A 100-yuan mooncake voucher changes hands without a single cake being produced! The optimal play is to sell more vouchers and deliver less, scalpers aren't even buying vouchers this year, manufacturers are now extending credit to chase orders, after the holiday a ton of cakes is worth only 1000 yuan, the stronger the financial character, the harder the fall! The verifiable retail sales figure is minus 3.7% yet the headline number is positive

This episode uses the unique consumption slice of Mid-Autumn Festival mooncakes and their redemption vouchers to conduct an in-depth analysis of China's current economic and consumption deflation status. The program details the financial derivative operation model of mooncake vouchers, the chain of interests between manufacturers and scalpers, the cliff-like depletion of liquidity in the secondary market for mooncake vouchers this year, the phenomenon of manufacturers rushing to sell and offering credit to secure orders, and the trend of polarization between the clearing of high-end gift boxes and the self-use of affordable ones. Finally, the program compares official retail sales data with actual industry retail performance, pointing out the contradiction between the negative growth of retail sales above designated size and the overall data.

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Observe things as they are, reject fragmented cognition. A week has passed since the Mid-Autumn Festival. Through alternative data—that is, how mooncakes sold during the Mid-Autumn Festival this year—we can look at China's economy. In the context of Chinese commerce, especially after the introduction of mooncake vouchers, mooncakes are no longer just food. What are they? They are non-interest-bearing, bearer acceptance bills with a fixed maturity date on the 15th day of the eighth lunar month. What is an acceptance bill? To put it bluntly, it is a piece of paper that carries credit. The issuer takes your money first, and then you exchange the voucher for mooncakes before the expiration date. Today, we are not just talking about mooncake sales; we are also going to calculate the entire process of mooncake vouchers from issuance and discounting to the rush to sell, all the way to the zeroing out on the night of the Mid-Autumn Festival, to see how this process actually works. Mooncake vouchers have actually existed since 2012. What were the regulations at that time? It was stipulated that companies issuing vouchers must file for the record, and 20% to 40% of the pre-collected funds must be held in escrow. It sounds quite strict, doesn't it?

However, five departments including the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce issued an implementation measure in June this year. Article 2 of this measure clearly states: one-time or seasonal redemption vouchers are not included in the management. What does this mean? It means that mooncake vouchers do not need to be filed or held in escrow, and the money received by the manufacturer is fully usable, non-interest-bearing capital. This is the legal basis for my definition of mooncake vouchers as non-interest-bearing bills, and it is also a backdoor left by the CCP's financial regulators for mooncake vouchers. So how does this voucher system work? A report by the Legal Daily on September 17, 2024, used the following industry standard: for a voucher with a face value of 100 yuan, the manufacturer sells it to a distributor for 65 yuan, the distributor sells it to a purchasing company for 80 yuan, the company gives it to employees as a benefit, the employees sell it to a scalper for 40 yuan, and the scalper sells it back to the manufacturer for 50 yuan. We can do a very rough mental calculation: after this process is completed, the manufacturer earns 15 yuan, the distributor earns 15 yuan, the scalper earns 10 yuan, the employee gets 40 yuan in cash, and the company spent 80 yuan. Not a single mooncake left the factory during the entire process. Let's not calculate any deeper. For the same voucher with a face value of 100 yuan, there are actually three outcomes for the manufacturer. The first is that the voucher holder actually comes to redeem the goods. At this time, the manufacturer has collected 65 yuan, and if the cost of the gift box is calculated according to the industry standard of 30 to 50 yuan, the gross profit is 15 to 35 yuan. The second situation is that the scalper sells the voucher back to the manufacturer. At this time, the manufacturer has collected 65 yuan and paid 50 yuan for the repurchase. In this case, not a single mooncake was made, and the gross profit is 15 yuan. The third situation is that the voucher expires and becomes void. The manufacturer has collected 65 yuan, and the gross profit is 65 yuan. So, everyone, think about it: what is the manufacturer's optimal solution? It is to sell more vouchers and deliver fewer goods. This is why the gross profit margin of top-brand mooncakes is high.

