Fang Lian Profiles: How to Become President by Playing Dumb? 1983-2007, See How Xi Jinping Fooled Everyone by Playing Dumb!
This video outlines the promotion path of Xi Jinping from 1983 to 2007, focusing on three key turning points. First, in 1983, driven by veterans such as Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, the Youth Cadre Bureau was established to cultivate successors, screening a list for the "Third Echelon." Xi Jinping was selected based on his red-heir background and traits of enduring hardship, marking the starting point of his political career. Subsequently, with the promotion of his father, Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping rose rapidly, though he was temporarily demoted when his patron fell. In 1997, during the Central Committee elections, Xi Jinping ranked low in votes, barely squeezing in as an alternate member, forming a sharp contrast with Li Keqiang, who was riding high at the same time. The second turning point was the Yuanhua smuggling case in 1999, where Xi Jinping caught the attention of Jiang Zemin's faction due to his perceived incorruptibility in the case, and with the promotion of Zeng Qinghong, he achieved a "triple jump" into the ranks of the Central Committee. The third turning point was the downfall of Chen Liangyu in 2006, which was seen as the result of infighting between the Communist Youth League faction and the Jiang faction, providing Xi Jinping with an opportunity to exploit the system. Ultimately, under the maneuvers of the Jiang faction, Xi Jinping won the highest number of votes in the 2007 17th Party Congress Politburo member election, surpassing Li Keqiang, establishing his status as the successor, and completing his path to ultimate power.
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The Chinese Communist Party now has a leader like Xi Jinping, who has thoroughly purged the top, middle, and bottom tiers of the entire Party, as well as all various factions. I believe that those who chose Xi Jinping back then must now deeply regret it. So, speaking of this, a question naturally arises: who on earth chose Xi Jinping back then? How did Xi Jinping climb to the position of General Secretary of the state? Hello everyone, I am Toronto Fang Lian from Infinite Connection. In this episode, we try to gather public reports from major media outlets and well-known journalists, adopting a non-rumor-mongering stance to review Xi Jinping's promotion path and see who promoted him. Of course, after watching this video, you will also understand why Hu Jintao was destined to be carried out. I think looking at Xi Jinping's entire promotion path, there are three major turning points or opportunities. The first opportunity among them began in 1983.
At this time, Mao had not been dead for long, and Mao's various governance achievements truly gave veterans like Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Xi Zhongxun psychological trauma. Therefore, after Mao's death and after they seized power, they gathered together to hold a meeting and decided to abolish the system of lifelong tenure for leaders. Of course, abolishing lifelong tenure means not only that the top leader must hand over power, but you still need to cultivate successors—even successors for ten, twenty, or thirty years down the road. To better screen successors, according to the description of former Organization Department cadre Yan Huai, as early as 1982, the Organization Department had already established a Youth Cadre Bureau specifically to screen young cadres.
At the same time, the Youth Cadre Bureau also followed the standards of the Four Modernizations—namely, being revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and specialized—and drew up a third-tier roster of 1,068 people. The political weight of this list was extremely high; what was it equivalent to? It was equivalent to a roster of chosen elite disciples from a martial arts sect. After entering this list, the cadres' promotion speed was extremely fast. Later on, senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party also basically all came from this list. For instance, among the 17th and 18th Politburo Standing Committees, there were a total of 14 people, and only Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao were not on this list; the other 12 people all came from this third tier.
Of course, Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao not making the list was not because they were not outstanding enough, but because the two of them already held certain official ranks back in 1983 and no longer fell under the category of disciples, which was why they were not added to this third-tier roster of CCP chosen disciples. So joining this list was naturally extremely important for Xi Jinping; it could be said that this was the starting point of everything for him. If Xi Jinping had failed to be selected back then, then later on—let alone General Secretary—even becoming a provincial party secretary would likely have had nothing to do with him. So should Xi Jinping have been selected for this list? From a theoretical standpoint, regarding the Four Modernizations of being revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and specialized, Xi Jinping arguably only met two of them: being revolutionary and young. At that time, Xi Jinping was just turning 30, so he was indeed young enough. Coming from a red-aristocracy background, he was also sufficiently revolutionary. However, with his primary-school-level education and a doctorate, he had virtually nothing to do with being specialized or knowledgeable.
