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Xi Jinping has collapsed: Ma Xingrui's confession is out of control: multiple Standing Committee members dragged in! A national-level elder regrets it deeply: He turned out to be my gravedigger! "White-Clad Retrograde" pulled from theaters again! (Lao Beijing Tea House/Episode 1798/2026/11/08)

1# · OP Author：老北京茶館 - 幽默時政 Published：2026-11-09 02:30 Replies：0 Views：7 Permalink：fanzei.net/d_bw9wyu

The main contents of this episode include: Former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui was prosecuted, suspected of severe bribery and familial corruption, implicating multiple members of the Standing Committee and political insider secrets; three retired high-ranking officials, Cai Fuchao, Huang Qifan, and Fu Chengyu, fell from grace one after another, dragging down several party elders; building materials and hardware markets in Sichuan and other places experienced a wave of panic closures due to sudden 3C certification surprise inspections; Andy Lau's starring movie "White-Cloned Defiance" was temporarily pulled from release; Bona Film Group fell into a massive debt and widespread wage arrears crisis.

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On November 5, former member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau and former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui was prosecuted. With this step, this imperial relative of the widely acknowledged Emperor of Unfinished Projects officially entered the judicial process as an enemy of the party, a criminal suspect facing trial. Regarding how Ma Xingrui ended up in this state today, a massive piece of gossip began to surge among the public. Following the vine to get the giant melon, let's first wind the clock back to October 29, the day the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee concluded. The official release of the meeting communique mentioned that 33 Central Committee members and alternate members, including Ma Xingrui, were expelled from the Party. Six days later, official CCP reports stated that the investigation into the suspected bribery case of Ma Xingrui, former member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau and former deputy leader of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, had concluded and he was transferred to prosecutors for review and prosecution. The Supreme People's Procuratorate made the decision to arrest Ma Xingrui on suspicion of bribery, and subsequently, the Yichang Municipal Procuratorate filed a public prosecution with the Yichang Intermediate People's Court. Ma Xingrui's official status was once blazing hot in official circles, making countless people envious. So the question arises: is Xi Jinping demonstrating profound righteousness, wielding the blade inward, and scraping the bone to heal the poison, or is he being step-by-step boxed in by anti-Xi forces, forced to sacrifice the rook to save the king as an expedient measure? Let's slowly unravel this and first look at what Ma Xingrui is specifically accused of. The indictment states that Ma Xingrui utilized his positions as party group member, deputy general manager, party group secretary, and general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, deputy secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee, and member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau, to seek benefits for others and illegally accept others' property, with an exceptionally huge amount, and he should be held criminally liable for the crime of bribery. In April of this year, Ma Xingrui was investigated. On July 14, official CCP reports stated that during his tenure, Ma Xingrui engaged heavily in power-for-sex and money-for-sex trades, family corruption, and accepting huge amounts of property, describing his nature as extremely severe and his impact as extremely vile, resulting in his expulsion from both the party and public office. These are, of course, the things officials can place on the table; as for what is beneath the table, we can only look at leaked gossip reports.

For example, the case of Ma Xingrui involves family corruption, corruption within the aerospace faction, the Guangdong officialdom, and the Xinjiang officialdom. Most importantly, Ma's case involves family corruption connected to the family of CCP leader Xi Jinping and his wife. The biggest patron of the "Shandong faction" is Peng Liyuan. One narrative is that the Ma and Peng families are old family friends, and Ma was a regular visitor to the Xi family. Another closer relationship is that Ma Xingrui's mother and Peng Liyuan's mother are sisters, making Ma Xingrui and Peng Liyuan cousins. Regarding Ma Xingrui's "family corruption," Hong Kong's Ming Pao disclosed in early April that it mainly involves Ma Xingrui's wife, Rong Li, and his younger brother, Ma Xingqiu. Whistleblowers revealed that when Ma Xingrui was in Shenzhen, he favored the business operations of Xi Jinping's eldest sister and her husband, Deng Jiagui. Independent political commentator Cai Shenkun believes that Ma Xingrui's case appears on the surface to be an investigation into corruption, but during the investigation, a hidden and complex political network was exposed. Ma Xingrui's wife, Rong Li, and his secretary, Li Guanglu, had previously been arrested, and after being investigated, they confessed to numerous issues. Cai Shenkun stated that Ma Xingrui's situation involves political factors; under high pressure, Ma Xingrui's mental state completely collapsed, and he implicated multiple current and retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee at the national leader level. Clearly, the issues involving Ma Xingrui have exceeded the scope of corruption, pulling behind them the fierce and cruel power struggle among the entire CCP top echelon. However, how many national-level Standing Committee members Ma Xingrui actually implicated, whether they are retired or current, and who they are, the whistleblower did not elaborate—isn't that agonizing?

