The Fifth Plenary Session is delayed until the last minute; there is no consensus within the party! Xi Jinping has emptied the national treasury of 15 trillion yuan, the spoils-sharing system has collapsed, and there is four-front zero-sum infighting between the central and local governments; Power = Guards × Personnel × Secrets, if one factor hits zero, you are liquidated overnight! Strict party governance is a survival sieve; the sequence numbers can be chaotic, but no one can afford the bill!

This episode deeply analyzes the profound political crisis and bureaucratic ecosystem behind the delayed scheduling of the 20th CCP Central Committee's Fifth Plenary Session. The host points out that as fiscal increments are exhausted and Emperor You Xi has hollowed out the national treasury of about 15 trillion RMB, the intra-party spoils-sharing mechanism has collapsed, leading to a four-front "zero-sum mutual harm" among the central-local governments and ministries. Meanwhile, the multiplication logic of power (loyal guards, personnel pricing, and information control) dictates that high-level stability maintenance relies entirely on die-hard loyalists, and strict party governance has degenerated into a life-saving sieve. The program concludes by constructing a crisis assessment model for local fiscal cash flows, predicting that the Chinese Communist Party regime will slide toward disintegration through long-term governance decay and failure.

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Everyone, after the CCP announced the meeting dates for the Fifth Plenary Session, it got lively, didn't it? There were rumors about Hu Jintao's family being poisoned, and over 170 delegates being arrested—all sorts of news floating around. What is the most important thing? It is the widely spread, highly condensed summary: Emperor You Xi is a total idiot, an odious rogue who completely disregards the rules. This pretty much serves as the atmosphere squad for the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session. Is this stuff true? I don't think we need to discuss it too much because there's nothing to discuss; it's just a smoke bomb. First, the source of the news is far too singular, with only one Qinfeng account talking about it; second, there is simply no need to do such a thing. Nowadays, Hu Jintao walks like Wu Laoer, and his family members have even less political power. Then you say poisoning happened in these people's videos, wouldn't that just be equivalent to saying Emperor You Xi did it? Is there any necessity for that? Completely unnecessary. Moreover, this year's Fifth Plenary Session not only features this sideshow atmosphere squad, but the official announcement is also bristling with murderous intent, with some bullshit theme about strict party governance. Isn't it bristling with murderous intent?

Actually, from the theme chosen for this fucking "Journey to the West," did you all see anything? It means that for the fourth term, he has to take it whether he wants to or not; he has to take it even if he doesn't want to. Now, regarding this Fifth Plenary Session, I have summarized five types of chaos: chaotic atmosphere, chaotic timing, chaotic themes, chaotic personnel, and the economy is even more fucking chaotic. This is the background of the Fifth Plenary Session. I have talked to you before that each CCP government's plenary sessions total seven times: the first session divides power, the second session determines government personnel, the third session manages the economy, the fourth session deals with abstract matters, and the Fifth Plenary Session is for the five-year plan. This division of labor has been a convention since the 11th session. Now it is the 20th session, and everyone knows what political rules or all rules are for—they are for providing stable expectations. Now that the CCP's internal politics are in chaos, all political expectations within the CCP will inevitably fall into chaos as well. The year before last, the Third Plenary Session was already about eight months late, and then they were forced to do what? They were forced to finalize the 15th Five-Year Plan at the Fourth Plenary Session in a very, very urgent manner. It was also a rush job at the time, because if they didn't finalize this plan, there would be no plan at all by the beginning of 2026. Then, this Fifth Plenary Session was only decided after a year-long gap, and in terms of rhythm, every time it is like what? It is like shit pushed right up to Emperor You Xi's lips, pushed right to his asshole, about to pop out. Only then does this idiot rush to decide to hold a meeting. Although this sounds a bit pungent, I really don't think the CCP's current stench is any better than that. Moreover, the rhythm of setting the meeting agenda itself proves one thing from the side: there is absolutely no consensus within the CCP now. Or to be more specific, under the premise of having that fucking idiot Xi Jinping as the CCP bandit leader, the difficulty of building consensus is extremely high. This also explains why the fucking Emperor You Xi held it in for a year, only to squeeze out a Fifth Plenary Session about strictly governing the Party.

