Ren Zhiqiang Gets 18 Years for One Article! Pan Shiyi's Company Sale Blocked by Antitrust Review, Late Fees at 18.25% Annualized Eating Up Twice the Profit in a Year, a County Head Prices a Businessman at 100 Million, Li Ka-shing's Port Sale Stalled for a Year and a Half! Private Investment Down 10.1%, 39 Yuan of Investment for Just 1 Yuan of GDP

This episode uses Pan Shiyi's dinner party video as a starting point to review a series of events, including Ren Zhiqiang being sentenced to 18 years in prison for criticizing Emperor You Xi, Pan Shiyi being squeezed by anti-monopoly reviews and huge late fees while trying to sell his company, Shaoyang County in Hunan Province using long-distance fishing-style extortion against business owner Zheng Shuai, and Li Ka-shing facing obstacles in selling his ports. It analyzes how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pushes private enterprises into a desperate situation by blocking channels for speech, leaving the country, and asset liquidation and pricing, leading to a sharp decline in private investment and a severe deterioration in investment efficiency.

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Observe things like a rock, reject fragmented cognition. In the past couple of days, a dinner party video of Pan Shiyi has blown up online. Looking at that video, it was also shot at home; the video is just a few dozen seconds long. Pan Shiyi is standing in front of a table of friends talking about what? He was talking about returning to New York in September 2020, having already bought the plane ticket back, planning to return to China after the Spring Festival. Immediately after, a friend he mentioned had something happen to them. This friend wrote a letter and sent it to eleven people, and the first person sent to was Pan Shiyi. Among them, several were arrested, and Pan Shiyi himself managed to escape it by staying in the United States. Speaking of this, Pan Shiyi even turned around and added, "Oh, please make sure not to record this." This guy has been staying in New York for six years, and still has to turn around and enjoin people not to record—just ponder what Pan Shiyi is actually afraid of. Today, through Pan Shiyi, we will look at how the CCP has blocked the roads of private business owners one by one over the past decade or so. Actually, everyone knows who that unnamed friend of Pan Shiyi's is—it must be Ren Zhiqiang, "Ren the Cannon." Ren Zhiqiang's father was Ren Quansheng, who served as the vice minister of the Ministry of Commerce. According to what Ren Zhiqiang said at the time, it was even reported by Jin Zhoukan. Anyway, he certainly comes from a red family, and furthermore, according to Ren Zhiqiang's own words, Wang Qishan was Ren Zhiqiang's counselor in junior high school. Later, he always worked as the boss of the party-owned enterprise Yuanhua Group in Xicheng District, Beijing. Leaving aside my political stance on the CCP regime, I actually think the old man is one of the rare people with guts in this organization in China, or rather, the old man's personality is more like a real human being. This big brother has one very gutsy trait: regardless of whether you are a group or a high-ranking official of the CCP, if I find you annoying, I am going to blast you. Therefore, in February 2016, after that fucking idiot Xi Jinping proposed that the party must be surnamed party, Ren Zhiqiang first started blasting on Weibo, saying, "When did your People's Government become the party's government? The media is funded by taxpayers' money." As a result, his Weibo account was shut down, and he also proudly received a one-year probation within the party. Afterward, he was constantly targeted by the CCP.