Always standing above fifty percent of the secret. The gross profit margin of mooncakes from Guangzhou Restaurant in 2025 is 53.31 percent. The gross profit margin of mooncakes from Yuanzu Joint Stock in 2025 is 54.81 percent. The two of them are actually quite similar. How much of this gross profit margin is real mooncakes, and how much is deposited vouchers? Not a single company has ever split it up in its annual reports; you can neither find this redemption rate nor the proportion of expired and voided ones. Then how big is this Wuxi money after all? Let's look at the financial reports of Yuanzu Joint Stock. What is Yuanzu's business model? It is the model of gift cards plus physical stores. Yuanzu Joint Stock's advance receipts for gift cards at the end of 2025 were 710 million, and contract liabilities reach a peak on September 30 every year, which was 909 million on September 30, 2025. And how much was Yuanzu's total revenue for the whole year of 2025? It was 2.081 billion. That means at any given time, Yuanzu holds in its hands advance cash equivalent to one-third to half of its annual revenue. Then where did this money go?

Well, I went to check this year's financial statements again, and currently there is only the semi-annual report. Yuanzu's trading financial assets as of June 30 this year were 1.234 billion, and wealth management assets are equivalent to 92 percent of net assets, but the interest value of this part is very small. Yuanzu's investment income in 2025 was 24.68 million, and the annualized return is around 8.5 percent, which is only equivalent to about 18 percent of the full-year net profit attributable to parent company shareholders of 140 million. Then where is the true value of this money? In the deposits. Actually, if we make a calculation, it becomes clear: among Yuanzu's 710 million in advance gift card receipts, if 3 percent ultimately expired and became void, that would be 21.3 million in zero-cost revenue, and this part alone is equivalent to 15 percent of the annual profit. If 10 percent expired and became void, that would be 71 million, which is equivalent to half of the net profit. But this is a calculation, it is not a fact. However, this also explains one thing, which is that among the profits of card-type enterprises, as long as the deposit rate moves by a single point, it moves more than the wealth management yield by a.

Point much more important. The structure of this ticker, we have finished talking about it. Let's look at how this ticker fell in the secondary market this year. Three or four days before the Mid-Autumn Festival in 2021, the scalpers' recovery price for Haagen-Dazs vouchers was 50 percent of face value, and how much was the same voucher in 2024? It was still between 60 and 70 percent. Let's take Maxim's mooncakes as an example: on September 14, Maxim's lava custard vouchers—well, they have 5 face value tiers, ranging from 238 to 498, while the scalpers' average recovery price was only 120, and during the same period the recovery price for that 238-yuan mooncake voucher from the Sheraton Hotel was only 65 yuan, which is only 2.7 discounting. Physical gift boxes actually fell extremely badly as well; let's take the mooncakes from Shenzhen Marriott as an example. The official price of Marriott mooncakes was 298 yuan, but the scalpers' recovery price was only 99 yuan, so most hotel gift boxes were dumped at 30 percent. We put these three days together to look at it: the vouchers of top-tier brands are still at 40 to 50 percent, but the hotel vouchers have already fallen to 20 to 30 percent, but the most obvious change.

What is it? It is transaction depth. Back in 2018, the media headline was still that scalpers were selling at a 30 percent premium, and customers at the time were in a state where there were no goods to redeem. What about in 2024? The discounts were big, but they could still be collected. By 2026, they simply stopped collecting them altogether. This liquidity depth experienced a cliff-like drop, down to what extent? Everyone can understand it this way: it transformed from a secondary market with quotes into a market without quotes. In financial terms, this is a typical liquidity exhaustion. And what was that scenario in 2018 called? It was called an expansion of discount to par. Why did this liquidity exhaust? Let's look at the demand side. The industry's anecdotal share of enterprise group purchases plummeted from over 60 percent to less than 30 percent. What industries are these? Bulk orders in the financial and real estate industries dropped by 35 to 40 percent. Enterprise orders for a star-rated hotel in Shaoxing dropped from 180 boxes in 2025 to only 50 boxes left in 2026.

