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Investment Down 25.5%, and It's the Northeast Again! GDP Share Falls from 13.2% to 4.5%, Daqing Oil Worth 700 Sold for 100 Yuan, 8,000 Yuan to Buy Out 30 Years of Seniority, Profits Go to the Center While Debt Stays Local, Heilongjiang's Pension Fund the Only One in the Country to Go Bust! The Northeast Finished the Race While the Rest of the Country Is Just Starting

1# · OP Author:一个狠人 Published:2026-09-29 00:20 Replies:0 Views:294 Permalink:fanzei.net/d_ejr2tu

This video provides an in-depth analysis of the historical roots and systemic issues behind the economic decline of Northeast China. From early resource exploitation, price scissors, and the Third Front Movement to the transfer of equipment and talent, the massive layoffs of state-owned enterprise workers in the 1990s, and the "buyout" of decades of seniority for 8,000 yuan, to the centralization of tax revenue while leaving debt at the local level—all of which led to Heilongjiang being the first province in the country to see its pension fund run dry. The host argues that the Northeast's current situation is the future of all of China, revealing the essence of the CCP's closed loop of control and plunder.

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Observing things as they are, refusing fragmented cognition. In mid-September of this year, the National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released the fixed-asset investment data for January through August. Fixed-asset investment nationwide fell by 7.2% year-on-year. Isn't this data ugly enough? Let's look further down at the regional breakdown: fixed-asset investment in the northeastern region dropped by 25.5%, while Liaoning's fixed-asset investment in the first half of the year plunged by 29.9%—roughly 30%. Ah, it's the Northeast again. Every time national data drops, the Northeast is forever among the earliest and hardest-hit groups. Why is this? Many people's first reaction is to parrot the CCP's talking points, claiming that the business environment in the Northeast is too terrible, and so on. After all, "investment does not cross Shanhai Pass" is already a famous dogma in the investment world. Previously, there was also regional slander—what kind of slander? Slandering northeasterners as gluttonous and lazy. This is pure bullshit and not even worth refuting. What kind of people were the ancestors of us northeasterners? They were much like the first batch of Americans on the Mayflower; they were all people with an extremely strong spirit of adventure. The current economic illness in the Northeast actually has almost nothing to do with whether northeasterners are lazy or not. What is the number one reason? It is determined by the CCP's blockade-and-plunder model. The Northeast was simply the first pilot field for the CCP's closed-loop system of control and plunder. The Northeast has merely finished walking this process ahead of time, and the entire country of China is now walking down that exact same path. Today, let's first examine how the Northeast was completely drained. Tomorrow, we will look at how many years the rest of the country is away from becoming like the Northeast. Let's first flip over the historical cards. If we don't flip the cards, we won't even be able to calculate how much blood has been sucked out. Let's start counting from over 70 years ago. In March 1950, Gao Gang reported a set of data at a representative meeting of the Northeast Bureau. Ah, what data? Taking 1943 as the baseline, the Northeast accounted for 49% of the national coal production, 87% of pig iron production, 93% of steel, 78% of electricity, and 42% of railways. What kind of concept is this? In 1943, China's total steel production was only 922,000 tons, and the Northeast region alone produced 868,000 tons. In other words, all the provinces inside Shanhai Pass added together produced only 53,000 tons. The annual output of just a single factory, the Showa Steel Works in Anshan, was 843,000 tons of steel—ah, this is the prototype of the later Anshan Iron and Steel Group—which was 16 times that of all areas inside the pass combined. In 1945, China's total railway mileage was 27,000 kilometers, while the Northeast alone accounted for 13,000 kilometers, nearly half of the entire country. When the Soviet army entered the Northeast in 1945 and dismantled and took away a large batch of equipment, the CCP itself did not keep statistics. Who was the one doing the statistics? The U.S. government. According to the report submitted by the U.S. special envoy at the time, what was the estimate? It was estimated that the losses in the Northeast were about 2 billion dollars. And that was in 1945 U.S. dollars—what kind of concept is that?