However, if you change your perspective and look at it from the perspective of China's national conditions, his entry onto this list was entirely reasonable and logical; in fact, no one was more suitable than him. First of all, Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongxun, as an elder of the reform and opening up, had his status right there—what was wrong with me getting one or two of my kids in? Moreover, among Xi Zhongxun and Qi Xin's four children, Xi Qiaoqiao and Xi An'an were daughters, and under the traditional mindset of the older generation, females were simply unsuited for a political career. As for Xi Jinping, looking at his subsequent career trajectory, he was single-mindedly focused on doing business and emigrated early on, meaning that among the four children, only Xi Jinping had political ambitions. Thus, Xi Zhongxun naturally had to pull every string to elevate Xi Jinping. On the other hand, Xi Jinping's own performance stood out relatively well among a bunch of princelings. Before 1982, Xi Jinping served as the secretary to the then-Minister of National Defense, Geng Biao. Of course, this secretarial post was also traded for by his father. After he became Geng Biao's secretary, Xi Zhongxun then arranged a position for Geng Biao's daughter. But by 1982, Xi Jinping decided to go to a county in Hebei, Zhengding County, to serve as the deputy county party secretary and temper himself.
Although this parachuted-in deputy county party secretary who relied on his father made Gao Yang, the then-party secretary of Hebei Province, extremely dissatisfied, this move—at first glance—looked utterly idiotic and should have been a total deduction of points. But you have to see who he was being compared against. At that time, most princelings either chose not to enter politics and remained pure playboys, or even if they did enter politics, they were completely unwilling to endure hardship. If you wanted to be a county magistrate and couldn't get it, others were handed a county magistrate position by their families, yet they didn't even want it. Among dozens of princelings, apart from Xi Jinping, only Liu Shaoqi's son, Liu Yuan, was willing to go down to the countryside to serve as an official. Therefore, compared against this list of a thousand chosen elites, no one willing to endure hardship had a more formidable background than Xi Jinping, and out of those with a stronger background than Xi Jinping, not a single one could endure as much hardship as him. Consequently, Xi Jinping naturally deserved to be selected for this third tier, and he was also the best candidate chosen for it. After entering the third tier, Xi Jinping entered a period of steady cultivation and growth. On June 15, 1985, Xi Jinping, who had been working at the grassroots level for not long, welcomed a massive birthday gift for his 32nd birthday.
When you are celebrating your 32nd birthday and still pondering whether to splurge a little on a PS5 or splurge a lot on an RTX 5090 graphics card to reward yourself, 32-year-old Xi Jinping had already received his birthday present: the position of member of the Xiamen Municipal Party Standing Committee and Vice Mayor. On the very day of his birthday, having worked at the grassroots level in Hebei for only two years, Xi Jinping made a sudden leap in his official career to become Vice Mayor of Xiamen, becoming one of the youngest officials at the deputy-廳-level (deputy bureau director) and above nationwide at the time. Of course, Xi Jinping being able to receive such a gift was inseparable from the backing of his father, Xi Zhongxun. According to reports by the official media *Study Times*, Xi Jinping's promotion to Vice Mayor of Xiamen could not have happened without two people: one was He Zai, then-director of the Cadre Review Bureau of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, who recommended Xi Jinping to Hu Yaobang; and the other was Xiang Nan, then-party secretary of Fujian Province who was responsible for receiving him. Both of these men had close ties to Xi Zhongxun. Among them, He Zai was responsible for redressing the Liu Zhidan case that had overthrown Xi Zhongxun, and was an old acquaintance of Xi Zhongxun; whereas Xiang Nan's father, Xiang Yunian, had served twice alongside Xi Zhongxun in the Northwest, representing a family friendship spanning generations with the Xi family. Xi Jinping's ability to take this step forward was clearly reliant on his father and his father's old connections.
But since he was promoted so quickly, why do I still call this period a stable one? As the saying goes, success is due to Xiao He, and failure is also due to Xiao He; success is due to Xi Zhongxun, and failure is also due to Xi Zhongxun. At this time, Xi Jinping also suffered a setback because of his father. In 1986, due to the power struggle between the reformist Deng Xiaoping and the conservative Chen Yun, Xi Jinping's patron Xiang Nan was implicated and forced to resign due to the Jinjiang counterfeit medicine case. Having lost his patron in Fujian, Xi Jinping was immediately transferred to the Ningde region, which was the poorest and least promising area in Fujian Province at the time, effectively being demoted. Of course, later on, with the resurgence of Xi Zhongxun and the reformists regaining power, Xi Jinping rose again. However, his promotion process was relatively slow, and he was not widely recognized by the cadres. Unlike the 20th National Congress, where Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary with 2,952 unanimous votes, reaching the highlight of his life, at the 1997 15th National Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping hit a low point in his life. The election for the Central Committee that year was conducted by secret ballot. As a result, in this secret ballot, Xi Jinping not only failed to be elected as a full member, but also ranked 151st out of 154 candidates, placing fourth from the bottom.