On the supply side, things are even more fatal. What is the business model of this scalper profession? It is collecting vouchers at a low price and selling them to manufacturers at a high price, right? But what is the premise? That manufacturers are willing to buy them back at a 50 percent discount, right? But on September 20 this year, Guangzhou Restaurant's own official flagship store—well, that 720-gram double-egg-yolk pure white lotus seed paste—was slashed from 137 yuan to 87 yuan in a single day. The manufacturers' own physical goods are being sold at below a 50 percent discount, so what vouchers would manufacturers buy back at this time? This directly cut off the channel for scalpers to exit. Scalpers face yet another blow to their exit path—well, that is digital vouchers. In June last year, Maxim launched a nationwide unified digital mooncake voucher, which involves scanning a QR code to fill in a shipping address, and then logistics delivers it directly to your home. Digital vouchers, real-name addresses, plus the brand's unified logistics directly cut off the channel of scalpers collecting paper vouchers offline and cashing them out with manufacturers from the process. Next, I think the most crucial change this year is what? It is that the capital flow of this ticker has reversed. Why is this?

What do you say? Hey, let's look at this: who was originally advancing funds to whom? It was enterprises taking prepayments from distribution channels to advance funds to the manufacturers, right? Back then, the manufacturers were producing while sitting on interest-free float funds. Now, the situation has completely reversed. Guangzhou Restaurant's accounts receivable as of September 30 last year were 525 million, which was 64 percent more than the 320 million on September 30, 2024. Contract liabilities at the same point in time, which are advance payments, dropped from 326 million to 287 million, a full 12-percent decrease. And everyone should also note another point: the Mid-Autumn Festival in 2025 fell on October 6, which was 19 days later than in 2024. Before you've even finished shipping your goods, what should normally happen? Advance payments at this time should be even higher, right? As a result, they were instead lower, and receivables surged. When these two things happen at the same time, there is only one interpretation: Guangzhou Restaurant was trading credit sales for orders. In its third-quarter financial report last year, Yuanzu Corporation wrote it down themselves. How did they write it? They said that within the seasonal credit period.

Credit sales collections were correspondingly delayed. Translated into plain human language, what does this sentence mean? It means that the issuers of mooncake vouchers started extending credit to the voucher holders, and manufacturers began turning things around to advance funds to the distribution channels. Guangzhou Restaurant's single-quarter credit impairment losses in the third quarter rose from 45.19 million in 2024 to 64.17 million in 2025. This is the bad debt provision generated from extending that credit. One could say that between 2025 and 2020, the issuance right for this interest-free promissory note—the mooncake voucher—directly expired; in other words, the original financial model directly collapsed. So after the expiration of this issuance right, hey, how did these manufacturers operate? Well, they rushed to get a head start, with very uniform actions. The timeline this year went like this: in June, the preparation of mooncake stock for e-commerce had already begun. There is a data statistics institution called Magic Mirror Insight—hey, let's look at the statistics from this e-commerce data monitoring agency. From June to August this year, mainstream e-commerce mooncake sales were 439 million, a year-on-year decrease of 21.6 percent. On July 16.

Before that, Suzhou Daoxiangcun had already released more than 50 gift box varieties. By the end of July, Guangzhou Restaurant's on-hand mooncake orders exceeded 900 million, equivalent to 55 percent of Guangzhou Restaurant's total 2025 mooncake revenue of 1.952 billion. By August, more than 120 mooncake production lines nationwide had already started operating. Why rush so early? Well, mainly because they needed to close out enterprise budgets. Mid-Autumn Festival corporate welfare is the least productive item among sales and administrative expenses, which makes it the easiest item to get chopped at year-end. On January 24 last year, ByteDance sent out an internal email notification that directly canceled things like Dragon Boat Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival gift boxes, and even canceled Spring Festival red envelopes for 2026 all at once. But big tech companies didn't all stop completely; however, the mooncake item was demoted in priority. For example, for this year's Mid-Autumn Festival, Tencent issued a cup plus mooncakes, and Meituan issued bowls and plates plus mooncakes, with mooncakes changing from the gift box itself into just one compartment inside the gift box. Right.

For manufacturers, an enterprise's budget might still exist in June, but by the end of September, it might not be there anymore. Therefore, their logic for rushing to grab orders was very clear: whoever issued orders first would be able to turn this budget—which hadn't been cut yet—into a part of their own contract liabilities. Guangzhou Restaurant's 900 million in on-hand orders at the end of July was the product of this logic. So some friends might ask: hey, did rushing to get a head start capture more total volume? No. Online sales from June to August decreased by 21 percent year-on-year. What about offline? Hey, there is an institution called Majoy (Mashangying). What do they do? They do offline retail monitoring. As of September 22 this year, offline mooncake sales dropped by 36.4 percent year-on-year, shipment volume fell by 24 percent, the average price per 100 grams dropped from 5.84 yuan to 4.89 yuan, and active SKUs decreased from 23,306 to 19,540. What kind of situation is this? Both volume and price plummeted, right? If you lay out Majoy's data for the past three years directly, it's even more frightening. The mooncake prices per.