Let's take a look. After World War II, in order to save and rebuild the post-war economy of Western Europe, the United States launched the famous Marshall Plan. As everyone knows, the entire Marshall Plan was only 13 billion US dollars, while the equipment dismantled and taken away by the Soviet Union from Northeast China, along with the destruction caused, was equivalent to one-sixth of the total aid for the reconstruction of over a dozen Western European countries over several years. If we calculate these 2 billion US dollars based on the gold-to-dollar peg price at the time, it is equivalent to 57.13 million ounces of gold, which is 1,777 tons. Today, the foreign exchange reserves claimed by the People's Bank of the CCP are only about 2,200 tons of gold, meaning the Soviet Union essentially robbed the current CCP central bank. This is just calculating the property taken away, not even counting the burning, killing, and looting committed by the Soviet army. After these facilities were dismantled, well, there was still a lot left in the Northeast. When the CCP took over the Northeast in 1949, the Northeast still accounted for 91% of the country's steelmaking capacity. In 1952, the national steel production was 1.3 million tons, and the Northeast alone accounted for 70% of that capacity. And this foundation was not just these factories; there were also people. In June 1949, there were about 800,000 skilled workers in the Northeast. And what else? There were also over 10,000 Japanese technical personnel and workers retained by the Nationalist government in the Northeast in 1947. After the CCP took over the Northeast, they ordered these 10,000-plus Japanese to continue working for the CCP. In other words, at that time, the Japanese Kwantung Army and a considerable portion of the industries where Japanese people worked were basically packaged and taken over by the CCP on the spot. During the War of Liberation, the CCP had already incorporated a significant portion of the surrendered Japanese Kwantung Army into its own ranks, which was an important reason why the CCP later gained an advantage on the battlefield against the Kuomintang. The CCP also knew that this place was valuable, so in the First Five-Year Plan, there were 156 key projects, 56 of which were placed in the Northeast, and in the investment for these 156 projects, the Northeast alone accounted for 44.3%. The reason for the investment was also very simple: only the Northeast had the existing capital and skilled workers to undertake these investments. Under these circumstances, the marginal productivity of the investment is the highest. The Northeast region's GDP accounted for 12.4% of the national total, and in 1978 it still accounted for 13.2%. Hey, everyone remember this 13.2%, because now this figure is only about 4.5%. In 1978, Liaoning's per capita GDP was 1.8 times the national average; now it is only about 80% of the national average. But this makes no sense no matter how you think about it. The Northeast has access to the sea, and there are world-class deep-water ports everywhere, such as Dalian Port and Lushun Port—both are year-round ice-free ports—as well as Jinzhou Port, Dandong Port, and Yingkou Port. The neighbors are not just that unlucky money-losing thing called North Korea, but also Japan and South Korea. It has airports, it has agriculture, it has industry, and it has universities. The density of universities in the Northeast back then was in a league of its own nationwide. Shenyang alone had over 40 universities clustered there at its peak, and Harbin, Changchun, and Dalian were all hubs of prestigious schools, with four '985' universities and eleven '211' universities. The per capita education level consistently ranked at the top of the country. The climate and environment are almost at the same latitude as the Ruhr area in Germany and the Great Lakes industrial region in the United States, but this place is just fucking underdeveloped. You tell me why? Isn't it because it was the first to enjoy the CCP's blood-sucking model?