According to reports from Radio Free Asia, the CCP was conducting a competitive election at the time, originally planning to elect 150 out of 154 candidates. However, seeing that Xi Jinping ranked 151st, and he should not have been elected, everyone, in order to save face for his father, forcibly expanded the quota by one, pushed Xi Jinping in, and made him an alternate member, albeit the last-ranked alternate member. In contrast, Li Keqiang at this time had such a dazzling brilliance that it was blinding to Xi Jinping. At the age of 42, Li Keqiang was directly elected as a Central Committee member with a high number of votes, and even became one of the youngest Central Committee members in the history of the CCP. Of course, this concludes the first opportunity for Xi Jinping, an opportunity built by his father. Soon, Xi Jinping ushered in his own second turning point, which was an opportunity he had earned himself. In 1999, Xi Jinping was serving as a member of the Standing Committee of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee and Deputy Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee. On April 20 of that year, a team of hundreds of people traveled south from Beijing to Xiamen. What was this team here for? They were here to do something that Xi Jinping would later become most adept at: anti-corruption. At that time, a shocking case broke out in Fujian, which is the Lai Changxing case that everyone has heard of.
Lai Changxing was from a peasant background in Jinjiang, Fujian, with very low education, just like our Chairman, graduating only from elementary school. Later, Lai Changxing started his business by reselling goods and became the largest smuggling company in China's history. He registered the Yuanhua Group in Xiamen in 1994, using the Xiamen port as a base to smuggle refined oil, automobiles, cigarettes, and other products on a large scale. Later, the CCP accused Lai Changxing of evading more than 80 billion yuan in taxes through smuggling. You may not understand what 80 billion yuan meant in 1999. What was the scale of this 80 billion yuan at that time? In 1999, the total fiscal revenue of Fujian Province was only over 30 billion yuan, which means Lai Changxing alone evaded taxes equivalent to several years of Fujian Province's fiscal revenue; that was truly insane. Of course, what was even more insane was Lai Changxing's bribery method. To ensure his smuggling went smoothly, Lai Changxing basically bribed all the officials in the Fujian Provincial Party Committee and Xiamen at that time. Lai Changxing also specially built a seven-story Red Building in Xiamen, where the third floor was a restaurant, the fourth floor was a sauna, the fifth floor was a dance hall, and the sixth and seventh floors were guest rooms, providing one-stop services for officials who entered.
Of course, Lai Changxing not only served officials but also secretly filmed them at the Red Dragon to blackmail them. Relying on this, Lai Changxing thrived in Fujian. At his peak, according to CCTV reports, appointments for Xiamen customs officials were no longer cleared with the director of the Xiamen Customs Bureau, but with Lai Changxing. Regarding this corruption, after the central special investigation team arrived, officials in Fujian and Xiamen were brought down in droves, from Xiamen Customs Director Yang Qianxian to Fujian Provincial Public Security Department Deputy Director Zhuang Rushun, and even Ministry of Public Security Vice Minister Li Jizhou and Fujian Provincial Party Committee Deputy Secretary Shi Zhaobin were all caught. In the end, 14 people were sentenced to death, and over 600 were investigated. This might not seem like much today in the era of successful anti-corruption, but back then, it was definitely a case that shocked the whole country. Of course, this case, it is rumored, could theoretically be traced higher, to Jia Qinglin, a high-ranking official who later served as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and was part of Jiang Zemin's faction. From 1985 to 1996, Jia Qinglin served as Deputy Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, Governor, and Party Secretary, respectively, with his tenure covering the entire process of Yuanhua from its inception to its expansion. His wife, Lin Youfang, even headed the Fujian foreign trade system, having served as Party Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Foreign Trade Bureau and Party Secretary of the Fujian Foreign Trade Company. Under such circumstances, if you say Jia Qinglin was not involved, I estimate that anyone with a brain would not believe it. However, this is not important, because the President at the time was Jiang Zemin, and under Jiang Zemin's strong protection, Jia Qinglin was not liquidated. But, after all, a major official under his command was corrupt, which certainly dealt a heavy blow to the prestige of Jiang Zemin's faction. At this time, Xi Jinping, who was in Fujian and not corrupt, became the brightest star among this group of bureaucrats.