100 grams over the past three years were: 6.38 yuan in 2024, 5.84 yuan in 2025, and 4.89 yuan in 2026—a drop of about 25 percent over two years. Meanwhile, the number of new products launched from January to August each year was 4,962 in 2024, and only 3,204 remained in 2026. New products collapsed faster than sales volume, which proves what? It proves that manufacturers stopped investing in product development for this category starting last year. The rush to get a head start in 2026 was just the scheduling of existing inventory. Oh, by the way, let's call out someone here: just a little while ago, about a week ago, outlets like 21 Century Business Herald and Sina Finance—at least six media outlets—cited a completely different set of figures, claiming that sales fell by 45.17 percent and gift boxes dropped by 49.04 percent. When I cross-checked this, this set of data matched down to the decimal point with the Majoy data for September 2024 cited by Jiemian News back then. Data from two years ago was being used wholesale by these so-called financial media in their 2026 articles. We really don't know what these financial...

Is the media fucking incompetent, or are they playing some kind of double game? How can they fuck up such basic data citations? Fine, it is said that by jumping the gun, they not only failed to capture volume but actually accelerated the collapse. The industry's rule of thumb is to lower prices three days before the festival, but this year? By September 1st, Ganso stores were already offering 12% off. By early September, Guangzhou Restaurant's offline stores also started discounting. Their official flagship store slashed prices from 137 yuan to 87 yuan in one go. By September 21st to 22nd, supermarkets were generally offering 40% to 10% off. Maxim's flagship product, the 740g double-yolk lotus seed paste mooncake, dropped directly from 318 yuan to 238 yuan. What did wholesalers tell 21st Century Business Herald? They said the profit margin on gift boxes is now only about 10%, and even if they lose money, they have to sell them at a discount, otherwise, they will rot on their hands after the Mid-Autumn Festival. The starting point for price cuts moved from three days before the festival to 24 days before, and the launch date moved to 116 days before. Squeezed from both ends, the full-price sales window shifted from 45 days to three days before the festival to 116 days to 24 days before. This window happens to be the period when companies haven't placed orders yet and ordinary people aren't planning to buy. The most direct mechanism for the failure of jumping the gun is right here: it moved the full-price window to a period where there is no demand.

At this point, someone is bound to ask: wasn't high-end mooncake pricing killed off by that 500-yuan red line in 2022? Well, let's look at the data. In June 2022, the CCP issued a notice to curb sky-high mooncake prices. What did the CCP's NDRC say at the time? They claimed that mooncakes over 500 yuan accounted for only 1% of industry sales. But according to the research scope of the China Association of Bakery and Confectionery Industry, the share of gift boxes over 500 yuan in regular channels was still 7.2% in 2023, and only dropped to about 1.8% by 2025. Sales of gift boxes over 1,000 yuan fell by 76% year-on-year. What does this mean? It means that a year after this fucking policy was implemented, the high-end price segment still held 7%. Where did the real clearing happen? It happened between 2024 and 2025. There were no new regulatory actions in these two years, but under these circumstances, what happened? Corporate group buying dropped from 60% to 30%. Let's take another alternative fucking organization as evidence: the CCP's fucking discipline inspection commission. In the September 2023 report by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, there was still a report on Jiang Yan, the former chairman of the Shanghai Futures Exchange, accepting mooncakes. But by the Mid-Autumn Festival reports of last year and this year, the content is all about cash gifts, alcohol, and tea; mooncakes are no longer worth writing into these reports.