Let's talk about money first. How is money siphoned off by the CCP? It starts with the CCP's price system. As you know, a planned economy doesn't siphon wealth through taxes; it relies on prices. The process works like this: the CCP sets a planned price for crude oil, coal, timber, and grain from the Northeast that is far below market preference. Then, it issues an allocation order, and the Northeast is forced to ship these goods inside the Great Wall at the planned price, while factories inside the Great Wall receive the goods at that same planned price. This system is identical to how Stalin siphoned the blood of Soviet farmers. Therefore, for the CCP, price has never been a signal for discovering market value; what is it then? It is the primary tool for siphoning wealth. You might wonder, where does this price difference go? Well, this difference becomes the low costs and profits for these state-owned factories inside the Great Wall. In other words, where is this difference recorded? It is recorded on the books of the recipient. On the books of the Northeast, you see nothing. This is the scissors gap. To put it bluntly, they take your goods and settle the payment at dirt-cheap prices, leaving no trace on the books, and the mineral resources in the Northeast have been monopolized by CCP party-owned enterprises for years. Furthermore, this portion of the price difference was not converted into basic welfare for the whole society; instead, it became a tool for these CCP officials to profit under the dual-track price system. Because at that time, everything was under unified purchase and marketing, meaning how much you produced and who you sold it to was already decided by the fucking CCP. Even if you say, 'Hey, the current market price isn't this,' it's useless to know that. The production capacity is what it is, and the price is just like that; you have to sell it whether you want to or not. Where is the largest price difference? In Daqing. From 1976 to 2002, the Daqing Oilfield produced over 50 million tons of oil annually for 27 consecutive years, and by 2023, it had cumulatively produced 2.5 billion tons of crude oil. Hey, these are the figures reported by China Energy News itself. So let's see how much money was siphoned from just one oilfield, Daqing. In the 1980s, the price of crude oil was 260 dollars per ton, while the domestic planned price was discounted to 35.7 dollars, which is one-seventh of the international market price. Based on the internal settlement price of 2.8 yuan at the time, one ton of oil was only a little over 100 yuan, while the international oil price was 260 times 2.8, which is over 700 yuan. Selling it to other domestic party-owned enterprises at a price of 100 yuan, and then those party-owned enterprises inside the Great Wall use it as if it were worth 700 yuan—is this fucking support? This is the scissors gap. So we can do the math. From 1976 to 1993, calculating at 50 million tons per year, that's 900 million tons in these 18 years. If we calculate the price difference in a conservative range of 100 to 300 yuan per ton, the value transferred out by Daqing alone is between 90 billion and 270 billion. Let's take the median, which is 110 billion to 180 billion—and this is in 1980s RMB. In 1985, the total fiscal revenue of all of China was only 200.5 billion. In other words, the price exploitation of Daqing by the CCP system in the first dozen years of the Reform and Opening-up was equivalent to half a year to a full year of the national fiscal revenue at that time. If the CCP had turned this into welfare for all the people through a low-price strategy, I wouldn't say anything. But clearly, they didn't do that; instead, it became a tool for personal enrichment. Has everyone thought about this? Why are these fucking corrupt CCP officials so fucking rich? None of them have any fucking talent, but every one of them is stuffed with money. This is the benefit brought by the dual-track price system. The essence of this thing is monopolizing the upstream to set monopoly prices. The method of monopoly is entirely administrative, exactly the same as the performance of agricultural products in the Soviet Union at the time, and it is the same system used by the CCP to exploit farmers. Hey, administrative pricing says it's worth one yuan, so it's worth one yuan, regardless of what your costs are. But the Northeast is fucking bled dry because everything it produces is stuff the CCP can use for administrative arbitrage. The more basic the resource, the more they can monopolize it.

Let me come back to this, starting from 1983. The upstream oil sector suffered policy-induced losses of about 15 billion each year. China's crude oil prices were not aligned with international oil prices until 1994, which means that Daqing's explicit tax and fee payments to date have already reached over 3 trillion, and that is just the open ledger, while the price scissor gap is the hidden ledger. The hidden ledger is not on any financial statement, so this 3 trillion-plus figure is the most conservative calculation. Besides Daqing, there are many others; for example, former China Construction Bank Chairman Wang Hongzhang compiled a set of data, what did he say? He said that from 1953 to 1987, Heilongjiang transferred out more than 300 million tons of coal, 269 million cubic meters of timber, 725 million tons of crude oil, and 64.75 million tons of grain. How much was that worth at the prices of the time? It amounted to 467 yuan handed over to the Chinese Communist Party. If converted to current prices, it is 3.5 trillion. The history of grain goes back even further; from 1949 to 2024, how much grain did Heilongjiang cumulatively ship to the rest of the country? 4.1 trillion catties of grain, with the grain shipped out from the three northeastern provinces accounting for one-third of the country's total transferred volume. From 1953 to 1957, the pig iron, steel, and cement transferred out by Liaoning accounted for 54% to 73% of its own production, meaning that half to three-quarters of the steel smelted from Liaoning did not stay in Liaoning at all. As for the people of the Northeast themselves, they were treated even more like allocated commodities. Starting in 1954, Anshan Iron and Steel transferred a total of 11,000 cadres and technical personnel, and 60,000 skilled workers under the fine-sounding pretext of doing what? To support 27 provinces, but in reality, it was to weaken strategic reliance on the Northeast. Especially during the years when the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a falling out, over 70,000 people were directly sent to more than 300 units nationwide, and the Northeast cumulatively exported 1.3 million talents. These people were extremely precious human resources that northeastern enterprises had produced and accumulated over twenty years, and once transferred, their value reset to zero for the Northeast, while the receiving end still recorded them at zero cost. Therefore, if we look at this blood-sucking model, what was extracted by pricing? It extracted cash flow. Once the cash flow was extracted, enterprises had no retained earnings, and without retained earnings, they could not replace their equipment. This consequence encountered what in the 1960s? It encountered the Third Front Construction, which was a fucking retarded thing. What was the Third Front Construction? Well, that fucking Mao Zedong. What did they predict at the time? They predicted that the Chinese Communist Party would fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. What was the assumption of the Chinese Communist Party at the time? It was that the coastal areas and the Northeast, which was the first front that the Chinese Communist Party fantasized about, would break out into a major war and then be smashed to pieces. So based on this assumption, what did the Chinese Communist Party do at the time? They moved large batches of heavy industry, military industry, along with people and equipment, deep into the mountains of the Southwest and Northwest. This area was called the Third Front. The Chinese Communist Party really loves this kind of categorization, like the first world, the second world, the third world, all this bullshit. Who knows what is actually stuffed inside the brains of these CCP folks, why can you guys manage to stratify everything you look at?