Although Xi Jinping is a fucking idiot after taking power and is constantly reversing progress, multiple reports show that Xi Jinping is indeed not greedy for money. In reports on the Yuanhua case corruption by The New York Times, The New Yorker, and the Financial Times, it was confirmed that Xi Jinping was not deeply involved. Moreover, according to secret internal US embassy intelligence documents later disclosed by WikiLeaks, Lai Changxing once gave a gift to Xi Jinping, but because Xi Jinping was not greedy for wealth, he refused it directly. US informants also evaluated Xi Jinping as someone who is not greedy for money or sex, but is greedy for power. The businessmen around him at the time also knew that sending money was useless, so they could only switch to sending him popularity, helping him get things done to improve his official reputation. This can actually be understood; as a top-tier princeling, Xi Jinping naturally had his eyes on power and the vast stars and sea, so his vision was not so low as to care about these petty gains. Of course, regardless of why Xi Jinping was clean, his clean style indeed earned him promotion. In September 1999, Xi Jinping, who had kept himself out of trouble, was promoted to Acting Governor of Fujian Province, specifically to assist the central government in handling the Yuanhua case. Later, perhaps because he followed Jiang Zemin's instructions, in handling the case, Xi Jinping was very obedient and stopped abruptly when he reached Jia Qinglin's door. This performance also caught the attention of Zeng Qinghong, the strategist of Jiang Zemin's faction who was serving as the Minister of the Organization Department at the time.
Under Zeng Qinghong's promotion, in 2002, Xi Jinping achieved a triple jump in his life. Within one month, he was transferred to Zhejiang Province to serve as Deputy Party Secretary and Acting Governor. Later, at the 16th National Congress of the CCP, he washed away his shame, rising directly from a candidate member ranked 151st—the very last—to a full member of the Central Committee, and simultaneously successfully took over as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province. At this point, the young Xi Jinping had entered the final round.
The year 2002 was not only the year of Xi Jinping's triple jump, but also the year Jiang Zemin handed over the baton of General Secretary to Hu Jintao, according to the arrangements made by Deng Xiaoping before his death. The CCP achieved its first power transition in history without bloodshed or a coup. A ten-year term and stepping down when the time comes became the theoretical tradition of the CCP. Since the tradition of transition had been established, the CCP had to look for Hu Jintao's successor. At this time, four people entered the final round: Li Keqiang, a member of the Youth League faction serving as Party Secretary of Liaoning Province; Xi Jinping, a princeling serving as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province; Bo Xilai, a princeling serving as Minister of Commerce; and Li Yuanchao, who served as Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province and belonged to both the Youth League faction and the princelings. However, although there were four people at the time, if one reviews the various insider news from that year, whether it was from Cheng Li, a well-known American political scientist and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, or the insider news disclosed by The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and Reuters at the same time, among these so-called four candidates, there was only one absolute top seed, and that was Li Keqiang.
Li Keqiang came from a humble background, rose through the ranks of the political arena through his own efforts, and possessed strong English proficiency, solid professional skills, intelligence, elegance, a strong political track record, and the courage to speak the truth. Combined, these factors earned Li Keqiang favorable reviews and high regard among mid-to-high-level officials within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Basically, all mid-to-high-level officials believed that Li Keqiang would succeed Hu Jintao. In contrast, Xi Jinping was much less impressive. At that time, it was generally believed that Xi Jinping's entry into the arena was guaranteed thanks to Zeng Qinghong's promotion. However, as for succeeding the President, there was no hope at all. As for the premiership, it could only be said that he might take a gamble and have a chance. But right at this moment, an unexpected event occurred—this was also Xi Jinping's third turning point and his third opportunity. And what was this opportunity? It was Chen Liangyu.
