Xi Jinping's Sister's Vault Picked Open! First Surrender Wang Hong's Knife, Then Raid Qiaoqiao's Accounts; 5 Days After Ma Xingrui's Expulsion, the President of China Development Bank is Caught [Jiang Feng's Horizon 20260720 Episode 440]
The video focuses on personnel changes within Wang Xiaohong's public security system and the trajectory of cases following the investigations into Ma Xingrui, Ouyang Weimin, and others. The content reviews the deaths of Huang Ruixue and Zhang Anjiang, the transfer of Tan Quan to Chongqing, reports that Guangdong Public Security Department Chief Liu Guozhou has been detained, the replacement of the Guangdong Organization Department head and the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee Secretary, and further investigates the relationship between China Development Bank loans, Shenzhen Metro properties, and Qi Qiaoqiao and Deng Jiagui.
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Today, we are going to dismantle a house-raiding technique that the CCP has used for years: first, disarm the gatekeeper, then open the master's ledger.
On July 15, Sichuan Provincial Public Security Department Chief Huang Ruixue suddenly fell ill and passed away in Chengdu that night, just after returning from a meeting in Nanjing; he was only 54. On May 7, Chongqing Public Security Bureau Chief Zhang Anjiang also died of a sudden illness according to official reports, at the age of 55. Two provincial-level public security chiefs in two months, with the same cause of death, and behind both of them stood Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong.
The day after Huang Ruixue died, on July 16, the State Council issued a dismissal notice, removing Wang Xiaohong's subordinate, Assistant Minister Tan Quan. Two days later, these eyes that had been watching Wang Xiaohong within the ministry were parachuted directly into Chongqing, prepared to take over the public security system left behind by Zhang Anjiang. Wang Xiaohong still holds the title of Minister, but he now only has the scabbard, not the blade.
Why the rush to disarm him? Because someone is prying open the safe of the First Family.
On July 14, former Guangdong Governor Ma Xingrui was expelled from the Party and public office. Just five days later, yesterday, on Sunday, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection suddenly announced that former China Development Bank President Ouyang Weimin had fallen. Ma Xingrui once managed major projects in Guangdong, and Ouyang Weimin later oversaw policy-based loans nationwide. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is following the trail, leading all the way to Shenzhen.
The current Emperor's own sister, Qi Qiaoqiao, and brother-in-law, Deng Jiagui, used the prime land of Shenzhen back in the day to pull off "empty-glove white-wolf" schemes, securing the most prosperous golden subway properties, all of which relied on Ma Xingrui's local projects and the policy-based funds managed by Ouyang Weimin.
Huang Ruixue, who passed away this time, was no ordinary local public security cadre. He worked for a long time in the General Office of the Ministry of Public Security, serving as secretary to the Ministry Party Committee and Director of the General Office; he was the chief steward for the Minister. Three successive ministers—Guo Shengkun, Zhao Kezhi, and Wang Xiaohong—had a vast amount of internal documentation and personnel relations pass through his hands.
In June 2022, Wang Xiaohong officially took office as Minister of Public Security. That same month, Huang Ruixue was appointed Vice Governor of Sichuan Province and Chief of the Public Security Department. This arrangement fits Wang Xiaohong's management style: send a chief steward who has followed him in the ministry for years to a populous province. Beijing controls the main system, and there is someone in Sichuan controlling the local "knife handle," creating a reliable communication line between the central and local authorities.
On July 14 and 15, Wang Xiaohong presided over a symposium of national public security department and bureau chiefs in Nanjing, where the chiefs of public security from various provinces gathered. Huang Ruixue returned to Chengdu after the meeting and passed away that night, causing the Sichuan public security system to lose a key official with deep ties to Wang Xiaohong.
Zhang Anjiang from Chongqing had already left ahead of time, dying suddenly of illness on May 7. The position of Chongqing Public Security Bureau chief that he left behind had been vacant for more than two months. On July 16, Tan Quan was removed from his post as Assistant Minister of Public Security; on July 18, he appeared in Chongqing.
Tan Quan had been in the leadership echelon of the Ministry of Public Security for only nine months and had not established an independent factional base within the public security system. He resembled more of a technical cadre executing tasks assigned by higher-ups. Keeping such a person in the Ministry of Public Security allowed for observation of Wang Xiaohong; transferring him to Chongqing allowed for taking over the system, cases, and network of relationships left behind by Zhang Anjiang.
Sichuan and Chongqing were originally controlled by two officials closely tied to Wang Xiaohong. Now, one has passed away and the other has left a vacancy, and the successors are being replaced by a different set of personnel. Local public security can no longer guarantee taking action solely on the orders of Wang Xiaohong.