Right, let's continue. From 1964 to 1980, the Third Front construction invested 205.2 billion yuan of that era. This money was not newly added; it was scraped together from the investment quotas of coastal regions and the Northeast. The Northeast relocated more than 200 enterprises and institutions to the Third Front, involving nearly 1 million people and 30,000 sets of equipment. Heilongjiang alone had 12 military enterprises building and supporting more than 210 units, transferring 3,389 sets of equipment and 160,000 personnel. Meanwhile, Liaoning saw a net outflow of 1.715 million people between 1960 and 1976. What does this mean? It means the Northeast already had no money left to replace its own equipment, yet the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) moved entire established factories root and branch into mountain ravines—meaning places with even faster depreciation and further away from mineral deposits, making their production costs terrifyingly high. The resulting consequence was that by the 1980s, Third Front enterprises were generally running at a loss. By the 1990s, 80% to 90% of these so-called Third Front enterprises were essentially abandoned or bankrupt. This directly led to the situation where, when the reform and opening-up was restarted, the Northeast's industrial equipment was the oldest in the country. So ponder this sequence: first, the profits are drained away, leaving you unable to replace equipment; then the good equipment is moved away; then the people are moved away; and then in the 1990s, what does the CCP tell you? Ah, the CCP tells you that your enterprise efficiency is too low and reforms are needed. Thus came the CCP's nationwide massive layoffs in the Northeast. So I fucking fail to understand how anyone can say Zhu Rongji is a fucking good person. Seriously, the mess was created by your CCP, the resources were taken by your CCP, the personnel were all administratively dispatched by your CCP, and not only was there such an astronomical loss, but you also unilaterally announced that all losses would be borne by the disenfranchised workers of the Northeast. Tell me, if you are still human, can you think this fucking piece of shit is any good? The slash of layoffs did not cut into assets, but what? Into liabilities.

The method was extremely simple and crude: unilateral breach of contract. Enterprise employees in the Northeast received extremely low wages under the planned system, and what was the counterpart? The counterpart was lifetime employment, housing, medical care, and pensions of unit duration—these were debts the CCP owed to the Northeast workers, only they were implicit liabilities. And what was the buy-out of seniority in the 1990s? It was liquidating this debt all at once based on the CCP's unilateral pricing. Nationwide, the cumulative number of laid-off workers from 1998 to 2003 was 28.18 million. Active employees in state-owned enterprises dropped from 110 million in 1997 to 71.63 million in 2003, a 35% decrease over five years. And what was the situation in the Northeast? During the pilot period from 2001 to 2002 in Liaoning, the euphemism was that 1.24 million people were "integrated." What was integration? Integration was layoffs, followed by giving you a sum of money, also called buy-out severance pay. Once this money was taken, from then on that person and the enterprise were even. Liaoning plus Jilin saw 2.61 million laid-off workers by 2005, and Heilongjiang had 1.72 million laid-off workers by 2006, totaling 4.33 million across the three provinces—accounting for 15% of the national total of laid-off workers, while the total population of the three provinces accounted for only 8% of the country. That is to say, among the laid-off people at that time, one out of every six or seven was from the Northeast; the proportion of the knife slash taken by people in the Northeast was twice the national average. So what was the given counterpart? The economic compensation paid by Liaoning from 2001 to 2002 was 10.23 billion yuan, meaning the per capita was only 8,250 yuan. Heilongjiang distributed 13.43 billion yuan by 2006 to 1.72 million people, with a per capita of only 7,800 yuan. Daqing Oilfield was considered one of the highest tiers nationwide, and the upper limit of the buyout was merely about 100,000 yuan. So look at what kind of fucking bullshitting things the Communist Party does! What did a per capita of 8,000 yuan buy out? It bought out 20 to 30 years of seniority, meaning a worker's seniority for one year was only worth 300 to 400 yuan, while the wages suppressed from these workers every year under planned wages were at least several times that amount. In other words, the CCP used less than 10,000 yuan to buy out a debt accruing interest for 30 years. So the one who breached the contract was the CCP, and the creditors were the workers. You say the people of the Northeast are lazy, yet the people of the Northeast were fobbed off with 8,000 yuan.