Chen Liangyu once served as the Mayor of Shanghai and the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. When mentioning Chen Liangyu, many people believe that Chen Liangyu was Xi Jinping's rival, and therefore Chen Liangyu's downfall provided an opportunity for Xi Jinping. Chen Liangyu's downfall indeed provided Xi Jinping with an opportunity, but Chen Liangyu was not Xi Jinping's biggest rival, nor did he provide the opportunity to Xi Jinping in that manner. First of all, judging by his age, Chen Liangyu could not possibly be Xi Jinping's rival. Chen Liangyu's age group was different from Xi Jinping's. Chen Liangyu was born in 1946, making him seven years older than Xi Jinping. Chen Liangyu was only four years younger than Hu Jintao. According to the CCP's retirement rule of "seven up, eight down", even if he succeeded to power, he could only serve one term as General Secretary. In essence, he was a transitional figure between Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, so Chen Liangyu was fundamentally unlikely to succeed to the top post. That being the case, why is it said that Chen Liangyu's downfall became an opportunity for Xi Jinping to rise to power? This brings us to the political landscape at that time. Chen Liangyu's downfall was actually the result of the infighting between the Youth League faction and the Shanghai faction, and this infighting created space for Xi Jinping to exploit. During the leadership transition in 2002, although it seemed to achieve a peaceful handover from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, this peaceful handover was heavily diluted.
Jiang Zemin remained as Chairman of the Central Military Commission until September 2004. Among the top nine members of the CCP's highest decision-making body, jokingly referred to by everyone as the "Nine Dragons Harnessing the Water," five individuals—Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Zeng Qinghong, and Luo Gan—belonged to the Shanghai faction, occupying a vast majority. At this time, Hu Jintao was at an absolute disadvantage. However, Hu Jintao was actually not panicked. Why? Because time was on Hu Jintao's side. Hu Jintao had many capable generals under his command, such as Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, and Ling Jihua, who were all in their growth period; they just needed to wait it out. Therefore, during their tenure, the Shanghai faction and the Youth League faction each saw their own advantages, and on the surface, everything appeared harmonious. But starting in 2004, the relationship between the two factions began to gradually spin out of control. According to Australian journalist Richard McGregor's book "The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers" and reports from multiple Hong Kong media outlets, starting in 2004, Chen Liangyu directly clashed with Wen Jiabao multiple times during Politburo meetings. Chen Liangyu even angrily stated at one point that the central government's policies were deliberately harming the interests of the Yangtze River Delta and were intended to intentionally suppress the region for political struggle.
Chen Liangyu was the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and what was another name for the Shanghai faction? It was called the Shanghai Gang. As the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Chen Liangyu was not only the primary striker for the Shanghai faction but also Jiang Zemin's interest representative in Shanghai. His remarks were clearly intended to attack Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao on behalf of the Shanghai faction. Of course, whether it was Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao, being able to reach those positions meant they were certainly no pushovers. Faced with the open hostility starting in 2004, Hu and Wen constantly sought opportunities for retaliation, and soon they created an opportunity themselves. At the end of 2005, the well-known financial blogger Lang Xianping suddenly received an anonymous tip. The anonymous tip claimed that the source of funds for Zhang Rongkun, the head of Shanghai Fuxi Investment, was highly suspicious. Afterwards, Lang Xianping prepared to expose this matter on his program "Lang Xianping on Finance," but it was soon completely censored and banned by Shanghai Television. However, after the censorship, driven by an unknown force, the matter was hyped up even further. Subsequently, through exposés by various media outlets, it was revealed that the source of the 3.2 billion RMB in funds for Fuxi Investment was none of other than Shanghai's social security fund.
At that time, as well as in China today, the social security fund is theoretically the absolute bottom line among the government's various ledgers that must never be touched. Whoever touches it is bound for misfortune. This gave Hu and Wen the leverage they needed. Soon, the swift strike from Hu and Wen arrived. In July 2006, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection intervened to thoroughly investigate the Shanghai social security system. Starting on August 24, a formal case was opened to investigate Chen Liangyu. Furthermore, it wasn't just Chen Liangyu; pulling up the radish brought out the mud clinging to its roots. Chen Liangyu's predecessor, Huang Ju, a prominent heavyweight of the Jiang faction who was then a member of the Standing Committee, was also deeply embroiled in the scandal. However, Huang Ju ultimately managed to avoid being officially investigated. On June 2, 2007, Huang Ju died of cancer while still in office. This turn of events was extremely unfavorable for Jiang Zemin. Chen Liangyu was Jiang Zemin's predetermined choice for the next Standing Committee position. With that dashed, and compounded by the incumbent Standing Committee member Huang Ju dying directly in office, the Jiang faction's strength suffered a devastating blow. At the same time, the political warning bells for the Jiang faction began to ring wildly. For the first time, the Jiang faction realized that the Communist Youth League faction's offensive could be so ferocious. To ensure its own survival, the Jiang faction quickly established a few principles, according to internal sources from former South China Morning Post editor-in-chief and renowned professor Willy Wo-Lap Lam and The New York Times.