This was essentially a warning to Ren Zhiqiang that under the fucking idiot Emperor You Xi, having a background in the elite inner circles is no longer a privilege that grants you the right to speak. After being silenced for a while, his old friend Pan Shiyi didn't exactly keep his head down either. Ren the Cannon's downfall stemmed from that 2020 article criticizing Xi; I think it could be perfectly titled 'The Xi-Criticizing Manifesto.' His article was aimed directly at the televised conference on February 23, 2020, attended by 170,000 cadres. There was a line in it that said: 'What stands there is not an emperor showing off his new clothes, but a clown who insists on being emperor even if he has to be stripped naked.' That’s pretty ruthless, right? It was basically a direct insult. Emperor You Xi, that fucking idiot, has been an extremely insecure person his whole life; only power allows him to feel like a human being. This immediately triggered the fuck out of him. But what was truly impressive was where this article was circulated. This brings us to the eleven people Pan Shiyi mentioned. What were most of those eleven people doing at the time? They were part of an environmental charity circle. Hadn't Pan Shiyi been focused on the Beijing smog, the PM2.5 issue, for a long time? Later, they formed the SEE Foundation in Alashan—a group where private entrepreneurs pooled money to 'commit suicide' together; it was one of the tightest-knit circles of private entrepreneurs at the time. The CCP regime isn't afraid of people criticizing it; what it fears is that the critics know each other are also criticizing, and that they have money and organization. In the eyes of the CCP, that’s not just an article anymore; that’s a political ambition. As we all know, Ren Zhiqiang was taken away on March 12, 2020. According to reports at the time, Ren Zhiqiang's eldest son and his secretary were also detained by the Disciplinary Inspection Commission. Then, on September 22, Ren Zhiqiang was sentenced to 18 years in prison on charges of economic crimes—the same old CCP routine. Don't doubt for a second that CCP economic crimes are basically political issues. When the verdict was read, Ren Zhiqiang was 69 years old. This reminds me of a small book written by American economist Albert Hirschman in 1970. What did this book say? It said that if an organization is rotten, the people inside only have two choices: either stay and voice your opinions, or leave. But voicing opinions is extremely dangerous; after all, stubborn people like Hai Rui are a minority, right? Someone who carries a coffin to curse the Jiajing Emperor is a super extreme example. Therefore, leaving becomes the only rational choice. But Ren Zhiqiang chose the path of Hai Rui, and the CCP put a price tag on that path: Ren Zhiqiang, who wrote the article, was sentenced to 18 years, and his son and secretary were also detained. According to Pan Shiyi, except for himself, the others were all arrested. Pan Shiyi didn't intend to run at the time either, and according to what he said then—which I believe—it was because his assets hadn't been moved out yet. Only he and his wife went to New York, which we will discuss in detail later. So, since 2020, have you seen any top-tier boss publicly call Xi Jinping a fucking idiot? Does that mean these bosses have become loyal? Definitely not. It’s just that the option to voice opinions has been completely cancelled; that path is dead. The son of a Vice Minister of Commerce was also sentenced to 18 years. You’re a boss, what are you trying to make money for? What are you showing off for, right? Arresting you is easy, so the only thing left is to leave. Pan Shiyi and Zhang Xin took this path, and there is a coincidence here that feels like something out of a novel. Let's talk about Pan Shiyi's assets at the time. The main body of his wealth was the company SOHO China, which was registered in the Cayman Islands—a very common VIE structure at the time. It went public in Hong Kong in 2007, and the Pan-Zhang family trust held about 64% of the shares. From 2006 to 2020, SOHO China distributed 20.778 billion in dividends, and the couple received about 13.3 billion. This money was distributed to their family trust overseas. Then, starting in 2011, the family trust began buying buildings in New York. In 2013, Zhang Xin and the Safra family of Brazil spent 1.4 billion USD to buy 40% of the GM Building in New York. Meanwhile, back in China, around 2013, SOHO China basically stopped acquiring land. From 2014 to 2019, the couple sold off about 29.3 billion in assets. Simply put, Emperor You Xi is a fucking idiot. One year after he took office, Pan Shiyi had already started the process of turning assets into cash, and then using dividends and trusts to turn them into overseas assets. They had already played this game long ago, so Pan Shiyi's vision was indeed spot on.

