Just back in Beijing, Xi Jinping begins a major party purge! The Fifth Plenary Session is moved up; nationwide door-to-door drone inspections, internal CCP turmoil: civil servant pensions to be cut upon retirement? Beijing hospitals banned from buying imported equipment, except for 301 Hospital | Old Beijing Teahouse / Episode 1756 / 2026/09/27
This episode mainly discusses how, after returning to Beijing from his visit to the United States, Xi Jinping accelerated major party purges, scheduled the Fifth Plenary Session ahead of time with a special emphasis on strict party governance, and expelled Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the party and office. At the same time, it focuses on the fiscal crisis surrounding rumors of potential cuts to civil servant retirement allowances in certain regions, the nationwide door-to-door registration and investigation of drones along with the suspension of low-altitude economy projects, and Beijing municipal hospitals' import-substitution policy to completely reject imported medical equipment.
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As the saying goes, after a panicked and humiliating US visit that barely lasted 48 hours in total, Xi Jinping finally fled back to Beijing in a panic. Upon returning to the little pond of Zhongnanhai, both Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan let out a long sigh of relief. Xi Jinping muttered to himself that home is still the best, where he doesn't have to be chased by rebels and scuttled around like a street rat. He thought: in my own territory, if anyone dares to rebel, just try it—let alone the cattle, horses, and leeks, even high-ranking military and political officials of the party-state can be chopped down whenever I want. Peng Liyuan curled her lip upon hearing this and said, "Time to take your medicine. You can chop whoever you want? What about my cousin Ma Xingrui? Weren't those good-for-nothing Xi faction members of yours just skirts trimmed away by anti-Xi forces?" Lao Xi blushed bright red, squatted in the toilet, and sulked, blaming himself for bragging and dropping big words only to smash his own feet. Well, a smile cures a decade of aging; new tea friends, please click [Subscribe] and the little bell, and welcome to join the joyful journey of the Teahouse. Look at the world from a different angle with the brothers and make your mood better. Note that subscribing is free; pressing the subscribe button will bring a continuous stream of laughter.
After returning from the United States, the CCP leader Xi Jinping has only one month left to make his presence felt and set the direction at his next home-field event. On September 21, the Politburo meeting officially set the dates for the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee from October 26 to 29. However, even though the plenary session has not yet been held, the phrase "murderous intent" has already been half-realized since that day on September 21. In addition to setting the dates, the Politburo meeting that day reviewed and approved a draft document titled "Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Persistently Advancing Comprehensive Strict Governance of the Party," which was decided to be submitted to the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session for deliberation. Looking at the title alone, you might think this is just another routine matter, as the words "comprehensive strict governance of the Party" are mentioned in CCP documents whenever there is nothing else to say, much like "great, glorious, and correct"—they are all abstract slogans of political correctness. Well, Liu Zhuo would like to gently remind you that you have misjudged. Strict governance of the Party is fine, but pay attention to the context, because according to the conventions of previous Fifth Plenary Sessions, the final agenda is invariably economic, focusing on formulating the next five-year plan, which is the central task of this meeting. However, while this Fifth Plenary Session will still discuss the "15th Five-Year Plan," the issue of "the Party's own construction" is placed at the very front, listed as a separate item, and specifically formed into a Central Committee decision. Those who have long observed the CCP's political ecology know that this arrangement breaks the agenda conventions gradually formed by previous Central Committee plenary sessions. In other words, Xi Jinping wants to handle this matter as a special case this time, placing internal party purges ahead of economic planning. The common people can be unemployed, and the economy can collapse, but the power in his hands cannot be targeted by "rebels"; it must be eliminated quickly. So, the strict governance of the Party is underway. Is this an over-interpretation? Look at the same day the dates for the Fifth Plenary Session were released: another major official announcement stated that former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia and former Chief of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli were officially expelled from the Party and the military, with their cases transferred to military procuratorial organs. With this compilation of events laid out, think carefully: has the "Emperor of Unfinished Projects" Xi Jinping begun a new round of internal party purges?