The first principle established by the Jiang faction was that the Communist Youth League faction must absolutely not be allowed to take power; otherwise, there would no longer be any Jiang faction in the post-Hu Jintao era. Launching an all-out effort to block Li Keqiang became the Jiang faction's primary task. Er, looking back now, though, even if Li Keqiang hadn't been kept out and we entered the post-Hu Jintao era, there indeed is no longer any Jiang faction left anyway. Of course, that is another matter. Looking back, the Jiang faction also realized at the time that it was already too late to select another candidate of their own. Therefore, supporting a princeling became their only option, and this became the Jiang faction's second principle. So what was the third principle? It was that this princeling had to be low-profile, clean, moderate, and not form cliques. Put bluntly, someone who would be easy for the Jiang faction to control. Of course, it is also worth explaining here why the Jiang faction could accept a princeling. People like Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, although belonging to the princelings, from a broader political spectrum, also belonged to the same faction as the Jiang faction. In the analysis of renowned scholar Cheng Li, China's political landscape was once defined as a one-party, two-faction system. He believed that during the Hu-Wen era, there existed an elite faction and a populist faction within the Communist Party.
The elite faction primarily consisted of the princelings and the Jiang faction. Representative figures included Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan, and Bo Xilai. Most of them started their careers in developed coastal cities, possessed sound family economic and political foundations, concentrated their power bases in coastal cities, and mainly followed a developmental path in coastal regions. For example, the Jiang faction generally controlled Shanghai, while Xi Jinping served in Fujian and Zhejiang. They generally represented the interests of entrepreneurs, the emerging middle-class capital, and the elites, and in policy, they tended to emphasize economic growth, market efficiency, and coastal prioritization. On the other hand, the populist faction was mainly composed of the Communist Youth League faction and technocrats, with representative figures such as Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, and Wang Yang. Most of them came from ordinary families and honed their skills in inland, less-developed cities. For instance, Li Keqiang successively served as Governor of Henan and Party Secretary of Liaoning, while Wang Yang primarily honed his skills in Anhui, Sichuan, and Chongqing before becoming a member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. They generally represented the interests of vulnerable groups such as migrant workers and urban commoners, and in policy, they emphasized social equity and redistribution while also being relatively supportive of democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, because they belonged to the same elite faction, even though Xi Jinping did not belong to the Jiang faction, he passively became Jiang Zemin's more preferred choice.
Under these circumstances, among the candidates Jiang Zemin could choose from, Li Yuanchao of the Communist Youth League faction was definitely going to be excluded. At that point, only Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai from the princelings remained. In the contest between Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai, Xi Jinping's victory could truly be described as effortless. This effortless win was mainly because Bo Xilai was far too flamboyant. At the 15th National Congress in 1997, Xi Jinping managed to rank 151st, placing dead last among alternate members of the Central Committee. Bo Xilai fared even worse, failing to even get elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee. Naturally, he and Xi Jinping shared a similar plight as companions in adversity. Fazing this defeat, both men hoped to advance further. However, their approaches were diametrically opposed. Xi Jinping chose to further disguise himself, packaging himself as a harmless, good-natured person just like his father. Before taking office in 1997, Xi Jinping had cracked down on some corruption while in Ningde, offending a few people. However, after 1997, his tenure throughout Fujian was extremely docile; he no longer took the initiative to strike out or actively pursue anti-corruption efforts, trying his best not to offend anyone. Bo Xilai's choice, on the other hand, was the exact opposite.
He became even more high-profile, hoping to achieve more and gain recognition from others. For example, Bo Xilai, who came to Beijing in 2004 to serve as Minister of Commerce, was very prominent and high-profile during the textile negotiations between China and Europe, and China and the US. At press conferences, he was full of golden quotes. He tried to replicate a witty and humorous Jiang Zemin. Foreign media described him as a charismatic leader. The term "charismatic leader" is definitely a compliment in the West, but once inside Zhongnanhai, in a Confucian culture that values low-key behavior, it is absolutely a 100% derogatory term. Research by Cheng Li, Willy Lam, and others all shows that in the face of Bo Xilai's high profile, the attitude of party elders toward him became worse instead. Being sharp-edged and eager for quick success became the unanimous evaluation of Bo Xilai by everyone. But Xi Jinping was different; Xi Jinping's low-key and obedient nature won unanimous praise from the elders, and this low-key nature of Xi Jinping even deceived American intelligence personnel. In the comments from the US Embassy, the evaluation of Xi Jinping was that he was of average intelligence, boring, and mediocre. The last time a similar evaluation was seen was for Hua Guofeng. If you think about Xi Jinping now, he was basically the perfect candidate for Jiang Zemin.