Regarding the arrest of Ma Xingrui, an even more bizarre rumor is that Ma Xingrui got into trouble because he attended a dinner hosted by Zhang Youxia, thus bringing disaster upon himself. What is this all about? A source close to the CCP's top leadership using the pseudonym "Tang Ming" revealed to The Epoch Times a true reason he understood regarding Ma Xingrui's downfall. Tang Ming said that his arrest was primarily a political issue, involving a private dinner gathering between military officials and local high-ranking officials of the CCP. Among them, the reshuffling of Li Ganjie and the problems encountered by Zhong Shaojun were all due to that dinner at the time. Tang Ming stated that Zhang Youxia, Ma Xingrui, Li Ganjie, Zhong Shaojun, and others all attended this dinner. At that time, Xi Jinping had been in poor health for a while, and they felt that an accident might happen to Xi Jinping's health, so what should be done? Consequently, they discussed the matter of a successor. However, the conversation at the dinner was eavesdropped on by former Central Party School president Chen Xi, who immediately reported it to Xi Jinping and the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Tang Ming said this was definitively a political issue; if it were merely about economic interests, Ma Xingrui would not have been touched. Just think, Ma Xingrui was originally one of the potential candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee at the 21st National Congress of the CCP. Had things not gone wrong, he would have had the chance to enter the Standing Committee—why would he risk it? Indeed, the leverage of his private conversation with Zhang Youxia was seized by others. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that people competing with Ma Xingrui were plotting against him. During his second term, Xi Jinping heavily promoted a group of officials originating from the CCP's aerospace and military-industrial systems. Ma Xingrui, along with CCP Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing, Chongqing Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun, and others, were all promoted during this second term. However, as Xi Jinping entered his third term, another faction of confidants and personnel networks represented by Cai Qi, Chen Xi, and others gradually gained greater political influence. Therefore, the favored favorites of Xi's third term were bound to eliminate the favored favorites of his second term, making infighting inevitable. Infighting and "biting" also conform to the pattern of CCP officials being investigated and falling from power. If you really have problems here, and I use this leverage to take you down, that is entirely par for the course.

