Living Like the Tang Dynasty, Dying Like the Republic of China! Four Final Ledgers Deduce the CCP's Final Script; Why Did the Same Disease Drag the Tang for 150 Years but Kill the Republic in 8 Months? Transfer Payments Are the Jianghuai Bloodline, Deep-Sea Fishing Is Electronic Likin, and Suppressing Interest Rates Is a Chronic Gold Yuan Note to Drain the Middle Class! Once Taiwan Is Attacked, the Republic's Clock Will Strike!
By examining the fiscal ledgers of four historical eras—the Tang Dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty, the late Qing Dynasty, and the Republic of China—this program deduces the endgame script for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime under the pressures of fiscal depletion, credit bankruptcy, power centralization, and external expansion. The program points out that while the CCP attempts to sustain its rule through southeastern fiscal blood transfusions and "offshore fishing" (cross-regional asset seizures), it is in fact sliding into an abyss of comprehensive collapse and the forced harvesting of the middle class, ultimately finding it hard to escape the fate of dying like the Republic of China.
Video link:
Full text:
See things as they are, and reject fragmented understanding. Today, we're doing something big—a special episode. We are going to take several representative cases of how public finances drive a dynasty toward its final days, and lay it all out clearly for everyone. Finally, we'll look at the CCP's finances to see how, in all likelihood, it will meet its end. I have laid out on the table the final fiscal ledgers of four dynasties before they drew their last breath: the Tang, the Yuan, the late Qing, and the Republic of China. After looking through them, you will discover something fascinating: it's as if these four regimes caught the exact fucking same disease. Their medical records could practically be copied from one another, yet their ways of dying were completely different. Counting from the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang Dynasty survived for about 150 more years relying on a sleight of hand with hollow titles. The Yuan Dynasty, counting from the day Toghtogha reformed the paper currency, collapsed in just 18 years. For the late Qing, counting from the day gunfire erupted in Chengdu, Puyi abdicated in just five months. The Republic of China was the most extreme: counting from the day the Gold Yuan notes were issued, Old Chiang lost most of his territory in just eight months. With the same disease, why could one drag on for 150 years while another only lasted eight months? Today, we will thoroughly unravel this core question. Once you understand these things, you will be able to deduce the thing we care about most: what hand of cards the current CCP regime is holding. As for the conclusion on how the CCP's finances will meet their demise, I'll put it right here first—eight Chinese characters are enough to sum it up: "Live like the Tang, die like the Republic of China." After listening to today's episode, you will understand.
Schumpeter, who proposed the theory of disruptive innovation, once said something fucking awesome, the gist of which was what? The spiritual civilization and social structure of a nation are all written in its fiscal history; conversely, the same holds true. How a regime dies is likewise written in its fiscal history. So today we won't talk about palace intrigues, only flip through the account books, starting from the Tang Dynasty. In 755 AD, a major event occurred, the An Lushan Rebellion, which directly trashed the Tang Dynasty's tax system. Before the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang Dynasty's tax system was called the Zuyongdiao system, which was paired with the equal-field system of the early Tang Dynasty. What was Zu? Zu meant that each adult male paid two dan of grain every year. Yong meant that each adult male served twenty days of corvée labor every year; if you didn't want to go, you could pay with silk cloth instead. Right after the An Lushan Rebellion, that original Zuyongdiao system of taxing per capita couldn't go on anymore. Why? Because what is the prerequisite for levying a poll tax on adult males? The prerequisite is that the imperial court must know how many people are in your household, right? After the An Lushan Rebellion, the household registers across the country were basically burned if they could be burned, and people couldn't be found either. Tell me, who are you going to collect taxes from? In 780 AD, Prime Minister Yang Yan introduced a major reform called the Twice-a-Year Tax system, meaning let's not care about headcounts anymore, since we can't count or tally them anyway. What do we look at? We look at assets, and taxes are collected twice a year. The reform itself—hey, there's no doubt that reform was needed—but the worst part was a sentence written into this system, whose lethality can be described as immense: 'measure expenditure to determine revenue.' That is to say, first calculate how much money the imperial court needs to spend, and then negotiate downwards how much to collect. Hey, savor this sequence: expenditure began to determine revenue. Then what if expenditure bloated? The Twice-a-Year Tax system stated in black and white that collecting taxes beyond this would be treated as illegal. In the end, what was written was pure bullshit. In Chang'an, another tax category was created called the 'roof-beam tax.' What did it mean? It meant taxes were levied based on how many roof beams your house had—levying taxes based on the number of beams. Another thing called the 'chumo money' was introduced—when doing business, fifty copper coins were taken for every thousand coins received. That is to say what? It was a tax on top of taxes, a layer-upon-layer structure. Oh right, speaking of Yang Yan, the father of this Twice-a-Year Tax system, when he came to power he did a major thing—hey, not a reform, but killing someone. What was the name of the person he wanted to kill? It was Liu Yan. Who was Liu Yan? He should be considered the true financial savior of the Tang Dynasty after the An Lushan Rebellion. At that time, Liu Yan was the figure who held both the salt and iron monopolies and grain transport in his hands. The historical records gave him a relatively high evaluation: 'taxes were collected without oppressing the people, yet state expenditures were sufficient.' Translated, the imperial court collected enough money, and the common people didn't feel the pain. But because Liu Yan and Yang Yan had an old grudge, Liu Yan was framed with a crime in 780, demoted and expelled from Chang'an, and subsequently ordered to commit suicide. The history books recorded four words: 'the whole realm deemed it an injustice.' What was even more mind-boggling was that, fuck, this retribution came extremely fast. One year later, Yang Yan himself was also pushed out by his political rival Lu Qi, demoted to Yazhou, and halfway along the road, he was also ordered to commit suicide by an imperial edict. The two most financially capable men in the entire Tang Empire: one killed the other, and then was also eliminated. Why? Because the person managing the money holds everyone's lifeline, and during times of fiscal strain, what kind of state is it? A zero-sum game state, right? The price of a zero-sum game is enemies everywhere. This leads to another fiscal problem: when the finances could still be salvaged, the zero-sum game had already begun. Under this kind of dynastic centralized system, the more capable a person is at managing finances, the less likely they are to survive.