In fact, looking back at the first half of 2026 and even a longer period before that, a considerable number of high-ranking officials have already fallen during the strangulation process between Xi and the "anti-Xi forces" within the CCP, including many with backgrounds in the "Xi Army" or those who were once considered Xi's men. This situation is much like both sides playing a game of planting mines: you plant one, I dismantle one, and while dismantling, I take the person who planted the mine with me. The result is constant tearing at each other and mutual destruction, and crucially, it is persistent and shows no signs of cooling down. For example, the highest-ranking "big tiger" in this round of strangulation, Politburo member Ma Xingrui, fell on April 3. Ma Xingrui had long governed in Guangdong and Xinjiang, and his career path was once seen as a model of smooth sailing. Another example is the Minister of Emergency Management Wang Xiangxi, who fell at the end of January; outside analysis linked this to a corruption case within the China Energy Investment Corporation system. There is also the Chairman of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPPCC, Wei Xiaodong, who fell in early June; in the days before and after his downfall, more than twenty officials at the bureau and department levels were taken away in the same wave of investigations. Furthermore, the Party Secretary of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Xu Liuping, former Hubei Governor Wang Xiaodong, Chongqing Mayor Hu Henghua, former Zhejiang Party Secretary Yi Lianhong, and former Inner Mongolia Party Secretary Sun Shaocheng were all high-ranking officials at the ministerial level who fell one after another in the same year. In the first half of 2026 alone, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection reported that 36 centrally-administered cadres had fallen, with the "list updated" steadily almost every month—ten in one go in January, and eight more emerging in June.
Looking further into the military system, from 2023 to the present, the top echelons of the Rocket Force, the Equipment Development Department, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) have been continuously purged. The original seven-member CMC leadership now consists only of Xi Jinping himself and Zhang Shengmin, a CMC vice chairman promoted just last year. As a core member of this so-called "collective decision-making body," the entire military power structure has been hollowed out systematically—it is no small matter. The downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli carries far more weight than those before them. The official phrasing used was "alienated from the Party, formed cliques, and was disloyal and dishonest to the Party," with special emphasis that their political and economic issues were intertwined and involved exceptionally large sums of money. Such language was previously reserved for cases at the level of Zhou Yongkang and Sun Zhengcai, implying that this is already a political issue challenging the authority of the top leader. Zhang Youxia has long been regarded as one of Xi Jinping's most trusted allies within the military system. When the investigation was announced in January this year, the PLA Daily used phrasing like "severely trampled on and undermined the system of the CMC Chairman's responsibility." By the time the results of their dual expulsion were announced on September 23, the PLA Daily published a special editorial stating that the investigation into the two had "eliminated a major political hidden danger." This phrasing almost confirms the power struggle between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping; some have even called it an attempted power transition crisis. The uprooting of his own former loyalists has caused real damage to the CCP military, leading to shaken morale and a vacuum of trust in the command system. The cracks accumulated from the continuous reshuffling of the military high command over the past few years have been torn wide open this time. Sources within the system reveal that a considerable number of military units are not buying into the directive to "publicly express support," and refusal to cooperate seems to be increasingly common, which is giving Xi a major headache. There are even rumors that after Zhang and Liu were processed, they remained in the custody of the military rather than local judicial authorities, and the specific location of their detention is unknown even to most Politburo members. It can be said that the surprise takedown of Zhang and Liu not only failed to stabilize military morale but further divided and disintegrated the strength of the CCP military, planting a significant bomb for Xi Jinping himself.
Returning to the Fifth Plenary Session, the draft decision placed on the table contains the words "perseverance," which implies that this Party cleanup will not be a one-time campaign-style investigation, but a long-term, bloody affair. "Several major issues" suggests that it will not stop at soft topics like work style, but will likely involve hard-core mechanisms such as the inspection system, the discipline inspection system, and the military political work system. For Xi Jinping, the essence of the Party stability maintenance to be achieved at this meeting is to clear the way for stability, eliminating those capable of challenging his authority one by one, and using fear and forced alignment to maintain a sense of conformity and uniformity. Both Wei Xiaodong and Wang Xiangxi have traces in their resumes of having worked with or been promoted by Xi Jinping. The fact that a leader is purging his own former team carries a strong signal: either these people really have problems so serious they cannot be tolerated, or the power struggle has become so intense that even his own people cannot be protected and must be sacrificed as cannon fodder. As the situation changes, comrades who stood side by side yesterday may become hidden dangers that need to be cleared away today. From the signal released on September 21 to the month before the meeting, it is highly probable that more names will be dragged in. When the plenary session officially opens on October 26, let us wait and see if a new round of larger-scale personnel changes will be put on the table. Xi once said, "Don't look at how boisterous you are today; be careful of the reckoning that will come later." This will surely come to pass, but the only thing he doesn't know is that he will also have to face this reckoning himself.