Similar changes have occurred in Guangdong. Overseas reports indicated that Guangdong Public Security Department Chief Liu Guozhou was suspended and placed under control around July 12. When Wang Xiaohong served as the Beijing Public Security Bureau chief, Liu Guozhou was responsible for the organizational personnel of the Beijing public security system; later, he was transferred to Shenzhen as the Public Security Bureau chief, and subsequently promoted to Guangdong Public Security Department Chief.
Once Liu Guozhou faces trouble from this position, regarding past reports of who prevented the Qijia project from being registered and who tipped off relevant companies in advance, subordinates may spill the beans one by one out of self-preservation.
Another anomaly for Wang Xiaohong this year occurred in Southeast Asia. In mid-April, senior Chinese leadership traveled to Cambodia, with public agendas including cracking down on cross-border telecommunications fraud. Foreign Minister Wang Yi went, Defense Minister Dong Jun went, but Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, who oversees cross-border crimes, did not enter Cambodia. It is reported that he was called in for questioning by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection at that time.
On July 18, Xi Jinping met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet in Shanghai, personally announcing that the two sides would cooperate in cracking down on telecommunications and network fraud. In the past, the public security system could handle telecommunication fraud issues as ordinary cross-border crimes; now, the top leader has written it into the China-Cambodia summit talks. If investigators continue to trace the Chinese protectors of the industrial parks upward, they will have an open political mandate.
Meanwhile, overseas reports have long pointed to Wang Xiaohong himself as the ultimate mastermind behind Southeast Asia's cross-border black industry. The telecommunication fraud parks in Cambodia and Myanmar both fall under his protection network.
Sichuan's old steward passed away suddenly, Chongqing's vacancy was taken over by Tan Quan, the Guangdong Public Security Department chief is rumored to be under control, and the Cambodia telecommunication fraud protection chain has been elevated to a summit agenda. After these moves landed, Wang Xiaohong could still preside over meetings, accompany foreign guests, and publicly appear as the Minister of Public Security, but local public security chiefs could no longer be certain whether Wang Xiaohong could still protect them. The CCP's sword has truly begun to change hands.
Dismantling the public security network can only prevent people from continuing to suppress cases and leak tips. To open up Shenzhen's projects and financial archives, it is also necessary to control Guangdong's personnel authority. For local governments and key cities, this work did not just begin after Ma Xingrui's dual expulsion. From the end of last year to this summer, Guangdong's most important gateways have been replaced successively.
The first to be dismantled was Guo Yonghang, Ma Xingrui's trusted aide in Guangzhou. During Ma Xingrui's tenure as Governor of Guangdong, Guo Yonghang worked closely by his side for a long time, later serving as the Guangzhou Municipal Party Secretary, controlling the personnel, projects, and local resources of the provincial capital.
In March of this year, it was announced that Guo Yonghang was under investigation. For the governor's top aide to become the municipal party secretary of the provincial capital meant that he not only knew what Ma Xingrui had done, but could also mobilize an entire set of local cadres to handle subsequent issues for Ma Xingrui. With Guo Yonghang removed, Ma Xingrui's most reliable messenger and coordinator in Guangzhou disappeared first.
Subsequently, two cadres without local roots arrived in Guangdong. Hu Fan assumed office as the Head of the Organization Department of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, controlling the entry and exit points for cadres throughout the province. Who gets promoted to department chief, who is transferred to municipal party secretary, who enters the provincial party standing committee, and whose inspection materials are sent to Beijing all have to pass through the organization system.
In the past, local cadres in Guangdong judged their prospects by looking at Li Shulei's... [Note: referring to Huang Kunming] attitude. After Hu Fan entered, Guangdong cadres had to first consider who would ultimately deliver their materials to the central authorities. This is equivalent to taking away the official hats from Huang Kunming's hands in Guangdong. Provincial Party Secretary Huang Kunming can still chair meetings, but cannot guarantee that his nominated candidates will definitely be promoted; department chiefs and municipal party secretaries can still publicly express loyalty, but cannot guarantee that their past backers can block organizational investigations.
The second outside official, Jin Lei, was placed in the position of Party Secretary of Shenzhen. Shenzhen is a concentration of large state-owned enterprises, local financing platforms, real estate projects, Hong Kong-Macau capital channels, and Special Economic Zone policies. The core commercial assets of Qi Qiaoqiao and Deng Jiagui have also long been located in Shenzhen.
Placing someone without prior local connections in Shenzhen into the position of Party Secretary produced a very specific effect: municipal state-owned enterprises had to report to the new secretary, personnel files could be reorganized, and projects previously suppressed by local connections could have their case files pulled and reviewed by a new batch of people. The outside head of the Organization Department took over official appointments in Guangdong, while the outside Party Secretary took over the safe of Shenzhen.
Following this, investigations began to unfold simultaneously in multiple directions. On June 13, Yu Xiaoping was placed under investigation. He had previously served as Vice President of China Life, but his truly Shenzhen-related resume was that he had served as President of the Shenzhen Branch of the China Development Bank for seven consecutive years.