What are the CCP's system and game rules? Do you still remember? The underlying driver of CCP politics is actually the CCP's internal spoils-sharing system. What was the compensation structure of this CCP game originally? It was that you endure the CCP's internal enslavement in exchange for a share of the fiscal growth. As long as the money is there, even if that fucking idiot Emperor You Xi is a total moron, the bureaucratic class would just accept it. What is the bureaucratic system like now? On one side, the growth is gone, and the compensation on this side has also disappeared. What does that equal? It equals pay cuts on one side, no more perks on the other, and having to take the blame for this fucking idiot Emperor You Xi. The treatment has seen a cliff-like decline, equivalent to Emperor You Xi forcibly stuffing a piece of uncertainty without consideration into the hands of every bureaucrat. In finance, this is called a risk premium; it should have gone up, but it didn't. So now, that fucking idiot Emperor You Xi can only shout louder. On one hand, he has blocked every other channel for expression that he could possibly block. Now, you can't even post comments on videos about reporting stock market gains or losses. In a word, what is the CCP's bureaucratic system facing now? It is an absolute asymmetry between risk and return. As long as the bureaucratic system faces such a risk-return structure, coupled with the logic of dictatorship where one is only responsible to those above, at such times, the bureaucratic system will have the impulse to sell off the regime in a package deal. Next week, I will do a special episode to look at how those regimes in history that were sold off in package deals by the bureaucratic class were actually priced and sold.

So, when a dictatorship faces a financial ebb, what props up its power? The answer is mystery. Especially now, this fucking Emperor You Xi—who is he trying to copy everywhere? Copying Mao Zedong (the roasted pork), right? Mao also relied on this mystery when playing power games in his later years. When money can buy obedience, rules can be transparent, accounts can be laid out on the table to be calculated, and bureaucrats can just work according to the price. What happens when the money is gone or not enough? Then obedience has to be bought with something else. Emperor You Xi copied the answer straight from old Mao, which is playing the mystery game. The entire system turns into one where nobody can figure out the rules, nobody can calculate their future, and even less can anyone see the full picture. This is mystery on the societal side. As for the organization, mystery is mainly created through three controls: who can meet whom, who prices this future, and who decides what kind of information you can see. These three things each create a kind of opacity, and these three opacities are the current power function of Emperor You Xi. As for meetings, did Emperor You Xi control them? Remember last year when that fucking Emperor You Xi instituted that rule where three people aren't even allowed to have a meal together? Isn't that precisely to prevent internal collusion within this organization? Ordinary dictators guarding against this bureaucratic group also make a fuss over two things: one side is guarding against something, which is just the aforementioned prevention of collusion among the bureaucratic group, and the other side is what? It's cultivating one's own loyal guards—things like the Eastern Depot and the Brocade Guard all came about this way. Therefore, Emperor You Xi now governs the country by relying on discipline inspection and the guard unit; even arresting Zhang Youxia was a job done by the Central Guard Bureau. As for the aspect of futures, I can say that the future of the CCP bureaucrats is now even more mysterious, and a massive internal party free-for-all has begun. What does this current situation of fighting look like? It looks like a piece of shit that has been dried in the sun and then scatters like stars all over the sky. When you look at who gets promoted or who gets arrested, there is completely no predictable pattern of struggle to speak of whatsoever. Information blockade, or the matter of the cards on the table, belongs to the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Now the General Office decides who gets to see what. Who is running the General Office now? Cai Qi, right. A member of the Politburo Standing Committee is running the General Office; who was the last Standing Committee member to run the General Office? It was Wang Dongxing, that minion under Mao! Original party documents go through that eunuch Cai Qi first, and only then can they land on Xi Jinping's desk. The China that Xi Jinping sees is the China that the General Office picks for Xi Jinping to see.