Tang Ming said that most of Ma Xingrui's interests were given to the Xi family. From his time in Guangdong, a large portion of Ma Xingrui's benefits went to Qi Qiaoqiao and Xi Yuanping; Ma Xingrui has always been in cahoots with the Xi family. During Ma Xingrui's tenure in Xinjiang, the CCP further expanded infrastructure, energy, and major industrial investments in the western region. Public data shows that in 2024, Xinjiang originally planned to implement 430 key projects with a total investment of 3.3 trillion RMB. After mid-year adjustments, the number of projects increased to 466, with a total investment soaring to 3.7 trillion RMB, adding another 40 billion. Large CCP state-owned enterprises, major conglomerates, coal mines, and Belt and Road related projects were successively implemented in Xinjiang. Ma Xingrui held enormous resource allocation powers, allowing him to funnel far too many benefits to Xi Jinping's family. Ma Xingrui's corruption cannot be separated from the Xi family, and we do not need to discuss this too much; as we just mentioned, the evidence exposed by various parties is already overwhelming. As for the rumors circulating among the public that he attended a secret dinner held by Zhang Youxia, harbored rebellious intentions, and coveted the emperor's dragon throne, that span is a bit too wide. Just think about it carefully: Ma Xingrui, the child of a coal miner from Shuangyashan, rose through the ranks solely by sheer blind luck. He got mixed up with the family of Steamed Bun Xi and Peng Liyuan, tangled together like a gourd stirring eggplants, which is how he lucked into this. Even if you gave him ten times his courage, he wouldn't dare push down his backer and make a backer out of himself. If he had really been summoned by Zhang Youxia, enjoyed some small drinks, and had his ears filled with how to get rid of Steamed Bun Xi and plot with a new master, wouldn't he have been scared peeing in his pants? He would have run right back to report this petty detail to the bun. Of course, it is also not ruled out that when the bun was in a coma from a stroke, Ma Xingrui might not have heard him reporting or exposing things, but didn't the bun eventually recover and start directing directions again? Ma Xingrui had no reason to dare harbor malicious intentions instead of urgently rallying around the bun couple to strive to be an a state's witness and redeem himself through meritorious service. Therefore, the greater possibility of Ma Xingrui being taken down is not that Xi Jinping wanted to punish him and turn the blade inward, but precisely that anti-Xi forces are helping the bun trim his fringes. After all, various signs of the downfall of old Xi's veteran ministers indicate that Xi Jinping holding absolute power is a bygone illusion, the ousting pressure from anti-Xi forces has advanced step by step, and the crumbling old Xi can hardly protect himself, let alone protect his underling Ma Xingrui. Tea drinkers, an emergency poll: Do you think Ma Xingrui was taken down by Xi Jinping, or by the anti-Xi forces? Candidate answers: 1. Taken down by Xi Jinping; 2. Taken down by anti-Xi forces; 3. Xi and the anti-Xi forces made a deal and sacrificed Ma Xingrui; 4. Unclear, anything is possible.

As we mentioned in our previous episode, three retired high-ranking officials—Cai Fuchao, Huang Qifan, and Fu Chengyu—were investigated one after another, implicating Zeng Qinghong, Jia Qinglin, Zhang Dejiang, and Li Zhanshu. So what is the exact reason that dragged out those four elders? This has to start with the official working experiences between the three fallen individuals and the four unfallen elders. Let's look at Cai Fuchao first. In 1998, while Jia Qinglin was governing Beijing, Cai Fuchao entered the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's Propaganda Department. Starting in 2002, Cai Fuchao served as the head of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's Propaganda Department, and subsequently also served concurrently as the vice mayor of Beijing. Reports claimed that Cai Fuchao's political career development in the Beijing propaganda system back then was closely related to Jia Qinglin, and Cai Fuchao was once implicated in a subordinate's corruption case, ultimately being protected by Jia Qinglin personally—the relationship between the two is clear to see. In addition, Jia Qinglin's secretary, Tan Weike, was assigned to work in a unit overseen by Cai Fuchao after being removed from his post as secretary of the Haidian District Party Committee. Precisely because of these historical personnel connections, Cai Fuchao's current investigation has been interpreted by some observers as someone beginning to make moves against Jia Qinglin's former political subordinates. Could Jia Qinglin possibly be uninvolved?

Now let's look at the ever-standing tumbler Huang Qifan. Huang Qifan has long been active in Chongqing's political arena and economic system, having served as the mayor of Chongqing. After stepping down, he moved to the National People's Congress as the vice chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee, and the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee at that time was none other than Zhang Dejiang. Huang Qifan possesses both a veteran Shanghai clique background and many years of work experience in Chongqing, making him quite familiar with the political operations, economic systems, and financial networks of both Shanghai and Chongqing. If the investigation against him deepens further, what gets dragged out might not just be his personal issues, but also past complex interest exchanges and personnel relationships.

