Taiwan Must Gain International Recognition by First Doing Two Things【Zhi Ding Lecture Hall Cao Xingcheng Yu Maochun】 EP192 (Part 1)

The program discusses the United States' stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine's relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the U.S. interpretation of Taiwan's international status and UN Resolution 2758. Yu Maochun believes that the United States has consistently treated Ukraine as a sovereign state under invasion, while it has long recognized that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are distinct political entities; Taiwan's status is unsettled in reality rather than theory. He also talks about Taiwan's de facto independence, the naming of the constitution, the CCP's military threat, and Lai Yizhong's proposal of "wartime deterrence".

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Our last conversation was in Taipei on August 11. Today is September 28, and we are in the United States. Over the past month, there seem to have been many changes among China, the United States, and Taiwan. First, has Trump’s attitude toward Putin recently shifted, showing a more hard‑line stance?

No matter where we chat, it is a great pleasure, so whether in Taipei or in the United States, the topics are equally meaningful. You just mentioned Trump’s attitude toward Putin; before the United States takes any final, decisive, and consequential military, political, or diplomatic actions, it always strives to avoid direct conflict as much as possible. This is the basic approach Trump uses in dealing with Putin.

Therefore, I am not surprised by Trump’s alleged shift, because the United States operates this way—making every effort to avoid direct conflict and unnecessary casualties. In fact, during negotiations, Trump has already been magnanimous, earnestly explaining the stakes to Putin. But Putin is a naturally aggressive person, living in a state of confusion, misunderstanding his international standing, the U.S. military power, and the United States’ ability to protect its allies, especially NATO countries’ sovereignty and territory.

He sends planes to provoke near Alaska every day, and the United States naturally has to respond. Russia, in many respects, cannot withstand such blows. In addition to a direct shift in attitude toward Russia, Trump has also taken very tough measures on Russia’s back‑channel, such as "Phase Two" sanctions, i.e., secondary sanctions. Regarding India’s and China’s purchase of Russian oil, he has adopted a resolute stance. As a result, Russia’s war is effectively unsustainable. So I think this shift is understandable and, in many ways, inevitable.

Now it appears that Zelensky has met with Trump. Zelensky seems to say that Ukraine remains a good friend of the United States. He feels that U.S. support for Ukraine has grown considerably, and the United States now also appears to support Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory. Under Trump’s attitude, might the Russia‑Ukraine war end earlier?

Ending the Russia-Ukraine war is a matter for everyone, and the United States will of course play a decisive role. You just said that Zelensky suddenly realized that the United States is also a friend of Ukraine, but in fact the United States has always been a friend of Ukraine, always treating Ukraine as an invaded country with independent sovereignty.

However, for diplomatic negotiations, Trump does not need to point at Russia’s nose every day and call it an aggressively expansionist nation. Doing so does not actually help end the war. Since the United States’ stance is becoming clearer now, this is entirely due to Russia’s actions and was expected.

Nevertheless, a leader like Zelensky, despite many achievements, has taken some extreme measures during the war in Ukraine, which have drawn some mild criticism from the United States, though not major criticism. For example, elections and media control—these, I think, are unnecessary. Of course, the U.S. government also puts some pressure on Zelensky.

As for Zelensky’s fantasies about the CCP, that is certainly a major concern for the United States. He has never expressed a very clear stance toward the CCP, and only recently has he made some remarks. The United States welcomes this shift because the CCP has always been an opportunistic state. It hopes to heavily support Russia during the war, providing weapons and financial aid so that Russia can continue its war against Ukraine.

At the same time, the CCP also wants to take advantage of Ukraine. Regarding Ukraine’s post‑war reconstruction, the CCP has its own designs. The United States sees this, so it has continuously pressured Ukraine and Zelensky to make a stance toward the CCP, especially on post‑war reconstruction, insisting that Ukraine sign economic cooperation and reconstruction treaties with the United States and not allow the CCP to repeat the situation after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

The United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan for more than a decade, close to twenty years, sacrificing thousands of American soldiers’ lives and spending an unknown amount of money, yet the reconstruction treaty was signed by the CCP, not the United States. Therefore, the United States does not want to suffer that loss again. Zelensky has shifted his attitude in this regard, but the shift is not yet complete.

Overall, the United States has never treated Ukraine as anything but a friend; Ukraine has always been a friend of the United States. The United States’ goodwill should be explained from this perspective.

Recently, there also seem to be some changes between Taiwan and the United States. Since last year, the United States has been helping to explain abroad that UN Resolution 2758 does not involve Taiwan. This effectively refutes the CCP’s claim that Resolution 2758 has transferred Taiwan’s sovereignty to the CCP.

Recently, it was also seen that the American Institute in Taiwan stated that Taiwan’s status is actually undetermined. The Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration did not transfer Taiwan’s sovereignty to the CCP, and Japan’s San Francisco Treaty also did not say that Taiwan’s sovereignty was transferred to the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China. Does this indicate that the United States’ positioning on the Taiwan Strait is becoming clearer—previously somewhat vague, now gradually becoming clear?

From the United States’ internal perspective, Taiwan’s status has always been clear in U.S. policy. Of course, the notion that Taiwan’s status is undetermined is not a theory but a reality.