Emergency poll: Do you think Xi Jinping being humiliated in the United States will translate into the motivation for internal strife and the slaughter of CCP officials? 1. Yes, they are like rats with guns, only fierce in their own nest. 2. No, because there aren't many left. 3. Don't know, observing quietly. Hurry up and type the number in the comment section.
Recently, something has been spreading like wildfire within the Party-state system. It is unclear whether it is a malicious rumor, a far-sighted prophecy, or the Party testing the waters, but in any case, the situation is treacherous. What is it? There is news that the pressure of fiscal strain has finally reached the most core group within the system—retired civil servants. Finding, an independent commentator living in Canada, revealed in a post on the X platform on September 24 that due to fiscal constraints, some regions have begun internal discussions on the possibility of reducing retirement allowances. Finding further explained that the pensions of retired civil servants and public institution employees in China are divided into two parts: first, the basic pension, accounting for about 60% to 70%, and second, the retirement allowance, accounting for about 30% to 40%, with the specific ratio varying by province and city.
Speaking of pensions, we cannot avoid mentioning the dual-track system—or rather, the multi-track system—of the pension framework under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). How many tracks are there? One track is for peasants and workers. Back in the day when the Party seized power by relying on peasants and workers to smash, loot, and make revolution, they built their fortunes on it. Yet today, peasants and workers have the lowest pensions: peasants who delivered grain quotas to the state their entire lives get only 163 yuan, and retired urban workers get around 3,000 yuan. Sigh, sometimes when you think about it, those who are pitiable must have something hateful about them. If you were willing to believe the Party and join the revolution back then for a share of the dividends, don't complain about being trampled underfoot in the future. After all, believing in the Communist Party is a fast track straight to the crematorium. As for another track in this multi-track system, retired personnel from state-institutions with formal establishment status can pocket 5,000 to 7,000 yuan a month, and the public servants' track is even higher. A Beijing law firm released the latest standards for civil servant retirement benefits for 2026. Taking a section chief-level police officer in a central province in 2026 as an example, they can receive 9,804 yuan after retirement—almost hitting 10,000 yuan. And note that this doesn't even include various local allowances, such as price-fluctuation subsidies, living allowances, as well as medical, housing, and other welfare subsidies. In short, long before the Party and the government went all out to raise peasants' pensions from 143 to 163 yuan, they had already wholeheartedly ensured that the post-retirement quality of life for civil servants remained top-notch. Retirement benefits for civil servants must be relatively generous and stable; the 9,800 yuan monthly retirement pay of that section-chief level police officer in a central province, which has been circulating hotly online, is merely the basic pension. Factor in various allowances, and it easily tops 10,000 yuan. Not to mention that retirement benefits for civil servants in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai are only going to be even better. Looking at it this way, when Hu Xijin, the avid defender of the Party, was rumored to have a retirement pension of 33,000 yuan at the bureau-level, it really wasn't that much, yet Hu still rushed to deny the rumor. One has to ask, where on earth is this guy's face?
Anyway, moving on to Finding's exposé post, whether the Party will actually set its sights on the retirement allowances of civil servants remains to be seen. Finding stated themselves that this discussion is not a final decision, that its implementation is extremely difficult, and that it falls under "individual regions" to be "decided by each province and municipality themselves," having not been confirmed as a nationwide policy. However, since such a far-ahead prophecy has leaked out, it shows that the landlord's family truly has no surplus grain left right now. Moreover, one signal seems to clearly illustrate the problem: money that is supposed to be raised is not being raised. Located in Harbin, Heilongjiang, a retired senior from a state institution recently reported that the government-issued pension had been increasing every year for over 20 years, with the increases announced every summer and retroactively paid out. Yet this year, it's almost October and there is still no news. The severity of the fiscal strain is self-evident. The Party says that cutting pensions is too sensitive, so they'll just not give raises for now; after all, you shouldn't take steps that are too big, lest you tear your crotch.