And then came the most absurd scene in Chinese fiscal history: in the year 783 AD, an army passing through Chang'an suddenly mutinied, known historically as the Jingyuan Mutiny. Emperor Dezong of Tang, surnamed Li, also fled overnight. The mutinous soldiers charged straight into Chang'an, and the slogans they shouted at the common people across the city were not about overthrowing a foolish ruler, nor opposing the Tang court, nor even opening the granaries to distribute grain. What was the general meaning of the original records in historical texts? It was: we will no longer collect your "Jiajia tax" (housing property tax), nor will we levy your "Chumo tax" (commercial transaction tax). Think about it, everyone: a rebel army used the abolition of tyrannical extortion as a political mobilization slogan, and it was remarkably effective. Can you imagine how deeply a regime's taxes must be hated to reach such a point? What came next was even wilder. Emperor Dezong of Tang, who fled overnight after being terrified by the tax-induced mutiny—well, the lesson he learned wasn't to lighten corvée labor and reduce taxes. What was the lesson he learned? It was to never trust anyone ever again. In this respect, he was very much like that fucking Journey to the West; he didn't trust his prime minister, he didn't trust the tax officials, he only trusted the money in his own room. In his later years, he did only one thing: desperately rake money into his two private treasuries, Qionglin and Daying, having local tributes sent directly into the emperor's private inner court. In the end, he didn't even bother pretending anymore, simply letting eunuchs loose on the streets to collect taxes, giving it the official name of "palace market," when in reality it was outright daylight robbery. Bai Juyi described this very clearly in his poem "The Charcoal Seller": the old charcoal seller had a cart with over a thousand catties of charcoal, and this bunch of dog eunuchs just hung half a zhang of red gauze and a zhang of damask over the ox's horns, and hauled the charcoal straight away. "Tying up the ox's head to pay for the charcoal" refers precisely to this. An emperor of an empire bypassed his entire fiscal system and establishment, sending fucking eunuchs onto the streets to commit robbery. Do you think this was mere incompetence? It wasn't; this was a structural inevitability. Because it was a very simple problem: your regular taxes sparked a military mutiny. Once supreme power completely lost trust in the system, the only remaining option was to step onto the field personally. When public finances deteriorated to the extreme, the emperor himself ended up living as the biggest tax collector.
Yet the Tang dynasty didn't collapse immediately. And that is the most miraculous part, because it found two lifelines: one was the money and grain from the southeast, and the other was the state monopoly on salt and iron. In the year 807 AD, Prime Minister Li Jifu conducted a fiscal survey called the "Yuanhe National Accounting Register." Everything seemed fine until he checked, and the findings broke out a cold sweat all over him. Among the forty-eight military commands across the country, those dutifully paying taxes to the central government were down to only eight circuits in the southeast, totaling around 1.4 million households—slashed by three-quarters compared to the taxpaying households in the early Tang. Han Yu put it very bluntly: "The wealth of the world comes forth, and Jiangnan holds nineteen parts of it"—meaning the single region of Jiangnan contributed ninety percent of the fiscal revenue in the mid-to-late Tang. The entire Great Tang was surviving on a single IV drip inserted into Chang'an from the Jianghuai region, and this drip remarkably kept it hanging on for more than a fucking hundred years, which is utterly mind-boggling. How long did it hang on? Right until Huang Chao cleanly severed the Grand Canal with a single blow, and the heart of the Great Tang completely stopped beating. So remember, the Tang dynasty's way of dying was a slow rot—meaning as long as the transfusion tube was there, even a rotting corpse could go on living.