Jiang Zemin needed someone to keep Li Keqiang in check, but this did not mean he needed a strong man or a wise man to keep Li Keqiang in check. Compared to being strong or smart, what Jiang Zemin needed was someone easier to control and more obedient, and the well-disguised Xi Jinping was clearly the only candidate. Later, also according to reports from Willy Lam and Reuters, under these circumstances, Zeng Qinghong strongly recommended Xi Jinping to Jiang Zemin. With Zeng Qinghong's strong push, Jiang Zemin finally made up his mind to groom Xi Jinping as the next General Secretary to keep Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang in check. Once Jiang Zemin made the choice, the execution had to begin. This executor was still Zeng Qinghong. The first step Zeng Qinghong took here was actually to seize the position of Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary. As a stronghold of the Jiang faction, after Chen Liangyu was taken down, Hu Jintao also tried to get involved. According to Hong Kong media reports, the Tuanpai (Youth League faction) tried to nominate Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao to succeed as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary, but both were rejected. Later, with Zeng Qinghong's strong support, Xi Jinping began to take over as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary. Before serving as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary, Xi Jinping's resume as Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee was enough for him to jump into the Politburo Standing Committee, but it was not enough for him to jump directly to become Vice President of the state and the successor to the leadership.
After becoming the Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary, Xi Jinping had the resume to become the President of the state. At the same time, after arriving in Shanghai, Xi Jinping immediately submitted his "pledge of allegiance." Unlike the current Xi Jinping who promotes anti-corruption everywhere—where "not being absolutely anti-corruption means absolutely not being anti-corruption"—the Xi Jinping who arrived in Shanghai immediately showed goodwill to the Jiang faction, stating that the cadre team in Shanghai was generally good. He went easy on Chen Liangyu's former subordinates and other members of the Jiang faction. This move naturally won further recognition from the Jiang faction. Later, Zeng Qinghong's second move was to use the opponent's methods against them. During Hu Jintao's term, within the civilian faction, both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao emphasized democracy, or at least intra-party democracy. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao had been pushing for an intra-party democratic decision-making system in various decisions. Therefore, Zeng Qinghong simply used a vote to deal a fatal blow to Hu Jintao. On June 25, 2007, inside the Huai Ren Tang in Zhongnanhai, more than 400 senior CCP cadres walked into the hall. In the Huai Ren Tang, each of them received an orange ballot, a ballot for electing members of the 17th Central Politburo.
There were nearly 200 names on the ballot, including all ministerial-level cadres under the age of 63 who met the criteria. The specific number of votes each person received was not announced. However, according to consistent reports from the New York Times and other media, the result was Xi Jinping in first place and Li Keqiang in second. Of course, why was Xi Jinping able to go from having the fewest votes to the most votes in just ten years? It was clearly not because Xi Jinping became more popular, but because the Jiang faction exerted its influence. The Jiang faction mobilized all the bureaucrats under its faction to vote together, allowing Xi Jinping to get first place. In this vote, Hu Jintao's civilian faction suffered a comprehensive defeat, and Li Keqiang completely lost the legal status to serve as General Secretary. The intra-party democratic procedure designed by Hu Jintao himself was ultimately backlashed due to incomplete procedures. Later, according to media reports, after it was determined that Xi Jinping had the most votes, Jiang Zemin gathered the CCP elders for a meeting at Beidaihe, where the order of "Xi first, Li second" was officially finalized. And Zeng Qinghong had a third move at this time, which was to sacrifice himself. In October 2017, in order to shut the mouths of the Tuanpai, as the big brother and main strategist of the Jiang faction, the 68-year-old Zeng Qinghong voluntarily handed over all his positions, citing the "seven up, eight down" age convention, and retired cleanly.