Some might naturally think: isn't this the disappearance of rent-seeking? Isn't this a good thing? Or some might think: once the unit price is locked below 500 yuan, the capacity of mooncakes as a carrier is too small. But I think this only explains a small part, because the price cap below 500 yuan came out in 2022, yet there was still a considerable amount of sales data in 2023 and 2024. In other words, as long as there is demand, companies will do it even if it violates the rules. But it completely disappeared starting last year. Why? Because liquidity collapsed. The cost of converting this stuff into cash, i.e., the discounting risk, is rising, which is why no one is giving this stuff as gifts anymore. So what are scalpers in the whole system? They are just doing arbitrage. So, fine. After the high-end was cleared by the budget, where did the money go? It went to both ends. From June to August this year, the price segment below 80 yuan accounted for 48.2% of mooncake sales on mainstream e-commerce platforms, while those over 200 yuan accounted for 13.4%. However, the sales volume share of those over 200 yuan was only 1.4%. In other words, over 98% of the sales volume fell below 200 yuan. Douyin is even more extreme. In 2024, the 0-10 yuan bracket on Douyin accounted for 36.48% of mooncake sales. The average customer unit price for gift boxes on Douyin this year was 196 yuan. People might say: hey, isn't that selling quite well? Isn't this contradictory? Actually, it's not. Douyin's mooncake transaction volume grew by 102% this year, but the number of orders and users only grew by 30%, which shows what? It shows that gift boxes moved from offline and e-commerce to live streaming rooms; this is a channel shift, not new demand. What got squeezed out? It's that middle segment, the 200 to 300 yuan middle-class gift boxes. That's why the gift boxes Guangzhou Restaurant pushed this year were deliberately kept under 200 yuan, while Ganso's mooncakes were 200 to 400 yuan, resulting in a severe loss in the first half of the year.

What about Maxim's? Their flagship product, the flowing custard mooncake, was priced at 499 yuan this year. They claimed it was part of a 'ten-billion subsidy' program, but what did it actually reach? 294 yuan—that's the discounted price at Maxim's own flagship store. Let's add another figure: this year, the proportion of mooncakes bought for personal consumption was 50.4%, surpassing the 42.5% for gift-giving for the first time. You see the structure here, right? The 9.9-yuan free-shipping mooncakes and the 196-yuan gift boxes are growing simultaneously, but the middle market has completely collapsed. This is a projection of consumption polarization on a single product. If we put five brands together, it becomes even clearer. Guangzhou Restaurant's situation is basically zero growth; from 2024 to this year, it has been hovering around 1.6 billion yuan. It's been three years of zero growth, and to maintain this volume without shrinking, Guangzhou Restaurant has paid a price—the dual rise of accounts receivable and credit impairment. In the first half of this year, Guangzhou Restaurant's revenue grew by 9.4%, but net profit attributable to shareholders fell by 21%. They have 961 million yuan in cash and cash equivalents on hand, plus 1.967 billion yuan in large-denomination certificates of deposit. Under these circumstances, they are still issuing 774 million yuan in convertible bonds to expand capacity. My understanding is that Guangzhou Restaurant is looking for cheaper, long-term capital for an asset that only makes money in one quarter of the year.

Yuanyuan is the extreme example of the voucher model. Take a look at their financial report. In the first half of 2026, the net loss attributable to shareholders was 63.2 million yuan, the first mid-year loss since going public. The sales expense ratio is 63.31%. In the first quarter of this year, cash revenue from offline stores dropped by over 60%; more than 800 stores have devolved into mere voucher redemption points. Yet, rent and labor costs haven't decreased by a single cent. Maxim's is a case study of the collapse of social currency credit. What is the official price of Maxim's double-yolk lotus seed paste mooncakes in Hong Kong? 429 HKD, but the price for second-hand gift boxes has dropped to just 190 HKD. Maxim's claims sales are still ideal, but the simultaneous occurrence of 'sold out' and 'second-hand prices slashed in half' means what? It means the goods didn't reach the consumers' mouths, right? Where did they stop? They stopped in the middle, at the gift-giving stage. And what do Daoxiangcun and Huamei rely on? They rely on the 32-to-66-yuan 'staple food' market to drive volume. Huamei's bulk mooncakes are purchased at the Gaoqiao Market in Changsha for 5 yuan and sold for over a yuan after the festival. Wufangzhai is the most interesting. The 2023 annual report stated that most mooncakes were outsourced, but in 2025, they produced 1,578 tons themselves, accounting for nearly half of the total sales of 3,470 tons. And what did they use? They used old equipment from their zongzi factory to make mooncakes priced under 100 yuan, which is why their gross margin on mooncakes is only 21.29%, just 40% of Guangzhou Restaurant's. But at least Wufangzhai's overall profit for the first half of this year still grew by 2.85%. Therefore, we can see a trend: Yuanyuan turned mooncakes into a financial instrument and ended up losing money. Wufangzhai turned mooncakes back into mooncakes and made a profit. A pattern emerges: the stronger the financial attribute of the mooncake, the worse it fell this year.