However, the script and style of the Mongol Yuan dynasty that followed were entirely different. The Yuan dynasty was the first empire in human history to use purely fiat paper currency. Kublai Khan's Zhongtong paper notes were originally backed by silver reserves, and in the beginning, the paper notes were genuinely valuable. But by the late Yuan, the entire situation changed: military expenditures, river works, royal court expenses—the deficit ballooned larger and larger, and the silver reserves had long been emptied out. Around the year 1350 AD, roughly the tenth year of the Zhizheng era, Chancellor Toghto presided over a court conference. He raised just one word: notes—that is, issuing new paper currency. How was it regulated? That regulation was also complete bullshit: one guan of new notes was equal to two guan of old notes. Put plainly, the court of the Mongol Yuan openly declared: hey, half of the money in your hands is now void. Was there anyone at the meeting who opposed it? Yes, there was. Lü Sicheng, the Chancellor of the Imperial Academy, laid out the pros and cons crystal clear right on the spot; his insight was penetrating. He said paper currency relies entirely on credit; if you do this, credit will be wiped out. What was the result? Lü Sicheng was demoted and exiled from the capital. So you see, it wasn't that no one gave a warning; it was that when a dictator's power begins to decline, he instinctively suppresses professional opinions, because immediate problems are what matter most to his power. What was the scene like after the currency reform? The "Treatise on Food and Money" in the History of Yuan described it in eight characters: "commodity prices soared wildly, exceeding ten times over." Later, it became even more fucking absurd: in the capital, even ten ingots of paper notes worth five hundred guan couldn't buy a single peck of millet. To what extent did the common people regress? Straight back to the era of barter trade, and the entire commercial credit of the Great Yuan collapsed from then on.
The following year, Toghon Temür, the Yuan emperor, wanted to launch a massive project to divert and dredge the old course of the Yellow River, mobilizing over 100,000 corvée laborers because the Yellow River was a suspended river above ground and flooded constantly. The result was the familiar story: a one-eyed stone man was dug up at the construction site. As the saying went, "A one-eyed stone man stirs up the Yellow River, and the whole realm rises in revolt." That was how it started. The Red Turban Army then began their uprising. The folk ditties sung among the common people back then were quite interesting too: "Opening the river and changing the currency is the root of calamity, provoking tens of thousands of Red Turbans." Mind you, this was not a summary by later historians; it was an on-site diagnosis by the people of that era. By cranking up the printing press and firing up both engines simultaneously, they directly sent the Mongol Yuan dynasty packing. There was also a rather black-humored scene in all this, which many people probably don't know and which is quite fascinating. The river-control official at the time was named Jia Lu. He was completely successful in the river-engineering project—a true hydraulic genius. Look, with over 100,000 men working for half a year, the Yellow River obediently returned to its old course. In other words, engineering-wise, he delivered a full-score answer sheet, but politically, it was a suicide pact. What did the Yuan court do? They concentrated over 100,000 furious able-bodied laborers—who had just been robbed by inflation—in one place, handed them shovels, and paid their wages in worthless paper money that depreciated daily. This wasn't flood control; it was organizing the rebel army's team-building event for them. As for that one-eyed stone man, everyone knows by now that it was just a nursery rhyme spread a few months earlier by Han Shantong and Liu Futong: "A one-eyed stone man stirs up the Yellow River, and the realm rises in revolt." They had buried the stone man in the riverbed in advance, just waiting for the laborers to dig it up with a shovel. You see, all the elements were complete—the script, the crowd, the emotions, and the full package for an uprising were all prepared by the court itself at its own expense. That is the terror of fiscal deterioration: it doesn't directly kill the regime; instead, it meticulously gathers all the firewood, sparks, and wind, just waiting for that single moment.
Ah, right, Toghon Temür himself had an ending as well: four years later, when he led a large army to besiege Gaoyou and the city was about to fall, what happened? An imperial decree from Dadian arrived at the front lines, stripping Toghon Temür of his military command. At this point, the zero-sum game of the fiscal decline period emerged. Fearing that Toghon Temür's achievements would overshadow the ruler, Toghon Temür replaced the commander-in-chief in front of a million-strong army just before victory, and the natural result was an overnight collapse. The Yuan dynasty's last field combat-capable military force was thus gone. So the formula for the Yuan dynasty, everyone should remember, is a reformer who is superstitious about major surgery combined with a supreme authority riddled with suspicion, equaling an 18-year countdown. The first formula is born.
Let's continue to look at the late Qing dynasty. In 1853, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom completely severed the Jiangnan tax district, cutting off the Qing's grain tribute transportation. Once the grain tribute was cut, the Board of Revenue's silver reserves immediately hit rock bottom. An official named Lei Yixian was sent to Yangzhou to assist with the military affairs of the Northern Jiangsu Army Camp. Upon arriving locally, he was dumbfounded: military provisions were intercepted layer upon layer, and the Qing court's allocations dwindled to a mere fraction by the time they reached him. He even tried selling official posts to raise money, but amid the chaos of war, nobody wanted or could afford a Qing official title. In this desperate situation, his strategist—a Zhejiang man named Qian Jiang—offered him a crooked idea. Upon hearing this, the fellow's mind spun: don't count on the court, the court has no money either, let's target the merchants. Thus, right outside Yangzhou at Xiannvmiao, a market town for rice merchants, they began levying transit taxes on the commercial shares of passing rice firms, known as collecting one-in-a-hundred, meaning a 1% toll. With just such an inconspicuous little checkpoint, hundreds of thousands of taels of silver were collected in a month. The military provision issue of the Northern Jiangsu Army Camp was resolved on the spot. After making a huge contribution, this strategist Qian Jiang got a bit full of himself and stopped showing respect to his superiors. The next year, Lei Yixian found an excuse to get rid of him. Look, there it is again! A life-saving fiscal invention, and its inventor didn't live past the second year either. This script has been played out once more, hasn't it?