These three combined powers—they are not added together, but multiplied. If even one of these powers hits zero here, it will be the day of reckoning for that fucking Emperor You Xi. Look at this fucking Emperor You Xi's power function, everyone: $S$ is the loyalty of the loyal guards, $H$ is the ability to price personnel, and $I$ is the effectiveness of information control. Where does the multiplication structure lie? It lies in a veto by a single item. In an additive system, say one item collapses, the other two can still cushion the blow. In a multiplicative system, any item approaching zero brings the entire score down approaching zero as well. This explains why in these three departments, Xi Jinping can only ever place dead-loyal followers. It's not that he can't pick someone else for their capability; it's that the mathematical structure does not allow for any exceptions. This multiplication equation was actually tested once on October 6, 1976. Back then, the Gang of Four had whatever they needed in their hands: they had the propaganda machine, the party affairs system, and Jiang Qing was even old brother Mao's wife; the paper strength of these three males and one female was indeed there. But whose hands were the guards in? Wang Dongxing, the aforementioned Wang Dongxing, who while running the General Office was also in charge of which guard unit? Unit 8341. It didn't take long—just one night at Huirentang, all four of those fuckers were arrested. Look at that: the four of them, they didn't lose on total score; item $S$ equaled zero, and zero multiplied by anything is zero. This is also why the positions of guards, personnel, and confidential affairs never fall to capable people, because Emperor You Xi only dares to place dead loyalists. It's not that he can't pick capable people; it's that if any single one of these three positions turns traitor, a single fucking night is enough. You could say that whoever sits in these three positions has the probability of reducing this supreme power to zero overnight.

Now, let's take a look at how the intra-party political ecology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the power logic of Emperor You Xi have step-by-step driven things to this state. Let's calculate one thing: exactly how much economic damage has Emperor You Xi's fucking reckless tossing caused over the years? Things like the Belt and Road, Xiongan, the poverty alleviation campaign, the massive semiconductor funds—just the Belt and Road alone flushed USD 1.4 trillion down the drain, nearly RMB 10 trillion. The real money poured into Xiongan has become an eyesore for all to see today, with another massive fortune of over a trillion gone. Back then, after the fucking Emperor You Xi finished bragging that the whole country had been lifted out of poverty, Li Keqiang stepped out to debunk Xi Jinping's claims, pointing out that 600 million people earn less than RMB 1,000 a month. Finally, there was the massive chip-building push, where broadly speaking, between RMB 450 billion and RMB 900 billion was flushed away. I am not even counting the economic information blows from the abnormal zero-COVID policy, the worsening of international relations caused by wolf warrior diplomacy, or the way they would issue a sudden directive to destroy an entire industry overnight—these hidden losses aren't even factored in. Let's just look at the money this fucking moron directly wasted: at least on a scale of RMB 15 trillion, equivalent to Emperor You Xi single-handedly hollowing out the entire treasury of the CCP. Speaking of this, I can't help but exclaim that Heaven truly blesses China for producing such a colossal fool. Even if ordinary people deliberately tried to ruin this fucking party, you certainly couldn't do as good a job as Xi Jinping. Now that the time has come to pay the bill, this guy wants to drag the entire CCP bureaucratic apparatus along to foot it. These CCP bureaucrats are only fucking evil, not fucking stupid; who is making their interests suffer? Everyone is as clear as a mirror in their hearts. So what can we already see from the theme of the Fifth Plenary Session on strictly governing the party? We can see what kind of political wind direction has emerged within the CCP because of Xi Jinping's hollowing out.

Just look at the current free-for-all infighting within the CCP and you'll understand. One sentence sums it up: borrowed money can no longer support that original looting sheet. In an era of stock-based survival, the relationship between the central and local governments, between ministries, and between provinces is a complete zero-sum game. Anyway, more for you means more for me, it's just a matter of how much more. In a stock-based era, if you take one more unit of the exact same money, I have to take one less, leading to what? Fighting erupts on four fronts simultaneously: the localities fight the central government, the localities even fucking fight other localities, and there are simply no bystanders. What is the central government fighting the central government over? It's fighting over the right to prioritize—what kind of priority right? The priority right for the budget. When the budget grew year after year, departments like the Ministry of Finance, the NDRC, the military, politics and law, and propaganda could each spend their own share without bothering anyone else, minding their own business. Now that the overall pie is shrinking, whose expenditures are ranked at the front, whose projects get chopped first—that ranking is a matter of life and death for power. Thus, the power of prioritization is pulled all the way up. What is Zhang Youxia? The most direct public announcement of the center fighting the center. The center and localities are also fighting, and the fighting methods are as mentioned before. How does this game of chess work? The center pushes tasks down, but simply refuses to give money. The contradiction between the center and the localities is extremely obvious: the center desperately pulls financial power back upward while pushing administrative responsibilities downward, and the localities turn around and lock horns with the center too. Their tactics are summarized in two words: stalling and dragging. They bare the gaps of the Three Guarantees—guaranteeing wages, guaranteeing livelihoods, and guaranteeing operations—right out in the open, telling the center that the police can't be paid, so deal with it. For the localities, rigid expenditures are hostages; whoever blinks first pays up. And localities are fighting localities too. What are they fighting over? Quotas: shares of transfer payments, debt allocation limits, and special bond quotas, all of which are zero-sum. If this province gets one more approved, that province gets one less approved. Back in the era of incremental growth, local CCP officials could still compare achievements; now they've changed the track, starting a competition of misery. With all four battle lines fucking firing at once, the overall organizational operating cost of the CCP will rise in a straight line, and you need not doubt this for a moment.