On June 22, Dai Beifang was expelled from the Party and dismissed from public office (dual expulsion). He was formerly the Chairman of the Shenzhen Municipal CPPCC and continued to serve as President of the Shenzhen Charity Association after retirement. The CPPCC and the charity association are important venues for officials, businessmen, and social funds to interact with one another.
On July 17, Wang Qiang was placed under investigation. He was formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee and Head of the United Front Work Department, interacting not only with democratic parties but also with private entrepreneurs, Hong Kong and Macao figures, chambers of commerce, and social organizations.
One controlled policy loans, one controlled CPPCC and charitable connections, and one controlled the networks of businessmen, Hong Kong-Macao affairs, and the United Front. The entry points of these investigations happened to cover several of the doors through which Shenzhen's hidden funds most frequently passed.
As for Guangdong Provincial Party Secretary Huang Kunming, rumors have been circulating outside the wall for several months that he is under investigation or facing restrictions. Although there is currently no public announcement proving that a case has been opened against him, you can see that the head of the Organization Department has been replaced, the Shenzhen Party Secretary has been replaced, Ma Xingrui's faction has fallen, and reports have emerged that the head of the Public Security Department has been placed under control. Even if Huang Kunming continues to make public appearances, it will be very difficult for him to prove to those under him that he can truly protect anyone.
After Ma Xingrui was placed under investigation on April 3, investigators were already able to examine the projects he handled in Shenzhen and Guangdong, the cadres he promoted, and the financial transactions associated with him. His dual expulsion on July 14 indicates that the main issues regarding Ma Xingrui himself have been largely investigated, and the case is being prepared for transfer to the judicial authorities.
Five days later, Ouyang Weimin, former President of the China Development Bank, was placed under investigation. Putting the resumes of these two men together makes it very clear what the investigators are looking to examine.
Ma Xingrui served as Party Secretary of Shenzhen and Governor of Guangdong, knowing which major projects were proposed by whom, who approved the land, who arranged state-owned enterprise cooperation, and which cadres opened doors for certain enterprises. Ouyang Weimin successively served as Vice Mayor of Guangzhou, Deputy Party Secretary of Guangzhou, and Vice Governor of Guangdong, later becoming President of the China Development Bank. He knew how these local projects secured policy loans, who made calls, and how much money the bank provided.
Next, investigators can cross-reference the projects approved by Ma Xingrui to see exactly how much in loans was granted and who ultimately benefited.
There is also another key figure at the Shenzhen end: Yu Xiaoping. From 2003 to 2010, she served for seven consecutive years as President of the Shenzhen Branch of the China Development Bank. After taking office, the Shenzhen Branch of the CDB signed a 30 billion yuan credit line agreement with the Shenzhen Municipal Government, and Longgang District alone obtained 19.8 billion yuan.
By 2004, the Shenzhen Municipal Government even hired the Shenzhen Branch of the CDB to act as its financial advisor. It was during this exact period that Yuanwei Industry, controlled by Qi Qiaoqiao and Deng Jiagui, acquired the properties built above the Dongmen Old Street Metro Station in Shenzhen.
When the project was approved in 2004, Shenzhen Metro Group held a 60% stake, and Yuanwei Industry held a 40% stake. In November 2011, as the building neared completion and was about to start collecting rent, Shenzhen Metro transferred all 60% of its shares to Yuanwei Industry.
When it was most costly and carried the highest risks, state-owned enterprises held the majority stake; when the project was about to become profitable, the state-owned enterprises withdrew, and the Qi family took over all the equity.
In 2012, Bloomberg disclosed these asset changes based on business registration data. Investigators are now able to put the materials of the three individuals together: ask Ma Xingrui who approved this project; ask Yu Xiaoping how much money the Shenzhen branch lent to related subway, real estate, and local platform projects; and ask Ouyang Weimin how these loans were subsequently handled at the headquarters of the China Development Bank.
Once these pieces are secured, they translate into a very specific arrangement: the government builds the subway, the bank provides the funds, and state-owned enterprises bear the early-stage risks; once the project starts making a profit, the leaders' family members take over the shares and the profits.
Why did Wang Xiaohong's public security network have to be dismantled first? Because before these documents were placed on the table, as long as someone leaked information in advance, the relevant companies would have time to transfer money, change personnel, and destroy materials. Therefore, the gatekeepers first had to be stripped of their ability to leak information and suppress cases, before investigators could examine bank accounts, state-owned enterprise accounts, and corporate accounts.
At this stage, Ma Xingrui is merely the first person required to hand over the project list. Ouyang Weimin and Yu Xiaoping’s role is to match the projects approved by Ma Xingrui with the funds provided by the China Development Bank.
The ones who will ultimately have to face the music are the First Family, who took that building, took 60% of the shares, and took 20 years of revenue. This family’s name has not yet appeared in any official notices, but the investigators have already arrived at their doorstep. We can watch together the day they knock on the door.