The zero-sum game of the system has been written into its genes since the very first day of its birth. Then came the loss of control. How did it lose control? Because lijin (transit taxes) was simply too damn useful. To what extent? Zeng Guofan's Xiang Army used it, Li Hongzhuang's Huai Army used it, and later, all the viceroys and governors were using it. To what extent did it become common? Within a few years, the country's water and land thoroughfares were literally choked with checkpoints. For instance, when goods were shipped from Hankou to Shanghai, they were peeled and taxed dozens of times along the way. The early accumulation of national industry and commerce was thus squeezed dry. What was even more ruthless? Lijin was self-collected and self-spent by local authorities from day one, and the central government could only reach out for money afterward. The problem then became simple: whoever held the money held the troops, and loyalty belonged to whoever held the troops. This line continued all the way to 1900. Didn't Cixi act like an absolute moron back then, insisting on declaring war on eleven nations? As a result, the viceroys and governors of the southern provinces held a collective discussion and concluded that this old hag Cixi was completely insane and that this was an illegitimate order. We refuse all compliance. They then signed a treaty with foreigners on their own. This was the Mutual Protection of Southeast China. The Qing court's financial power and local loyalty were declared bankrupt in the exact same year.
There are two accounts in this, and they are fucking hilarious. The first account is the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. If you ask which government office in the late Qing Dynasty collected taxes the cleanest and had the least amount of corruption, it was indeed the Customs. Who was in charge? A British man named Robert Hart, who managed it for over forty years. The accounts of the Tax Department under Hart's leadership were the clearest in the entire Qing court, and the cultural practices he introduced were excellent; staff were paid high salaries and dared not embezzle, and customs duties rose from a few million taels to tens of millions, eventually becoming the most reliable purse for the late Qing. So, think about it: it's not that the Chinese don't know how to collect taxes, but that any lucrative position placed within this system will be hollowed out within three years. Only by moving it outside the system and letting the British manage it could it survive. The second account is even more ruthless. After the First Sino-Japanese War, there were indemnities to pay, right? The late Qing wanted to learn from civilized nations and issue bonds—borrowing money from their own people—and gave it a very decent name: Zhaoxin Stocks. Zhaoxin meant 'inviting trust.' As a result, without a parliament, without property rights protection, and without so-called voluntary subscription, it turned into forced apportionment once it reached the local level. Consequently, whether it was merchants or residents, they looked at it and thought, 'Fuck, this isn't buying bonds, this is paying a fine!' There was no choice, and the attitude was very clear: avoid it if you can. The bond issue, with a target of 100 million, ended up collecting only one or two percent. A bond called 'Zhaoxin' thus became the tombstone of the late Qing's credit. This is what we call a structural deadlock under a zero-sum game. You see, whether it's national debt or customs, the tools themselves are good, but as long as they are grafted onto unchecked power, national debt inevitably becomes forced apportionment.
Of course, the late Qing couldn't swallow this. In 1911, the Regent Zaifeng and his group of young nobles first created a 'Royal Cabinet,' and then did something fucking stupid: they announced the nationalization of trunk railway lines. The actual goal was to take the Chuan-Han Railway, which had been funded by private capital in Sichuan, and make it state-owned—or rather, take it back for the court—and then turn around and borrow 6 million pounds from the Four-Nation Banking Consortium, intending to replace private shares with foreign debt, without any intention of returning the hard-earned capital of the Sichuan people. With such a robbery, the Railway Protection Movement broke out. As soon as shots were fired in Chengdu, the Hubei New Army was immediately transferred to Sichuan to suppress the chaos, leaving the defense of Wuchang empty. From the first shot on the streets of Chengdu to Puyi's abdication, it took only five months. Remember this way the late Qing died: it wasn't poor that killed it, it was the centralization of power that killed it.
Finally, this last account is the most painful one: the Republic of China. On August 19, 1948, Nanjing issued an emergency financial and economic decree. The content of this decree was simple: issue the Gold Yuan. One Gold Yuan was worth 3 million of the old Legal Tender. Actually, when the Legal Tender was issued in 1935, it was a decent currency, at least it could be pegged to serious currencies like the British Pound and the US Dollar. But in just thirteen years, military spending burned it all into waste paper. Some studies estimate that military spending in the later period accounted for more than 60% of fiscal expenditure. The bond reform also included a ruthless move: a mandatory deadline for the forced exchange of private gold, silver, and foreign currency. If you failed to turn them in by the deadline, you would be charged with disrupting the financial order. By the way, the chief designer of this plan was the Minister of Finance, Wang Yunwu. You would never guess his background: he was the boss of the Commercial Press. Hey, that famous four-corner indexing method for looking up characters was invented by him. A man who taught all Chinese people how to use a dictionary designed a currency that taught all Chinese people how to go bankrupt. Funny, right? It wasn't just him being a fucking idiot; the entire Kuomintang system at the time was absurd. By 1948, those who really knew what they were doing had either already fucking run away or didn't dare to touch this mess. I won't even mention others; just take T.V. Soong. T.V. Soong was at least a Harvard-educated economist, right? But by that time, he and Chiang Kai-shek were completely at odds. What was T.V. Soong doing then? He hadn't left the officialdom; he was the Chairman of Guangdong Province. He neither participated in the design of this currency reform nor was optimistic about it. At such a time, only two types of people dared to sign their names on the edge of a cliff: either the ignorant who didn't know the depth of the water, or people like Wang Yunwu who had no choice but to be the scapegoat.