Reactions from overseas netizens to the news that the Party is coming for civil servant pensions are polarized. Many believe this is digging up the foundations of the Party because if it were actually implemented, it would be too difficult. Some even bluntly stated that unless the Communist Party stops ruling, not a single penny can be shaved off for these retired veteran cadres. Cutting pensions does not offend ordinary folks; whoever dares to touch the slave masters' interests by lowering retirement benefits will affect the foundation of tens of millions of Party members and officials. The CCP will most likely still choose that "digging ore out of the leek patch is much easier." However, other netizens hold different views, citing examples of how some parts of the Northeast already began suspending retirement allowances for those inside the system a few years ago; the street protests by teachers at Northeastern University were precisely because their allowances were halted. You can understand the development of Chinese society just by looking at the Northeast. If that is indeed the case, it is certainly an important observation indicator, especially since in recent years, the notion that "the Northeast is a leading indicator guiding the country's development" has basically become a consensus among people nationwide. Years ago, people mocked people from the Northeast for their obsession with the system and pride in taking the civil service exams—now everyone takes the civil service exams. People once mocked the Northeast for its low fertility rate—now the whole country has a low fertility rate. People once mocked the Northeast as "light industry livestreaming, heavy industry barbecuing"—now livestreaming and barbecuing are everywhere across the country. Looked at this way, the Northeast didn't fall behind; instead, it led the country by 20 years. The three northeastern provinces weakly point out: don't forget the severe aging we are currently experiencing—isn't that exactly the future facing the whole country? When that time comes, who will we even count on to pay money for the elderly to retire...
Recently, DJI, the global drone giant based in Shenzhen, has been having a tough time, and it has no one to turn to, forced to swallow its blood with its broken teeth. This wave of hardship doesn't come from attacks by overseas hostile forces, but 100% from Zhongnanhai—specifically, from Emperor Xi. After all, in this world, there is a kind of insecurity called "the leadership feels insecure," and whatever superiors show a fondness for, subordinates will take to extremes. Following Beijing's comprehensive ban on drones, localities across the country have followed suit, determined to fight drones to the death. The Party has made it clear: leaving a drone at home gathering dust is not allowed either. What if one day a drone is remotely controlled by rebels, strapped with firecrackers, and swoops down like a B2 bomber directly on Chunzhizhai? Netizens hit the nail on the head: if Beijing is allowed to be afraid of death with a 300-li flight ban, why shouldn't Hangzhou be allowed to be afraid of death too? With a 300-kilometer defense ring for the imperial capital, having a 250-kilometer defense ring for the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta isn't too much to ask, right? Local officials' lives matter too, and every village should have its own no-fly zone in the future. Other netizens argued for the rationality of banning drones from the perspective of local governance: if Qingyuan in Guangdong had banned drones some time ago, the difficulty for Brother Qi in smoking out the sulfur-bleached bamboo shoot dark dens would have been greatly increased. Consequently, police everywhere acted as if they had coordinated, knocking on doors and disturbing residents to ask if they had drones, and if they didn't honestly confess, it was off to the execution ground.
On September 24, a Zhihu netizen whose IP showed Guangdong revealed that at past 9 PM last night, several police officers came to his door asking if he had a drone. Upon receiving a positive reply, the police officers' eyes lit up, and they immediately carried out a series of operations: making him take out the drone, registering it, taking photos, and then having him fill out a registration form. He learned from the police conversation that they still had to rush off to the next household. The netizen was very considerate, noting that it was so late and yet they still had to go door-to-door to notify, take photos, supervise the upgrade, and take photos again—it was quite hard work. The police replied, "Although we are inept at protecting the people, the Party has taught us that disturbing the people must be done with skill. Thank you for your concern." Many netizens in the comment section responded that they had encountered similar situations. Someone said that shortly before, the local police uncle called him and started by asking, "Are you X Jingdong? Register your drone." That's how he knew they had pulled Jingdong's order information. A netizen from Sichuan said below that the DJI drone he bought in 2017 had crashed and burned years ago, but in 2026, an uncle still called to find him, and he didn't even know where they checked the purchase records. Various government departments showed that under the Party's big data monitoring, they knew everything about you up to eighteen generations, as well as your friends and relatives in all directions; if you want privacy, go dream your Chinese Dream. Another netizen's experience was even more comical: at least leaving a file is something, but this guy's gadget was just a large selfie stick, not a drone. Another said that on the eve of the G20, the police came to his door saying he had to sign a pledge promising not to take aerial photos during the conference. He stared blankly at the printed paper showing his transaction item—that was a toy smaller than a palm that he bought for his nephew to play with at home. Look at that, this is the 2026 drone version of dynamic zero-COVID and layer-upon-layer intensification.