At the same time, there was another operation going on. While offloading these debts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) directly harvested the best assets in the Northeast for the central government, such as Angang Steel, FAW Group, and Harbin Electric, all of which are now central state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Daqing Oilfield was merged into the PetroChina Group starting in 1998, and legally, it is now just a branch. So, how are the taxes handled? Value-added tax (VAT) remains in Daqing, but after the 1994 tax-sharing reform, the central government of the CCP took 75% first, and after 2016, it took 50%. As for corporate income tax, since 2003, the central government has taken 60% first. After the new tax law in 2008, corporate income tax for cross-provincial businesses is first settled at the headquarters, and the remaining local portion is then divided according to the locations of the headquarters and the branches. Daqing only gets the portion allocated to the branch. Resource tax, on the other hand, belongs entirely to the local government, but for crude oil, before October 2011, it was only collected at 8 to 30 yuan per ton. This means that when a ton of oil was sold for three or four thousand yuan, the local government could only get less than 1% in resource tax. It was not until after October 2011 that it was changed to 5% of the oil price. In other words, from the start of Daqing's production in 1960 to 2011—half a century—the local tax that Heilongjiang Province received from each ton of oil from Daqing was only a few yuan to a few dozen yuan. In 2015, the taxes and fees paid by Daqing were 35.8 billion yuan, while Heilongjiang's general public budget revenue for the same year was only 116.5 billion yuan. This means that the payments from Daqing Oilfield accounted for more than a quarter of the entire province's own-level revenue. Therefore, Heilongjiang's fiscal budget was never really Heilongjiang's, and the Northeast's fiscal budget was never really the Northeast's. Let's look at why the Northeast fell behind. At the end of 2001, what was the proportion of state-owned economy in industry? At that time, Liaoning was 78.2%, Jilin was 86.2%, and Heilongjiang was 87.2%, while the national average was around 65%. The number of SOE employees in the Northeast dropped from 17.1 million in 1993 to 8.4 million in 2003, but the proportion of SOEs did not decrease at all; it was just that the number of SOE employees had been halved. So where did the laid-off people go? Nowhere, because the private sector was never allowed to grow in the Northeast. Why wasn't it allowed to grow? Because credit, land, and raw material orders were all in the hands of state-owned enterprises. Banks also followed instructions to only lend to SOEs. Private enterprises could neither get land nor money, and if they grew large, their property rights were not protected. If they became successful, they would be in trouble. Why? Because they would instead become targets for extraction.