So who handed over the gold? According to archival research, in just two months, the Kuomintang government confiscated over 1.6 million taels of gold from the public, along with silver and foreign currency worth nearly 200 million US dollars. At that time, it was the gold standard; US dollars were truly US dollars. Who were the people who handed over the gold? They were teachers, clerks, doctors, and small business owners in Shanghai—the urban middle class. As for the speculative tycoons and the powerful capital, they had long since converted their money into US dollars and moved it into accounts in Hong Kong and New York, exactly the same thing the CCP elites are doing today. Look at this screening mechanism again; does it look familiar? Remember, whether it's regulation or forced exchange, who is this knife naturally aimed at? It's aimed at the urban middle class, because only the wealth of the middle class is denominated in local currency, fully registered, accessible, and impossible to run away with.
To prop up this Gold Yuan, Chiang Kai-shek really went all out and sent Chiang Ching-kuo straight to Shanghai. As mentioned in older episodes, from late August to early November 1948, Chiang Ching-kuo served as an economic supervisor in Shanghai to "beat the tigers." Why did he go to beat tigers? Mainly to establish authority and build public trust for the Gold Yuan. In the end, authority was not established, and the trust he tried to build ended up smashing right back into his own face with the Yangtze Development Corporation case. At the time, in order to show his might, Chiang Ching-kuo arrested more than 60 prominent figures in the business community one after another, including who? Including Du Yuesheng's son. Yes, even Du Yuesheng's son was locked up. Then Chiang Ching-kuo even organized an overwhelmingly massive parade to purge unscrupulous merchants or something like that? Well, I forgot. Consequently, Shanghai truly believed it at that time, and commodity prices were indeed suppressed for more than 70 days, over two months, until Chiang Ching-kuo ran into the Yangtze Development Corporation—this Yangtze company. Ironically enough, the person who handed over the knife was none other than Du Yuesheng. After his son was arrested, Du Yuesheng pulled strings, but couldn't get him out, which naturally left him deeply displeased. However, when this godfather of Shanghai spoke at a business community meeting, he neither quarreled nor made a scene; he simply said a few words in a leisurely manner. What was the gist? The gist was: if my son broke the law, I will not shield him; you handle it however you should. But since you, Chiang Ching-kuo, want to put on this show of being completely impartial, well, the whole of Shanghai knows just how much goods the Yangtze Development Corporation has hoarded; presumably, you will treat them equally without discrimination, right? Hearing this, the whole room fell dead silent. A mob boss publicly checkmated the crown prince in the name of the rule of law. And who was the boss of the Yangtze Development Corporation? His name was David Kung (Kung Ling-kan), the son of H. H. Kung and the direct nephew of Soong Mei-ling.
From then on, the script played out so fast people couldn't even react. Right after Chiang Ching-kuo detained David Kung, Soong Mei-ling immediately flew to Shanghai. At that time, Soong Mei-ling even called back Chiang Kai-shek, who was in the United States asking for money. As soon as Chiang Kai-shek returned, he lashed out right in Chiang Ching-kuo's face, saying things like: why did you target your own family? The moment Chiang Ching-kuo heard this from Chiang Kai-shek, he knew at once that the Gold Yuan was completely doomed. After walking out the door, he broke down and wailed loudly. What was the political slogan for the Gold Yuan at the time? That the powerful elites and ordinary commoners would be measured by the same ruler. In the end, this political advertisement was torn to shreds by this single Yangtze case. Forced with no other choice, on October 1, all price caps were compelled to be canceled. On that day, panic buying erupted across the entire city of Shanghai; the price of rice changed every day, skyrocketing by leaps and bounds. Citizens rushed into rice shops carrying sacks full of banknotes, and even coffin shops were bought out completely. Later on, coffin shop owners were left with no choice; they had to go inspect your house first to see if someone had actually passed away, or else they wouldn't sell you a coffin. Just imagine: hoarding of goods had already reached such an extreme. For the working class, it was the most brutal; a lifetime's savings evaporated to zero in just a few weeks. Then on October 6, Chiang Ching-kuo published an announcement in newspapers bidding farewell to all Shanghai citizens, admitting the failure of the Gold Yuan. And from the issuance of the Gold Yuan to the fall of Nanjing, it took only 8 months.