Then the last remaining piece is the more than sixty percent of shares held by the family trust, and this part is the Blackstone controversy. On June 16, 2021, Blackstone offered 5 Hong Kong dollars per share, valuing the entire company at around 3 billion US dollars, intending to buy out SOHO China entirely. If this deal had gone through, Pan Shiyi would have completely made his exit. But as a result, it got stuck right there. Less than two months after Blackstone made its offer, the State Administration for Market Regulation initiated an anti-monopoly investigation into the matter, and the review was completely unfinished within the validity period of the acquisition, so the acquisition directly failed in September 2021. An office building owner being bought out by a financial investment institution—what on earth could that possibly monopolize? I ask you. Therefore, the review process itself was simply used to trap people; since the acquisition didn't work out, forget it, but the trouble was actually stirred up from this acquisition. The week before Blackstone made its offer, SOHO China's stock price surged all the way from 2.57 Hong Kong dollars to 3.8 Hong Kong dollars. Then, on July 7, 2022, SOHO China released a very, very strange announcement, and what was the content of the announcement? It stated that Chief Financial Officer Ni Huiyang was suspected of insider trading in the company's shares and was under investigation. The market generally believed that what was being investigated was this period of stock price movement. Ni Huiyang entered SOHO in 2008 and was also a core figure among core figures who managed the money. The final step—SOHO China was neither sold nor able to make an exit, and instead ended up dragging the person managing the money domestically into a criminal lawsuit. To this day, this judgment cannot be found through public channels, and because the assets were blocked like this by the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they could only be forced to stay in China. Why did the CCP do this? Wasn't it just to disgust you and torment you? In August 2022, the tax bureau demanded that Wangjing SOHO Tower 1 and Tower 2 pay back land appreciation tax of about 1.733 billion, so the CCP had long since used the tactic of anti-taxation; now they are just pulling out that old template again. Then if you look at the overdue penalty, you can still see a little bit of a familiar shadow. The overdue charge is a late fee of 0.05% levied per day, well, 0.05% a day multiplied by 365 days. The annualized rate is 18.25%, which is exactly the same as the current price. Just one month later, on September 7, 2022, Pan Shiyi resigned as chairman, and Zhang Xin resigned as chief executive officer. Let us calculate how fast this late fee grew! By the end of 2025, SOHO China had only paid a total of about 180 million, and the unpaid principal plus late fees had already rolled up to 2.566 billion. Well, calculating the unpaid principal as 1.55 billion, multiplied by 0.05%, the daily late fee is 775,000, multiplied by 365 days, and a year is around 280 million. What was SOHO China's basic net profit after deducting property valuation changes in 2025? Only 134 million, meaning only this portion came from rent collection. And the money generated by the late fee increasing over a year was more than twice SOHO China's annual basic profit. Blackstone offered 5 Hong Kong dollars per share back then, and now SOHO China's stock price has steadily remained below 1 Hong Kong dollar year-round. Just from this price difference alone, the shares in the hands of the Pan family trust lost more than 10 billion Hong Kong dollars in market value. Well, and this isn't even market value; it's cash. Oh, that's right, according to what Pan Shiyi said in his video, Pan Shiyi originally planned to return to China after the Spring Festival, but then Ren Zhiqiang was arrested in March, so he didn't go back. Well, if he had really gone back, rest assured, not a single one of the remaining matters would have escaped him. And the person arrested wouldn't have been a minor character like Ni Huiyang; it would have had to be Pan Shiyi himself—they definitely would have arrested him. So returning to that phrase, "never record audio," Pan Shiyi came out physically, but SOHO China still has about 53.7 billion in investment properties on its books, around 11.5 billion in bank loans, and a lot of company employees. That means a considerable portion of his assets are still in China, and his family fortune and crew are still clutched in the hands of the CCP. Therefore, Pan Shiyi's mouth is no longer Pan Shiyi's own. This move with Pan Shiyi, well, it reminds me of whom? It reminds me of a book written by a German, which makes it extremely, extremely clear. In 1941, Frank, a Jewish lawyer who fled Nazi Germany to the United States, wrote a book called *The Dual State*. It argued that Nazi Germany had two states stacked together: one was a state that operated according to law, where contracts counted and property was protected, because whatever kind of state you are—whether dictatorship or democracy—you have financial revenue, and where there is financial revenue, people must be made to work. And what was the other Germany? It was a Germany that disregarded all laws, arresting whoever the fuck it wanted, with whatever matter falling under whichever jurisdiction decided by this latter state behind the scenes. If you compare Pan Shiyi to this, the previous dozen or so years—from registering in the Cayman Islands, listing in Hong Kong, to dividend distributions into trusts, and then buying buildings in New York—all followed the channels of that state that respects the law.

When it finally came down to the last step of selling the company and getting out, that fucking idiot Xi Jinping came to power and ignored the law, and that country came out of nowhere. Censorship just dragged the transaction down until it fell through, the people managing the money got arrested, and the tax bills plus late fees got heavier year by year. So Pan Shiyi's situation wasn't an isolated piece of bad luck; it was the prototype for a whole set of tactics the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used afterward. Look at it—whether it's long-distance fishing later on or inspections under the guise of state security, aren't they all copied from this prototype? The CCP is running this exact playbook now, and on top of that, there's one more thing they have that they didn't back then: a shortage of money. Sure, you've got people pinned down, and you can extort money at will, but all of this is existing capital, and existing capital shrinks every time you tap into it. Then the CCP's old tricks came fucking back. What is the CCP thinking? They want a steady stream of income every year, so what do they have to control? They have to control the flow, and what is the flow? It's prices. There is an American political scientist named James C. Scott who wrote a book called Seeing Like a State. What is it about? It talks about how states have an old habit of trying to turn things they don't understand into numbers the state can read, and then they just slash right through it, wiping out all the experience that cannot be written into spreadsheets. Hong Kong is doing the exact same thing now. Just a while ago, around September 10, the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Administration for Market Regulation issued Document No. 1303—yeah, that's a slash made right at prices. How exactly does Document No. 1303 control these prices? I made a separate episode about it, and as soon as it's produced in the next couple of days, I'll release it.