And where did this part of the debt that was shed go? It didn't disappear; it just shifted from the corporate balance sheet to the pension insurance account. Let's look at this: the deficit in the urban employee pension insurance in Heilongjiang exceeded 11 billion in 2011. By 2013, the current period balance was already negative 4.043 billion. In 2015, revenue was 92.5 billion, while expenditures were 110.8 billion, leaving a cumulative balance of only 8.8 billion—enough to cover just one month of payments. In 2016, the current deficit was negative 32 billion, and the cumulative balance was 23.2 billion; at that time, it was the only province in the country with a negative cumulative balance, meaning it had gone bankrupt. After going bankrupt, what did they rely on to pay? They relied on outside money. This can be seen directly from the China Statistical Yearbook 2025; the numbers provided are very straightforward. How are they given? Look, in 2024, Heilongjiang's urban employee pension insurance revenue was 218.1 billion, while expenditures were 284.3 billion. The gap between revenue and expenditure was 66.1 billion, which was clearly filled by the more than 80 billion allocated by the fiscal budget. Only with this 80 billion was there a remaining cumulative balance of 30.8 billion on the books. The number of active contributors was 8.41 million, while the number of recipients was 7.02 million, already far ahead of the rest of the country. Heilongjiang is now at a ratio of 1.2 people supporting one retiree. By the end of 2025, the total number of people participating in urban employee pension insurance in Heilongjiang, including both active workers and retirees, was 15.4 million, down 0.2% from the previous year. In other words, the number of contributors is shrinking, while the number of recipients is growing. Liaoning and Jilin are in the same situation. Liaoning's current deficit in 2016 was negative 25.4 billion, and Jilin's in 2016 was negative 5.2 billion. By 2024, the number of retirees in Liaoning was 9.16 million, and the annual pension expenditure was 392.4 billion. At the end of last year, the number of active insured employees in Liaoning was 12.75 million, and the number of retirees was 9.31 million, meaning Liaoning has 1.37 people supporting one retiree. In the same year, the number of employed people in Liaoning was 20.24 million, a decrease of 500,000 in one year. During the same period, the number of active insured employees in Jilin was only 5.458 million, and the number of retirees was 4.232 million, meaning 1.29 people support one retiree. Jilin's deficit has been widening over the past few years, from over 25 billion in 2024 to definitely exceeding 35 billion this year. Looking further ahead, the basic pension transfer payment arranged by the CCP this year is 1.25 trillion. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the CCP announced in July that the total revenue for the three social security funds in the first half of the year was 4.88 trillion, with expenditures of 4.14 trillion. The cumulative balance at the end of June was 11.07 trillion. Although it is still positive on the books, what is this revenue composed of? It is fiscal subsidies. The situation at the provincial level is even more direct. In 2025, the total social security fund revenue for Liaoning province was only 543.5 billion, while expenditures reached 521 billion. Although it looks like there was a surplus of 22.5 billion, this revenue includes money allocated from the national pool. This year, the budgetary deficit for the provincial-level social security fund in Liaoning has already reached 520 million, which is consistent with my prediction last year. A single provincial-level employee pension insurance scheme requires an annual expenditure of 351.6 billion. In 2025, the total social security fund revenue for Heilongjiang province was only 410 billion, with expenditures of 375.4 billion. The budgeted revenue for 2026 will continue to decline by 1.3%, while expenditure arrangements will continue to grow by 4.2%. In other words, one end is being pressed down while the other is rising. Moreover, these fucking Chinese governments in the three northeastern provinces—every single one of them, whether it's Liaoning, Jilin, or Heilongjiang—whenever they are fucking broke, they love to reach their hands into the social security accounts. Therefore, I dare to assert that if you were to open up all the social security books in the Northeast, every single one of them would be negative right now, and in this regard, they are once again leading the country.

Now, let's put these four cuts together and look at them. You see, what does pricing drain away? It drains away traffic. Once the traffic is drained away, enterprises cannot replace their equipment. Then the third-tier regions also take away the existing stock, and advanced basic workers are also moved away in batches. The equipment has become the oldest in the country, and the people are fucking hollowed out. Once the equipment gets this old, competitiveness is lost, and enterprises will continue to operate at a loss. Then in the 1990s, workers were bought out with 8,000 yuan, and at the same time, all the best assets were nationalized under the central government. It can be said that the center of gravity of profits was entirely appropriated by the central government of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while the center of gravity of debt was entirely left to local governments. This is what that fucking Zhu Rongji did. Whether Zhu Rongji is anti-communist or anti-China, I'm not sure, but at the very least, whoever praises this bastard is letting down this land. Everyone remember, the prototype of the Northeast's plight is the script of the CCP's future. What will this series of actions directly lead to? It will directly cause the business environment in the Northeast to rot and die. Young people in the Northeast either want to get into the system, or they simply run away to the South, or even flee abroad. The dependency ratio is heading all the way towards 1 to 1. Do you see this chain? Every cut the CCP makes to Northeast China is the disposal cost of the previous cut, and then the disposal of each cut creates the next one. Northeast people have no say at all in this entire chain, and the property rights of Northeast assets do not belong to the Northeast either. Only one fucking thing was left to the Northeast, and that is debt—specifically, the debt of the CCP. Look at that number at the beginning again: in the first eight months of 2026, fixed asset investment in the Northeast directly plummeted by 25.5%, and Liaoning already dropped by nearly 30% in the first half of the year. Investment in the Northeast had already collapsed once in 2016, and now it's just collapsing for the second time. Meanwhile, as the Northeast collapses for the second time, the rest of the country is only collapsing for the first time. Actually, this set of procedures has a formula, consisting of three steps: draining cash flow through administrative pricing, then administrative deleveraging to shed burdens, and finally, macroeconomic fiscal destruction, coupled with the debt owed to Northeast workers for which the CCP should be responsible, and finally the 8,000-yuan buyout. The direct consequence of all this? It is making this land lose all possibility of development. The Northeast has already run a full circle ahead of the whole country. It's not that the Northeast is slow; it's that the whole country is just too late. How many years behind? In the next episode, let's look at three questions: population, pensions, and balance sheets, to see which step of the Northeast script the whole country has already developed into. Well, tomorrow I will present them to you one by one. Alright, that's all for today's wrap-up with everyone.

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