This matter didn't end there; the most ruthless scene came afterward. Think about it: where did the more than 1.6 million taels of gold that Shanghai citizens lined up to hand over actually go? Late on the night of December 1, 1948, martial law was declared all along the Shanghai Bund. The vault doors of the Central Bank of China opened in the dead of night, and lines of coolies carrying shoulder poles carried box after box of gold bars onto a customs anti-smuggling cutter. There was no announcement, no news. How was this discovered? Well, it just so happened that a British journalist's office faced right across the Bund, and he happened to witness it: China's gold reserves were being carried away box by box by coolies using the most ancient method, and the ship's destination was Taiwan. Through months of batch transportations afterward, according to archival estimates, the total amount of gold transported away wasn't all that much—not all the gold as the fucking Communist Party claimed, but just about 125 tons. If we straighten out this entire chain: in the name of currency reform, using the rhetorical phrasing of patriotism, the Nationalist Government collected gold bars from the hands of the citizens, and then a few chieftains loaded them onto ships—which indeed prepared an escape route for themselves later. But what ordinary people surrendered was their entire family fortune, while what Old Chiang loaded onto the ships was his travel allowance for running away. Why don't I have much fondness for the Kuomintang? It fucking pulled off a stunt where your gold bars became their tickets to abandon that very ship. Therefore, from start to finish, this so-called reform by the Kuomintang was merely a recorded and receipted confiscation. So they were just thugs as well, only not as deeply thuggish as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
I must also take a jab at Chiang Kai-shek himself here. This Generalissimo had a very famous habit when governing: he loved writing personal directives. There are tens of thousands of his handwritten directives in the existing archives. For instance, he would directly command division-level units as a theater commander, and to bypass the bureaucratic system he didn't trust, he maintained a private agency called the Office of the Aide-de-Camp. How powerful was this office? It was so powerful that people at the time compared it to the Grand Council of the Qing Dynasty. This office even controlled all communications for national company radio stations. Yet, this core of the core was infiltrated by two underground CCP members, the Duan brothers, one after another! Basically, the CCP's intelligence at the time could reach directly under Chiang's bed. Once a dictator loses trust in the system, what does he become superstitious about? He becomes superstitious about his inner circle. And it turns out, that inner circle is the dictator's greatest vulnerability.
Then the new formula emerges. Economically, if you use the gun to oppose the laws of price, and organizationally, you use a private clique to hollow out the state apparatus—if you do both of these things at the same time, that is the eight-month recipe for the Kuomintang. Once these four ledgers are opened, the pathology becomes very easy to understand. An authoritarian regime in China has only three sources of money: taxation, sharing growth, and borrowing. Borrowing is spending the future in advance, and the end result is printing money and confiscation—which is cutting into the existing stock. All four dynasties followed the same script: when growth is gone, they spend the future; when the future is overdrawn, they take the knife to the existing stock. And the piece of meat in the existing stock that is easiest to cut is always the middle class. Why? Because at the time, farmers could at least retreat to a state of self-sufficiency, and the powerful could flee across borders. Only the middle class has their wealth entirely locked into visible and tangible accounts and property deeds. Therefore, whether it is hyperinflation, forced exchange, or even extreme deflation, it is essentially a harvester aimed at the middle class. Oh, right, this machine also has a bonus feature—don't forget—it also grinds up the people who repair the machine. Look at this list: Liu Yan was killed by Yang Yan, and Yang Yan was put to death just a year later. The year after Qian Jiang invented the lijin (transit tax) system, he was finished off by his superiors. Wang Yunwu stepped down carrying the blame for the Gold Yuan notes, and even Chiang Ching-kuo had to publish a public apology. Everyone who truly tried to fix the fiscal system was swallowed by the system, right? Because the real solution to fiscal problems requires touching the power structure. But can an authoritarian government do that? It cannot. The methods that could actually solve the fiscal problems would first cut not into the wallets of the common people, but into the power structure itself. Therefore, the authoritarian system only allows for the existence of fake solutions, which forms what? A structural deadlock. And the tipping point for the collapse of a regime is precisely the moment when the middle class and the grassroots bureaucracy—the two basic pillars—are completely harvested.
So, it is never the poorest people who crush a dynasty, but those whose property has been confiscated. Now, let's stack this historical negative against the reality of 2026, one layer at a time. First, let's stack the Jianghuai blood transfusion line. This year, the central government's transfer payments to local governments exceeded 10 trillion yuan, breaking the 10 trillion mark for four consecutive years. Where does the money come from? Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai—you can count them on your fingers. Guangdong alone contributed over a trillion yuan to the central government in a year, but the transfer payments it received back were only about 260 billion, a net transfusion of nearly 800 billion. And on the receiving end, Sichuan Province took over 680 billion in a year. Does this structure look familiar? The tax collection from the forty-eight towns and eight circuits of the Cloud and International Department—isn't it all the same structure? What's even more interesting is that this year, the central government's deficit accounted for 86% of the national total. Translated, this means that even this equilibrium is just a facade created by central government borrowing. At least the Tang Dynasty could rely on the eight circuits of the southeast, but today the CCP can only rely on the six southeastern provinces plus the national debt printing press. In other words, the CCP's blood transfusion line is even thinner than the one in the Tang Dynasty.
Let's stack the Yangzhou Fairy Temple layer. There's no need to talk about land finance; it's already dead. Revenue from land sales has been slashed at the knees since 2021, falling by nearly 30% in the first five months of this year alone. It has been declining for five consecutive years, and the faster it falls, the worse it gets. How do local governments fill this hole? History gives the answer as the lijin system; reality gives the answer as "ocean fishing" (extortionate law enforcement). A while ago, a law enforcement recording was exposed. Someone from a market supervision bureau in a Shandong county called a company in Hebei, and what they said was fucking honest. They said they had a 50 million quota this year, and they had only completed 21 million, leaving a 29 million gap. Now, fines must have quotas, and there are revenue-generating tasks for handling cases. Isn't this just electronic lijin?