Let's break down the earlier point about controlling people and extorting money. There is a template for this method of controlling people and extracting funds. The earliest version of this template was the eleven people mentioned by Pan Shiyi; how were they eventually dealt with? We have gone through the fates of those eleven people. Ren Zhiqiang, who wrote the letter, was sentenced to eighteen years, and his eldest son and secretary were arrested together. Regarding the list of eleven people mentioned by Pan Shiyi, a list circulated online, but we should just take it as a reference or just watch the spectacle. Surprisingly, Wang Qishan was on it, which I found quite astonishing. Besides political figures like Wang Qishan, there were names like Wang Shi, Feng Lun, and Liu Chuanzhi. To be honest, I cannot verify this list. The person who posted the list was also quite cautious, saying that most of them were just questioned or cooperated with investigations. But regardless of which version you believe, most of the recipients of the letter could not escape being psychologically or physically tormented by the CCP. Pan Shiyi is in the United States, so he couldn't be caught; there was no way around that, so they went after the people and money he left behind in China. This directly led to the investigation of his Chief Financial Officer, and the tax bill for Wangjing SOHO, including principal and late fees, ballooned to over 2.5 billion yuan. Everyone should take a moment to analyze this handling structure; it is the current way the CCP plays the game: detaining people around you to use as hostages for pressure. If you run away, they seize the money you left behind, and then they can drag the case on indefinitely without giving you any explanation. This handling structure later became a template for the CCP's fiscal extraction. Isn't that the same set of tactics used in the "long-range fishing" by county-level authorities later on?

Just a while ago, around September 19, the media disclosed the case of Zheng Shuai. Who is Zheng Shuai? He is the boss of Shanghai Maishi Technology. What was his experience? On January 8, 2024, he was taken away at Shanghai Hongqiao Airport by the Public Security Bureau of Shaoyang County, Hunan Province, and first detained in a hotel under designated residential surveillance. What crime did the investigators want Zheng Shuai to confess to? It was "illegally controlling computer information system program tools." If he didn't confess to that, they would charge him with "illegal business operations." Tang Zhanxiong, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, blatantly stated in the hotel room: "County Magistrate Yin has set a quota of 100 million yuan for you." This Magistrate Yin is the deputy county magistrate and director of the Public Security Bureau, Yin Xiangfeng. On April 22, after Zheng Shuai paid 100 million yuan to be released on bail, the police from this Hunan county demanded that Zheng Shuai continue to transfer money; if he didn't, they wouldn't grant bail to his co-defendants. In June, Zheng Shuai was arrested again. Reports say that at least 64.8 million yuan of that 100 million went into the non-tax revenue account of the Shaoyang County Finance Bureau. Tang Zhanxiong was very blunt with Zheng Shuai, saying that the county was indeed in financial difficulty, and this money could solve many problems. They aren't even pretending anymore; it is pure extortion. If you put the Zheng Shuai case together with the handling of those eleven people, the structure is identical. What is the first layer of the structure? The charge is one thing, but the real purpose is something else entirely. Ren Zhiqiang was hit with the label of economic crime, but everyone knows the real reason was that article. And as for Zheng Shuai's charge, it's fucking impressive—you can even choose it yourself; if you don't confess to this one, just confess to illegal business operations. The real reason is that the finances of that Hunan county have fucking collapsed, so they went to Shanghai to fish for money. And there is another tactic here: detaining people around the target to apply pressure and continue demanding money. To this day, the Zheng Shuai case is still being dragged out, which is the same structure as the case of Ni Kuiyang, where no verdict can be found to this day. In Zheng Shuai's case, the procuratorate has received two notices to correct illegalities, and the director and deputy director were dismissed in July last year, but the case is still not being adjudicated. It has been nearly a thousand days since he was taken away. The only difference is the level. In 2020, this was a tactic used by the CCP's central government to deal with those who spoke out, but after 2024, it is county-level officials using it to deal with people who have money. The template has simply shifted from political use to fiscal use. So don't believe the bullshit that the people at the top are good; the people below are just following the example of those fucking bad guys at the top. Even the current CCP tactic of using "national security" to control the capital market is using this same Pan Shiyi template.