The third is Fu Chengyu. Fu Chengyu served in the Chinese petroleum system for a long time, having held important positions such as General Manager of China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Chairman of Sinopec Group. It is reported that Fu Chengyu was a figure long cultivated and promoted by Zeng Qinghong within the petroleum system, so the investigation of Zeng Qinghong is almost a certainty. If we put Cai Fuchao, Huang Qifan, and Fu Chengyu together, we will find that they share a common characteristic: they have all been retired for many years and no longer hold actual power, but they may possess a large amount of internal information regarding the personnel arrangements, capital flows, and interest distribution networks of that time. The keyword is "internal information"; once these people start to confess, the scope involved will likely go far beyond themselves. Then a new question arises: if the goal is to move against the four state-level elders, why not take direct action instead of starting with their former subordinates? There may be three reasons. First, investigating former subordinates first encounters less political resistance. Investigating a retired high-ranking official can be initiated through a notice issued by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, but dealing directly with a retired member of the Politburo Standing Committee could trigger political tremors throughout the top leadership of the CCP, making the operational difficulty of a different magnitude. Second, these people are highly likely to hold the key ledgers of the corruption from that era. Huang Qifan worked in Chongqing for 15 years, Cai Fuchao served in the Beijing propaganda and cultural system for 20 years, and Fu Chengyu worked in the petroleum system for over 40 years—half a lifetime. They know better than outsiders who took which projects in the past, through what channels funds were circulated, and what kind of interest exchanges were involved behind the scenes. Their brains are the ledgers; the intricate and complex relationships involving everyone from Zhang San and Li Si to their extended families—even ChatGPT couldn't figure it out, but they could certainly straighten it out for you, because they were the ones handling it at the time. Therefore, once these ledgers fall into the hands of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the relevant elders will have to re-evaluate the risks before taking any political action. The third reason is that the timing of these cases is likely not a coincidence. Cai Fuchao was officially announced to have fallen in July, during the preparation stage of the Fifth Plenary Session; when did Huang Qifan get into trouble? Only 13 days before the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session; Fu Chengyu was investigated two days after the closing of the Fifth Plenary Session. The three cases, occurring before, during, and after, happened to sandwich the Fifth Plenary Session. This chronological arrangement easily leads to speculation: moving against people before the meeting, is it to remind certain elders not to create resistance during the session? Continuing to move against people after the meeting, is it releasing another signal that the central documents have been passed and it is time to enter the execution phase? It is not the thief stealing that is feared, but the thief plotting; after the four elders finish imagining the three cases at home, they might be scared half to death. So, if the previous speculations and analyses are eventually confirmed, the room for maneuver for Zeng Qinghong, Jia Qinglin, Zhang Dejiang, and Li Zhanshu in the future will likely be very limited. The first path is to remain silent, no longer actively intervene in the power struggles among the current top leadership, try to minimize their political presence, and wait for the situation to become clearer. The second path is to cut ties with former subordinates, abandoning past personnel networks and even sacrificing the interests of some people around them in exchange for the political safety of themselves and their families. The third path is to continue to unite with other conservative elders in the name of upholding the Party, prevent anti-Xi forces from further expanding their influence, and attempt to interfere with the power layout before the 21st National Congress. The risks faced by the third path are undoubtedly the greatest; those sitting at the center of power today may also be included in the scope of investigation and supervision after they retire tomorrow. The Fifth Plenary Session clearly stated that there will be no 'kings with iron hats' (untouchables) or 'iron certificates' (immunity); on the surface, this is emphasizing anti-corruption, but if connected to the recent series of political changes, it may also convey a deeper signal: the two major forces that supported Xi Jinping's power in the past are in the process of failing. The military is said to have changed hands, and the political elders who once supported him may also be gradually weakened. From this perspective, the cases of Cai Fuchao, Huang Qifan, and Fu Chengyu may mark that everything has begun. As spectators, let us continue to wait and see.