What's even more fucking impressive is what these black-clad thugs are doing in batches now: arresting fucking web novel authors. How crazy is it? Police from a county in Hebei crossed provinces for thousands of kilometers to arrest authors writing novels on overseas websites in batches. They arrested over 50 people in one county. What for? Just for that bit of royalties. These fucking black-clad dogs call royalties "illegal gains" and then add fines on top—this is all cold, hard fiscal income. And you can see that the greater the fiscal pressure in a place, the faster the confiscation revenue rises. It was exactly the same in the late Qing Dynasty, wasn't it?
Then look at the reaction in the coastal regions now. A police station in Hangzhou posted a notice directly at its entrance, stating that police from other provinces are not allowed to enter local enterprises to handle cases without being accompanied by local police. Later, the three provinces and one city in the Yangtze River Delta simply issued a joint document, establishing a regional joint defense mechanism to prevent cross-regional illegal law enforcement. This is essentially the police station version of the 'Mutual Protection of the Southeast' (Dongnan Hubao).
Next, let's play the 'Emperor Toghon Temür' card. You might say there is no hyperinflation right now, so the inflation script doesn't fit. This is correct, and it is also where the current CCP system is even more insidious than Emperor Toghon Temür. They don't stupidly start by printing ten times the currency; doing that is just too obvious. But how does the CCP do it? They secretly stuff bad debts into the balance sheets of commercial banks, not only stuffing in toxic assets but also suppressing interest rates on the government side. This has caused risk pricing to fail completely. Now, the net interest margin of commercial banks has been driven down to 1.2%, and the non-performing loan ratio is still rising sharply even with such cover-ups. The Zhongbang Bank in Wuhan collapsed a couple of days ago. This is just moving Emperor Toghon Temür's extreme money printing under the table; they are actually doing the same thing. What does the CCP want to do now? It is quietly siphoning off seigniorage every year from the 150 trillion yuan deposit pool of the common people. A rough calculation shows that one percentage point is in the magnitude of over 1.5 trillion yuan. Emperor Toghon Temür had it rougher, with deficits plus super-taxation, diluting half the value overnight. What is the CCP doing? It is slowly and steadily sucking about 3% from you every year. The tools are of the same origin, just with different dosages. I gave it a name: the 'Chronic Gold Yuan Coupon.' So you see a strange phenomenon now: macroscopically, there is a flood of liquidity, but microscopically, everyone is short of money. Where did the money go? It went to pay off debts, and to support this gang of the CCP's imperial court.
Let's play the 'Anti-Corruption' card. What did the Kuomintang use to control prices in 1948? It was the Military Statistics Bureau (Juntong) and the police stations, just like how the CCP uses the Ministry of State Security (MSS) to manage the economy today. Look, after 2023, those CCP cadres have really turned themselves into dogs, biting frantically as if everything is their business. The CCP's 'Dog Official Department' publicly issued a document defining 'talking down the economy' as endangering national security, and then they arrested an analyst from a legal inspection firm, gagged these people, and arrested bloggers. This is a common tactic: when monetary tools and fiscal tools all fail, a regime like the CCP can only rely on intelligence agencies to maintain market information. And at this point, the entire system has completely degenerated. How has it degenerated? It has devolved from market incentives to high-pressure stability maintenance (weiwen). Chiang Kai-shek's initial governance was just a different way of saying it; now it has become 'personally commanding, personally deploying.' And this circle is also shrinking in radius. Who was Chiang's radius of employment back then? It was his fellow townsmen from Fenghua plus the Whampoa clique students. How are the idiots doing it now? It has just been replaced by the 'Zhejiang New Army' old-guard system. Once this organizational structure is formed, crises are no longer the problem, because any crisis will always be diagnosed as a loyalty issue, not a mechanism issue. Therefore, the prescription is always to strengthen control, not to open up prices.
Price caps also have their counterparts; doesn't real estate have a 'limit on price drops'? You are not allowed to lower prices, and the result is that prices haven't dropped thoroughly, but the trading volume died first. So what is the result? The market will inevitably execute the prohibited price discovery through the death of liquidity. This is an economic law that does not shift according to human will; only the form is different. In 1948, it appeared in the form of hyperinflation; now it appears in the form of balance sheet deflation. By the way, the CCP's bureaucratic system is also being backlashed. Everyone can see that since this year, whether it's planes crashing into buildings or whatever, nothing has been effectively stopped. Economically, how many tools has the CCP pushed since this year? Are they useful? Not at all. Below, they can only mindlessly increase the pressure or simply lie flat (tangping). So the situation now is very obvious: nominally it is still highly centralized, but the actual loss cost of instructions is just outrageously large. The reason is also very easy to understand: since you have elevated economic management to a political level, who can turn it back at this point? No one can. Either they listen to you, or they just don't do anything. So don't fantasize about the CCP launching any effective policies; nothing works now.
So how exactly is the public finance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) going to rot all the way down? Let me state first: the following deduction is based on historical structures and current data, not fortune-telling. Let's rule out one option first: an immediate 1948 scenario. I don't think that will happen, after all, the national foundation is different. In 1948, the Nationalist Government's foreign exchange and gold reserves had hit rock bottom, it was fighting a full-scale civil war, and inflation had completely spiraled out of control. Today, the regime of the CCP at least still has over 3 trillion US dollars on the books, but the amount actually available is far less than that. Therefore, what it currently resembles most is not Nanjing in 1948, but Chang'an in 807: the core tax base is dying on a massive scale. However, the blood transfusion tubes are still there, and the monopolistic state-owned enterprises are still there. In other words, it has the foundation to drag things out, but dragging has a time limit, and at most it can only be dragged until between 2032 and 2034. Why do I say this? Two figures explain the problem better than anything else. Last year's newborn population dropped to 7.92 million, which ranks among the worst in nearly a century if evaluated by decline.