Let's look at the data. In the first half of this year, there were a total of 35 transactions where listed companies changed their controllers. State-owned buyers accounted for 14 of them, making up 40% of the total. Last year, the proportion of state-owned buyers was less than 30%. There is also a very interesting piece of statistical data: from 2018 to December 2025, which was the end of last year, at least 260 listed companies sold their control rights to state-owned capital. On average, nearly three private enterprises turned into guaranteed enterprises every month. This is the current plight of private enterprises under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Oh right, even the so-called retrospective tax inspections and overdue fines with an annualized rate of 18.5% now use this template. Looking at it this way, how should I put it? The CCP is making its catching-and-harvesting line rather rebellious, you know? Pan Shiyi is basically the very first precedent; Pan Shiyi's case also serves as a prototype on this censorship and review pipeline. In June 2021, wasn't Blackstone going to buy Sohu China? An antitrust investigation by the State Administration for Market Regulation dragged on until the offer expired. That summer, it wasn't just Sohu China that had bad luck; there was another unlucky fellow called Didi. Didi is related to the Liu family circle I just mentioned. That same summer, on June 30, 2021, Didi went public in New York. On July 2, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced the launch of a cybersecurity review against Didi, giving the reason of preventing national data security risks. Two days later, Didi's app was forced to take down from app stores. In June 2022, Didi subsequently delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. In July, Didi was fined 8.026 billion. If you put these two events together, both are private enterprises. Then, one is connected to the Liu family, and the other is connected to Pan Shiyi. One sold its company to American capital, and the other raised financing by running to American capital. The CCP's methods of interference are all called reviews and censorship, so the Didi incident most likely involves this Liu family affair, and half of the reason is also related to the elders. It's just that one used the name of antitrust, and the other used the name of national security. Basically, all of the CCP's methods had already taken shape back in 2021.

By last year, this set of methods had completely matured and was applied to who? Li Ka-shing. In March of last year, Li Ka-shing's CK Hutchison announced that it would package and sell the majority interests of its 43 ports, including the two ports near the Panama Canal, to the US capital consortium BlackRock. This transaction was priced at 22.8 billion US dollars. Then the good show began. First, the eunuch media in Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, published articles criticizing it for two consecutive days, and then the website of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office reposted all of them with two articles in three days. Everyone knows what happened afterwards. By December of last year, the Financial Times reported that COSCO Shipping wanted to take the majority equity, and BlackRock was already considering not buying it. By April of this year, rumors emerged that China Merchants Group was also talking about joining and helping COSCO Shipping pay for it. By this month, this transaction has dragged on for a year and a half and has still not been finalized. So as you can see, when it comes to causing trouble for enterprises, the CCP is still very adept at it. If you put CK Hutchison and Pan Shiyi side by side, the structure is the same: both are Chinese bosses listed in Hong Kong, both want to sell their company's assets to American capital, and both encountered the State Administration for Market Regulation coming out to fart something about legal review. The only perverted part is the asking price. In 2021, Pan Shiyi was directly blocked, giving you no way out at all. In 2025, if Li Ka-shing wants to leave, he can, but he has to let COSCO Shipping in and take the lion's share, otherwise you aren't leaving. But these diaspora capitalists don't want to pay this market price, so they resort to making you unable to do anything and dragging you to death. This is the countless variation and usage of the censorship and review tactic. Therefore, Pan Shiyi's case is actually the mother body. If you copy it downward to the county Public Security Bureau, it is just a carbon copy of catching and harvesting—detaining people and money in exchange for cash. If you copy it outward to bosses who want to go overseas for financing, censorship and review are what block your path to going outward. Today, SF Holding's minus—take this path, exchange your road for the control in your hands. There are plenty of excuses for these things, whether it's national security or economic crimes. Anyway, the right of interpretation is always in the hands of the CCP. So everyone can just watch: the path of speech, the path of leaving, the path of protecting family assets, and the path of self-pricing have all been blocked. What is left for private business owners? Well, staying put, which means not investing anymore.