Resolution 2758 was adopted in 1971. At that time, the Nixon administration’s fundamental principle was that the United States should recognize the People’s Republic of China’s status at the United Nations, while also hoping that Taiwan would retain a seat at the UN. That goal was later not achieved, reportedly due to technical reasons, but those technical reasons did not resolve the United States’ basic national policy. Taiwan’s status in Resolution 2758 was not only undefined in wording but also lacked consensus in principle, so Taiwan’s status has remained undefined.

Therefore, it is not surprising at all for the American Institute in Taiwan to put forward this view for those handling this policy internally. The undetermined status of Taiwan has actually been the case since the start of the Taiwan Strait separation, that is, since the Korean War began, after June 1950.

The basic starting point for the United States, Taiwan, and the CCP is that the mainland and Taiwan are two different political entities. Before the 1990s, both sides were essentially contesting one issue: who represents China. In the 1990s, starting from the Lee Teng‑hui era, Taiwan decided not to contest this issue with the CCP; the People’s Republic of China represents China, but who represents Taiwan is decided by Taiwan itself. That is the essence of the matter.

The United States acknowledges this reality. Starting with the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, all subsequent communiqués have said that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must resolve this issue, but its resolution requires two preconditions. First, force must never be used. If force is used, the United States will intervene, and that has not changed. Second, any future solution to the Taiwan question must have the consent of the peoples on both sides of the Strait.

Of course, the Taiwanese people themselves will not agree to merge with or be unified under China. Overall, Taiwan's political status and future have not been recognized by the international community, nor have they been definitively settled. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spouts rhetoric, claiming that Resolution 2758 has solved the issue, which in fact it has not. Therefore, the United States' stance on this matter has remained consistent, with no change.

Some insightful Americans, including my former supervisor Pompeiu, as well as an increasing number of members of Congress and U.S. government officials, are gradually realizing that the Taiwan status issue is not a matter of ideology, not a debate over whether Taiwan will become a new, independent country, but a need to acknowledge Taiwan's reality.

The United States says force cannot be used to change the status quo, so what is the status quo? Many knowledgeable Americans believe the status quo is de facto independence. The question is whether this independence has received international recognition. Now many in the United States think the U.S. should recognize this reality of Taiwan. Pompeiu is among the most active proponents, and this position is likely to gain recognition from many abroad.

Thus, I do not see this as a major issue in U.S. foreign policy; the key is that the Taiwanese people themselves need to clarify how they define the Republic of China. Whether the Republic of China still includes mainland China, Mongolia, and many other territories, or whether it consists only of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, should be decided by the Taiwanese people. I hope Taiwan can, through democratic processes, gradually work out this question.

In fact, the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese consider the status quo to be separation from China, which is a fact. A few years ago an international law authority, James Crawford, apparently said that in many respects Taiwan is an independent country, just lacking international recognition.

He said Taiwan has two shortcomings. First, the Republic of China's constitution contains a so‑called “One‑China constitutional clause,” which blurs Taiwan’s own positioning with that of China. Second, Taiwanese people have not unequivocally declared that they possess sovereignty over Taiwan. He believes that because of these two issues, Taiwan’s independent status cannot obtain international recognition.

In the past, when Taiwan proposed a constitutional renaming—abolishing the One‑China clause and changing the Republic of China’s name—many said this crossed a line the CCP could not tolerate and would inevitably trigger war. Even Singapore once warned Taiwan not to go too far. Taiwan reacted angrily, asking why Singapore should involve itself in Taiwan’s affairs.

If the CCP’s territorial claims over Taiwan are not recognized by the United States, should Taiwan at some point do two things: first, declare Taiwan a sovereign independent state; second, discard the One‑China constitutional clause? What consequences would that bring?

Countries that do not recognize Taiwan’s independent sovereignty can look to Israel as a reference. For decades, many nations have not recognized Israel, and to this day a large portion of the Arab world’s major states still deny Israel’s right to exist.

Israel’s approach is: regardless of whether you recognize us or not, we develop ourselves. I am an independent sovereign state, managing myself, implementing my own democratic mechanisms, and developing my own economy. This bears some similarity to Taiwan.

The current issue is not whether Taiwan has the right or duty to amend its constitution and exercise democratic rights and obligations as a state based on existing facts. The only thing preventing this is the CCP’s threat of force. As soon as Taiwan even hints at constitutional amendment, the CCP threatens war.

Blue‑camp politicians have no reason to oppose Taiwan doing these things, but their main debate with the green camp now is: if you do what should be done, the CCP will attack you. The United States has already made it clear that it firmly opposes any side using force to change the status quo. Thus, the blue‑camp’s argument may have some persuasive power, but it is not the real rationale.

Of course, this is an internal Taiwanese issue, not for someone like me to comment on. Overall, Taiwan’s basic mechanisms of governance, governmental structure, and civil behavior all meet the full definition of a sovereign state. To me, that is not the most important point; the important thing is how the Taiwanese people assess the CCP’s war threat.

If Taiwan were to be frightened by the war threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it would be unable to do anything. This has been the basic attitude of the CCP toward Taiwan for decades: using extremely brutal force to block Taiwan's social progress and to prevent Taiwan from seeking international space.

Taiwan has a Cross-Strait Exchange Vision Foundation, and Dr. Lai Yizhong has proposed a very interesting concept called "wartime deterrence." It seems to mean that if the CCP were to use force against Taiwan, Taiwan should first secure commitments from countries such as the United States and Japan: that if the CCP uses force, they will support Taiwan in declaring independence.