Then look at the debt balance of the household sector, which has experienced negative growth for the first time in 30 years. Ordinary people are no longer borrowing money, and enterprises are no longer borrowing money either. Not only are they not borrowing money, but people are no longer buying houses, and they are not having children. This is pricing the future with their feet. But note that these are still only slow variables; what is truly ruthless? It is the inversion of the CCP's pension system. If this demographic and labor structure continues, it simply cannot survive past 2034. Therefore, the main storyline has a high probability of going like this: I call it the digitized Tang Dynasty. Further down, the confiscation economy will transition from an unwritten rule to a system-default allocation, and departments with punitive powers will inevitably take on revenue-generation targets. Now, what is also among the most dangerous? It is county-level finance. The regime of the CCP will definitely start rotting from the grassroots level. Why say this? Because the internal system of the CCP also distributes wealth according to the size of power or the proximity to the center of power; those far away die first, and those close die later.
To elaborate further on the relationship between the southeast and the central authorities, it will enter a state of surface obedience and private interception. Didn't the fucking brother keep boasting about the so-called unified national market? Under such circumstances of mutual precaution, how can this thing ever get off the ground? This is typical financial Balkanization. The middle class will most likely not be wiped out overnight, but you never know when the CCP will suffer a sudden fracture. However, one thing is certain: every year you will have 3% of your interest spread drained, while you are dragged down by steadily declining housing prices, and on top of that, you must bear the reality that your children graduate right into unemployment.
In fact, what do the financial death knells of the Tang, Yuan, Qing, and Republic of China tell us? How fast the bell tolls does not depend on how badly things have rotted, but on the type of triggering event. If it is merely pure fiscal exhaustion, that is the Tang bell, measured in decades; if it is a currency credit crisis, that is the Yuan bell, measured in years; if it is forcibly reclaiming power against the current, that is the Qing bell, measured in months; if it is wartime financial plundering, that is the Republic bell, also measured in months. Currently, the latter three types of triggering events are still brewing and have already brewed into certain forms, but they are tightly suppressed by the CCP so they cannot spread, preventing people from seeing the truth. This is the sole reason why the CCP can still put on a facade of stability.
Therefore, what we truly need to keep our eyes on is not that fucking Emperor You Xi and his GDP growth of five percent, nor his data on being a size-five battery enthusiast. Let me tell you, these are all signals that everyone can clearly see. In fact, some of them have already appeared, they just haven't deeply fermented yet. For example, the black uniforms of the police (Public Security), procuratorates, courts, and SWAT police have experienced organized wage arrears that can no longer be covered up. What does this mean? Their sustenance line has broken. These people are the final wall of the regime of the CCP. For another example, large cash withdrawals require approval, and your real-name quotas for buying gold and foreign exchange will get tighter and tighter. This is a typical fence closing in, and it is happening now, just not yet expanded. If one day the wages and pensions of the CCP are forcibly distributed using digital currency, shifting from optional to mandatory, that will mean the CCP is definitely about to make a move. What else should we watch? It is the continuous widening of the exchange rate gap between offshore and onshore, and the next US dollar cycle. If you see hundreds of billions of US dollars fleeing within a month, those are the people running away, the smart ones who have won.
So the point in time where we are standing right now is precisely the Yuan dynasty clock, which is ten years into the reign, after the plenum has concluded, and after Lusi Cheng has been demoted and exiled from the capital. This character has already started moving. Who is the accelerator clock? It is the Republic of China clock, right? What are the characteristics of the Republic of China clock? In fact, its mainspring has only one, which is war. Why did the Gold Yuan have to be issued in 1948? Because military spending had already hollowed out the public finance, and not issuing it left no other choice. The same logic applies to today. If this fucking brother dares to attack Taiwan, then the financing demand of the Chinese Communist Party coupled with capital flight will inevitably spiral out of control, and the Republic of China clock will start ticking. This is an obvious issue. If this fucking brother dares to take action across the Taiwan Strait, sanctions will immediately hit home. Whether it is your foreign exchange reserves, your trade surplus, or your exports, these three blood transfusion tubes will fail simultaneously within a few months, and this will instantly wipe out the gap between the entire family fortune of the Chinese Communist Party in 1948 and today in one fell swoop. Even following the Chinese Communist Party's current delaying tactics, dragging it out to between 2032 and 2034, the financial contribution from the southeast still cannot erase the massive fiscal tail of the Chinese Communist Party's pensions and stability maintenance. At this time, the Chinese Communist Party will still inevitably drift toward the Republic of China clock, or at the very least, toward the Mongol Yuan clock.
To summarize the entire deduction in one sentence, it is the most probable destiny of this regime: it wants to live like the Tang dynasty, but its governance costs are far higher than those of the Tang dynasty, so it can only die like the Republic of China.