In the People's Republic of China, the Party and the government have turned all kinds of pretext-based inspections into revenue generation, especially now when even the landlords have no surplus grain left, and various confiscation and fine tactics under the banner of "for your own good" emerge endlessly. However, for every policy from above, there is a countermeasure from below; amidst this back-and-forth struggle, small business owners have also figured out a counter-attack tactic: we will simply close our shops and cease operations, what can you do to us? The latest round of "devils entering the village" style enforcement operates under the nationwide banner of "3C Safety Certification Inspections," where violators face heavy fines. Consequently, merchants are in a state of panic, and multiple regions have seen a wave of "panic-style closures" in building materials and hardware markets. Online videos show that on November 4 and 5, building materials, hardware, and electromechanical markets in Chengdu, Nanchang, Panzhihua, Mianyang, Suining, and other places in Sichuan province all experienced large-scale business closures and suspensions. A netizen filmed a video saying, "It's still not open at 10 o'clock, they're all locked up, I really don't understand." Another netizen said, "Oh my god, everything is closed, this market is even harder to survive in than during the pandemic, everyone is scared out of their wits, regulations are so strict, people don't even dare to sell things, better close down quickly." Why did everyone collectively close their doors and lie flat? A WeChat group screenshot provided the answer: starting in November, the State Council inspection team launched a comprehensive quality supervision inspection and specialized "3C certification" spot checks in Sichuan, running until the end of November, prompting a large number of merchants to choose temporary suspension of business to avoid inspections. The netizen who posted the screenshot mocked: "Alas, a 20-day major inspection, from now on it's basically closing up and squatting by the street." In fact, as early as 2024, many such inspections had already appeared; in November 2024, merchants in Chaoshan, Guangdong, collectively closed their doors once to evade fire safety inspections. Since June of this year, the Chinese Communist Party has continued to roll out 3C certifications and product quality inspections nationwide, sweeping through industries such as building materials, hardware, lighting fixtures, kitchenware, and general merchandise, and other provinces and cities had already experienced waves of closures well before Sichuan. I checked, and 3C certification (CCC certification) is a mandatory certification system implemented in China for products such as electromechanical goods, automobiles and parts, and children's toys. Only products that pass the certification can be considered compliant with mandatory requirements in terms of safety, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), and environmental protection, and related products can only be imported, exported, manufactured, sold, and used after passing the certification. Moreover, this certification system has been implemented since May 1, 2002. Let me timidly ask, after all these years, isn't launching a sudden crackdown a bit too late? Some merchants' questions hit the core of the issue: regarding these 3C products, why not trace the source instead of insisting on inspecting us distributors? The inspection team replied: "Of course it's convenient to inspect and easy to fine; law enforcement also has costs. Besides, some source small factories might have gone bankrupt long ago, who do you expect us to fine?" Naturally, as expected, actual law enforcement inevitably expands in scope, just like the layer-upon-layer escalation of dynamic zero-COVID. As early as June, "3C certification" swept through Hunan, and Ms. Wu, the owner of a hardware store in Yanling County, told Epoch Times that her store was primarily targeted for PE water pipes (polyethylene water pipes). Ms. Wu felt especially miserable, saying, "My goods aren't power banks, gas combustion appliances, or electric bicycles—things prone to catching fire." She also mentioned that a friend's store was inspected in August for similar products, and "this is very hard to pass." Ms. Wu's biggest takeaway is that official inspections of distributors are just meant to collect more fines, and their operational pressure is growing heavier and heavier. A man in the decoration industry in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, said that according to his understanding, the inspections are not just targeting small brands; "even domestic first-tier brands are being inspected." Those caught face fines of 50,000 or 200,000 RMB, and some people have already been fined. Does it end with just fines? How could that be; business suspension penalties are bound to be waiting for you next. Do you remember the mass strikes of over a million merchants in Heilongjiang from April to June this year? As we just mentioned, the people nationwide are no longer surprised. Merchants figure that closing down themselves is voluntary suspension, while opening and getting inspected is involuntary suspension accompanied by heavy fines. How to choose is a complete no-brainer, so they all tightly shut their doors in unison. Sorry, whether it's bosses, clerks, customers, or cheap goods—none, none, none at all. CCP, what can you do to us?

Recently, the entertainment industry has seen two consecutive cases where people "broke their teeth" while trying to profit from "mainstream melody" (propaganda) films, which in a sense has accelerated the "winter of the film industry" in China. First, let's talk about Andy Lau. It must be said that ever since he became a vice-ministerial level official of the Party—specifically, the 11th Vice Chairman of the China Film Association—things have been quite rough for him. The film he starred in, *White-Clad Renegades* (Baiyi Xingzhe), which is a propaganda film set against the backdrop of the Wuhan lockdown at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, had already been shelved for six years. It was finally scheduled for a nationwide release on November 6, but it was hit with a sudden blow and pulled from the schedule at the last minute. On November 6, both Maoyan and Taopiaopiao, China's two major film ticketing platforms, showed that all information regarding *White-Clad Renegades*, which was supposed to be released that day, had been deleted, and tickets could not be purchased. In other words, the film has been effectively pulled from theaters. In fact, there were signs a few days prior, as the film did not open for pre-sales as is customary. On Douban, the release date for *White-Clad Renegades* was changed to 2027, and users were unable to post reviews. It is estimated that neither the producers, the National Radio and Television Administration, nor Andy Lau himself could withstand the overwhelming sarcasm, mockery, and ridicule. People were saying things like: "I won't watch it without Li Wenliang," "I won't watch it without the Urumqi fire," "I won't watch it without the White Paper Movement," "I won't watch it without a sequel about the 2022 Shanghai lockdown," "I won't watch it without the voluntary three-dose vaccine," and "I won't watch it without the repeated throat swabs." Perhaps they had some self-awareness; it's better to leave quietly and not rub salt into the unhealed wounds of the common people.