The National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released data on September 15th showing that from January to August of this year, national fixed-asset investment fell by 7.2% year-on-year, and private investment fell by 10.1%. Moreover, the decline has worsened month by month; from January to February, private investment had only fallen by 2.6%. This is still a nominal figure. This year, their PPI turned positive, meaning upstream raw materials became directly more expensive. In fact, after deducting these price increases, the actual investment decline is even greater, which I estimate to be around 9%. The total capital formation—that is, the construction of new factories and equipment plus inventory—as a share of GDP has dropped from 42.3% in 2020 to 38.9% in 2025, a drop of nearly 4 percentage points. There is a strange thing here: in the first half of this year, fixed-asset investment fell by 5.7%, yet the capital formation announced by the Bureau of Statistics supposedly drove GDP growth by 1.7 percentage points. So, tell me, isn't that fucking fake? Even a fucking idiot can see that this is just made up. After the CCP took control of these enterprises, did their investment efficiency improve? We can calculate this by dividing the capital formation rate by the GDP growth rate. Even according to the CCP's own bragging—that is, a 5% growth rate in 2025—38.9 divided by 5 is about 7.8, meaning you have to invest 7.8 yuan to produce 1 yuan of GDP. I have always judged that China's real GDP growth is at most around 1%. If you use this calculation, it means 39 yuan for 1 yuan of growth. In this situation, investment basically generates no return at all; it is all fucking negative return. This is the consequence of China cracking down on private enterprises.

Returning to the question of why Pan Shiyi won't go back, it's a very simple issue: trust is not something that can be restored just by issuing a document. Look at last year, didn't the CCP's State Council try to set up a facade to deceive the public, giving people the impression that it's all the local governments that are rotten while the central government is good? The State Council issued a document prohibiting profit-seeking cross-regional law enforcement. If you say it was completely useless, it had some effect, but where? It was useful in that local governments started grabbing money locally instead. Everyone should think about one question: among so many CCP officials, has a single government official been punished for cross-regional predatory law enforcement? No. With this kind of behavior, even if the CCP issues another hundred laws to protect private enterprises, business owners can only treat them as fucking noise. The CCP has blocked the path of leaving, so capital can only respond by not investing. At the end of August, the liquid money that enterprises and residents can spend at any time, which is M1, only grew by 4.1% year-on-year, which is significantly lower than the 7.5% growth of M2, which includes all deposits. In the first eight months, household loans decreased by 1.03 trillion yuan, and from January to August, actual foreign investment utilization fell by 5.3%. These are all shadows of the same thing on different ledgers. We will talk about the No. 1303 document later; the significance of this fucking document is to protect inefficient old production capacity through price floors. Whose are most of these old production capacities? They belong to the CCP's state-owned enterprises. This will inevitably squeeze out efficient downstream private enterprises, which will inevitably lead to the existing stock becoming increasingly rotten. This is not something that can be fixed in a year or two. In economic history, there have been cases where prices did not tell the truth; the Soviet Union was one. Things in the Soviet Union at that time were only cheap in terms of price tags, but you couldn't buy them; you had to wait in line. Now, prices in China are being artificially propped up, and goods are piling up because they can't be sold. After 1970, the Soviet Union also had a consistently high investment rate, but investment efficiency kept falling, followed by a decade of stagnation. The CCP has an export sector and a central bank with very, very strong control that the Soviet Union didn't have, which can drag out this stagnation for a longer time, but the direction has already been set.

Finally, let's return to my friend Pan Shiyi, or 'Big Cannon' as he's called. You say one word, and even a fucking second-generation red like him gets sentenced to eighteen years and has to run. Now, you have to get approval for everything, and there are even more tools available, like tax audits and control. And what's the most fucking insane part? It's that now, even a tiny, shitty county government under the CCP can take you and your money to fill their own holes. Plus, after that Document No. 1303 came out, you even have to listen to the CCP's accounting agencies on what price to sell things at. So, everyone, look at what the CCP is actually taking away: they have claimed the right of interpretation over your speech, your ability to leave, your assets, and your pricing. So, it's not at all strange that Pan Shiyi specifically asks people not to record when he's having a meal in New York. Alright, that's all the bullshit for today. If you like the show, please click follow and share. If you want to support me, you can join the membership channel, which features four gigabytes of in-depth programming every month. Welcome to join the 'Ruthless Gang,' and I'll see you in the next episode.