How was money distributed in the era of growth? It relied on conventions, and basically, no negotiation was needed. But in the era of stagnation, the allocation of every single cent has to be negotiated individually. How do you negotiate? You have to seek instructions; to seek instructions, you have to pick a side; and picking a side leaves a paper trail. Meetings, documents, and directives multiply exponentially, and the entire organizational cost is burned up in internal bargaining. Moreover, in the era of stagnation, if you sign off on something, you offend people, because if you approve a little more for this province, that province gets less. What does this lead to? Every person with signing authority shifts into a self-preservation mode. If a collective decision can be made, they will never make a personal call; if they can push it upward, they will fucking never carry it themselves. A matter that could once be settled with a single phone call now requires going through three processes, and the efficiency and speed of getting things done are plummeting. So, look at the current situation in China: income is shrinking, operating costs are rising, and another pair of scissors has been created. Now, the CCP is truly specialized in producing these scissors. Look, the gap between income and interest is cutting into money, and this one is cutting into the organization itself. With both blades cutting at once, what is being smashed? It is the system itself. With this in mind, does the bullshit 'strict party governance' from the Fifth Plenary Session make sense now? And after these four fronts are fought, every loser will keep a tally, and they will all hold that fucking idiot Xi Jinping solely responsible. Furthermore, 'strict party governance' is not governance; it is about saving one's own life—it is Emperor You Xi saving his own life. The first to be taken out will definitely be the disobedient bureaucrats within the system, or those who are not loyal enough. But the more you force the entire party through this sieve, the more it shows that Xi doesn't trust a single one of them. When the cake stops growing, the game changes from dividing the spoils of growth to sharing the losses. The bureaucratic system will not think they are getting less; they will think that the full share of profits that should have been theirs has been lost. The psychology of getting less is completely different from the psychology of loss. Getting less is at least a positive number, at least there is something to take, but the mentality of sharing losses is a negative number, triggering loss aversion. Everyone can get a little when dividing growth, but sharing losses requires clear losers. In other words, who loses, how much they lose, and when they accept it—all of this will become a game, and this is the game route of CCP politics. Just look at whether the current CCP party is a microcosm of Chinese society: no one trusts anyone, but when it comes to screwing each other over, they are second to none, and their moves are always lethal. What I am very, very happy to see is the non-linear rise in the organizational costs within the CCP.