Finally, there's the expiration date of mooncake vouchers. What did everyone do? On September 25th, the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival, mooncakes at a chain supermarket in Tongzhou, Beijing, were taken off the shelves by noon. The clerk was very trendy, saying that whatever wasn't sold was returned directly to the manufacturer. Then, on September 26th, bulk mooncakes at the Daguan Commercial City in Kunming were 10 yuan for four; on September 27th, bulk mooncakes at the Gaoqiao Market in Changsha were as low as 1 yuan each. Where did the mooncakes returned to the manufacturers go? On September 25th, China News Service interviewed a feed mill in Hebei; the recovery price they offered was 1,000 yuan per ton for five-nut mooncakes and 800 yuan per ton for red bean paste mooncakes—they were sold directly as pig feed. Guangzhou Restaurant's mooncake revenue in 2025 was 1.652 billion yuan; divided by its sales volume of 16,600 tons, the cost per ton is about 99,000 yuan. From 99,000 yuan per ton to 1,000 yuan per ton, only 1% of the value remains. Even if we assume the cost for small factories is one-fifth of the big ones, the residual value is no more than 5%. This edit was completed within 48 hours after the Mid-Autumn Festival. Oh, by the way, Beijing implemented a daily reporting system for seasonal food in 2017, requiring mooncake factories to report production, sales, and return volumes to regulatory authorities every day. Beijing's regulators actually have a draft of return and sales rates every year; they just never published it.

What does this mooncake ticket reveal about the macroeconomy? Well, mooncakes have a very distinct attribute: they are only sold once a year. This means they cannot be stockpiled, subsidized, or traded in for anything new. Therefore, this is one of the cleanest slices of Chinese consumption. What are the figures for this year? Prices dropped by 16%, and volume fell by 24%. Prices fell, and volume didn't recover—this is deflation. But what data did the National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) release in August? Total retail sales of consumer goods grew by 0.4% year-on-year. Let's break down the Bureau's own table: retail sales are divided into two parts. Enterprises above the designated size—retail companies with annual revenues over 5 million and catering companies over 2 million—have primary reports that can be audited. Enterprises below the designated size are small street-side stalls; this statistical data cannot be fully audited, but estimates rely on sampling. In August, retail sales of units above the designated size were 1.4891 trillion, a year-on-year decrease of 3.7%, and down 0.4% from January to August, accounting for 37% of total retail sales. Just think about it: the 37% that can be audited is a negative 3.7%, yet the total number is a positive 0.4%. That positive sign can only come from the 63% that cannot be audited. However, in deflation, small shops die the fastest. Look at this: the number of mooncake SKUs on sale dropped by 10.4% in a single year. So even the 0.4% retail sales figure reported by the CCP is actually very low, but I still highly doubt it. To say nothing else, durable goods consumption and retail consumption are both in this state, and durable goods like automobiles are falling by over 20%. How on earth could this metric be positive?

On September 28, what did the Ministry of Commerce of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) say in its Mid-Autumn Festival report? It claimed that the average daily sales of key retail and catering enterprises increased by 0.1% year-on-year compared to 2025. The entire report did not mention the word mooncake even once. And what was the baseline? The baseline was the lunar August 14 to August 16 of 2025, which corresponds to October 5 to 7, 2025. Is there a problem with this baseline? By the time of last year's baseline, basically all the fucking money had already been spent. This is the return trip period of the CCP's fucking eight-day National Day long holiday! This is like taking the Spring Festival purchasing revenue of New Year's Eve and comparing it to the fucking New Year's Eve purchasing revenue of the sixth day of the lunar new year, and then announcing that consumption on New Year's Eve this year is better than last year. The CCP probably couldn't find any propaganda material to show that the economy is stable and improving, so they started pulling out this kind of bullshit to disgust people. Isn't this already the CCP's National Business Festival? Let's see how the October 1 consumption turns out this year! Alright, that's all for today. If you like the program, please hit the bell. If you want to support me, please subscribe to the channel, welcome to the four-issue monthly in-depth program, and welcome to join the gang of good people. See you in the next episode.