As for the "low-altitude economy," "drone development," and various drone competitions vigorously promoted by the Party in recent years, along with the "low-altitude economy colleges" and "low-altitude economy majors" opened by many universities, they are now completely defunct. What to do? The Party stated that only a government capable of acknowledging and correcting its mistakes is a good government. Look, the drone competitions originally planned to be held at the "Aviation Town" in Jiande, Hangzhou, after July were all canceled. On September 19, Hangzhou City pressed on, releasing the "Announcement on Publicly Soliciting Opinions" on the Finance Bureau's official website, and these "several measures to support the high-quality development of the low-altitude economy" that were about to be repealed had only been implemented for two years. Sure enough, compared to development, security is the absolute principle, and the safety of Party and state leaders is of paramount importance. Netizens mocked it incisively: sprinkling bait to fish, only to find the fish too dangerous, so they directly drained the water, dried the pond, and exterminated the fry. The most miserable ones are those kids who managed to get admitted to universities like Beihang University and Beijing Institute of Technology to study the "low-altitude economy"; before they even graduate, with one look up, the entire industry has been wiped out by Xi the Steamed Bun. The question is: "What is the psychological shadow area of these college students?"
Beijingers are in for a treat: from now on, taking medicine, using medical supplies, and getting check-ups will no longer be tainted by foreign forces. Everything must be domestic medicine and domestic equipment, giving the masses a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to gloriously contribute to the Party's medical cause. However, I must whisper a quick note: rest assured, the PLA 301 Hospital, which exclusively serves senior CCP officials, will certainly still be fully equipped with imported devices. Otherwise, how will Xi the Steamed Bun ever reach his goal of living to 150? What is going on? According to a report by Taiwan's Storm Media on September 21, news is spreading like wildfire online that Beijing municipal hospitals are completely phasing out imported diagnostic equipment. Data from the Beijing Public Resource Trading Service Platform shows that 17 Beijing municipal hospitals recently launched a centralized procurement of medical equipment for 2026, with a total budget of approximately 382 million RMB, planning to purchase 177 devices covering radiology and ultrasound instruments. Pay attention here: in the tender documents, the column for "whether imported products are allowed" is marked "No" across the board, meaning imported equipment is completely excluded from bidding eligibility. These 17 hospitals are all famous, including Chaoyang, Anzhen, Friendship, Jishuitan, Tiantan, Xuanwu, Tsinghua Changgung, Beijing Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Beijing Children's Hospital, Capital Institute of Pediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Chest Hospital, You'an, Ditan, Anding, and the Geriatric Hospital. Among them, in a medical equipment procurement case announced by Peking University People's Hospital this July, a 1.5T or higher MRI system with a budget of 6.6 million RMB explicitly stated "No" under "whether to accept bids for imported products." Beijing Zhongguancun Hospital's procurement case announced this August, which included a 256-slice CT scanner with a budget of 11.4 million RMB, also marked "No" for "whether to purchase imported products.
This is the result of the so-called "domestic substitution" that the Party-state has been pushing in the medical industry for years. In other words, from now on, those precision CT scanners, pacemakers, and surgical robots imported from Europe and America—and even a single imported drainage tube or a vial of imported anesthesia used during surgery—will become unreachable legends for ordinary people. Behind this, besides the main reason that the medical insurance fund is broke, there is also the factor of the CCP arm-wrestling with the US and Europe. Consequently, the CCP has once again turned a funeral into a celebration, packaging the dilemma of the medical insurance fund's deficit into a patriotic narrative: we must be self-reliant and controllable, and no longer rely on foreign goods. Furthermore, the procurement of drugs in the medical insurance catalog started earlier and went further; imported original research drugs have long since vanished. For example, imported antihypertensive drugs, imported anesthetics, and imported antibiotics have all disappeared from the medical insurance catalog, and thus from hospital pharmacies. They then euphemistically call it "making medicine affordable for low-income groups." So where did the saved money go? The answer: it went to Beijing 301 and a whole host of other special-supply hospitals serving high-ranking officials. They are always equipped with the world's top imported medical devices and original research drugs, never out of stock, and never restricted. When those high officials have surgery, they use precision instruments from Germany, advanced imaging equipment from Japan, and original drugs from the United States. That said, can their medical insurance cover it? No, don't overthink it; they don't have that penny-pinching medical insurance. Their healthcare is a special supply for the Party-state. In other words, Xi the Steamed Bun's dream of living to 150, when it falls on the heads of ordinary people, is likely to turn into a medical nightmare: anesthesia that doesn't numb, blood pressure medication that doesn't work, blood pressure that doesn't drop, laxatives that don't purge, and even a minimally invasive ventricular drainage surgery that could be solved with one imported drainage tube might turn into "full anesthesia craniotomy with drilling," not only doubling the surgery cost but also carrying the risk of subsequent intracranial infection. As long as the Communist bandits are not removed, the nightmares of the Chinese people will continue. What do you think, tea friends? By the way, let me mention our advertising sponsor.
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