We are answering a question: where is the critical tipping point of this system? In fact, what has a short-term, major impact on them is not the fiscal debt-to-GDP ratio. Why? Because this debt ratio is equivalent to what? It is equivalent to a company's fundamentals; pricing will eventually return to the fundamentals, but it just takes time. Why is that? Because in theory, a sovereign state can keep rolling over its debt denominated in its own currency. However, this slow-paced fundamental reality will produce a fast-paced byproduct. Although the true boundary for the collapse of a regime is never a certain numerical ratio, its byproducts will inevitably affect regime stability in the short term, and they will affect it very, very much. What is this byproduct? It is called forced cash flow. To put it bluntly, what is it? It is a situation where you must pay at a certain moment, but you cannot pay. I break this boundary down into three steps. The first step is to calculate a cash coverage ratio for each locality. A is what? It is the cash that this locality can sustainably obtain, such as regular revenue, plus net transfer payments, and if any, plus net land revenue. B is what? B is the minimum compulsory cash expenditure, such as wages, basic people's livelihood, grassroots operations, and public security (Public Security) and organizational system expenses. When C is greater than one, well, this place stays quiet and calm; when C is less than one, it starts making noise. Next, we aggregate the national shortfalls. L only adds up the shortfalls, and surpluses are not allowed to be deducted, because the balances of wealthy areas cannot be directly taken to pay wages at the poverty line. F is what? F is the cash flow capacity that the central government can freely deploy, but you must first deduct national defense, interest, national social security and other strategic funds; what remains is the truly movable portion. L divided by F being less than one means what? It means the hole can still be patched. If it is greater than one, then it cannot be patched, and you are forced to choose which place goes hungry first. This choice itself is the starting point of a political crisis. Finally, we combine them into a risk degree score. Actually, despite it looking so complicated, when broken down, it is all plain language. L is the sum of the money short in every part of the country. To put it bluntly, it is the wages a county must spend minus the actual money handed up; the difference is calculated as the shortfall, and only shortfalls are added without taking the bottom line of wealthy areas. The money left over in your Guangdong cannot automatically fly to Gansu to pay wages, right? F is the relief money the central government can truly cough up; you see, things like military spending, national debt interest, stability maintenance (weiwen) expenditures, and pensions must be deducted first, and what remains is the free cash flow that can be moved. L divided by F is the ratio between what is missing and what can be rescued. For example, suppose you are short of 100 billion, but can cough up 200 billion, that belongs to the category where it can still be rescued. If you are short of 300 billion, but can only cough up 200 billion, that equals 1.5, meaning it cannot be rescued, and you have to pick who to rescue first. The act of picking itself will become the beginning of a political crisis. The next three are amplifiers. Q is whose head the shortfall falls on. For example, if you lack the expense for repairing a road or building a plaza, well, you can still endure it; if what you lack is the police's wages and millions of subsistence allowances, that is a completely different matter. T is what? It refers to how long it can be dragged out. If you are short for a month, everyone can still wait; if you are short for a year, people's hearts directly scatter. V is expectations, or how chaotic the environment is. If your policy changes overnight and data quality is as shitty as shit, the effect is that the same hole in a chaotic situation will cause panic several times greater than usual. The four numbers are multiplication factors amplifying each other, so under normal circumstances, this R must stay below one for the long term. Well, if R continues to be greater than one, it means the hole cannot be patched. Then it will first hit non-crucial places, and later it will definitely hit crucial places. However, this matter is also very easy to understand: the longer you drag it out, the faster people's patience scatters, and panic is further amplified. At this time, a fiscal problem turns into a political problem. Although I have not calculated this R currently, I think it is already at the level of around 1.5. Once I get the fiscal data for the next quarter complete, I'll calculate the accounts roughly. Therefore, the most likely path for the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to go to hell is not some loud bang one day, but the long-term governance decay leading to delayed wages, systemic failure, and the inability to establish expectations. It just drops level by level like this. Although its speed cannot be completely calculated, the direction is entirely certain.

Finally, let's get back to this official notice from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Look at this fucking idiot, what is the opening sentence? It says "several major issues concerning studying and advancing the full and rigorous governance of the Party on a long-term basis." If you apply the logic we discussed today and read it again, you will see it extremely clearly. To put it bluntly, isn't it just that money can no longer buy consensus, and then a massive free-for-all chaos broke out in the canyon? What does "rigorous governance of the Party" translate to? It means I no longer dare to bet on your loyalty, and the whole fucking Party must go through my screening sieve. What does the so-called "long-term basis" translate to? It means this sieve is not going away; we have to go through it year after year. There is also a joke in here, what joke? It talks about fully stimulating the enthusiasm of the whole Party, as well as some issue of creativity. Right after saying that bureaucrats now pass the buck whenever they can and drag their feet whenever possible, this fucking idiot turns around and orders the bureaucratic system to have enthusiasm. It really has that strong hostage-taking vibe of a robber telling the hostage to smile. Still the same old saying, if you can't handle it, you Chinese people and bureaucrats might as well just package and sell China, and I can even teach you how to value it. What would the condition be? The condition is to leave this fellow Xi Jinping out on the street for 3 days, and no matter what anyone does, the police won't intervene. So everyone just wait and watch the fun at the Fifth Plenary Session. I can tell you the future will definitely be even more exciting. Look at this five-way chaos; it has already been played out to the extreme. I just want to see if it can break through the limits and continue to be this chaotic in the future. Emperor You Xi, you fucking idiot, keep it up! In my heart, there is only one Chief Accelerator, and that is you, the fucking idiot Xi Jinping. Alright, that's all for today with Big B. Hope you all enjoy the show, and thanks for the Jianghu orders.