By using his own sacrifice as a pawn, he exchanged it for Xi Jinping's formal entry and candidacy for President. Once this move was made, Hu Jintao had nothing more to say. It was during that year, from 2006 to 2007, that Li Keqiang was officially demoted from a candidate for President to a candidate for Premier, while Xi Jinping leaped from a candidate for the Standing Committee to a candidate for President. Since then, Xi Jinping completed his entire path of ascension. On October 22, 2007, in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People, Hu Jintao led the new Standing Committee members onto the red carpet. The 54-year-old Xi Jinping and the 52-year-old Li Keqiang stood side by side at the end of the line; their suits were almost the same color, but crucially, Xi Jinping's position was further ahead than Li Keqiang's. This positioning was equivalent to publicly announcing to the world that Xi Jinping would be the next President, while Li Keqiang would only be the next Premier. Having finished explaining the entire process of Xi Jinping's transition from a deputy to the successor of the President, the first thing we can understand is why Xi Jinping had to remove Hu Jintao. This was not just a matter of disrespecting an old cadre; Hu Jintao was actually the biggest boss in the later stages of Xi Jinping's rise, or perhaps the first boss to be cleared.
Xi Jinping rose to power precisely by defeating the Hu Jintao faction. Of course, at this point, we can understand why Xi Jinping held such a grudge against Li Keqiang, and why there was even a high probability that he would murder Li Keqiang. Because if we put ourselves in Xi Jinping's perspective, what was Li Keqiang? He was that unique genius of the sect. Although Li Keqiang's background was not great, he was smart, hardworking, and gentle, winning the recognition of most officials within the Party. As for Xi Jinping himself, only his background was better than Li Keqiang's; in all other aspects, he was far inferior. Under Li Keqiang's dazzling brilliance, Xi Jinping initially seemed like nothing. It wasn't until that accident in 2006 that Xi Jinping, through a twist of fate, managed to overtake Li Keqiang within a year—and the reason for this comeback wasn't because he was so outstanding, but because he was too mediocre. At this time, superimposed on Xi Jinping, who was part of the elite faction, was an inherent disdain for the populist faction represented by Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. Xi Jinping's attitude toward Li Keqiang must have been both arrogant and insecure. U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Xi Jinping and other first-generation princelings often mocked officials who were not second-generation, like Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, believing that since their parents did not die for the revolution, they were not entitled to power and could only possess management rights.
What does this mean? It means Xi Jinping considered himself a shareholder, while the others were merely stewards. If we stack all these emotions together, think about it: what should Xi Jinping's feelings toward Li Keqiang have been? First, jealousy—jealousy that the other person was always better than him; second, contempt—contempt for the other person's poor background; and third, disdain—disdain that Li Keqiang, having led by so much, ended up losing in the final year. With these complex emotions, I really can't think of anyone who could be more hated by Xi Jinping. Of course, after talking about the Tuanpai (Youth League faction), let's talk about the Jiang faction. Did the Jiang faction, which pushed Xi Jinping up in one fell swoop, receive a return? Actually, no. The power struggle in 2007 seemed like a great victory for the Jiang faction, but in reality, after Xi Jinping took office, he stopped pretending and his true nature was exposed, leading to a bloody purge of the Jiang faction. Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the military proxies for Jiang Zemin, were arrested one after another. Su Rong of the Jiang faction, and even Ai Baojun, a close associate of Jiang Zemin's eldest son Jiang Mianheng in Shanghai, fell in 2015. The entire Jiang faction was basically wiped out; only Zeng Qinghong seemed to have escaped liquidation, perhaps because he truly had a hand in discovering Xi Jinping.
Looking at the fate of the Jiang faction, it was even worse than the Tuanpai. Because the Tuanpai adhered to grassroots principles and their corruption was not as severe, fewer of their officials fell; they were mostly isolated and marginalized, unlike the Jiang faction, where imprisonment was common. But having said that, it's not really the point anymore. The Tuanpai and the Jiang faction were eventually completely destroyed by Xi Jinping. The "one party, two factions" pattern of co-governance between the populists and the elites, which Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao tried to build, was also completely destroyed. The pathetic intra-party democracy of the Chinese Communist Party disappeared. From then on, the Party only listens to one person, and that is Xi Jinping, and there is only one faction, the Xi Army. In the end, this power struggle ended with both factions suffering heavy losses, allowing the seemingly harmless Xi Jinping to pick up the pieces, which is truly sigh-inducing. There is a meme on the internet now called "Watch me pretend to be a pushover, and win by a landslide." Looking at it now, the most outstanding talent at playing this game is probably Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping was truly a master at pretending to be a pushover back then. Finally, thank you all for watching today's program. I am Toronto Fang Lian. I hope you will like and support my program, as this will increase the weight of YouTube's recommendations for me. See you in the next episode.