital, they cannot guard his own body, and the healthcare doctors serving the medicine may not be reliable either. So whether he dies in the end is a tug-of-war between the conservatives, the military, and his own health. The highest probability is "a hundred years" (a euphemism for death), which refers to this tug-of-war.
The military has only one price for the Senate: at the October Fifth Plenary Session, appoint a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the candidate is Hu Chunhua. This is because he is the only one who has uttered the word "liquidation" and the one who brought the Li Keqiang case to the table. Leaks from outside the wall suggest that Hu Jintao has entrusted Hu Chunhua to the military, and the military has veto power over who succeeds.
On September 17, Xinhua News Agency reported on its front page that Old Xi issued important instructions regarding the development of advanced manufacturing. The National Advanced Manufacturing Conference was held in Beijing from September 16 to 17. Standing on the stage were Li Qiang, Zhang Guoqing, and Wu Zhenglong; he was not present, with only a written instruction. The meeting was not his, but the words were his—this is what it means when the title remains, but the person is no longer on the scene.
What the Old Xi clique wants now is down to just one thing: not to be liquidated. They still have three cards in hand: one is the title of General Secretary; the second is the Fujian faction consisting of Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, plus one Dong Jun; and the final card is his own struggling body.
First, let's talk about where he is. From August 30 to September 3, Bishkek and Cairo; September 12 to 13, New Delhi; Washington is also scheduled for late September. Three foreign trips in a month, with a fourth on the way. This is the first time in his fourteen years in power. Overseas leaks say that these itineraries were arranged by Wang Yi's line. The last thing needed before the Fifth Plenary Session is for him to sit in Zhongnanhai; even if he flies into the sky, or goes to Egypt to look at the pyramids, he must not stay in Beijing. Moreover, Cai Qi must be brought along on every trip, separating the director of the General Office from the General Office itself.
He knows very well in his heart that whenever the Chinese Communist Party undergoes major personnel adjustments, no unit head dares to leave their post, but he dares not refuse to leave, nor does he dare fake illness. History has someone who walked the exact same path. In April 1989, Zhao Ziyang visited North Korea, having talked things over well with Deng Xiaoping before leaving. While he was in Pyongyang, the April 26 editorial defined the student movement, and less than a month after his return, he was placed under house arrest.
The real use of these trips arranged for him by Wang Yi today is singular: to clear Beijing for the elders so they can leisurely complete their layout before the Fifth Plenary Session in October.
Now look at Cai Qi. This month, he has only one mode of existence in official media: following foreign trips. Lianhe Zaobao reported that Cai Qi and Wang Yi accompanied him. After returning to Beijing, not a single meeting he hosted himself or document he approved appeared in official media; the General Office has been hollowed out, and the Secretariat is now dispatched by Wen Jiabao.
Overseas leaks say that at the bargaining table, it was stated more than once that Cai Qi would be held fully responsible. His entire family is under tight surveillance, guarding against anyone trying to flee in advance. A member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, instantly invisible upon returning to the country—this is what being outed looks like.
As for the rest of the Fujian faction, Chen Xi was removed from office and is under investigation; He Lifeng disappeared for twenty days before showing up; Wang Xiaohong didn't even have a seat in the transcript of the State Council's special study session. Looking at those who haven't fallen, Li Qiang delivered three blows in Shanghai in early September—the mayor resigned, and People's Daily pointed at the Suzhou dock, though the person didn't move. On September 6, the Xi Jinping Thought on Culture Symposium was held in Shenzhen; he didn't even go to his own turf.
Those who spared these people were actually Wen Jiabao. Zeng Qinghong wanted to take over Old Xi's team as a whole, but those retained were all individually interviewed and kept on by Wen Jiabao, one by one. Those who stayed owe a debt of gratitude to Wen Jiabao. The resolution on Li Ke-qiang's case required over two hundred members of the Central Committee to raise their hands; while Old Xi's faction gathered peripheral votes, Wen Jiabao collected them one by one in September.
Overseas leaks also said that during the final vote at the Fourth Plenary Session in 2025, six people refused to raise their hands: Old Xi himself, Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, Huang Kunming, He Lifeng, and Li Hongzhong. Comparing this past month, Cai Qi has vanished, Wang Xiaohong has no seat, Huang Kunming missed a meeting on his own turf, He Lifeng ran to Tianjin, and Li Hongzhong's former subordinate Jin Xiangjun received a suspended death sentence in the first instance. The hand that did not rise at the Fourth Plenary Session will be forced up one by one at the Fifth.
Old Xi's core team is guarding a political zombie shell, and their method of guarding is to paste slogans and issue instructions. The only thing they can hold onto is the title of General Secretary. At the Fifth Plenary Session in February 1980, Hua Guofeng didn't step down, but four people resigned from the Political Bureau first; a year and four months later, at the Sixth Plenary Session, he resigned as Chairman. This October's Fifth Plenary Session is that Fifth Plenary Session, with only one difference: no one accused Hua Guofeng, but someone is accusing Old Xi. The person accusing him is Cheng Hong, and the person delivering the petition is Hu Chunhua.
Therefore, whether Old Xi steps down has nothing to do with this case. Step down and he will still be investigated—Zhou Yongkang stepped down in 2012 and was still put under investigation in 2014; die and he will still be investigated, it's just that dead people are not convicted. As long as he is alive, he cannot walk out of this case.
Let's read through the calendar and see which day this gang plans to make their move and carry him out.
First stop: the Fifth Plenary Session in October 2026. The Standing Committee will fill Cai Qi's chair, the Political Bureau will fill the seats vacant for three years, the Vice Chairmanship of the Military Commission will be handed over to Hu Chunhua, and the names of Wang Xiangxi and two others will be crossed out; with a single motion from Hu Chunhua, the plenary session will authorize the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to comprehensively investigate the Li Ke-qiang case. Once the Fifth Plenary Session concludes, within a month or two, the notice for the election of delegates to the 21st National Congress will be issued, and provincial reshuffles will begin by the end of the year.
Second stop: the first half of 2027, provincial party congresses across thirty-one provinces to elect delegates to the 21st National Congress.
Third stop: the autumn of 2027, the 21st National Congress, where the General Secretary, Political Bureau, and Party Constitution will be reshaped.
Fourth stop: the Two Sessions in March 2028, the handover of the presidency and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. Those two Air Force generals promoted in December 2025, Han Shengyan and Yang Zhibin, are meant to ensure the gun barrels experience no chaos during this handover.
The curtain raiser for this liquidation is Cheng Hong, the petition deliverer is Hu Chunhua, the table setter is Wen Jiabao, and the gatekeeper is the military. Zeng Qinghong wanted Old Xi to settle his accounts after a hundred years, the military wants Old Xi to live until he speaks, but no one can be certain about Old Xi's own health. Whether he is alive or gone, this case will be investigated to the end.
Wen Jiabao could win at the Fifth Plenary Session, and he could also win at the 21st National Congress; both victories would depend on the same person. That person is not Hu Chunhua, but the widow of Li Keqiang, who did not prioritize the overall political situation.
If Hu Chunhua were to come to power, China would not open its doors. The "seclusion order" would still be signed by Li Qiang, and the party elders would continue to maintain internal control. The difference is that the country would not head toward becoming a large-scale North Korea, and the nearly severed lifeline of the economy could recover just a little bit. For the Chinese people, who have been stifled for fourteen years, even this tiny bit would be a monumental event.
In this game of Zhongnanhai, there is a new situation every single day.