Speaking of those who hit a wall with propaganda films, there is also the Chinese film giant Bona Film Group. This company, which once bet heavily on propaganda films, is now heavily in debt and has recently been exposed for owing employees several months of wages. To briefly introduce it, Bona Film Group is a film group company with a full industrial chain layout, established in August 2003, mainly investing in China-Hong Kong co-productions. In August 2022, the company was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Its highlight moment came in 2021, when Bona produced *The Battle at Lake Changjin*, a tribute film for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. The film glorified the Korean War and praised the "Ice Sculpture Company" as cannon fodder. The truth is that the so-called "fearless of hardship and death" was actually the result of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army being ordered to ambush the U.S. military in temperatures of minus 40 degrees Celsius for three days and three nights. Due to a lack of logistics and winter clothing, all three companies were frozen to death, hence the name "Ice Sculpture Company." Even more embarrassing is that at the time, the CCP sent 100,000 troops to surround 10,000 U.S. soldiers, and despite sacrificing so many people to the cold, the U.S. military still successfully evacuated. The casualty ratio between Chinese and American soldiers in the Battle of Lake Changjin was as high as 140 to 1. Isn't that infuriating? In the past, the CCP felt quite humiliated by this and didn't want to mention it at all. However, as time passed, the truth of history was buried, and especially when there was a need to stir up anti-American sentiment among the public and divert attention from domestic economic difficulties, the "Ice Sculpture Company" could be whitewashed and brought out to be told again. So, as soon as *The Battle at Lake Changjin* was released, political mandates were pushed down, leading to various company-sponsored screenings, achieving a box office of 5.7 billion yuan. Bona tasted the sweetness of propaganda films and felt it had to grow bigger and stronger on this track. Thus, it continued the commercial film model of "big production, all-star cast, and propaganda themes." However, it couldn't overcome the audience's aesthetic fatigue, and more importantly, various work units didn't have the spare money to keep sponsoring screenings, so the dividends from the propaganda film market dried up. For example, Bona's heavily invested propaganda sequel, *Operation Dragon*, suffered huge losses, reportedly reaching 800 million yuan, which directly crippled the company's cash flow. As of the first half of 2026, Bona Film's available cash and cash equivalents on the books were about 96 million yuan, but the debt due in the same period was as high as 3.33 billion yuan. With no cash flow and a mountain of debt, it was no surprise that they started defaulting on wages. According to financial media and employees, Bona Film usually paid salaries on the 5th of each month in previous years, but since the summer of 2026, serious delays began to occur. Salaries for June and July were delayed until the end of the month, and by August and September, payments were stopped entirely, with no official notice given. Starting October 29, current and part-time employees of Bona Film began publicly demanding their September wages online. Some part-timers asked the company several times to no avail and finally chose to go to the labor inspection office to register a complaint. Almost simultaneously with the news of unpaid wages, rumors circulated about the personal credit collapse of Bona boss Yu Dong. Almost at the same time as the employees' collective wage demands, information disclosed on the Tianyancha platform showed that the equity under Yu Dong's name that had been frozen was worth as much as 566 million yuan. There is also gossip that Yu Dong allegedly owes 4.73 million Hong Kong dollars in debt at a Macau casino. This news further ignited the emotions of the onlookers: "Yu Dong, stop gambling, your mother is calling you home to pay wages." We also offer Yu Dong a piece of advice: distorting history unscrupulously and singing praises for the Party will eventually have to be paid for. The brothers at the Tea House would like to thank senior tea friend Mr. Huang here.

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